胡振東Tony重話警告：疑美論就是認知戰！臺灣軍購卡關真相一次講清楚！

影片訪問軍事專家胡振東，說明台美軍售從威脅評估、預估報價、立法院批准預算到簽署發價書的流程，並解釋台灣軍購價格較高及交付、維修、訓練等原因。胡振東也談到美台防務合作、台灣軍隊的人力短缺、認知戰、軍中滲透、人工智慧與全民防衛。

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因为台湾在供应链上离得很远，所以台湾通常得采购额外的备品、支援和训练。所以有时候人们看价格时不会明白，为什么台湾付得比美国还多，陆军付的还多。因为美国陆军会训练我们自己的人员，美国陆军有时已经有现成可供应的零件之类的东西。所以当台湾采购那套系统时，台湾就得把所有支援都买齐，还有好几年的所有备品，所以这就把价格拉高了。

你看某些行为模式，正常的行为模式，当有人想攻击某个地方时，他可能会在同一区域来回走几次。大多数人走过去就会说去目的地，但这个人却绕了好几圈。他可能就是我们所说的在踩点，或者他带著什么可疑的东西，或者根据他的通讯内容，他可能偷听到一些什么。

大家好

欢迎来到 Freedom is Not Free 和新闻硬邦邦

听新闻最爽频道今天很荣幸能和胡振东谈话，他是最顶尖的军事专家之一，不仅在美国，不仅在台湾，而且可能是全世界。我的天啊，今天我们参加的是 TACEC，也就是台湾人会议。你怎么看今天的会议？

我觉得很棒，这么多台美人聚在一个地方，彼此交流学习，彼此鼓励。而像这样的活动，把台美人团结起来，在美国各地。

鲁比欧一再表示，我们的政策没有改变。如果你看实际行动的话，我仍然非常有信心，美国对台湾的支持依然存在，尽管有人试图拿川普总统访中来说，喔，也许支持不一样了。其实并没有改变，因为就我所看到的，尤其是派遣人员到台湾协助训练，我认为支持反而还增加了。所以我不太看重言论，我更看重行动。所以我认为美国对台湾的支持依然强劲。

而且你过去曾在国防部和 AIT 处理过台湾相关议题，很多台湾人也都对军购以及向美国采购弹药感兴趣。你能不能带大家了解一下，一轮军售流程是怎么运作的？因为有时候大家会说，好，是台湾在提出需求，然后美国提供，还是美国会主动建议某些军事装备呢？这整个流程看起来是怎样？

大多数情况下，双方在我们进行国防检讨会谈时，我们会先看威胁是什么。所以大多数情况下，双方其实已经同意了要采购什么来对应那个威胁。所以接著台湾通常会要求我们所称的价格与供货资讯，那是一个大致的概估价格。所以台湾就知道该向立法院争取多少预算，也就是从立法部门那边争取。

所以通常双方其实已经达成共识，因为美国不会提供那些报价资料，也就是那个概估价格资料，如果我们不想卖。所以基本上，当台湾收到这个我们所谓的P&A时，就已经代表美国愿意出售。

那就是所需的金额。通常国防部会把它带到立法院，说，嘿，要买这个，我们需要这么多钱。接著立法院核准预算，然后国防部那时就签署LOA，也就是实际的发价书，接著交易就完成了。

所以现在在立法院，很多其他政党都说，你知道，在发价书到之前我们不想通过预算，合约文件送到这里。所以现在你知道，国民党说，喔，我们不会在合约文件来之前批准预算，合约文件送到这里。他们说那是唯一的，美国会出售的象征。这不对。

等到合约文件到了之后，有效期可能只剩 30 到 45 天，立法院根本不可能在这么短的时间内通过预算。

所以总结来说，这个流程基本上是双方先就威胁以及应对方式达成共识，也就是要采购什么来反制这个威胁。美国会先提供一个大致的金额，供规划参考和用途定价，而这个价格是国防部送交立法院批准的。等立法院批准后，美方才会发出 LOA，也就是法价书，然后台湾再签署。这就是标准流程，而且一直行得通。但现在因为政治因素，这个流程被中断了。

