胡振東Tony重話警告：疑美論就是認知戰！臺灣軍購卡關真相一次講清楚！

影片訪問軍事專家胡振東，說明臺美軍售從威脅評估、預估報價、立法院批准預算到簽署發價書的流程，並解釋臺灣軍購價格較高及交付、維修、訓練等原因。胡振東也談到美臺防務合作、臺灣軍隊的人力短缺、認知戰、軍中滲透、人工智慧與全民防衛。

影片連結：

完整文字：

因為臺灣在供應鏈上離得很遠，所以臺灣通常得采購額外的備品、支援和訓練。所以有時候人們看價格時不會明白，為什麼臺灣付得比美國還多，陸軍付的還多。因為美國陸軍會訓練我們自己的人員，美國陸軍有時已經有現成可供應的零件之類的東西。所以當臺灣採購那套系統時，臺灣就得把所有支援都買齊，還有好幾年的所有備品，所以這就把價格拉高了。

你看某些行為模式，正常的行為模式，當有人想攻擊某個地方時，他可能會在同一區域來回走幾次。大多數人走過去就會說去目的地，但這個人卻繞了好幾圈。他可能就是我們所說的在踩點，或者他帶著什麼可疑的東西，或者根據他的通訊內容，他可能偷聽到一些什麼。

大家好

歡迎來到 Freedom is Not Free 和新聞硬邦邦

聽新聞最爽頻道今天很榮幸能和胡振東談話，他是最頂尖的軍事專家之一，不僅在美國，不僅在臺灣，而且可能是全世界。我的天啊，今天我們參加的是 TACEC，也就是臺灣人會議。你怎麼看今天的會議？

我覺得很棒，這麼多臺美人聚在一個地方，彼此交流學習，彼此鼓勵。而像這樣的活動，把臺美人團結起來，在美國各地。

魯比歐一再表示，我們的政策沒有改變。如果你看實際行動的話，我仍然非常有信心，美國對臺灣的支援依然存在，儘管有人試圖拿川普總統訪中來說，喔，也許支援不一樣了。其實並沒有改變，因為就我所看到的，尤其是派遣人員到臺灣協助訓練，我認為支援反而還增加了。所以我不太看重言論，我更看重行動。所以我認為美國對臺灣的支援依然強勁。

而且你過去曾在國防部和 AIT 處理過臺灣相關議題，很多臺灣人也都對軍購以及向美國採購彈藥感興趣。你能不能帶大家瞭解一下，一輪軍售流程是怎麼運作的？因為有時候大家會說，好，是臺灣在提出需求，然後美國提供，還是美國會主動建議某些軍事裝備呢？這整個流程看起來是怎樣？

大多數情況下，雙方在我們進行國防檢討會談時，我們會先看威脅是什麼。所以大多數情況下，雙方其實已經同意了要採購什麼來對應那個威脅。所以接著臺灣通常會要求我們所稱的價格與供貨資訊，那是一個大致的概估價格。所以臺灣就知道該向立法院爭取多少預算，也就是從立法部門那邊爭取。

所以通常雙方其實已經達成共識，因為美國不會提供那些報價資料，也就是那個概估價格資料，如果我們不想賣。所以基本上，當臺灣收到這個我們所謂的P&A時，就已經代表美國願意出售。

那就是所需的金額。通常國防部會把它帶到立法院，說，嘿，要買這個，我們需要這麼多錢。接著立法院核准預算，然後國防部那時就簽署LOA，也就是實際的發價書，接著交易就完成了。

所以現在在立法院，很多其他政黨都說，你知道，在發價書到之前我們不想透過預算，合約檔案送到這裡。所以現在你知道，國民黨說，喔，我們不會在合約檔案來之前批准預算，合約檔案送到這裡。他們說那是唯一的，美國會出售的象徵。這不對。

等到合約檔案到了之後，有效期可能只剩 30 到 45 天，立法院根本不可能在這麼短的時間內透過預算。

所以總結來說，這個流程基本上是雙方先就威脅以及應對方式達成共識，也就是要採購什麼來反制這個威脅。美國會先提供一個大致的金額，供規劃參考和用途定價，而這個價格是國防部送交立法院批准的。等立法院批准後，美方才會發出 LOA，也就是法價書，然後臺灣再簽署。這就是標準流程，而且一直行得通。但現在因為政治因素，這個流程被中斷了。

