Miles Yu Analyzes the U.S.-China Summit and Trump’s China Strategy

This article is an exclusive interview by Voice of America with scholar Miles Yu, providing an in-depth analysis of the second U.S.-China summit between President Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping. The interview covers the high-profile ceremonial arrangements of the meeting, the game between the U.S. and China surrounding the fourth 'T' (Artificial Intelligence), Tehran (the situation in Iran), and Taiwan, as well as progress on arms sales to Taiwan, human rights and the release of political prisoners, and the continuity and core demands of Trump's China strategy in his second term.

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Welcome back, Professor Miles Yu, to Voice of America to provide us with an in-depth analysis of the U.S.-China summit. The reception protocol this time seems even higher than previous U.S.-China summits. President Trump personally went to Joint Base Andrews to meet the plane, plus the welcome ceremony at the White House, the scale of the state dinner, and the visit to the U.S. National Archives. How do you interpret this three-day state visit?

I don't think this protocol and pomp are particularly important, because when Xi Jinping visited China in May of this year, Xi also put on a big show for Mr. Trump, so this should be reciprocal; it should be like this in terms of diplomatic etiquette. I don't think this pomp necessarily proves that there has been substantive progress in U.S.-China relations. On the contrary, precisely because there is nothing substantive to be done, the pomp, etiquette, and display of strength appear even more important. This time, the place where Mr. Trump showed off to Xi Jinping was at Andrews Air Force Base, and there were many of America's most advanced bombers and fighter jets nearby. So, one of the main purposes of him telling Xi Jinping this is that I can treat you with high protocol, but you must understand that this is in the United States, and the United States is far superior to you in many aspects of strength, especially military strength. So, we should not confuse the president's diplomatic rhetoric with what the U.S. government is actually doing. Of course, the two countries emphasize being courteous to each other, but in reality, in many practical operations between the two countries, they are basically working against each other every day and every week.

Professor Yu just specifically mentioned that at Andrews Air Force Base, the U.S. side displayed the most advanced U.S. military fighter jets. In fact, the welcome ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House also arranged for fighter jets to fly over, including B-2 bombers and F-22 Raptor fighter jets, which will also appear when welcoming Xi Jinping to the White House. How do you interpret such an unprecedented arrangement?

I think this is, of course, unprecedented. For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), they feel this is unprecedented, but I believe Mr. Trump pays a lot of attention to visual effects. Look at his most recent meeting with Putin; it happened right when the US and Russia were having the most heated arguments over the Ukraine issue. He met Putin in Alaska at an Air Force airfield, with America's advanced bombers and fighter jets lined up all around them. That sent a message: the US is not to be messed with. I can treat you with high status, but the message is very clear. This time, I think the heads of both countries do not want to make people feel like they are weak, nor do they want to make it seem like either side needs this summit more than the other. For the US, whether there is a summit or not is not that crucial; the key is whether the commitments reached by the CCP in May have actually been fulfilled. For Xi Jinping, his core issue is wanting the US to stop extending the tariff truce, and to prevent the US from pulling the trigger on this critical issue, which would push the CCP's economy and trade further into an abyss. Mr. Trump feels that's fine, we can consider it, but the crucial point depends on whether you have made concrete, practical progress since May on the things you already promised at that time, especially regarding rare earth imports and the procurement of US agricultural products. In fact, US government officials have been saying from the very beginning until now that the CCP has completely failed to fulfill its commitments. So for Mr. Trump, the approach toward the CCP is to treat them with high-level protocol, but use that to force the CCP to seriously fulfill its so-called commitments.

Aside from the high-profile pageantry, let's also talk about the agenda. The agenda for this US-China summit might be as lavish as the menu of a White House state dinner. Beyond the three Ts we discussed back in May—which were the most important issues then, including Tehran, trade, and Taiwan—people are saying there is a fourth T this time: Technology, specifically AI. Some outsiders even speculate whether the heads of the US and China might reach a so-called AI hotline. How do you view whether these four Ts are the most important issues of this summit, which T is most likely to reach a consensus, and which one is most likely to cause misjudgment or divergence?

I think none of these Ts can reach a final conclusion. In the end, it might result in a slightly extended fifth T, and that is Truth—well, a truce, which starts with a T. So in that sense, why? Because on these critical issues, it touches upon the fundamental national policies and strategies of both countries. As you mentioned regarding the Taiwan issue, the CCP will never yield, and neither will the US. The trade issue is even less likely, and other issues are the same. Of course, since May, artificial intelligence—now Mr. Trump talks about super intelligence, and super intelligence has also become an important topic. This is mainly about the US and China exercising control. Why? Because super intelligence, AI, is extremely powerful. Its power can benefit humanity, but it also poses a massive threat to the destruction of humanity. Therefore, management by both the US and China is also important. As for this aspect, the US isn't really begging the CCP for anything, because the US is innovative and leads in artificial intelligence, whereas the CCP is number one at stealing US artificial intelligence products. Therefore, regarding control, the US and China might reach some kind of gentleman's agreement on paper. As everyone knows, in cyberspace, there has actually never been a day of truce for artificial intelligence, regardless of any agreements. If the CCP were to stop stealing advanced US technology, then the CCP would no longer be the CCP.