对。有时候也会有人批评说，美国只卖过时的装备，像 M1 战车就是例子。你怎么回应这些人，说指控美国只卖旧东西，卖美国自己也不需要的东西？

这很可惜，因为几乎所有东西都是新的。美国只有在这种情况下才会卖旧东西，就是当美国已经不再生产它了。像 M1 战车就是如此。所以当台湾要求 M1 战车来取代较旧的 M60 时，其实已经晚了。因此美国把它从陆军库存中调出来，翻修并现代化，然后提供给台湾。

所以即使美国卖的是旧东西，因为它已经停产了，它还是有整修过的。在这种情况下，有新的引擎和新的火控系统，所以它仍然是一套有能力的、非常有战力的防御系统，而且也仍然更新到符合现代战争需求。

完全正确。不过，另一方面，买旧装备可能有一些价格优势。当然，因为美国总是会根据硬体在美国已经使用多久来折旧，所以价格总是会便宜得多。当美国出售旧装备时，美国总是会先折旧处理，让台湾拿到合理的价格。

目前在台湾，多数关于军事装备的讨论，关于国防，都集中在它什么时候会送到台湾。例如，台湾政府其实已经付了钱，我们什么时候拿到装备？

但从军事角度来看，有时候把一套新武器系统真正转化为实战能力，还需要调校、维修、弹药，还有台湾自制装备之间的整合，以及与美国标准的后勤，等其他问题，以及其他问题。你认为这些里面，台湾最容易低估的是哪一项？

首先，有一种误解，认为军售，你知道，是台湾付了钱，美国却不交货。事实上，军售是一个付款流程，每 90 天，台湾付款一次，而台湾支付的是生产下一个 90 天所需的项目。所以不是说你一次付清，美国却没有交付那些东西，不是这样。这是一点。

另一点是，因为台湾在供应链上离得很远，所以通常台湾必须采购额外的备件、支援和训练。所以有时候人们看价格时不明白，为什么台湾付得比美国陆军还多。因为美国陆军是自己训练人员，美国陆军有时候本来就有可直接供应的零件和物资。所以当台湾采购那套系统时，台湾需要把所有支援都一起买齐，还有好几年的备件，所以成本就会增加。

而且您也曾在国防产业和安全合作领域，无论是台湾和美国之间，您认为台美防务合作应该如何演进，从单纯采购军备，走向共同打造可持续作战能力？例如备用零件库存、维修人员和战损修复，这类问题。

因为台湾和美国在这里是非常紧密的盟友。这个观察很到位，其实现在就在演变中。如果你看一下目前在台湾的美军军事人员数量，以及他们正在进行的训练和这种关系，这种参与程度，以及前来的人员层级，这一切都显示出更紧密的关系。

而且不只是硬体方面，还包括规划、人员训练，以及整体发展防卫能力，包括战略与战术。所以这一切都在更加紧密地发展，因为越来越多地，美国已将中国是整个区域的主要威胁节奏对手，而台湾是确保对中国的吓阻得以建立的重要一环。所以美国正在投入更多资源与台湾合作。

而且，我相信美国也很高兴看到，赖总统也同样愿意分担责任，提高国防预算，并做得更多，让台湾能展现保卫自己的决心。

我们来谈一些国安议题，因为在您的演说中，您提到了胁迫问题、渗透问题，包括这件事也曾登上台湾新闻。台湾军方内部有些人正在签署宣誓书，他们愿意真的向中国投降。你认为台湾应该怎么做，而美国应该去做，是为了降低这种渗透的风险吗？

我不确定联合有多少各州可以做，但台湾当然可以做到更多，是在训练方面，理解民主的重要性，以及来自中国的威胁，这种认知作战威胁，以及你该如何抵抗这种威胁，并避免沦为中共的工具。

不幸的是，这一块就像你刚刚说的，我看到越来越多令人意外的人数，做了我们会视为叛徒的事，签下投降书，或签下承诺书，不作战之类的东西。这是个问题，但我想我们还是得培养爱国心，以及这类事情，才能防止它。

我也非常感谢你所做的，实际上对抗这些讯息，因为只要有人批评美国对台湾的军事承诺，总会有人拿出 Tony Hu 的影片说，不对，美国仍在支持，美国仍愿意提供协助，而且美国仍然是台湾最可靠的伙伴之一。Tony，真的非常感谢你这么做。

谢谢。我能做的其实很有限，就这样而已。但你知道，我一直都在努力反击那些认知战，因为疑美论就是认知战。对美国的怀疑，他们就是用这个来削弱台湾的决心，削弱台湾对自身实力的信心，以及作战意志。我觉得我们很重要的是要设法提升并维持台湾的作战意志。