對。有時候也會有人批評說，美國只賣過時的裝備，像 M1 戰車就是例子。你怎麼回應這些人，說指控美國只賣舊東西，賣美國自己也不需要的東西？

這很可惜，因為幾乎所有東西都是新的。美國只有在這種情況下才會賣舊東西，就是當美國已經不再生產它了。像 M1 戰車就是如此。所以當臺灣要求 M1 戰車來取代較舊的 M60 時，其實已經晚了。因此美國把它從陸軍庫存中調出來，翻修並現代化，然後提供給臺灣。

所以即使美國賣的是舊東西，因為它已經停產了，它還是有整修過的。在這種情況下，有新的引擎和新的火控系統，所以它仍然是一套有能力的、非常有戰力的防禦系統，而且也仍然更新到符合現代戰爭需求。

完全正確。不過，另一方面，買舊裝備可能有一些價格優勢。當然，因為美國總是會根據硬體在美國已經使用多久來折舊，所以價格總是會便宜得多。當美國出售舊裝備時，美國總是會先折舊處理，讓臺灣拿到合理的價格。

目前在臺灣，多數關於軍事裝備的討論，關於國防，都集中在它什麼時候會送到臺灣。例如，臺灣政府其實已經付了錢，我們什麼時候拿到裝備？

但從軍事角度來看，有時候把一套新武器系統真正轉化為實戰能力，還需要調校、維修、彈藥，還有臺灣自制裝備之間的整合，以及與美國標準的後勤，等其他問題，以及其他問題。你認為這些裡面，臺灣最容易低估的是哪一項？

首先，有一種誤解，認為軍售，你知道，是臺灣付了錢，美國卻不交貨。事實上，軍售是一個付款流程，每 90 天，臺灣付款一次，而臺灣支付的是生產下一個 90 天所需的專案。所以不是說你一次付清，美國卻沒有交付那些東西，不是這樣。這是一點。

另一點是，因為臺灣在供應鏈上離得很遠，所以通常臺灣必須採購額外的備件、支援和訓練。所以有時候人們看價格時不明白，為什麼臺灣付得比美國陸軍還多。因為美國陸軍是自己訓練人員，美國陸軍有時候本來就有可直接供應的零件和物資。所以當臺灣採購那套系統時，臺灣需要把所有支援都一起買齊，還有好幾年的備件，所以成本就會增加。

而且您也曾在國防產業和安全合作領域，無論是臺灣和美國之間，您認為臺美防務合作應該如何演進，從單純採購軍備，走向共同打造可持續作戰能力？例如備用零件庫存、維修人員和戰損修復，這類問題。

因為臺灣和美國在這裡是非常緊密的盟友。這個觀察很到位，其實現在就在演變中。如果你看一下目前在臺灣的美軍軍事人員數量，以及他們正在進行的訓練和這種關係，這種參與程度，以及前來的人員層級，這一切都顯示出更緊密的關係。

而且不只是硬體方面，還包括規劃、人員訓練，以及整體發展防衛能力，包括戰略與戰術。所以這一切都在更加緊密地發展，因為越來越多地，美國已將中國是整個區域的主要威脅節奏對手，而臺灣是確保對中國的嚇阻得以建立的重要一環。所以美國正在投入更多資源與臺灣合作。

而且，我相信美國也很高興看到，賴總統也同樣願意分擔責任，提高國防預算，並做得更多，讓臺灣能展現保衛自己的決心。

我們來談一些國安議題，因為在您的演說中，您提到了脅迫問題、滲透問題，包括這件事也曾登上臺灣新聞。臺灣軍方內部有些人正在簽署宣誓書，他們願意真的向中國投降。你認為臺灣應該怎麼做，而美國應該去做，是為了降低這種滲透的風險嗎？

我不確定聯合有多少各州可以做，但臺灣當然可以做到更多，是在訓練方面，理解民主的重要性，以及來自中國的威脅，這種認知作戰威脅，以及你該如何抵抗這種威脅，並避免淪為中共的工具。

不幸的是，這一塊就像你剛剛說的，我看到越來越多令人意外的人數，做了我們會視為叛徒的事，簽下投降書，或簽下承諾書，不作戰之類的東西。這是個問題，但我想我們還是得培養愛國心，以及這類事情，才能防止它。

我也非常感謝你所做的，實際上對抗這些訊息，因為只要有人批評美國對臺灣的軍事承諾，總會有人拿出 Tony Hu 的影片說，不對，美國仍在支援，美國仍願意提供協助，而且美國仍然是臺灣最可靠的夥伴之一。Tony，真的非常感謝你這麼做。

