Heilongjiang's fertility rate fell below 1.0 in 2000, while the national rate took 25 years to do so; Heilongjiang's pension fund went bankrupt in 2011, while the national fund will only turn negative in 2028; Liaoning's investment fell by 63.5% in 16 years, while the national figure only dropped by 7.2% in 26 years! The Northeast script played out early, and the rest of the country is just getting started.

This episode compares historical data on fertility rates, pensions, fixed-asset investment, and fiscal revenues between northeastern provinces like Heilongjiang and Liaoning versus the national average, pointing out that China is currently fully replicating the Northeast's playbook of decline. The host analyzes three major steps—administrative pricing draining cash flow, administrative deleveraging dumping burdens, and the collapse of private investment—revealing the historical trajectory of the Northeast as an experimental field for the Chinese Communist Party's predatory model. It predicts that against the backdrop of mounting pressure on exports and central government finance, the systemic crisis facing the country will further accelerate.

Video Link:

Full Transcript:

Observe reality as it is and reject fragmented understanding. Today, let's look at how much of the Northeast's playbook China as a whole has already completed, or from another perspective, how many years other regions in China lag behind the leading Northeast. I think through this kind of comparison, everyone can build a very clear map and coordinate in their minds. Let's start with a few less-noticed sets of data. This July, the Chinese Communist Party's Ministry of Education released the 2025 education statistical bulletin, and the data shows this: nationwide kindergartens decreased by 24,100 in a single year, a drop of 8.45%, and the number of children enrolled in kindergartens decreased by 3.58 million in a year. Some people say this is a nationwide declining birthrate, and it has nothing to do with the Northeast. Then let me show you another figure: the kindergartens closed by Heilongjiang in 2024 alone accounted for 12.5% of the province's total, and enrolled children dropped from 488,700 in 2021 to 305,600 in 2024, a full 37.5% drop in three years. The nationwide closure speed in 2025 is something Heilongjiang already went through back in 2023. Heilongjiang in 2024 had already accelerated to 12.5%. After that, Heilongjiang no longer published this data.

In the previous episode, we finished calculating the accounts of the Northeast, and the conclusion is very clear: pricing drains cash flow, third-line relocation consumes existing stock, and 8,000 yuan is used to buy out workers to carry out a breach of contract. In other words, the Chinese Communist Party unilaterally declared the restructuring of this debt, or to put it bluntly, opened its eyes wide and simply reneged on the debt. What is most ruthless about the Chinese Communist Party? It is that after reneging on the debt, it harvests valuable assets and hands them over to the central government, and finally, the pension funds run dry, the business environment is completely ruined, and young people are forced to leave their hometowns. These four swords form an operational chain that slaughters the Northeast. What we are going to calculate today is no longer the Northeast, but rather, using the Northeast's data as a prototype, how many years China as a whole still has until it reaches the Northeast's condition. We can say this: the Northeast is the first and most successful experimental field of the Chinese Communist Party's predatory closed loop. The processes run in this experimental field are now being copied and pasted across the country using the same formula. Today, we will calculate the time-lag dimension, one dimension at a time. Let's first write down the formula clearly: it actually has three steps, each step being one playbook for the Northeast and one for the nation.

The opening move is administrative pricing to drain cash flow; well, this is part of the CCP's pre-casting animation. Basically, whenever the CCP says it is paying attention to something, the subtext is that it has set its sights on that area or industry. Under the power structure, the possible way to create arbitrage space through price differentials is to use monopoly pricing power to suppress factor prices below market rates, and then leave that price difference to departments controlled by the CCP. What is the Northeast version? It is the planned pricing for crude oil and grain. So what is the national version? Currently, there are only two things: land and savings. On the land side, the CCP's local governments directly monopolize the primary land supply, and then use administrative pricing to fold residents' thirty years of savings and future income into the land transfer fees. Total land transfer revenue across China reached 8.7 trillion in 2021, which was the peak. Then in 2024, it was 4.8699 trillion, and in 2025, it was 4.1518 trillion. Now, from January to August of this year, it has fallen to only 1.3753 trillion, a year-on-year drop of 28.6%—it can be said that it has been cut in half, and then cut in half again. This is exactly the same as the price scissors of Daqing, isn't it? Now, the CCP can no longer extract from land; this is not because the CCP has had a change of heart and doesn't want to extract anymore, but because the source has been drained dry. The debt and leverage ratios of the entire population have been pushed to a point where they cannot be increased any further.