但台湾在日常军旅生活上还是有一些问题对吧？例如，台湾有很多新闻，说有人力短缺、行政负担、训练压力，以及装备保养需求。而你过去曾在美军服役，你也曾和美台安全合作，台湾军队目前面临的哪些问题是最迫切需要解决，才能真正建立对中共的有效吓阻？

哇，这题很难。如果往长远看，显然人力资源是关键项目。台湾现在生得没那么多，所以可补充军队的人力短缺是个问题。

我认为一个解方是要强调给家长听，军事训练其实能让孩子更快成熟，你知道的，以更快的方式。训练的前几天、前一周，连美国小孩也会想家之类的，但过两三个月后，他们就学会自律。他们学会那些就算没人看著，你也得把事情做好。早上起床要折被子，还有这些事，虽然没人看著，但你知道，你得把它做好。他们正在建立那些习惯。

对，建立那些习惯，让台湾的年轻人，因为台湾家长似乎更保护自己的孩子。另一方面，当他们进入社会时，在他们转换阶段的时候，通常会花更长时间。但如果孩子去当兵一两年，他们的贡献，他们这辈子剩下的生产力，在社会上的层次会更高。

你知道，所以如果家长能把这种军事训练看作会对未来的孩子这辈子的生产力带来改变的事情，以及他们如何照顾自己，而不是一直住在家里的人，等到三十岁以后，你知道，这两年就会变成正面的。所以我觉得这是我们需要去思考的一种方式。

如果台湾父母能改变想法，那么同一个人就能为国防做出贡献，也能为社会做出贡献，而不是把它单纯看成竞争，而是看作一种成长，一种个人成长的事情。我觉得这很重要。

此外，我认为台湾需要更加更多地走向人工智慧 AI，因为很多使用 AI 的系统会降低人力需求。台湾需要检视哪些领域可以由 AI 发挥作用，这样你仍然可以在国防上保持同样的效能，同时也能在参军人数越来越少的情况下生活。

对，这很有见地，特别是考量到人工智慧技术发展得多么快，以及台湾在 AI 方面有多么关键，尤其是在晶片和所有晶片方面，他们在那个领域已经很先进了，要善加利用，你知道的。

但另一方面，我们刚才只谈到军事。如果我们看民间、社会和民防、民间韧性，你认为台湾在什么方面应该注意，不只是把台湾当作军事上的保护对象，而是让每一位公民都具有这种责任感和认知？如果发生什么事，如果遭到攻击，如果真的打起仗来，就像你刚刚在演讲中提到的，在一开始没有人知道发生什么事的那个阶段，一个很好的例子就是那次完美的委内瑞拉行动。当时没有人知道发生了什么，没有开一枪，对吧？

台湾人作为一个社会，应该知道些什么，到了关键时刻？他们该怎么做？

我认为这需要彻底改变台湾社会看待威胁的方式。我举以色列为例，那里每个人都要接受国家防卫训练，并培养对异常情况的警觉。他们会通报异常情况，也会阻止异常情况，而且这有助于整个国家在面对可能的自杀炸弹客或公车上的攻击者时更安全。当他们采取行动时，就会有人站出来，然后试著制止他。我想这就是台湾需要达到的程度。

台湾离那样还差得远，能够察觉异常、辨识异常，并且采取行动。一个人要怎么学会辨识异常？

这很重要，这本来就是训练的一部分。你要观察某些行为模式，正常的行为模式。当有人想攻击某个地方时，他可能会在同一区域来回走好几次。大多数人走过去就会直接前往目的地，但这个人可能会绕好几圈，我们称之为在场勘地点，或是他带著什么奇怪的东西，或者从他的通讯状况来看，你可能会听到一些东西。

我们大家都得别再失去警觉了。我觉得这就是重点，因为你不想插手，或者你根本不在乎，这种态度我觉得其实是在帮我们的敌人。所以关心、保持警觉很重要，并且要注意你周遭的环境。

当有人掏出刀时，你就说：欸，你他妈在干嘛？你是在切蛋糕吗，还是你要伤害某个人？我们基本上应该学会把手机放下。

没错，看看周遭正在发生什么，不要只顾著拍，然后说我有在场！

最后一个问题，首先非常感谢您。这是一场很棒的演讲，而且非常非常有见地的谈话。但因为我的很多观众其实都在台湾军中，他们是现役军人，有些是前线军官、士官，有些是义务役。您最想让他们知道什么，关于美国视他们为伙伴所做的努力？美国在他们身上看到了什么样的伙伴？