謝謝。我能做的其實很有限，就這樣而已。但你知道，我一直都在努力反擊那些認知戰，因為疑美論就是認知戰。對美國的懷疑，他們就是用這個來削弱臺灣的決心，削弱臺灣對自身實力的信心，以及作戰意志。我覺得我們很重要的是要設法提升並維持臺灣的作戰意志。

但臺灣在日常軍旅生活上還是有一些問題對吧？例如，臺灣有很多新聞，說有人力短缺、行政負擔、訓練壓力，以及裝備保養需求。而你過去曾在美軍服役，你也曾和美臺安全合作，臺灣軍隊目前面臨的哪些問題是最迫切需要解決，才能真正建立對中共的有效嚇阻？

哇，這題很難。如果往長遠看，顯然人力資源是關鍵專案。臺灣現在生得沒那麼多，所以可補充軍隊的人力短缺是個問題。

我認為一個解方是要強調給家長聽，軍事訓練其實能讓孩子更快成熟，你知道的，以更快的方式。訓練的前幾天、前一週，連美國小孩也會想家之類的，但過兩三個月後，他們就學會自律。他們學會那些就算沒人看著，你也得把事情做好。早上起床要折被子，還有這些事，雖然沒人看著，但你知道，你得把它做好。他們正在建立那些習慣。

對，建立那些習慣，讓臺灣的年輕人，因為臺灣家長似乎更保護自己的孩子。另一方面，當他們進入社會時，在他們轉換階段的時候，通常會花更長時間。但如果孩子去當兵一兩年，他們的貢獻，他們這輩子剩下的生產力，在社會上的層次會更高。

你知道，所以如果家長能把這種軍事訓練看作會對未來的孩子這輩子的生產力帶來改變的事情，以及他們如何照顧自己，而不是一直住在家裡的人，等到三十歲以後，你知道，這兩年就會變成正面的。所以我覺得這是我們需要去思考的一種方式。

如果臺灣父母能改變想法，那麼同一個人就能為國防做出貢獻，也能為社會做出貢獻，而不是把它單純看成競爭，而是看作一種成長，一種個人成長的事情。我覺得這很重要。

此外，我認為臺灣需要更加更多地走向人工智慧 AI，因為很多使用 AI 的系統會降低人力需求。臺灣需要檢視哪些領域可以由 AI 發揮作用，這樣你仍然可以在國防上保持同樣的效能，同時也能在參軍人數越來越少的情況下生活。

對，這很有見地，特別是考量到人工智慧技術發展得多麼快，以及臺灣在 AI 方面有多麼關鍵，尤其是在晶片和所有晶片方面，他們在那個領域已經很先進了，要善加利用，你知道的。

但另一方面，我們剛才只談到軍事。如果我們看民間、社會和民防、民間韌性，你認為臺灣在什麼方面應該注意，不只是把臺灣當作軍事上的保護物件，而是讓每一位公民都具有這種責任感和認知？如果發生什麼事，如果遭到攻擊，如果真的打起仗來，就像你剛剛在演講中提到的，在一開始沒有人知道發生什麼事的那個階段，一個很好的例子就是那次完美的委內瑞拉行動。當時沒有人知道發生了什麼，沒有開一槍，對吧？

臺灣人作為一個社會，應該知道些什麼，到了關鍵時刻？他們該怎麼做？

我認為這需要徹底改變臺灣社會看待威脅的方式。我舉以色列為例，那裡每個人都要接受國家防衛訓練，並培養對異常情況的警覺。他們會通報異常情況，也會阻止異常情況，而且這有助於整個國家在面對可能的自殺炸彈客或公車上的攻擊者時更安全。當他們採取行動時，就會有人站出來，然後試著制止他。我想這就是臺灣需要達到的程度。

臺灣離那樣還差得遠，能夠察覺異常、辨識異常，並且採取行動。一個人要怎麼學會辨識異常？

這很重要，這本來就是訓練的一部分。你要觀察某些行為模式，正常的行為模式。當有人想攻擊某個地方時，他可能會在同一區域來回走好幾次。大多數人走過去就會直接前往目的地，但這個人可能會繞好幾圈，我們稱之為在場勘地點，或是他帶著什麼奇怪的東西，或者從他的通訊狀況來看，你可能會聽到一些東西。

我們大家都得別再失去警覺了。我覺得這就是重點，因為你不想插手，或者你根本不在乎，這種態度我覺得其實是在幫我們的敵人。所以關心、保持警覺很重要，並且要注意你周遭的環境。

