武装反共:暴力反抗的正義之源

Chapter 1: Introduction: The Source of Justice in Violent Resistance

In the political history of humankind, resistance to tyranny has never been an accidental outburst, but a periodic echo of awakened justice. Whenever a regime deviates from its essence of serving the people and relies on intimidation, violence, and deception to maintain its rule, the voice of resistance will emerge from suppression. Resisting tyranny is not only a right but a responsibility—a concept already enshrined in the cornerstones of modern civilization such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the American Declaration of Independence:

**

When a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government.

In contemporary China, this issue is more urgent than ever. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime has constructed an unprecedented totalitarian system with the aid of digital technology. It is no longer a dictatorship in the traditional sense, but a ubiquitous control machine. From the concentration camps in Xinjiang to the welded doors and windows during the "zero-COVID" lockdowns; from censorship, account bans, and imprisonment to cross-border suppression of dissenting voices; from the plunder of state-capital and the deprivation of people's basic right to survival, all these have long since rendered the regime's "legitimacy" utterly bankrupt. It maintains not order, but fear; it creates not prosperity, but obedience.

The Justification of Armed Resistance Against the CCP

Faced with this reality, the core question is: "Do we have just cause to overthrow it by force?"

This is not a question to be taken lightly. It involves moral bottom lines, historical lessons, and practical feasibility. But if we avoid discussing it, if we dare not even acknowledge in thought the legitimacy of violence in certain extreme circumstances, then we are effectively tacitly accepting the invincibility of tyranny.

History has already provided the answer:

The victory of the American Revolutionary War established the first modern constitutional republic;

The French Revolution, though it spiraled out of control at one point, its ideological influence ultimately ended the European feudal system;

The Polish "Solidarity" movement combined intellectual enlightenment with mass organization, leading to a non-violent regime change;

During World War II, armed resistance against fascism was humanity's ultimate response in defense of justice.

The conclusion is not "violence is always right," but "under certain conditions, violence is just and necessary."

We write this book not to incite conflict, but to construct a clear theoretical framework with executable boundaries to answer three questions:

1. Under what circumstances do people have the right and obligation to use violence?

2. How can we ensure that violent actions do not slide into "new despotism"?

3. On the eve of the collapse of tyranny, how can the foundation for future order be built?

Theoretical construction is not wishful thinking; it is preparation and resistance. The CCP, through decades of brainwashing education, has stripped people of their ability to discuss the justice of violence. What we are doing now is reclaiming that ability.

True resistance does not begin with weapons, but with language; it is not driven by hatred, but ignited by conviction.

When we regain the language to judge violence and justice, the regime's fear truly begins.

Chapter 2: The CCP Regime's Logic of Rule and Structure of Violence

To understand whether it is necessary and possible to overthrow a regime by extraordinary means, the first step is to clarify: What is the essential logic of this regime's rule? Where does its foundation lie?

The CCP's ruling structure, while superficially maintained by a series of discourse packages such as the "People's Congress System," "Party-State Integration," and "Unified Centralized Leadership," is in substance built upon three core pillars:

1. Information monopoly and ideological indoctrination;

2. Strong stability maintenance and a system of violent deterrence;

3. Binding of political loyalty with a community of shared interests.

This chapter will be divided into three sections:

Section 1: Information Blockade and Discourse Manipulation — How to Create a "Reality Cage"**

The CCP does not win the legitimacy of its rule by persuading the people, but by creating a "single voice." Through the state education system, news censorship, public opinion guidance, and social media algorithm blocking, it imprisons the vast majority of people in a cognitive cage of "simulated democracy, lack of comparison, and fear of expression."

It prohibits independent historical research, restricts the inflow of foreign information, suppresses dissenting public intellectuals, and blocks alternative ideological content (such as constitutionalism, federalism, and theories of separation of powers). Within the confines of the Chinese internet, it is almost impossible for real Chinese people to systematically access the operating mechanisms of the free world.

This control is not as simple as "brainwashing"; it is the severance of ideological possibilities at the source.

