According to a netizen submission, during the recent county-level People's Congress election in Anyang, Henan, government departments used household registration information to verify voter identities, allowing them to access personal information in the system backend and cast votes on behalf of voters without needing their ID numbers.
On November 8, MeT, who first posted the content, responded that he had not clarified the activation conditions for the screen recording at the time, and reiterated that it was Xiaomi's system security component that performed the recording.
On November 7, Bilibili creators epcdiy and Bian Liang released videos claiming that after Xiaomi's "AI Call Warning" is enabled and authorized, the phone will record about 3 seconds of screen footage during WeChat and QQ video calls, encrypt and upload it to the cloud to determine if it involves fraud, and continue recording after about 2 seconds if no risk is detected; this feature is disabled by default.
On November 5, anti-peeping volunteer Zhou Ninghe revealed that peeping incidents exist in all 34 provincial-level administrative regions in China. According to his statistics, approximately 140,000 women have been victims of peeping. Over the past year, he has assisted the police in solving 18 peeping cases, two of which involved minors.
A behavioral analysis report of the Honor HiView four-piece APK suite submitted by a netizen shows that its log component can read the list of installed apps, track usage duration, receive cloud pushes, execute debug commands, and capture network traffic, with the upload module containing a device serial number field; another module can determine whether an operation is an automated script based on operational data.
A V2EX forum post on November 5 sparked discussion. Researchers conducted a reverse analysis of Xiaomi HyperOS and discovered that the SystemHelper component collects and reports app lists, usage duration, IMEI, SIM card information, and location data to China Unicom servers. They also decrypted reported data for 169 app entries from a test phone.
Recently, an out-of-town tourist posted that after scanning the QR code to log into the "Mango Shared E-bike" mini-program at Wuhan University, they were logged out for not being a student or staff member. Just two minutes later, a private individual added them on WeChat using their phone number, raising suspicions that the mini-program has a risk of leaking personal information.
On November 4, 2026, X user kiraequal performed ADB dynamic forensics and DEX reverse engineering on a locked-bootloader Xiaomi 13 Pro (HyperOS 3.0). They discovered that the system's Security Center contains a built-in anti-fraud database named 'fraud_detection_data.db', where the 'voip_record' table involves silent screen recording logs of QQ and WeChat voice and video calls. [Follow-up · November 4, 2026] On November 4, X user KiraEqual posted after disassembling a Xiaomi 13 Pro running HyperOS 3.0, stating that the pre-installed anti-fraud component can record screens, record audio, and log network call details without triggering any authorization pop-ups. Another researcher verified that on some models, screen recording covers the entire screen, and even after turning off the protection switch, the screenshot time is still recorded.
Media reports indicate that Nanjing University's Xianlin Campus has implemented a smart classroom system equipped with facial detection and intelligent recognition algorithms, which tracks real-time attendance and head-up rates, sparking criticism over privacy violations.
On November 3, a netizen posted that screenshots from the Android version of Taobao taken a few months ago contained invisible watermarks, which were visible when zoomed in. The user encountered significant trouble after sending the screenshots to others. In the comments section, some netizens claimed they had received calls from customer service demanding they delete posts after sharing Taobao shopping screenshots, while others confirmed they had also discovered the watermarks.
On November 2, a netizen posted that the China Unicom 'SystemHelper' program, pre-installed on phones from brands including Xiaomi, OPPO, vivo, Samsung, OnePlus, and Realme, can collect information on app installation and usage, data traffic, and device identification. This reporting can be triggered even when using a non-Unicom SIM card, and the program reportedly does not check whether the user has consented to the privacy policy.
On October 31, a developer checked a friend's Xiaomi 14 and claimed to have found pre-installed components reporting the application list to Xiaomi and China Unicom servers, and that security components contained code for encrypting and uploading approximately 3-second screen recording clips to the cloud for detection.
On October 19, a bank employee in Guangdong posted a notice from their workplace group chat requiring unmarried employees to share their parents' WeChat contacts and married employees to share their spouses' WeChat contacts with grid administrators, to be completed within the same day. Netizens said some banks also demand parents' ID numbers, job titles, and their children's school and class information, and even home visits.
On October 12, a netizen posted that China Unicom had used their information to open 30 mobile SIM cards without their knowledge or authorization; after discovering this, China Unicom's Jilin Changchun branch canceled and transferred the relevant phone cards in the person's absence.
On October 10, a person claiming to be a senior mathematics student at a 985 university posted asking for help, saying that his college entrance exam preferences had been secretly altered by his parents, causing him to fail and repeat a year; 9 cameras had been installed at home to monitor him; he was diagnosed with severe depression; he received two academic warnings for failing courses and now faces the risk of being expelled, sparking heated discussion among netizens.