A Ruthless Man: Xi Jinping intensively receives Trump, meets Putin, and flies to Pyongyang to meet Kim Jong Un in two weeks! The collapse of the CCP economy forces geopolitical self-rescue—revealing the full-speed operation of the "underground arteries" between China and North Korea, where North Korean rice prices have surged 3-fold and wigs account for 80% of exports to China. A desperate gamble to protect power for the 2027 21st Party Congress.
This content interprets Xi Jinping's recent intensive diplomacy as political compensation following the collapse of the CCP's economic legitimacy. The article argues that China's real economy, local government debt, corporate debt, and fiscal credit have all fallen into a cycle of idling and contraction. Xi Jinping can only create external narratives by leveraging three diplomatic lines—Trump, Putin, and North Korea—to extend his power for the 21st Party Congress in 2027. The text focuses on analyzing that China-Russia cooperation is not "without limit"; the CCP utilizes Russia to counter the West but is unwilling to be dragged into war by Russia. Meanwhile, Xi Jinping is reconnecting with North Korea to turn Pyongyang into a bargaining chip for US-China negotiations and to transfer the legitimacy pressure caused by the domestic economic crisis to the risks of the Korean Peninsula.
Observe things as they are; reject fragmented cognition.
Does everyone feel that this idiot Xi Jinping has been very busy lately? In a window of less than two weeks, Xi Jinping successively hosted Trump and Putin in Beijing, and will likely go to Pyongyang to meet Kim Jong Un.
What is my intuition? It is that Xi Jinping currently has no mind, nor any way, to fix the Chinese economy. Or rather, the current mess of the Chinese economy can no longer be solved by any policy. After all, the poison this idiot injected into the Chinese economy is not only highly toxic but also massive in quantity. What "state advances, private sector retreats," what massive infrastructure, what deteriorating geopolitics—what is this guy's series of actions doing now? He is providing compensation for the economic narrative framework to prove that the CCP still holds a relatively high position in international politics.
Xi Jinping wants to use external politics as a substitute support. Support for what? For his logic of shifting from the regime's economic-driven nature to the so-called political security and ideological fortification of the CCP. To put it bluntly, the CCP's traditional economic performance legitimacy has peaked and collapsed. Then, he uses these intensive visits as a show to prove "I'm still okay, I can still move, Xi Jinping can still flip the situation."
Today, we will strip down the causal chain behind this round of Xi Jinping's intensive diplomacy to his underwear. After listening, you may come to a new understanding of what "subterranean mutual exploitation between miserable people" means.
Why must Xi Jinping conduct intensive diplomacy? It is not because he wants to, but because he has no choice.
We can now see very clearly that the bond issuance data for the first four months of the entire Chinese economy is so absurd that it is truly heartbreaking. Let me report to you: in the first four months, the net financing of corporate bonds reached 1.17 trillion yuan, a massive surge of nearly 905.4 billion yuan compared to the same period a year ago.
But don't be fooled by the surface data.
How did this bond issuance data come about? As I have mentioned before, the surge in corporate bond scale is not because real enterprises are booming and need to borrow money to expand factories or build capacity. The real background of the skyrocketing demand for bond issuance is an epic idling of assets and funds.
In the real economy, no one dares to take loans or borrow money now. What are the common people doing? They are all desperately making early repayments. This was mentioned in a previous program.
At the same time, this is not the only factor. Early repayment by the public is just one aspect. Currently, the capital adequacy of banks is flashing red. Even if you want to borrow, do banks have that much money to put into the real economy? These banks are not stupid. Now, a loan often leads to a default. Therefore, they scramble for the credit bonds of large state-owned enterprises and LGFVs (Local Government Financing Vehicles).
Then, these state-owned enterprises and LGFV platforms issue bonds to borrow money at interest rates of 2.5% or even lower, and then immediately deposit them back into banks as large-denomination certificates of deposit at 3% interest. Nothing more than arbitrage.
This is a pure internal financial circle game of issuing low-interest bonds and making high-interest deposits—completely a risk-free arbitrage game.
Then let's look at another huge anomaly.