Section 2: The Structure of Violence — Organization and Digitization of the Stability Maintenance System

The statement "the essence of a regime is violence" is most clearly embodied in the CCP.

From the suppression of the "June Fourth" student movement to the large-scale post-autumn crackdown on participants of the White Paper Revolution in recent years, the CCP's stability maintenance machine has gradually transformed from traditional violence (police, military) to digital violence (facial recognition, location tracking, social network tracing, cross-provincial arrests).

Its system of violence is divided into three tiers:

Bottom tier: Grid-based governance at the community and street level, implementing local surveillance and a citizen reporting system;

Middle tier: Quasi-military stability maintenance forces such as state security, police, urban management, and armed police;

Top tier: The CCP Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission and the National Security Commission coordinate all coercive means.

This is a modernized "matrix of violence," whose purpose is not to ensure order, but to deter social mobilization, plunging everyone into isolation and fear.

Section 3: The Structure of Interests and Political Loyalty — Why Does the Bureaucratic System Agree to Maintain Stability?

The CCP regime has maintained long-term stability not just because its violence is effective, but because it has formed a vast network of interest exchange.

In this system:

Officials share economic dividends through the "promotion mechanism" and "land finance";

Wealthy businessmen obtain monopoly privileges and immunity through "princeling capital";

Scholars exchange political loyalty for resources and space for publication;

Police receive establishment, bonuses, and housing allocation through stability maintenance performance.

The entire system becomes a closed alliance of interests—whoever resists is excluded, isolated, and punished by the system.

Conclusion of this chapter:

The CCP cannot "self-reform" because its logic of rule is inherently anti-reform.

It is not an accidental product of a bad system, but a modern totalitarian model that has been carefully considered and designed over a long period. If we fail to recognize this, we will constantly fantasize about "gentle and gradual transition," ultimately becoming obedient subjects of tyranny.

Only by thoroughly negating its legitimacy in thought can the first step be taken to break it in reality.

Chapter 3: Historical Perspective: International Legitimacy of Violent Overthrow of Tyranny

Understanding the legitimacy of violent resistance cannot stem solely from emotion or anger, but must find its basis in historical experience and international consensus. Modern world history shows that under certain specific conditions, the violent overthrow of a regime is not only legitimate but is widely recognized by posterity as a turning point of justice.

This chapter focuses on four historical cases to reveal the logic, cost, and legitimacy of violent resistance to tyranny in different cultural contexts.

I. The American Revolutionary War: Armed Resistance Against Colonial Oppression

The thirteen North American colonies that revolted starting in 1775 did not rise up due to physical atrocities, but because the British Parliament imposed taxes without the consent of representatives, restricted free trade, and suppressed freedom of publication and association.

They ultimately resorted to arms, formed the Continental Army, and in the Declaration of Independence, systematically proposed for the first time:

**

When a government violates the purpose of protecting the rights of the people, it is the duty of the people to overthrow it.

This war, by violent means, overthrew the colonial regime, yet it became a template for the legitimate birth of modern democratic republics. After victory, the American founders did not establish a strongman rule, but designed a system of separation of powers, representative government, and electoral checks and balances, thereby legitimizing their violent revolution in institutional construction.

II. The French Revolution: The Double-Edged Sword of Violence

In 1789, the French people overthrew the Bourbon dynasty in resistance to feudal privileges, hunger-inducing taxes, and a corrupt court. The revolution initially produced the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, proclaiming liberty, equality, and fraternity as universal values.

However, with the rise of radical factions, the revolution devolved into the "Reign of Terror," sending thousands to the guillotine, and ultimately sliding into Napoleon's military dictatorship.

This history reminds us:

**

Violence can be a tool for freedom, or it can degenerate into a substitute for tyranny.

Without institutional arrangements to limit power, "fighting violence with violence" will fall into a cycle.

III. The Anti-Fascist War: International Consensus on Just Violence

World War II is the "just war" with the strongest international consensus in modern times. The Allied forces' confrontation with Nazi Germany, Japanese militarism, and Italian Fascism was humanity's response to systematic genocide and aggressive expansionism.