Among these Ts, there is also another one: Tehran, Iran. I want to ask you, back in 2017, I remember President Trump hosted Xi Jinping for a banquet at Mar-a-Lago, and during the banquet, he personally informed Xi Jinping that the US had launched a military strike against Syria, which was shocking news at the time. Do you think President Trump might drop another bombshell on Xi Jinping during this White House state dinner, especially now when the Middle East is tense, and Trump just stated in his UN General Assembly speech that he might completely destroy Iran? Therefore, do you think this US-China summit might affect the tense situation in the Middle East, and will it lead Trump to bring up China's covert support for Iran or even Russia?

China not only provides covert support to Russia, but in other aspects, it is not even covert—it is blatant support. Especially regarding countries like Russia, the long-term strategy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is that anyone who opposes the United States will receive the full support of the CCP. Russia, Iran, Venezuela, Cuba, and North Korea are all like this; this is the traditional strategy of the CCP, which has been the case since the 1950s. This time, regarding countries like Iran, actually, Iran's dependence on the CCP is much greater than the CCP's dependence on Iran. In fact, the CCP has little dependence on Iran; it simply uses Iran to oppose the United States because Iran opposes the United States. Practically speaking, what is happening? Led by the Department of the Treasury, they are implementing so-called secondary sanctions. This means that for countries like China that provide massive blood transfusions to Iran and Russia, the sanctions imposed by the U.S. on these state-sponsors of such countries will be just as severe. The blow of this to China is immense. Therefore, I see this becoming an issue this time, but this issue is not a new one; it is an old cliché. Trump and Xi Jinping both know this, and both sides are secretly exerting effort. Mr. Trump also knows that it is hard for Xi Jinping to change his nature, and he will not make significant and substantial progress. Therefore, the most critical issue is to put into action what Mr. Trump has repeatedly vowed for years: to implement secondary sanctions against countries that support these rogue nations. So this time, I see it as being serious.

Professor Miles Yu, in fact, you served in an important position during Trump's first term, so you probably have a better understanding of his strategy when interacting with other foreign leaders. We know he is a president skilled at reaching deals or agreements. What is it that he most wants to get at the negotiating table this time? From Beijing's perspective, what are the goals that Xi Jinping most wants to achieve through this visit to the U.S.?

I think this time, the goal Mr. Trump wants to achieve is primarily to reach a kind of strategic stability with the CCP, saying that we should not have accidental conflicts; this is his consistent policy. Another point is that every time the CCP uses these summits, it is to undermine the psychological balance of America's allies. Therefore, every time there is a U.S.-China summit, America's allies—such as Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines—tend to feel quite anxious. This time, taking advantage of the United Nations General Assembly, President Trump first publicly held phone calls with leaders like the South Korean leader and the Japanese Prime Minister, and then treated these meetings with high-level protocols. Thus, I think this acts as a reassurance pill. Another point is that I think the U.S. wants to establish very specific mechanisms with the CCP regarding the specific implementation of commitments. This is why in negotiations on these critically pivotal crossroad issues, Mr. Trump did not handle it himself; instead, he let his Treasury Secretary negotiate with the CCP's Vice Premier He Lifeng. They negotiated maybe a dozen times with zero results. Up to now, the CCP has only made verbal commitments to the U.S. on any issue, with no signed documents whatsoever—nothing was signed in May, and I see nothing being signed now either. Because Xi Jinping simply wants to feel on the surface that he has reached some sort of strategic stability with the U.S., in reality, both sides are buying time and have never given up their guard against each other. If you look inside the U.S. government, Mr. Trump says that his personal relationships with leaders of other major countries make them his good friends, but in fact, his cabinet members and various departmental officials launch crackdowns on the CCP in various aspects almost every week. Huawei was taken to court, followed by technical controls from the Department of Justice, the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, and the Department of Commerce—every week there are actual actions in this regard. So I think U.S.-China relations may look relatively harmonious on the surface with these scenes and state banquets, but in reality, this is just like the late 1950s at the height of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, when President Eisenhower invited Khrushchev to take a tour of the United States with high-level receptions. In this way, I think the two major powers need this kind of psychological stability, but in reality, the institutional and material confrontation between the two countries has never stopped. In other words, they still shake hands on the surface and drink a few glasses at the state banquet, but behind the scenes, they are still wrestling with each other.