What stands in stark contrast to the corporate bond carnival? It is the government bonds, which serve as the economic ballast—namely, national bonds plus local government bonds. Their net financing was only 1.26 trillion yuan, a sharp year-on-year decrease of 1.02 trillion yuan. The issuance speed of local special bonds in the first half of the year can be called the slowest in history.
Everyone might wonder: why is the government no longer issuing bonds?
The core reason is that the credit leverage of local finances has been punctured; they don't know what to use as collateral to borrow more money.
What is the current situation? While Xi Jinping is performing his diplomatic operations, there is a severe tightening of government debt. Especially for 12 high-risk key provinces such as Tianjin, Guizhou, and Yunnan, most new infrastructure projects have been forcibly stopped.
Since projects are not approved, the quota and speed of local governments issuing special bonds naturally drop precipitously.
What does this mean? It means that investment in China will also drop significantly this year. And what is the current situation? Local and central finances are splitting. Not for any other reason, but because the central government can no longer support the growth of local debt. Meanwhile, local governments can no longer produce any new items as financial collateral.
Didn't they do something last year where they bundled resources and gave them to banks, making it look real? Now this bundle can't be held together because the CCP government truly has no fresh assets left in its hands.
So, in this state of internal economic collapse, what is Xi Jinping facing?
Xi Jinping is now facing the countdown to the consolidation of power for the 21st Party Congress in 2027. The matter involved is what he cares about most: whether his fourth term can be stabilized.
Therefore, he must now perform a narrative shift, converting internal ruling pressure into an external geopolitical narrative.
The CCP has this tradition. For example, on the eve of the CCP's establishment of government in 1949, what did Mao Zedong put forward? He put forward the three major policies such as "leaning to one side" and "starting a new stove." Then, around the 18th Party Congress in 2012, Xi Jinping abandoned "keeping a low profile" and shifted to so-called "striving for achievement."
Every period before a Party Congress is accompanied by a major diplomatic strategic restructuring.
Once you understand this, you will understand that when economic legitimacy is gone, geopolitics is the only available tool for maintaining power.
What Xi Jinping is doing now is three high-density diplomatic events in two weeks. In essence, it is a political performance to build momentum for the 21st Party Congress.
Now that the background is explained, let's look at the specific operations.
The CCP has released completely different diplomatic temperatures toward the United States, Russia, and North Korea.
First, look at Trump's visit to China. Basically, what is it? It looks exciting, but there is nothing substantial. China is like a dog biting a firecracker—empty joy. I think this description is appropriate.
What was basically achieved can be summarized in one sentence: strive for neither side to get too heated. To put it further, even if things get heated, notify each other first.
To put it bluntly, only the rules of dispute awareness are somewhat useful; as for the rest? Do you see anything useful after Trump returned home? Nothing useful.
Now look at Putin's visit to China.
They directly signed 41 cooperation agreements, and the joint statement was full-throttle, directly naming and criticizing US-Israeli attacks. Regarding Russia, they also opposed NATO expansion and opposed US-South Korea cooperation. Even more severe is that the joint statement deliberately avoided the word "denuclearization."
Who is this warning? Trump.
Translated, it means: the risk of war breaking out on the Korean Peninsula depends on me; I can control it. This is a direct intimidation of the trilateral security cooperation between the US, Japan, and South Korea.
However, the strategic big-ticket item Putin craves most, the Siberia-2 natural gas pipeline, was not settled.
This pipeline was originally planned to transport 50 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually to China through Mongolia. What is this? This is the most critical lifeline for the eastward shift of energy exports after Russia lost the European market.
Thus, the real boundary of China-Russia cooperation is clearly defined. The so-called "cooperation without limits" is bullshit. What the CCP wants now is an overwhelming price advantage in energy negotiations while preventing over-reliance on Russian energy.
So, what is the essence of this axis? It is a pragmatic intersection of interests. It can be said that it is not bound by any treaty at all.
Now let's talk about North Korea.
Xi Jinping's attitude toward North Korea in recent years could be described as very dissatisfied. Because the CCP has always arrogantly believed that North Korea is within the CCP's sphere of influence. But North Korea's behavior does not support the CCP's arrogance, or rather, does not support Xi Jinping's self-perception.
We can look at the data. From 2023 to 2025, the number of high-level interactions between Russia and North Korea reached 25, far exceeding the only 8 interactions between China and North Korea in the same period, creating a gap of 3.1 times. This is a peak state since the Cold War.