In this war, countless resistance fighters, guerrillas, and underground organizations employed violent resistance, which was not classified as "terrorism" but was later confirmed by the United Nations as having a just status.

This indicates:

**

When a regime's essence is a criminal structure, the violent acts to resist it are legitimate self-defense.

IV. The Collapse of Eastern European Regimes: Ideology First, Institutional Transition

In Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and other countries around 1989, there were widespread ideological enlightenment (e.g., Solidarity, underground media), awakening of the middle class, religious united resistance, and disintegration from within the system.

Although most Eastern European regimes did not experience large-scale violent conflict when they collapsed, these transitions were long underpinned by methods such as underground organizations, labor mobilization, and even assassination threats.

This experience tells us:

**

Non-violent transitions often rely on the long-term construction of a culture of resistance and the existence of a certain violent fringe.

Conclusion of this chapter: The justice of violence is not absolute, but conditional.

Summarizing historical experience, the legitimacy of violent resistance has several common prerequisites:

1. The regime itself possesses "structural illegitimacy" such as oppression, plunder, and atrocities;

2. Peaceful reform paths have been blocked;

3. The goal of resistance is to establish a more just system, not revenge or power seizure;

4. Actors possess a certain organizational capacity, moral self-discipline, and popular support;

5. After the violence, focus on institutional design rather than rebuilding violent rule.

This chapter is not a simple glorification of violence, but provides historical reference for our subsequent construction of a "path for change in China's future."

Chapter 4: What is "Just Violence"?

If violence is not absolutely wrong, then what kind of violence is "just"? This is the core ethical question of this book, and the boundary that all who pursue freedom and order must face with caution.

We cannot act solely out of "hatred," otherwise justice will slide into revenge; nor can we compromise forever out of fear of "order," otherwise oppression will never end. Just violence must be built upon a dual framework of morality and politics.

I. Moral Boundaries: No Indiscriminate Killing, No Intimidation of Innocents

The first principle is:

**

The target of violence must be clearly directed at oppressors, perpetrators, and the machinery of tyranny itself, not at ordinary people, dissenters, or neutrals.

This means:

No targeting of civilians, the weak, medical personnel, teachers, minors, etc.;

No acts of terror or indiscriminate attacks to "attract attention";

All use of force must have moral objectives and limits of restraint.

An unconstrained storm of violence will only turn the victors into new tyrants, causing the revolution to lose its source of justice.

II. Political Goals: The Ultimate Aim is to Establish Free Institutions

The key to just violence lies in its "constructive purpose"—overthrowing tyranny is the means, and establishing a free, constitutional, and human rights order is the goal.

Therefore, participants must:

Achieve a minimum level of political consensus, such as supporting elections, freedom of the press, and judicial independence;

Reject personality cults or the rule of strongmen who replace one tyranny with another;

Establish temporary governance mechanisms to ensure order does not collapse during the transition.

A violent revolution without a vision will inevitably fall into chaos and warlordism, causing the new regime to lose its legitimacy.

III. Realistic Prerequisites: Popular Support + Organizational Capacity + External Public Understanding

Just violence is not the impulse of a few, nor isolated suicidal actions, but must possess:

Broad popular support and willingness to participate;

Basic organizational capacity: intelligence, security, propaganda, logistics, discipline;

Sympathy or understanding from the outside world, avoiding being universally labeled as "terrorists."

This requires long-term ideological dissemination, organizational construction, and value shaping in the early stages.

Conclusion of this chapter: Not all violence is just, but without justice, there is no standard to distinguish violence.

We are not trying to whitewash violence, but to reclaim the discourse monopolized by tyranny. Justice does not mean weakness, nor does it equal non-violence. True justice is to uphold human bottom lines, institutional constraints, and future hope in the face of oppression. **

On this basis, the next chapter will explore: In the reality of China, what situations might trigger the critical point of "just violence"? How do we judge this possibility?