对他们来说，守住阵地非常重要，用来展现战斗意志。因为如果你展现出战斗意志和自我防卫的决心，你的朋友就会站在你这边，这就是关键。你必须展现你每天都在训练，也正尽全力吓阻中国。这样一来，当吓阻失效时，你的朋友就会和你并肩而立，协助你保卫并守护台湾。

非常感谢你，Tony。

谢谢。

Because Taiwan is so far away in the supply chain, so usually Taiwan has to purchase additional spares and support and training. So sometimes when people look at the pricing, they don't understand why is Taiwan paying more than the U.S Army paying? Because the U.S Army trains our own people. The U.S Army sometimes already has ready-to-supply parts and stuff. So when Taiwan purchased that system, Taiwan needs to purchase all the support, all the spares for several years. So that adds to the price.

You look at certain behavior patterns, normal behavior patterns, and when somebody wants to attack a place, he might walk around the same area several times. Most people walk by and go to wherever the destination, but this person walk around several times. He might be what we call casing the location, or he's carrying something strange, or based on his communication, he might overhear something.

Today I have an honor to talk with Tony Hu, who is one of the best military experts, not only in America, not only in Taiwan, but probably in the whole world. Oh my god. And today we are taking part in the TACEC, the Taiwanese Conference. What do you think about today's conference?

I think it's wonderful that so many Taiwanese-Americans come together in one place and try to learn from each other, try to encourage each other, and basically events like this uniting Taiwanese-Americans in various parts of the United States.

Rubio has said it again and again, our policy is not changing. And if you look at the actions that's taken, I still feel very good that the U.S supports Taiwan, even though people try to use President Trump's visit to China to show, oh, maybe the support is different. Actually it has not changed, because based on what I can see, especially with the deployment of personnel to Taiwan to help train, I think the support, if anything, has increased. And so I don't look at the words as much as I look at the action. So I think U.S support for Taiwan remains strong.

And because you used to work on Taiwan-related issues in both the Pentagon and in AIT, and many people in Taiwan are interested in military purchases and ammunition purchases from the United States, could you walk the audience along one cycle of those arms sales? Because sometimes people say, okay, Taiwan is asking for something, and then the United States provides. Or is it the United States that suggests something in terms of military equipment? How does it look like?

In most cases, the two sides, when we have our defense review talks, we look at a threat. So in most cases, the two sides have agreed on what to purchase to counter that threat. So then Taiwan usually asks for what we call price and availability. It's a rough order of magnitude pricing. So Taiwan knows how much to ask for the money from the LY, from the legislative side. So usually the two sides have already agreed, because the United States will not provide those pricing data, the rough order of magnitude data, if we don't want to sell.

So basically, when Taiwan received this, what we call P&A, it's already an indication that the United States is willing to sell. That's the amount of money usually MND takes to the LY. They say, hey, to buy this, we need this much money. Then the LY approved the money. Then the MND signs the LOA at that time, the actual Fa-Jia-Shu. And then the sales is completed.

So right now in the LY, many of the other parties say, you know, we don't want to pass the budget until Fa-Jia-Shu gets here. So basically, so right now there's, you know, KMT saying, oh, we're not going to approve the budget until Fa-Jia-Shu gets here. They say that's the only indication the US will sell. That's not true. By the time the Fa-Jia-Shu gets there, you have maybe 30 to 45 days validity. And there's no way LY is going to pass the budget in such a short duration.

So to summarize the process basically, the two sides agree on threat and what to do, what to purchase to counter that threat. US provide a rough order of money to planning purpose pricing. And that's the pricing that MND sends to the LY to approve. And then once the LY approved, then the US gives the LOA, the Fa-Jia-Shu, and then Taiwan signs it. That's the standard process and it works. Right now unfortunately because of politics, that process is interrupted. Yeah.

And sometimes there are accusations that the United States only sells outdated equipment, like M1 tanks for example. What do you have to say to these people who accuse the United States of only selling old stuff that the US doesn't need anymore?