Now, you just mentioned strategic stability, which is an important keyword for the current U.S.-China summit. Although both sides may have different definitions of strategic stability, do you think the U.S. and China can really achieve strategic stability? Can both sides genuinely establish so-called mechanisms to manage potential crises? What is your view?

I think this mainly depends on the CCP. The CCP's view of the United States is entirely based on Marxism-Leninism. It believes that the American political system—this insistence on democracy, the rule of law, and human rights—poses a huge threat to its regime. Why? Because the American system has a very powerful appeal to the Chinese people. Therefore, the CCP wants to pull down and eliminate the moral, military, economic, and political leadership of the United States globally. Given this, I believe the CCP has always defined its relationship with the U.S. as one of hostility. If this concept, this ideology, and the principles guiding this policy are not dispelled, then I think it will be very difficult for the U.S. and China to achieve a strategic stability truly built on mutual trust.

Professor Yu, you just mentioned the anxiety among U.S. allies during the U.S.-China summit. How exactly will President Trump reassure or guarantee to his allies that the relationship between the U.S. and Japan or Taiwan will not be affected by this meeting with Xi Jinping? While reaching agreements or deals, how does he maintain the strategic leverage and advantages of the U.S. and its allies? What is your take?

I am quite familiar with this, because since his first term, Mr. Trump has dealt with the CCP by trying to the greatest extent possible to avoid bringing up other issues that have no direct relation to the U.S.-China relationship. So, to a large extent, when Xi Jinping brings up Taiwan, Trump has always said that Taiwan is Taiwan and China is the CCP; if you insist on talking to me about it, I will listen, but I will not make any commitments. This time, I don't think Taiwan will become a major issue either. On other issues, such as the situation with Japan, it is the same. The CCP now portrays Japan as a country where militarism is being restored, which is a monstrous lie. For a leader of a major power to still spout this kind of 1950s-style ideology in the 21st century, I don't think anyone believes him. Therefore, Mr. Trump attaches great importance to U.S.-Japan relations, and his defense commitments to the U.S.-Japan relationship, as well as commitments in technology, are very, very tight. So, I think if the CCP does not abandon its very outdated Marxist-Leninist worldview and strategic perspective, I think it will be very, very difficult. Mr. Trump, in this regard—you see, this time, he is handling so many U.S.-China issues, there are already too many to cover—so he tries to avoid other issues as much as possible. Therefore, I think U.S.-China relations are very difficult, but the crucial move is not for the U.S. to make; it should be the CCP's move.

However, what do you make of the view held by many in the Washington policy circle that the $14 billion in arms sales to Taiwan seems to be delayed until after this summit, or even after APEC or the G20, or perhaps until next year? How do you view such predictions from many experts?

I don't think this necessarily indicates any major change in U.S. policy toward Taiwan. Everyone knows that the U.S. is the world's largest arms exporter, and the world's largest purchaser of weapons is Taiwan; this is a very obvious fact. If you don't understand this fundamental point, it is hard to understand the solidity of U.S.-Taiwan relations. Last December, the U.S. sold $11 billion worth of these very critical, targeted weapons to Taiwan, which was a very large deal, and the $14 billion is still pending. This requires some specific measures. First of all, the U.S. now also needs a kind of strategic balance; there is a balance in the supply of weapons. Another point is that the U.S. weapons for Taiwan are mainly targeted at the level of the CCP's threat to Taiwan. This has been the case since the 1970s; whether the U.S. sells weapons to Taiwan is entirely determined by the degree of the CCP's threat to Taiwan. So the U.S. has its own policy considerations. You see, is there an increase in the CCP's threat to Taiwan? Of course, there is an increase, but at the same time, Taiwan is also buying a lot of weapons from the U.S. So, Taiwan needs to make internal adjustments because although Taiwan's defense system and the U.S. defense system have a lot of close integration, this level of integration is still far from enough. Therefore, this requires a gradual process; if too many things are sent over and cannot be consumed, it will instead become a burden. Of course, this does not mean that the U.S. lacks the determination for further arms sales to Taiwan. In fact, the $14 billion has already been approved; to a large extent, this is to give Xi Jinping some face and some pressure. If you continue to increase pressure on Taiwan, we will sell the weapons immediately. This is also a check and balance on the CCP. I don't think this necessarily means there is any change in U.S. politics; this is mainly a strategic consideration. This is also actual pressure on the CCP, and for Taiwan, it is effectively a guarantee of its security.