Chapter 5: The Critical Point of Armed Anti-Communism: Judgment Standards in the Chinese Context

The theoretical justice of violence is clear, but in the current Chinese context, the truly complex issue is: How do we judge whether "now" is approaching the historical critical point where extraordinary means must and can be taken?

The purpose of this chapter is not to call for action, but to provide a rational judgment mechanism to help people identify: when social crises, regime cracks, and popular emotions converge, are we approaching a turning point for fundamental political structural change?

I. Are Peaceful Avenues Completely Blocked?

The most crucial prerequisite is: All channels for peaceful reform have been completely sealed off. Judgment standards include:

Electoral systems are completely hollow, and grassroots elections are a farce;

The legal system cannot check power, and administrative decisions take precedence over judicial judgments;

The media is completely silenced, and even "suggesting reforms" is considered inciting subversion;

Social organizations are disbanded or co-opted, and the masses have lost even the right to legal assembly;

Information from overseas is blocked, VPNs are illegal, and academic exchanges are interrupted.

When a system no longer allows any form of "internal correction mechanism," violent resistance begins to gain its logic of legitimacy.

II. Does the Regime Exhibit Characteristics of "Structural Harm"?

Judging whether a regime should be overthrown is not just because it is corrupt and incompetent, but because it has essentially become:

Actively creating poverty and despair (e.g., systematic suppression of private enterprises, indifference to the phenomenon of young people "lying flat");

Continuously implementing systematic persecution (e.g., religious suppression, ethnic cleansing, forced confessions, normalization of surveillance);

Institutionalizing ruling violence (e.g., National Security Law, cross-border pursuit of fugitives, expanding the scope of "subverting state power" crimes, establishing the catch-all crime of "picking quarrels and provoking trouble").

These constitute the standard of "structural violence" in the sense of the United Nations.

III. Are There Signs of "Critical Collapse" in Social Psychology?

Widespread disappointment and even apathy: the younger generation generally no longer believes in the national narrative and future hope;

Increase in passive resistance: "jumps from buildings" during lockdowns, youth "lying flat," self-immolation incidents, the White Paper Movement, individual protests, and collective rights defense are not uncommon;

The official propaganda system repeatedly contradicts itself, relying more on censorship than persuasion;

The regime must rely on the "Anti-Espionage Law," "reporting rewards," and "political security" to maintain normalcy.

These phenomena indicate that rule no longer relies on consensus, but on fear and inertia.

IV. Are There Cracks in the Ruling Group?

Localities pay lip service to the central government while mechanically implementing policies;

Ambiguous but persistent factional tendencies within the party, such as "nostalgia for Hu and Wen" or "unwavering commitment to reform and opening up";

Frequent "runs" by CCP families, with many high-ranking officials' children holding foreign nationality;

Frequent downfall of high-ranking cadres with the color of "line struggle" rather than simple corruption.

These phenomena suggest that the unity at the top is wavering, and the cracks in the system are widening.

Conclusion of this chapter: The "critical point" of just violence is not formed by calls, but is "approached" by historical reality.

When the above four types of factors are present simultaneously and gradually move towards extremes, a society is on the verge of "stable collapse." At this time, people are not "choosing" whether to act, but are forced to face the historical question of "either humiliating decline or self-awakening."

The next chapter will construct a hypothetical model: In the multiple possible scenarios for the end of the CCP's totalitarian rule, what preparations can the public, thinkers, and activists make? How can they seize the window of opportunity?

Chapter 6: Multiple Scenarios for the End of Totalitarianism and Civilian Response Strategies

Totalitarian regimes do not exist forever, but their collapse often does not occur in a rational manner. It may be a sudden rupture after a gradual process, or it may be a seemingly solid structure that instantly disintegrates.

This chapter attempts to model possible future points of rupture and explore several scenarios for the end of the CCP regime under its current structure, and to propose how civilian thinkers and resisters should prepare and respond.