Kim Jong Un can be said to have rapidly abandoned the past single-track line of North Korea's simple reliance on China and fully embraced Russia.
North Korea sent millions of artillery shells and short-range ballistic missiles to the Russian front, and even directly dispatched 12,000 cannon fodder in organized units. Now, these 10,000-plus people have basically been consumed.
What did Russia give North Korea in return? Military aerospace technology, food, energy, plus 9 to 12 billion US dollars. Finally, what was completed in June 2024? The "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty" between North Korea and Russia, which also includes mutual defense clauses. This forms a military alliance treaty with strong Cold War colors.
So what do you see? The attitudes of both China and North Korea are basically lukewarm.
For example, when Kim Jong Un was elected, Xi Jinping delayed sending a congratulatory telegram for 8 days. Xi Jinping also significantly reduced aid to North Korea. The CCP has always viewed the Korean Peninsula as its own absolute geopolitical
Buffer. Add to that Xi Jinping's insatiable lust for power, and you have the truth of great power games. All this talk of brotherhood is for the media, just storytelling. Geopolitical buffers are what the CCP truly leaves for itself.
Then, against this tense backdrop with North Korea, Xi Jinping is set to visit. This is a 180-degree reversal in attitude.
Indeed, we should always trust Xi Jinping, the master of unfinished projects. His crotch has been thoroughly hollowed out by Russia, yet he can still forgive.
This single point exposes the CCP's strategic weakness in economics. Why? Because status follows economics.
The fundamental paradigm shift has already occurred in the underlying operational mechanism of the CCP's policy towards North Korea.
As everyone knows, the CCP has two diplomatic systems, just like its worldview for doing all bad things. The overt system is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but who runs the covert one? It's the International Liaison Department.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs handles the state's public diplomacy. This channel is bound by international law, multilateral treaties, and diplomatic etiquette. But what does the International Liaison Department play with? It's party-to-party diplomacy.
Within the CCP's fundamental political logic, interactions among socialist brother parties always and absolutely supersede ordinary state relations.
So what does the CCP believe? Dealing with rogue states is an unofficial, covert channel not bound by international rules. And this channel isn't new; it's existed for decades since the founding of the PRC.
When Sino-US relations were manageable, if North Korea developed nuclear weapons, the CCP would still play the role of a mediator. But now, the overall logic has completely reversed. Since the US is trying to win over Japan and South Korea in the Indo-Pacific, the CCP now needs to rally under a big banner.
This is equivalent to using the black box of the International Liaison Department to create a tailor-made geopolitical sanctuary for Pyongyang, absolutely shielded from international sanctions.
But politics alone isn't enough; substantial economic transfusion is necessary.
How has the CCP acted as a lapdog to North Korea? In fact, the CCP has been sending things to North Korea since its founding. They've built railways for Pyongyang, subsidized grain transport annually, supplied basic industrial materials, and even shared military technology.
However, this pipeline for supplying materials has been largely cut off for nearly five years.
But starting from March 2026, the China-North Korea international passenger train, which has been suspended for five to six years, will fully resume operation. On the surface, this is a channel for personnel exchange. But everyone knows that this signifies Xi Jinping abandoning political punishment of North Korea and re-engaging Pyongyang politically.
And do you remember how this channel was closed? Kim Jong Un first shut down the border crossings in 2020. The reason? The Wuhan pneumonia epidemic. To put it bluntly, Kim Jong Un was the first to turn his back on the CCP.
From Xi Jinping's perspective, consider this: When North Korea shut down the border crossings for material transfer and then bypassed the CCP to create such a major issue with Putin, did Kim Jong Un even have Xi Jinping in his eyes?
But Xi Jinping could tolerate it, which is unbelievable.
Moreover, although this train is nominally for people, it's actually a channel for supplies. It's a simple matter: customs can just turn a blind eye to the inspection of this passenger train and the belongings of its passengers, applying an exceptionally lenient standard. Anything can be transported, any supplies can be moved. What can't be transported?
Then, in April 2026, hundreds of North Korean laborers poured into processing plants in Northeast China in organized groups via Dandong. This is a blatant violation of the UN agreement prohibiting the overseas export of North Korean labor. Yet, the CCP has conceded again. And it is systematically and organizationally violating the agreement.