On the savings side, the CCP's People's Bank of China has suppressed savings interest rates below inflation and nominal growth, which causes the actual returns on household deposits to be transferred to whom? To the borrowers—that is, the local governments, state-owned enterprises, and banks. You are not getting the interest you should have received. The magnitude of this, I have already calculated in the episode on the central bank's outright reverse repos. Household deposits currently total 173 trillion; for every 50 basis points that the deposit interest rate is suppressed, households lose 867 billion in interest per year. This figure is actually very huge. To make a comparison so everyone understands: this is equivalent to more than half of the annual personal income tax revenue for all of China. In the last two years, it has cumulatively been suppressed by 75 basis points, which means that the interest surrendered by depositors reaches 1.31 trillion per year. This 1.31 trillion is close to half of the annual profit of commercial banks. This is basically consistent with the predatory structure of the Daqing Oilfield, which serves as a typical control group. In 1980, Daqing surrendered six-sevenths of the price of a ton of oil, while in 2020, depositors surrendered the entirety of their actual deposit returns. So, it is just that the objects of extraction and the methods of extraction have changed, but the accounting method of extraction has not changed by a single word. The CCP is actually a party with a very high degree of path dependency, so to speak. The general strategy that this group of party hacks keeps repeating is to use power to create two sets of pricing, and then place power at the center of this arbitrage structure. This is the main thread of all the CCP's predatory models.

Following the spell-casting and demon-capturing by the the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), what phenomenon closely follows? It is that after the cash flow is drained, the liabilities of the department that was drained can definitely no longer be repaid, much like some old enterprises in the Northeast. At this time, the gaps in the balance sheets of these enterprises will grow larger and larger over time. At this point, the formula moves to the second step, which is administrative deleveraging to shed burdens. At this time, the CCP will use administrative means to unilaterally modify the terms of these liabilities. What was the Northeast version? It was buying out seniority, directly liquidating lifetime employment for 8,000 yuan per person. Anyway, this doesn't matter whether you ordinary people are willing or not; this is a typical sovereign-style default. Placed nationwide, the name has changed now—oh, it's called debt resolution. According to the CCP's rhetoric, it goes like this: on November 8, 2024, the CCP approved a quota of 6 trillion yuan to swap hidden debts, replacing them at a rate of 2 trillion yuan per year from 2024 to this year, plus 5 trillion yuan of new special bonds over five years. The hidden debt balance dropped from 14.3 trillion yuan at the end of 2023 to 10.5 trillion yuan by the end of 2024, and out of the 6 trillion yuan quota, 5.63 trillion yuan had already been issued by the first half of 2026. This swap has also been discussed before; what does this mean? It means taking 3- to 5-year urban investment bonds with interest rates of 5% to 7%—that is, those bad debts issued by local government financing platforms—and extending them, swapping 5- to 7-year terms into 20- to 30-year terms, oh, and dropping the interest rates directly from 5%-7% to around 2%. Discounted by present value, oh, who takes the hit for this? The existing bondholders take the hit, and the extent of this interest cut is as high as 30% to 50%. But what is the actual situation? The CCP's hidden liabilities are at least in the range of 60 trillion to 80 trillion yuan, and this is a baseline range. In other words, by next year, the CCP is highly likely to pull off a buyout-of-seniority-style default trick. As for the calculation method, I already provided an example in the episode on the bank dissolution wave. Look, what was buying out seniority? It was a default on the workers, right? And the debt resolution hazard is a default on the creditors, and most of these creditors are commercial banks. Look, only 26 years apart, and they are still using the exact same accounting techniques.