That's unfortunate because almost all the stuff's new. The only time the United States sells old stuff is when the United States don't produce it anymore, like the M1 tank. So when Taiwan asked for the M1 tank to replace the older M60s, it's overdue. So the United States took it out of the Army inventory and refurbished it, modernized it, and then provided Taiwan. So even when the United States sells old stuff because it's not in production, it's still refurbished. In this case, new engine and new fire control stuff. So it's still a capable, very capable defense system. And it's still updated to the modern warfare. Absolutely.

On the other hand, probably there are some price advantages in buying old equipment. Absolutely, because the United States always depreciates the hardware based on how long the United States has used it. And it's always much, much cheaper. When the United States sells old stuff, the United States always depreciates it, so that Taiwan gets a good price.

Right now in Taiwan, most of the discussions about military equipment, about defense, are concentrated on when does it arrive in Taiwan. For example, the Taiwanese government has paid already. When do we get the equipment? But sometimes, from the military perspective, turning a new weapon system into a real combat capability also requires tuning, maintenance, munitions, also integration between Taiwanese domestically produced equipment and the United States standards, logistics, and other issues. Which of these do you think Taiwan most easily underestimates?

Well, first of all, there's a misperception that for arms sales, you know, Taiwan pays and the United States doesn't deliver. The fact is arms sale is a payment process. Every 90 days Taiwan pays. And Taiwan pays for what's required to produce the product for the next 90 days. So it's not like you pay in full and the United States doesn't deliver the things. So that's one thing.

Another thing is, because Taiwan is so far away in the supply chain, so usually Taiwan has to purchase additional spares and support and training. So sometimes when people look at the pricing, they don't understand why is Taiwan paying more than the U.S. Army is paying. Because the U.S. Army trains its own people. The U.S. Army sometimes already has ready-to-supply parts and stuff. So when Taiwan purchases that system, Taiwan needs to purchase all the support, all the spares for several years. So that adds to the price.

And you've worked in both the defense industry and security cooperation between Taiwan and the United States. How do you think the U.S. Taiwan defense cooperation should evolve from just purchasing military equipment to jointly building sustainable capability for fighting? For example, spare parts stockpiles, maintenance personnel and battle damage repair, issues like that. Because Taiwan and the United States are very closely allied here.

That's a good observation. Actually, it's evolving right now. If you look at the number of U.S. military personnel who are in Taiwan right now doing the training and the type of relationship, the type of involvement, and the rank of the people that's coming, it all shows a much closer relationship. And especially not only in the hardware, but in the planning, in the personnel training, and in the overall development of defense capability, including strategy and tactics. So that is all growing closer.

Because more and more United States have identified China as the pacing threat for the entire region. And Taiwan is an important element of making sure that deterrence against China is in place. So the United States is investing more in our cooperation with Taiwan. And also, I'm sure the United States is very happy to see that President Lai is also willing to share the burden, increase the defense budget, and doing more so that Taiwan can demonstrate its determination to defend.

Let's talk about some national security issues. Because during your speech, you highlighted that there are coercion issues, there are infiltration issues, including it has been on the news in Taiwan that within the Taiwanese military there are some people who are signing affidavits saying that they are willing to actually surrender to China. What do you think Taiwan should do and the United States should do to minimize the risks of such an infiltration?

I'm not sure there's much the United States can do. But certainly Taiwan can do more in terms of training, understanding the importance of democracy and the threat from China, the cognitive warfare threat, and how you need to resist that threat and resist becoming a tool of the PRC. That is an area, unfortunately, as you said recently, I've seen a surprisingly larger number of people who have done something that we will consider as being a traitor, signing the surrender or signing the commitment not to fight type things. It's a problem, but I guess we have to develop patriotism and that type of things to prevent it.

And I'm also very grateful for what you do, actually, to fight back against the email, because whenever anyone is criticizing the US military commitment to Taiwan, there is always Tony Hu's video saying that no, the United States is still supporting, the United States is still willing to help, and the United States is still one of the most reliable partners of Taiwan. So Tony, thank you so much for that.

Thank you. There's very little I can do and only that, you know, but I'm always trying to fight back those cognitive warfare, because 疑美论 is a cognitive warfare, the skepticism toward the United States. That's what they use to weaken Taiwan's resolve, to weaken Taiwan's belief in their own strength and their will to fight, and I think it's important that we try to increase and sustain Taiwan's will to fight.

But there are still some everyday military life issues in Taiwan, right?