當有人掏出刀時，你就說：欸，你他媽在幹嘛？你是在切蛋糕嗎，還是你要傷害某個人？我們基本上應該學會把手機放下。

沒錯，看看周遭正在發生什麼，不要只顧著拍，然後說我有在場！

最後一個問題，首先非常感謝您。這是一場很棒的演講，而且非常非常有見地的談話。但因為我的很多觀眾其實都在臺灣軍中，他們是現役軍人，有些是前線軍官、士官，有些是義務役。您最想讓他們知道什麼，關於美國視他們為夥伴所做的努力？美國在他們身上看到了什麼樣的夥伴？

對他們來說，守住陣地非常重要，用來展現戰鬥意志。因為如果你展現出戰鬥意志和自我防衛的決心，你的朋友就會站在你這邊，這就是關鍵。你必須展現你每天都在訓練，也正盡全力嚇阻中國。這樣一來，當嚇阻失效時，你的朋友就會和你並肩而立，協助你保衛並守護臺灣。

非常感謝你，Tony。

謝謝。

Because Taiwan is so far away in the supply chain, so usually Taiwan has to purchase additional spares and support and training. So sometimes when people look at the pricing, they don't understand why is Taiwan paying more than the U.S Army paying? Because the U.S Army trains our own people. The U.S Army sometimes already has ready-to-supply parts and stuff. So when Taiwan purchased that system, Taiwan needs to purchase all the support, all the spares for several years. So that adds to the price.

You look at certain behavior patterns, normal behavior patterns, and when somebody wants to attack a place, he might walk around the same area several times. Most people walk by and go to wherever the destination, but this person walk around several times. He might be what we call casing the location, or he's carrying something strange, or based on his communication, he might overhear something.

Today I have an honor to talk with Tony Hu, who is one of the best military experts, not only in America, not only in Taiwan, but probably in the whole world. Oh my god. And today we are taking part in the TACEC, the Taiwanese Conference. What do you think about today's conference?

I think it's wonderful that so many Taiwanese-Americans come together in one place and try to learn from each other, try to encourage each other, and basically events like this uniting Taiwanese-Americans in various parts of the United States.

Rubio has said it again and again, our policy is not changing. And if you look at the actions that's taken, I still feel very good that the U.S supports Taiwan, even though people try to use President Trump's visit to China to show, oh, maybe the support is different. Actually it has not changed, because based on what I can see, especially with the deployment of personnel to Taiwan to help train, I think the support, if anything, has increased. And so I don't look at the words as much as I look at the action. So I think U.S support for Taiwan remains strong.

And because you used to work on Taiwan-related issues in both the Pentagon and in AIT, and many people in Taiwan are interested in military purchases and ammunition purchases from the United States, could you walk the audience along one cycle of those arms sales? Because sometimes people say, okay, Taiwan is asking for something, and then the United States provides. Or is it the United States that suggests something in terms of military equipment? How does it look like?

In most cases, the two sides, when we have our defense review talks, we look at a threat. So in most cases, the two sides have agreed on what to purchase to counter that threat. So then Taiwan usually asks for what we call price and availability. It's a rough order of magnitude pricing. So Taiwan knows how much to ask for the money from the LY, from the legislative side. So usually the two sides have already agreed, because the United States will not provide those pricing data, the rough order of magnitude data, if we don't want to sell.

So basically, when Taiwan received this, what we call P&A, it's already an indication that the United States is willing to sell. That's the amount of money usually MND takes to the LY. They say, hey, to buy this, we need this much money. Then the LY approved the money. Then the MND signs the LOA at that time, the actual Fa-Jia-Shu. And then the sales is completed.

So right now in the LY, many of the other parties say, you know, we don't want to pass the budget until Fa-Jia-Shu gets here. So basically, so right now there's, you know, KMT saying, oh, we're not going to approve the budget until Fa-Jia-Shu gets here. They say that's the only indication the US will sell. That's not true. By the time the Fa-Jia-Shu gets there, you have maybe 30 to 45 days validity. And there's no way LY is going to pass the budget in such a short duration.

So to summarize the process basically, the two sides agree on threat and what to do, what to purchase to counter that threat. US provide a rough order of money to planning purpose pricing. And that's the pricing that MND sends to the LY to approve. And then once the LY approved, then the US gives the LOA, the Fa-Jia-Shu, and then Taiwan signs it. That's the standard process and it works. Right now unfortunately because of politics, that process is interrupted. Yeah.