What is this? Isn't this North Korea earning foreign exchange from China? They provide labor, and the money goes to the North Korean government. That's the deal.
Why is the CCP doing this?
Let's look at the North Korean economy. After six years of severed supply from the CCP, the effects are very clear. We won't even discuss the exchange rate for North Koreans, as that's purely self-entertainment online. Let's talk about material goods, which are more objective.
The price of rice has surged from 7,000 North Korean won per kilogram to 21,000 won, a threefold increase. In areas like Chongjin and Pyongyang, ordinary people still have some way to survive. What do they do? They assemble wigs at night. This is the 100% real and cruel reality.
Why wigs? Because the UN sanctions list includes coal, seafood, and iron ore, but explicitly does not restrict hair products. This has created a perfect gray area for arbitrage.
China transports cheap raw materials, such as synthetic hair, real hair, or false eyelashes, into North Korea through limited ports. North Korea utilizes extremely cheap labor, almost akin to slavery, to hand-stitch these products in dimly lit rooms or home workshops. Then, the finished wigs are transported back to China and labeled
Using "universal concern" to frantically whitewash, what does this indicate? This shows that the CCP's attitude toward North Korea has undergone a massive shift. Therefore, the so-called denuclearization consensus reached with the United States in May was, from start to finish, merely a tactically tailored scam designed to collect bargaining chips.
Finally, let's pull our perspective higher to look at something that seems unrelated but is actually critical: the continued stagnation of Russia's Siberia Power Siberia 2 gas pipeline.
As long as the CCP continues to play tactics of talking without signing or implicit delay on this core agreement that touches the lifeblood of the Russian economy, it completely exposes Xi Jinping's true strategic bottom line. This shows that the CCP simply cannot afford a full-scale conflict.
So, what is Xi Jinping calculating now? He wants Pyongyang to become a bargaining chip for the CCP, while also courting Putin—that great sucker—to counter the West, all while slamming on the brakes to ensure he is absolutely not controlled by others, including his so-called allies.
Why guard against these allies? Because he cannot be dragged into the pit of war by these damn allies to serve as a sacrificial pawn.
In other words, Xi Jinping is now forced to walk a geopolitical tightrope. Who would want to walk a tightrope when there's a wide open road? What does this demonstrate? It shows that Xi Jinping's tools at the strategic level have hit rock bottom.
Xi Jinping now has to put on a fake smile for North Korea. Otherwise, he truly has no cards left to play.
Therefore, the situation is now very clear: the domestic economic landscape has collapsed, leading to a rapid decline in the CCP's performance-based legitimacy. In order to stubbornly protect the power dynamics of the upcoming 21st Party Congress, Xi Jinping can only frantically use external geopolitical narratives to forcibly displace domestic economic contradictions.
Thus, you can see Xi Jinping flying all over the world, or receiving guests from all over the world in Beijing.
So, this so-called "three birds with one stone" trip to Pyongyang is not some diplomatic victory, but rather a political self-rescue orchestrated by Xi Jinping in his current predicament. Moreover, this is also a tightrope, as it involves internal political contradictions among China, North Korea, and Russia.
The dark clouds over the Korean Peninsula are no longer just a dangerous device waiting for the international community to dismantle. What is it now? It is now the outermost protective electric fence for Xi Jinping in a passive geopolitical situation. Keeping it is for the purpose of creating bargaining chips to desperately protect the security of his own core power base.
Actually, what I really want to say today is: what kind of garbage is the underlying methodology of the CCP's diplomatic ledger?
Next time, when this idiot Xi Jinping visits places everywhere, let's run three questions through our minds first.
First, is this show intended to resolve real international relations, or is it a forced cleanup for domestic politics?
Second, within the overwhelming CCP press releases, which parts are noise to deceive people, and which are the real bargaining chips and real signals exchanged under the table?
Third, and most crucially, which power node is Xi Jinping's constant visiting for, or rather, which uncontrollable internal contradiction is he paying for?
Once you think through these three questions, whether it is "China's Pillar," "friendship forged in blood," or "no limit to China-Russia cooperation," this kind of red narrative used to harvest the masses will no longer be able to fool you.
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