For example, there are many pieces of news in Taiwan saying that there are manpower shortages, administrative burdens, training pressure, equipment maintenance requirements, and you used to serve in the US military, and you also used to work with US-Taiwan security cooperation. What problems that the Taiwanese military is currently facing are in the most urgent need to fix in order to truly build an effective deterrence against the CCP?

Wow, that's a tough one. That's a tough one. If you look down the road, obviously human resource is a critical item. You know, Taiwan's not having as many babies, so human resource, the shortage of people to join the military, is a problem. And I think one of the solutions is to emphasize to the parents how military training actually can mature the kids, you know, in a faster way. Initial few days, initial week of the training, even US kids will miss home and all that, but after two or three months, they learn self-discipline. They learn the stuff that even nobody's watching, you need to do a good job, and you get up in the morning, you make the bed, and all that stuff. Nobody's watching, but you know, you need to be down. They're building those habits.

Yeah, building those habits, so that the young kids in Taiwan, because Taiwan parents seem to be more protective of their kids. On the other hand, when they go into the society, when they have the transition, it usually takes longer, but if a kid goes to the military for one or two years, their contribution, their productivity for the rest of their life in the society will be a higher level.

You know, so if the parents can look at this military training as something that will make a difference in the child's productivity for the rest of their life, and how they can take care of themselves, and not be someone who still stays at home after they're 30, you know, then these two years become positive. So I think that's one way we need to see if Taiwan parents can change their thinking, and that way the same guy can contribute to national defense, also contribute to the society, and not look upon as a competition per se, but look like a growth, a personal growth type of things. I think that's important.

In addition, I think Taiwan needs to move more and more to artificial intelligence, AI, because a lot of systems using AI would reduce manpower requirement, and Taiwan needs to look at what are the areas where AI can contribute, and that way you can still be as effective in national defense and also still live under the condition of having less and less people join the military.

Yeah, that's very insightful, especially looking at how fast the artificial intelligence technology is developing and how crucial is Taiwan for AI in terms of chip and all the chips. They're already advanced in that field. Take advantage of it, you know.

But on the other hand, we've just talked about the military. If we look at the civil society and civil deterrence, civil resilience, what do you think Taiwan should pay attention to in terms of not only protecting Taiwan as a military, but also that every citizen has this kind of responsibility and understanding? If something happens, if there is an attack, if there is war going on, as you just said during your speech, the first stage when nobody knows what's going on, a good example of that would be when this perfect operation in Venezuela, when nobody knew what came, not a single shot was shot, right? What should Taiwanese know as a society when push comes to shove? What should they do?

I think it requires a total change of how Taiwanese society look at the threat. I used the example of Israel, where everybody goes through a national defense training and their awareness of unusual. They're going to report unusual, they're going to stop the unusual. And that helps the whole country secure when a possible suicide bomber or attacker on the bus, when they take action, somebody else is going to get up and try to stop him. I think that's what Taiwan needs to get to. Taiwan is still far from that, being able to observe the unusual, recognize the unusual and do something about it.

How can a person learn to recognize the unusual? Well, it's important, it is part of the training. You look at certain behavior patterns, normal behavior patterns, and when somebody wants to attack a place, he might walk around the same area several times. Most people walk by and go to wherever the destination, but this person walk around several times. He might be what we call casing the location, or he's carrying something strange. Or based on his communication, you might overhear something.

We need all of us just stop being aware. I think that's the main thing. Being you don't want to be involved or you don't care, that type of attitude, I think it actually helps our enemy. So it's important to care, to be aware, and to pay attention to the environment around you. When somebody pulls out a knife, you say, hey, what the hell are you doing? Are you cutting the cake, or are you going to hurt somebody? We should learn to put our phones down, basically.

That's right. Look at what's going on around. Don't just film and say, I was there!

And the final question would be, first of all, thank you so much for it. It was a great speech and a very insightful talk. But because many of my viewers, they are actually in Taiwanese military, they are serving members of the military. Some of them are frontline officers, NCOs, some of them are conscripts. What would you most want them to know about the efforts America sees in them as partners?

It is so important for them to hold the ground, to demonstrate the will to fight. Because if you demonstrate will to fight, willingness to defend yourself, your friends will be there. So that's the key. You must show that you are training day to day, and you're doing your best to deter China. And that way, when deterrence fails, your friends will be right there with you to help you to defend and protect Taiwan.

Thank you so much, Tony.

Thank you