And sometimes there are accusations that the United States only sells outdated equipment, like M1 tanks for example. What do you have to say to these people who accuse the United States of only selling old stuff that the US doesn't need anymore?

That's unfortunate because almost all the stuff's new. The only time the United States sells old stuff is when the United States don't produce it anymore, like the M1 tank. So when Taiwan asked for the M1 tank to replace the older M60s, it's overdue. So the United States took it out of the Army inventory and refurbished it, modernized it, and then provided Taiwan. So even when the United States sells old stuff because it's not in production, it's still refurbished. In this case, new engine and new fire control stuff. So it's still a capable, very capable defense system. And it's still updated to the modern warfare. Absolutely.

On the other hand, probably there are some price advantages in buying old equipment. Absolutely, because the United States always depreciates the hardware based on how long the United States has used it. And it's always much, much cheaper. When the United States sells old stuff, the United States always depreciates it, so that Taiwan gets a good price.

Right now in Taiwan, most of the discussions about military equipment, about defense, are concentrated on when does it arrive in Taiwan. For example, the Taiwanese government has paid already. When do we get the equipment? But sometimes, from the military perspective, turning a new weapon system into a real combat capability also requires tuning, maintenance, munitions, also integration between Taiwanese domestically produced equipment and the United States standards, logistics, and other issues. Which of these do you think Taiwan most easily underestimates?

Well, first of all, there's a misperception that for arms sales, you know, Taiwan pays and the United States doesn't deliver. The fact is arms sale is a payment process. Every 90 days Taiwan pays. And Taiwan pays for what's required to produce the product for the next 90 days. So it's not like you pay in full and the United States doesn't deliver the things. So that's one thing.

Another thing is, because Taiwan is so far away in the supply chain, so usually Taiwan has to purchase additional spares and support and training. So sometimes when people look at the pricing, they don't understand why is Taiwan paying more than the U.S. Army is paying. Because the U.S. Army trains its own people. The U.S. Army sometimes already has ready-to-supply parts and stuff. So when Taiwan purchases that system, Taiwan needs to purchase all the support, all the spares for several years. So that adds to the price.

And you've worked in both the defense industry and security cooperation between Taiwan and the United States. How do you think the U.S. Taiwan defense cooperation should evolve from just purchasing military equipment to jointly building sustainable capability for fighting? For example, spare parts stockpiles, maintenance personnel and battle damage repair, issues like that. Because Taiwan and the United States are very closely allied here.

That's a good observation. Actually, it's evolving right now. If you look at the number of U.S. military personnel who are in Taiwan right now doing the training and the type of relationship, the type of involvement, and the rank of the people that's coming, it all shows a much closer relationship. And especially not only in the hardware, but in the planning, in the personnel training, and in the overall development of defense capability, including strategy and tactics. So that is all growing closer.

Because more and more United States have identified China as the pacing threat for the entire region. And Taiwan is an important element of making sure that deterrence against China is in place. So the United States is investing more in our cooperation with Taiwan. And also, I'm sure the United States is very happy to see that President Lai is also willing to share the burden, increase the defense budget, and doing more so that Taiwan can demonstrate its determination to defend.

Let's talk about some national security issues. Because during your speech, you highlighted that there are coercion issues, there are infiltration issues, including it has been on the news in Taiwan that within the Taiwanese military there are some people who are signing affidavits saying that they are willing to actually surrender to China. What do you think Taiwan should do and the United States should do to minimize the risks of such an infiltration?

I'm not sure there's much the United States can do. But certainly Taiwan can do more in terms of training, understanding the importance of democracy and the threat from China, the cognitive warfare threat, and how you need to resist that threat and resist becoming a tool of the PRC. That is an area, unfortunately, as you said recently, I've seen a surprisingly larger number of people who have done something that we will consider as being a traitor, signing the surrender or signing the commitment not to fight type things. It's a problem, but I guess we have to develop patriotism and that type of things to prevent it.

And I'm also very grateful for what you do, actually, to fight back against the email, because whenever anyone is criticizing the US military commitment to Taiwan, there is always Tony Hu's video saying that no, the United States is still supporting, the United States is still willing to help, and the United States is still one of the most reliable partners of Taiwan. So Tony, thank you so much for that.

Thank you. There's very little I can do and only that, you know, but I'm always trying to fight back those cognitive warfare, because 疑美論 is a cognitive warfare, the skepticism toward the United States. That's what they use to weaken Taiwan's resolve, to weaken Taiwan's belief in their own strength and their will to fight, and I think it's important that we try to increase and sustain Taiwan's will to fight.