Let's first look at where the commonalities lie. Look, who was the losing party back then? It was the Northeast workers of that era, oh, meaning the side with the weakest voice bears this part of the liabilities. Laid-off workers do not have labor unions, and the creditors of urban investment bonds are also mostly local banks. Previously, in the episode on county-level finance, I also calculated with everyone that there are hundreds of de facto bankrupt counties in China, and the number of de jure bankrupt ones is zero. The disposal method is that slightly larger banks continuously absorb these village and township banks, and then provincial-managed banks are used to absorb city-level banks. Look, what is this absorption method similar to? It is the same as the CCP's social security pooling method, right? Layer by layer, pooling upwards according to administrative rank. What does the CCP's so-called pooling mean? It means stirring a pot of water so that you cannot tell whose account is whose; it looks like everything is fine, but in reality, it has completely rotted through. As soon as the CCP mentions pooling, things have already begun to rot. So look, what is the method of these Chinese banks? This method is merely to cover up that huge gap on the balance sheet, and there is no way to repair it at all. The strongest evidence is that even those famous MCs of the CCP—meaning financial sewers—are now experiencing large-scale congestion. Therefore, it is not that the CCP does not want to use the traditional MC method of absorbing bank bad debts for legal disposal, but rather what? It is that between stability maintenance and a storm of defaults, they chose an ostrich strategy, sticking their heads into the dirt, and then using higher-level statements to cover lower-level statements, wanting to buy time indefinitely. But the gap thing cannot be solved by dragging it out; the greater possibility is still to seize the opportunity to choose a more elegant default method. This is precisely the character of the CCP.

Once the CCP completes the first two steps, market expectations regarding property rights are completely shattered. Then, the final step of the formula is automatically triggered. What does this step trigger? It destroys micro-level credit, marked by a massive exodus of people from the market—which is exactly what the CCP constantly whines about as 'lying flat' incited by 'foreign forces,' but is actually manifested as the withdrawal of private capital. The Northeast version of this is the saying, 'Investment does not pass Shanhai Pass,' coupled with the rush for civil service exams; those who fail to get a position wander across the country, or even abroad. As for the national version, private investment fell by 6.4% for the full year of 2025, and by 10.1% from January to August 2026, while total fixed-asset investment in the same period fell by 7.2%. Everyone should understand that 'lying flat' and the 'banditization' of local governments are profound characteristics of the Northeast process, and they are two sides of the same coin. In my memory of the Northeast at that time, what stood out most was the gradual increase in 'gailiuzi' (loafers) and 'hunzi' (thugs). These loafers and thugs are also a manifestation of the Northeast's 'lying flat,' which is related to the region's unique culture. Let's look at the data again: at the end of 2001, the share of the state-owned economy in industry was 78% to 87% in the Northeast, while it was only 64.9% nationwide. The Northeast was a full 13 to 22 percentage points higher than the national average. Now, the whole country is catching up to this gap.

You see, doesn't the formula match up perfectly? Next, let's look at the 'Northeast dialect' of the whole country; there is no rhetoric here, this is just the data presented by the CCP's own National Bureau of Statistics for the region. National fixed-asset investment fell by 3.8% in 2025, while the Northeast region fell by 15.5%. From January to August 2026, the national figure fell by 7.2%, while the Northeast region fell by 25.5%. National real estate development investment fell by 17.2% in 2025, and by 19.9% from January to August 2026—roughly 20%. Liaoning's investment plummeted by 63.5% in a single year back in 2016; the decline the whole country is seeing over two years now is essentially the same magnitude as what Liaoning experienced in 2016, spread out over 2025 and 2026. As for fiscal conditions, Liaoning's general public budget revenue in 2025 was 291.8 billion, while expenditures had already reached 661.5 billion, with a fiscal self-sufficiency rate of only 44%. But don't think Liaoning is the worst off.

The two provinces behind it are even worse. What about Jilin? Jilin had 135 billion in revenue against 479.1 billion in expenditures, with a self-sufficiency rate of only 28%. Heilongjiang is the worst, with 153.5 billion against 656.5 billion, a self-sufficiency rate of 23%. And what is the national local-level revenue? It is 12.2082 trillion, and the local-level expenditure is 24.4 trillion, with a self-sufficiency rate of about 50%. What about the three Northeast provinces? They are at 23% to 44%. The national average for local governments has already reached 50%, which is bad enough, but the three Northeast provinces are even worse. However, we can see a trend: the whole country is moving in the direction of the Northeast. There is another eye-catching figure: from January to August 2026, national general public budget revenue was 15.66 trillion, a growth of 5.7%, and tax revenue grew by 6.6%, but the nominal growth rate for the same period was far lower than these figures.