I. Four Main Scenarios for the Collapse of the CCP

1. Palace Infighting Type Collapse

Irreconcilable rifts occur at the highest levels of power, such as the "Gorbachev-Yeltsin" style line struggle in late Soviet Union, with open division between certain factions of the military, local authorities, or high-ranking cadres and the central government.

Risks: The situation is highly opaque, with extremely strict information blockade;

Opportunities: If someone defects and openly opposes the party core, it may trigger systemic loosening;

Countermeasures: Rapid intervention by public opinion warfare, overseas dissemination systems must seize the window to build momentum and present a clear political alternative narrative.

1. Economic Collapse + Social Unrest Type

High unemployment, high inflation, currency devaluation, capital flight, people's livelihoods become unsustainable, and local riots occur frequently.

Risks: The CCP may resort to strong suppression or manufacture external wars to divert contradictions;

Opportunities: When economic discourse loses control, civilian narratives can quickly replace party-state narratives;

Countermeasures: Build an alternative economic discourse system, cultivate underground mutual aid organizations and grassroots self-governance prototypes.

1. Event-Triggered Collapse

Such as a recurrence of the "White Paper Movement," but on a larger scale and with failed suppression, leading to nationwide protests or military/police mutiny.

Risks: May lead to alternating states of chaos, suppression, and martial law;

Opportunities: Once the regime loses its ability to suppress, it will rapidly disintegrate;

Countermeasures: Pre-set rapid response channels, mobilize cultural and symbolic forces, provide a moral framework for the transition.

External Shock Type Collapse

Such as major war defeat (international containment if military action is taken against Taiwan), paralysis of industry due to international sanctions, or key allies defecting.

Risks: Nationalism being manipulated, potentially intensifying ethnic hatred or creating pretexts for war;

Opportunities: International intervention creating breathing room for the populace;

Countermeasures: Establish an external liaison team to express to the international community "We are not the CCP" and request support for transition and reconstruction.

II. Four Preparatory Tasks for Civilian Response

1. Stockpiling and Unifying Ideological Narratives

Clarify that the goal is not revenge, but building a free country;

Establish a clear and communicable "Blueprint for Transition Goals": such as separation of powers, freedom of the press, federalism, provincial and municipal autonomy, etc.;

Prevent the resurgence of warlordism, regional separatism, or personality cults.

1. Covert Construction of Organizations and Networks

Utilize digital tools to build "trust communities": underground reading groups, anonymous podcasts, encrypted communication circles;

Overseas forces provide encrypted technology support, security education, and anonymous funding channels;

Clarify the "decentralization principle": cannot rely on a single leader.

1. Preparation of Symbols of Legitimacy

Prepare a "Draft Shadow Constitution," "Transitional Government Concept Paper," and "People's Covenant";

Establish a "moral high ground": the White Paper Movement, youth voices, and commemoration of martyrs become the basis of legitimacy;

Plan narrative resources such as visual symbols, slogans, and commemorative days.

1. External Liaison and International Mobilization Mechanism

Maintain contact with overseas democracy movements, academic institutions, and human rights organizations;

Set up a "72-Hour Collapse International Notification Mechanism" to quickly issue external statements on civilian goals, legitimate forces, and willingness to cooperate;

Counter the CCP's rhetoric of "color revolution" and "external interference" to win the public opinion battleground with international consensus.

Conclusion of this chapter: The end is not far, but what truly determines the future is who is ready for tomorrow.

The collapse of the CCP may be sudden or gradual. The key is not how it falls, but how we stand up.

Ideological preparation, organizational construction, institutional design, and moral legitimacy are all indispensable. We are not waiting for fate, but seizing the initiative of fate.

Chapter 7: Blueprint for Reconstruction – Political Vision for a Free New China

Overthrowing tyranny is only the first step. What is more crucial is: what kind of country do we want to build?

Too many historical changes have failed, not because of the revolution itself, but because of the chaos, resurgence of autocracy, and moral collapse after victory. To prevent history from repeating itself, this chapter proposes a political blueprint for the future: a free, autonomous, decentralized, and open new China.