But there are still some everyday military life issues in Taiwan, right?

For example, there are many pieces of news in Taiwan saying that there are manpower shortages, administrative burdens, training pressure, equipment maintenance requirements, and you used to serve in the US military, and you also used to work with US-Taiwan security cooperation. What problems that the Taiwanese military is currently facing are in the most urgent need to fix in order to truly build an effective deterrence against the CCP?

Wow, that's a tough one. That's a tough one. If you look down the road, obviously human resource is a critical item. You know, Taiwan's not having as many babies, so human resource, the shortage of people to join the military, is a problem. And I think one of the solutions is to emphasize to the parents how military training actually can mature the kids, you know, in a faster way. Initial few days, initial week of the training, even US kids will miss home and all that, but after two or three months, they learn self-discipline. They learn the stuff that even nobody's watching, you need to do a good job, and you get up in the morning, you make the bed, and all that stuff. Nobody's watching, but you know, you need to be down. They're building those habits.

Yeah, building those habits, so that the young kids in Taiwan, because Taiwan parents seem to be more protective of their kids. On the other hand, when they go into the society, when they have the transition, it usually takes longer, but if a kid goes to the military for one or two years, their contribution, their productivity for the rest of their life in the society will be a higher level.

You know, so if the parents can look at this military training as something that will make a difference in the child's productivity for the rest of their life, and how they can take care of themselves, and not be someone who still stays at home after they're 30, you know, then these two years become positive. So I think that's one way we need to see if Taiwan parents can change their thinking, and that way the same guy can contribute to national defense, also contribute to the society, and not look upon as a competition per se, but look like a growth, a personal growth type of things. I think that's important.

In addition, I think Taiwan needs to move more and more to artificial intelligence, AI, because a lot of systems using AI would reduce manpower requirement, and Taiwan needs to look at what are the areas where AI can contribute, and that way you can still be as effective in national defense and also still live under the condition of having less and less people join the military.

Yeah, that's very insightful, especially looking at how fast the artificial intelligence technology is developing and how crucial is Taiwan for AI in terms of chip and all the chips. They're already advanced in that field. Take advantage of it, you know.

But on the other hand, we've just talked about the military. If we look at the civil society and civil deterrence, civil resilience, what do you think Taiwan should pay attention to in terms of not only protecting Taiwan as a military, but also that every citizen has this kind of responsibility and understanding? If something happens, if there is an attack, if there is war going on, as you just said during your speech, the first stage when nobody knows what's going on, a good example of that would be when this perfect operation in Venezuela, when nobody knew what came, not a single shot was shot, right? What should Taiwanese know as a society when push comes to shove? What should they do?

I think it requires a total change of how Taiwanese society look at the threat. I used the example of Israel, where everybody goes through a national defense training and their awareness of unusual. They're going to report unusual, they're going to stop the unusual. And that helps the whole country secure when a possible suicide bomber or attacker on the bus, when they take action, somebody else is going to get up and try to stop him. I think that's what Taiwan needs to get to. Taiwan is still far from that, being able to observe the unusual, recognize the unusual and do something about it.

How can a person learn to recognize the unusual? Well, it's important, it is part of the training. You look at certain behavior patterns, normal behavior patterns, and when somebody wants to attack a place, he might walk around the same area several times. Most people walk by and go to wherever the destination, but this person walk around several times. He might be what we call casing the location, or he's carrying something strange. Or based on his communication, you might overhear something.

We need all of us just stop being aware. I think that's the main thing. Being you don't want to be involved or you don't care, that type of attitude, I think it actually helps our enemy. So it's important to care, to be aware, and to pay attention to the environment around you. When somebody pulls out a knife, you say, hey, what the hell are you doing? Are you cutting the cake, or are you going to hurt somebody? We should learn to put our phones down, basically.

That's right. Look at what's going on around. Don't just film and say, I was there!

And the final question would be, first of all, thank you so much for it. It was a great speech and a very insightful talk. But because many of my viewers, they are actually in Taiwanese military, they are serving members of the military. Some of them are frontline officers, NCOs, some of them are conscripts. What would you most want them to know about the efforts America sees in them as partners?

It is so important for them to hold the ground, to demonstrate the will to fight. Because if you demonstrate will to fight, willingness to defend yourself, your friends will be there. So that's the key. You must show that you are training day to day, and you're doing your best to deter China. And that way, when deterrence fails, your friends will be right there with you to help you to defend and protect Taiwan.

Thank you so much, Tony.

Thank you