Once fiscal revenue outpaces economic growth, what does that mean? It means the fucking CCP is just robbing people; it's very easy to understand. How is this part being robbed? Through retroactive tax audits, resurrecting closed-down enterprises, and so on. This playbook started in the Northeast back in 2016; honestly, the whole country is just playing with the leftovers from the Northeast. A huge chunk of the Northeast's fiscal revenue relies on logging and so-called 'remedial measures.' It's just that this practice has been fully rolled out nationwide in 2025 and this year. Looking inside the Pass, everyone else is just a little brother. Alright, now let's calculate the time lag. Let's peel back the layers of population, pensions, and balance sheets one by one. For population, let's look at the total fertility rate—the average number of children a woman has in her lifetime. During the fifth national census in 2000, what was Liaoning's? Liaoning was 0.98, Jilin was 0.84, and Heilongjiang was 0.88. In other words, by the year 2000, these three provinces had already fallen below 1. The national average at the time was still 1.2. By the time of the sixth national census in 2010, Liaoning was down to 0.74, Jilin was 0.76, and Heilongjiang was left with only 0.75.

At that time, the national figure for the same period was 1.18. During the seventh national census in 2020, Heilongjiang was 0.76, Jilin was 0.88, Liaoning was 0.92, and the national average was 1.3. So when did the birth rate for the entire country fall below 1? In 2023, it still claimed to be 1.01, but by 2025, the national total fertility rate was already between 0.95 and 1. This year, 0.95 is probably a stretch. Meanwhile, the Northeast already fell below 1 as early as 2000, while the country as a whole only fell below 1 in 2025. In terms of the birth rate metric, the Northeast is 23 to 25 years ahead of the rest of the country. As for total population, the resident populations of the three northeastern provinces had already successively shifted to a decline between 2010 and 2016. From 2010 to 2020, the three northeastern provinces lost a total of 11 million people, a drop of 10 percent—10 percent of the population vanished within a decade. Then, from the end of 2020 to the end of 2025, another 4.09 million were lost. The country's total population only peaked in 2021, and saw its first decrease in 2022. At the end of last year, the whole of China lost 3.39 million people in a single year. Therefore, in terms of total population volume, the population in the Northeast is leading the country by 6 to 11 years.

Combining the two metrics, in the dimension of population collapse, the Northeast is ahead of the national average by about a decade. By the way, looking at today's speed, Liaoning's natural growth rate in 2025 is minus 6.88 per thousand, Jilin is minus 6.37 per thousand, and Heilongjiang is the most awesome—it hasn't reported this figure since 2024, so you can figure that out for yourself. Just imagine how ugly Heilongjiang's numbers must be. The national figure in 2025 is minus 2.41 per thousand, which means the natural reduction rate in the Northeast today is 2.6 to 2.9 times the national average. Heilongjiang has already given up, having failed to release birth and death data for three consecutive years. Kindergartens, as we mentioned at the beginning, are a lagging indicator of population, meaning that 3 to 6 years after the birth population drops, kindergartens start closing down. Kindergartens in Heilongjiang dropped from 5,763 in 2020 to 4,390 in 2024, a full 24 percent decrease in four years. Liaoning dropped from 9,273 in 2021 to 7,817 in 2024. Jilin, in just one year, went from 3,511 down to 3,229.

Looking further back, from 2013 to 2022, how many primary schools did Heilongjiang close? Nearly 60 percent. Jilin closed 50 percent, and Liaoning also closed 50 percent. Nationwide in 2025, only 8.45 percent of kindergartens were closed in a single year, whereas Heilongjiang closed 12.5 percent of its kindergartens in 2024 alone. This indicator doesn't look like much in terms of temporal lead, right? But in terms of intensity, the Northeast is 1.5 to 3 times the national level, meaning the rest of the country won't catch up to Heilongjiang's 2024 closure intensity until between 2028 and 2030. The pension dimension is even harder, because why? Because pensions are cash flow and cannot be fudged. Heilongjiang's urban employee insurance gap already exceeded 11 billion back in 2011. By 2013, the current-term balance directly turned negative. By the end of 2016, the accumulated balance was already minus 23.2 billion. In other words, Heilongjiang's urban employee pension insurance went bankrupt a decade ago. In 2019, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences under the CCP made some kind of actuarial report, right? That was calculated for the whole country. What did they say? They said the current-term balance of the national urban employee pension insurance would turn negative for the first time in 2028.