We emphasize that this is not an ultimate model, but a "starting framework" to provide a possible path for China to move towards a modern democratic society.

I. Political System Design: From One-Party Dictatorship to Constitutional Republic

Establish popular sovereignty: National sovereignty belongs to all the people, not to any party, class, or institution;

Abolish one-party rule and the merger of party and state: Prohibit political parties from controlling the military, judiciary, and media;

Establish a representative parliament: Create a legislative body with multi-party competition and direct universal suffrage;

Separation of powers and checks and balances: Executive, legislative, and judicial branches are independent of each other, with a constitutional court to arbitrate constitutional disputes.

II. Distribution of Power: Moving Towards a Federal Autonomous Structure

Establish the principle of "federated autonomy": Provinces can establish local parliaments and administrative bodies based on their historical culture and economic conditions;

The central government retains only core powers such as defense, diplomacy, and currency;

Encourage grassroots autonomy: County and city governments are directly elected, promoting village autonomy and independent operation of residents' committees.

III. Judicial Reform and Rule of Law Guarantees

Judicial independence enshrined in the constitution: The court system is free from administrative interference, with life tenure for judges and a mix of appointment and election systems;

Liquidate evil laws and political crimes: Abolish "picking quarrels and provoking trouble," "inciting subversion," and other tools of autocracy;

Establish a "transitional justice" mechanism: Fairly review political persecution cases from the CCP era, and establish national compensation and rehabilitation mechanisms.

IV. Freedom of Speech and De-monopolization of Media

Abolish the propaganda department system and allow private and foreign media to operate legally;

Freedom of speech enshrined in the constitution, with internet management taken over by an independent regulatory agency;

Abolish the real-name social system, allowing anonymous expression and association;

Encourage freedom of education and diverse publishing, preventing any ideology from monopolizing the national education system.

V. Restructuring of Military and Police Systems

Nationalization, de-partification, and de-politicization of the military;

Disband the People's Armed Police and SWAT systems or transfer them to local public security systems;

Establish an independent military oversight mechanism and parliamentary review of military budgets;

Punish those who used state violence to oppress the people, establishing a system of accountability through a "People's Judgment Day."

VI. Ethnic Relations: Guaranteeing Autonomy and Natural Integration

Recognize China as a multi-ethnic country, guaranteeing complete equality for all ethnic groups in laws and institutions, without special privileges;

Respect the cultural autonomy, language use, and educational independence of all ethnic groups, while ensuring their equal right to participate in national governance;

Guarantee high-level autonomy for ethnic regions such as Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia, including regional decision-making autonomy in legislation, education, culture, and economic policies, and establish an inter-ethnic political coordination mechanism to promote institutional dialogue and balance;

Guarantee the right to natural ethnic integration, meaning no artificial segregation or forced assimilation, allowing different ethnic groups to communicate, integrate, and coexist in a free society according to their own will;

Prevent the suppression of ethnic cultural expression in the name of "security" or "stability maintenance," and reject the use of identity labels to create political discrimination, achieving true ethnic equality;

The new regime should not bear excessive historical burdens. The development of ethnic relations should be promoted by civil society independently. The government should intervene and control less, allowing genuine ethnic unity and integration to emerge naturally in a free, fair, and just environment.

VII. Religion: Freedom of Belief and Separation of Church and State

Prohibit any form of religious indoctrination or religious education for minors under 18 years of age;

Schools should implement modern civic education courses centered on constitutionalism, democracy, civil rights, and social jurisprudence. These courses may introduce the historical background, basic concepts, and principles of freedom of belief of major world religions to enhance understanding rather than guide affiliation;

Citizens over 18 years of age can freely choose to believe in a religion or no religion in accordance with the law, and participate in religious activities only in their personal space outside the school system, ensuring that the principles of freedom of belief and separation of church and state are not violated;

The state shall not fund, control, or interfere with any religious organizations or doctrines. Religious organizations must register in accordance with the law and adhere to principles of openness, non-violence, and non-coercion.

Conclusion of this chapter: Freedom is not natural; it requires institutional protection and citizen defense.

Overthrowing the CCP is not the ultimate goal; establishing a free country where people no longer live in fear is the end point.

Institutions are the containers that protect freedom, and culture is the soul that sustains it. We can no longer rely on "enlightened rulers" or "strongmen" to save the country, but must establish a new China with institutional checks and balances, transparent power, and where the people are masters of their own destiny.

Chapter 8: After Victory – Reflecting on Violence and Upholding Justice

History has repeatedly proven: the first shot after overthrowing tyranny often determines the nature of the new regime.

After the French Revolution came the guillotine; after the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia came purges and great cleansings; after 1949 in China came the suppression of counter-revolutionaries, land reform, the Cultural Revolution, and the Anti-Rightist Campaign.

If violence is not restrained and accounted for, it often leads to new tyranny in the name of "justice." If resistors cannot uphold their original intentions after victory, the revolution will devour its children, and the people will continue to live in new fear.

This chapter is the final chapter of the book and the most ethically reflective: How do we ensure that "victory does not turn sour"? How do we prevent those who once took up arms to resist oppression from becoming oppressors themselves?

I. The Endpoint of Violence Must Be Institutions

Violence is merely a transitional and extraordinary means; its goal must be directed towards an institutional order:

Reject personal dictatorship and worship of heroism;

Reject the logic of violent absolution that "rebellion is justified";

Reject the indiscriminate hatred labels like "enemies of the people."

If victors cannot limit their power and accept supervision from the outset, they have already betrayed their original revolutionary intentions.

II. Four Principles of Transitional Justice

Every post-totalitarian country faces the issue of transitional justice: how to deal with the atrocities and responsibilities of the former regime.

Successful examples like South Africa, East Germany, and Chile share common experiences:

1. Hold high-level officials accountable, forgive grassroots executors: High-level masterminds must undergo judicial trial, while grassroots executors can be forgiven through exposure, repentance, and compensation;

2. Establish a "Truth and Reconciliation Commission": Allow victims to tell their stories and establish historical memory, rather than "muddling through" and covering up atrocities;

3. Rehabilitate political victims and restore civil rights: Comprehensively review cases of political injustice, criminalization of speech, illegal detention, etc.;

4. Institutional guarantees to "prevent history from repeating itself": Such as establishing citizen oversight committees, freedom of information laws, and laws for tracing state violence accountability.

III. How to Prevent "Revolution Betraying the Revolution"?

Actors must withdraw from power rent-seeking: Revolutionary organizations cannot directly transform into ruling groups;

Establish a "Transitional Government" system: Immediately after victory, establish a temporary government with universal participation and a time limit to organize constitutional design and public elections;

Preserve the voices of critics.

：革命が勝利した時でさえ、異議を許容しなければ、新政権は旧政権の継続となる。

四、教育と文化の再建は至極重要である

「記憶メカニズム」の設立：例えば「六四追悼日」「白紙記念館」「言論の自由公園」などの記念空間を設けること。

洗脳教育システムを撤廃し、憲政、民主、人権、独立思考によって市民教育を再建すること。

歴史反省文学、ドキュメンタリー、劇作、映画などの自由な再現を奨励すること。

社会がその暗黒を記憶できなければ、真に光明に向かうことはできない。

本章結語：勝利の名の下に人間性を守る

暴力は正義を開くための鍵に過ぎず、正義そのものではない。

真の勝利とは、より多くの敵を殺すことではなく、新たな人民の敵を生み出さないことである；旧秩序を打ち砕くことではなく、新秩序がもはや人々を畏怖させないようにすることである。

中国共産党を打倒することは、我々の時代の責任である；しかし、暴力に依存しない社会を構築することこそ、我々が後代に残す真の遺産である。

この本は終わりではなく、始まりである。思想の火種はすでに灯され、歴史の歯車はすでに回り始めた。

この本を読んだすべての人々が、暗黒の時代における火の守り手となることを願う。