Well, at that time it will be minus 118.1 billion, and the accumulated balance will peak in 2027—well, at 6.99 trillion—and then be exhausted by 2035. Heilongjiang's current-term balance turning negative happened as early as 2011 to 2013. The national prediction is 2028, meaning it is a full 15 to 17 years ahead of the national timeline. Heilongjiang's bankruptcy happened as early as 2016, while the national prediction is in 2025—well, and that is still a relatively optimistic view, you see. On this point, Heilongjiang is 19 years ahead of the national average, meaning in the pension dimension, the Northeast is leading the country by 15 to 19 years, with a median of 17 years. So someone is bound to say, hey, isn't there still money in the national pension account? In 2025, the national urban employee pension insurance revenue is 7.917 trillion, and expenditures are 7.1203 trillion, which means the year-end accumulated balance still has a little under 800 billion. Well, it looks like a positive number, but what does this revenue also include? It also includes fiscal subsidies. As for the original table of collection revenue and expenditure excluding subsidies, I haven't obtained it.

Even if we calculate based on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) transferring at least two trillion yuan annually, there is still a gap of at least 1.2 trillion yuan. The gap in Heilongjiang in 2011 also first appeared in the collection caliber, so the positive balance here does not mean it can support itself in the current period. This is also consistent with the aging data: by the end of 2025, the population over 60 in the whole country accounted for 23%, while in Liaoning, it had already reached 32.5% in 2025, and in Jilin, it was 30%. The growth rate of this proportion nationwide is about one percentage point per year, which is a terrifying speed. It will only take nine to ten years to reach Liaoning's current position, and the national data is already accelerating to catch up with the Northeast. Finally, let's look at the dimension of balance sheet clearing; the gap in this dimension is the shortest. Let's look at the investment caliber first: as early as 2016, fixed asset investment in Liaoning had already fallen by 63.5%, while the national decline in 2025 was 3.8%, and in the first eight months of 2026, it fell by 7.2%. Therefore, in terms of time, it is a full nine years ahead of the national level.

Looking at the credit default caliber, Northeast Special Steel defaulted in March 2016, and Yongcheng Coal & Electricity and Brilliance Auto defaulted in October and November 2020, respectively. The Yongmei case involved 1.032 billion yuan in principal and interest that was not repaid, and Brilliance failed to repay 1 billion yuan in principal plus 53 million yuan in interest. These are just a few very small cases; there are a bunch of banks that I won't list one by one. So, in this caliber, it is four years ahead. Let's look at the bank merger caliber: Liaoshen Bank began absorbing and merging Yingkou Bank and Liaoyang Bank as early as 2021, while the number of banking legal entities nationwide only decreased by 196 at the end of 2024. In 2025 alone, it decreased by 676, among which rural small and medium-sized banks decreased from 3,603 to 2,933, and by early September this year, 160 village and township banks had dissolved—not even talking about bankruptcy, just direct dissolution. In this area, the Northeast is only three to four years ahead. In the entire balance sheet dimension, the Northeast is three to nine years ahead. We can rank these three numbers: population is 23 to 25 years ahead, credit contraction is 15 to 19 years ahead, and the balance sheet is three to nine years ahead.

What does this tell us? It tells us that each level is shorter than the last. Why is it getting shorter? The biggest reason is fiscal blood transfusions. What is the course of the Northeast's disease? It has been artificially prolonged by the central government's fiscal policy. How much central transfer payment did Liaoning actually receive in 2025? It was 357.48 billion yuan. What about Jilin? Jilin received about 300 billion yuan. Heilongjiang received 414.3 billion yuan in transfer payments in 2025. The three provinces combined reached a magnitude of nearly one trillion yuan, which is equivalent to more than half of the 1.8 trillion yuan in general public budget expenditures of the three northeastern provinces in a year. Then there is the pension part, which requires an additional allocation of more than 200 billion yuan every year. You might say that if a province's pension fund runs out, it can be filled by other provinces; if a province's investment collapses, it can be dragged along by central projects. But what if the whole country becomes like the Northeast? At that time, where would there be a larger fiscal source to provide blood transfusions for the whole country? The only source would be the central bank! The Ministry of Finance issued 500 billion yuan in capital-injection special treasury bonds in 2025 and 300 billion yuan in 2026, and at the same time, it borrowed more than 80 billion yuan from tobacco companies. What is this money mainly for? It is mainly to replenish the capital of large banks and financial central enterprises.

This trend is even more obvious this year. Looking at the use of tools, the net injection by the CCP's central bank directly replaced 17% of the government bond net financing for banks. This is a national version of the central adjustment fund, but the source of the adjustment is not the contributions from Guangdong, but the deposit purchasing power of all depositors. If the thread of fiscal blood transfusion to the Northeast reaches its end, then only currency remains. Moreover, the Northeast suffered these four blows over the past forty years, one by one. But the national malaise is due to the fact that land finance was exhausted all at once in 2021. Therefore, for the whole country, these four blows—investment, credit, and fiscal—all fell simultaneously starting in 2025. As a result, the time gap in the balance sheet dimension has been compressed to single digits. As for the counter-argument, I have heard your thoughts; some say that the Northeast is suffering from resource depletion and industrial cycles, and that the Ruhr and Detroit are the same. My response is: when Detroit entered bankruptcy proceedings in 2013, it only wrote down 7 billion dollars in debt, and after clearing, there was still an opportunity for repricing.

And what has the Northeast experienced? It has endured forty years of administrative bloodletting, and after being battered into the miserable shape it is in today, it has neither received market repricing nor any restoration other than fiscal transfer payments. With its resources depleted, the system simply cannot explain Daqing's oil priced at a fucking 100 yuan per ton, nor can it explain the 8,000 yuan buyout price. Some people say that the central government gives the Northeast over 900 billion yuan in fiscal transfer payments every year, and that this is compensation, not plunder. What is my response? You have to look at the two ledgers side by side. Daqing alone paid over 3 trillion yuan in taxes based on visible achievements, plus over 100 billion yuan in hidden price scissors, and Daqing is merely the tip of the iceberg. What else is there? There is a brain drain of 1.37 million people—this is an act of extraction. And what is the designated use of that 900-plus billion yuan that flows back? It is to guarantee wages, government operations, and pension payouts; essentially, it is just the cost of keeping this extractive apparatus running itself. What does compensation bring? Compensation brings capital formation, whereas maintenance only brings dependency. In the first half of 2026, Liaoning's investment plummeted by 30 percent—this is proof that the returned funds failed to turn into capital.

The strongest argument from the opposing side is exports. Ah, they say the country has what the Northeast lacks, and the trade surplus from 2025 to this year remains at the scale of trillions annually. Ah, I concede this point, and this is precisely the second variable. What does this variable determine? This variable determines how much longer the Northeast can rely on external bleeding. Because the Northeast's external bleeding relies on the central government's finance, while the country's external bleeding relies on this trade surplus. Whether this surplus can be sustained depends on the U.S. capital expenditure cycle and tariffs, not on the CCP itself. Once this export leg is broken, the country's situation will be no different from Liaoning's in 2016, only worse. Because back then, Liaoning at least had the central government's finance behind it, whereas the country now only has the printing press behind it. This is the single biggest variable for the next 3 to 5 years. Let's push this timeline forward: 2025 to 2027 will see a massive collapse in investment and the demise of credit—this is happening every single second right now. In 2028, according to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences' own forecast, the national pension fund's current balance will turn negative.

By around 2030, the grim reality of kindergarten closures nationwide will catch up to Heilongjiang's 2024 level. This is calculated directly by comparing the 7.92 million births in 2025 with the 10.62 million births in 2021. Looking further ahead, between 2034 and 2035, the nation's aging proportion and pension reserves will completely walk into the desperate dead end that Liaoning and Heilongjiang waded through a decade ago. The Northeast has not found any exit on this path, and neither can the entire country. The only difference is that when the Northeast was battered like this back then, it at least had central government finance transfusing blood into it. But if the whole country contracts the Northeast disease under the CCP model, then behind it there will only be the central bank, and what the central bank outputs to you has never been real money. It can be understood this way: the CCP itself is a massive virus, and the Chinese economy is the host of this virus. So what is the truth of the Northeast disease? It is actually the symptoms produced by this CCP virus. Ah, this is just the fever, the cold, and the runny nose. Speaking of "far ahead," Huawei and the like are all fucking younger brothers; the Northeast is truly far ahead.

It can be said that as long as you understand the Northeast, you can understand China under CCP rule. Alright, that is all I will ramble on about with you today. If you like my show, please click the bell icon below. If you want to support me, you can join the membership channel to get four in-depth episodes every month. Welcome to join the gang of ruthless people, and see you in the next episode.