Professor Yu, I still remember that before the last U.S.-China summit in May, you specifically spoke to us at Voice of America, saying that the U.S. side should take every opportunity of meetings with high-level Chinese officials and U.S.-China heads of state to convey the voice of the United States directly to the Chinese people. So, I would like to discuss the issue of human rights, because after the May meeting, we actually saw Jimmy Lai released. Do you think the two will discuss human rights issues or the release of political prisoners, as well as U.S. citizens wrongfully detained by China, at this September summit? What message do you think President Trump can convey to the Chinese people through this summit? Professor Yu.

This is to say that Xi Jinping's visit to the United States this time has aroused the anger of many people. Almost all levels and groups across the United States have expressed to the White House their hope to convey a voice of protest and dissatisfaction to Xi Jinping. There are such voices in Congress, and even more so among civil society organizations, so thousands upon thousands of people have the determination and desire to express their protest against Xi Jinping. President Trump has already indicated through his spokesperson that he will raise these demands with Xi Jinping, so these things are a form of immense pressure, which is, of course, unavoidable. Regarding what you just said about how to convey information directly to the Chinese people, if you look at some of the information from the U.S. Embassy in China, it is very clear. All major decisions by the U.S. President, whether related to China or not, but having some connection to China, are conveyed through the U.S. Embassy in China. Another point is that conveying this information to the Chinese people and conveying American values does not necessarily require a clear policy statement. The U.S. government has many actions; it can exert a huge influence on mainland China through its own government's behavior. For example, during the war against Iran, the Chinese public was naturally very concerned about this matter, but what had the most impact on the Chinese public was that the U.S. military mobilized thousands of people and spent hundreds of millions of dollars in resources to rescue two injured U.S. military pilots. This was discussed very, very much among the Chinese public. This demonstrates the values of a country and shows that a country respects its own people and respects its soldiers; this is very, very impactful. Such subtle influences are, I think, a more indirect way of sending a message to China. Another point, of course, is that there are many gradual soft power tools, including Voice of America—you are doing a very good job—and I think many Chinese listeners and viewers can also understand the direction of U.S. policy and the policy statements of its leaders through your channels. These things are all subtle and gradual. To change China's understanding of the United States, I think it requires a lot of effort from both the United States and the Chinese people.

Professor Yu, this week you also had a conversation at Harvard University with the renowned historian Rana Mitter about the historical evolution of U.S.-China relations. From the initial engagement to the current containment, the qualitative change actually began during President Trump's first term. You held an important position during his first term. Do you think that so far in President Trump's second term, there have already been two U.S.-China summits; how do you compare the strategy and tactics on these two levels with his first term? Are there any obvious differences? Do you think there are significant changes? Professor Yu.

I find this itinerary of Harvard University that you just mentioned very interesting. I've had many discussions about it with friends, and many agree with my view. I think even more people will eventually agree with my view, which makes for a very good exchange. Now, speaking of the different issues between the first and second terms, I think the U.S. policy toward China, from Trump's first administration through Biden to the present, has a fairly obvious continuity; it's not as if there has been some kind of shift. The first administration was, of course, very important. During Trump's first term, for instance, we changed the entire U.S. strategic positioning toward China—that is, designating the Chinese Communist Party as the primary threat to the United States. This was a hugely significant change. U.S. policy, public sentiment, the economy, politics, and the military all made major, world-historically significant changes from the perspective of this redefined outlook. That is extremely important. Ever since then, the Biden administration has not changed any of these basic judgments at all, so they have also followed this path we laid out. Secondly, its basic positioning hasn't changed at all; the Chinese Communist Party remains the top threat to the United States, and this threat is deepening day by day. This is not just something the U.S. government has to convince the American people of—the American people see it very clearly, and Congress even more so, without the slightest change. U.S. policy toward China has become more mature and more targeted. Even though the obvious rhetoric about direct confrontation with the Chinese Communist Party has noticeably decreased—President Trump told Xi Jinping we are good friends and we want to achieve a kind of strategic stability—in reality, everything the second U.S. administration does is related to the Chinese Communist Party, because the Chinese Communist Party truly is the number one threat to the United States. For example, strengthening domestic security and the security of the Western Hemisphere—this is aimed at the Chinese Communist Party, kicking its influence out of places like the Panama Canal and Venezuela. Secondly, another policy focus in President Trump's second term is to strengthen deterrence, which is unmistakably aimed at China. Third is to increase so-called burden sharing, meaning that allies, especially European allies, should increase their own defense spending to reduce the burden on the United States, allowing us in the U.S. to have more energy and financial resources to deal with the Chinese Communist Party. The final point is to revitalize the U.S. economy and rebuild the U.S. industrial base. So it's not about directly confronting the Chinese Communist Party, but in many areas there is now technological control. The United States is an innovative nation with many leading technologies in the world, and it must prevent the Chinese Communist Party from using technologies invented by the U.S. to counter the United States; this is also a policy consideration for the U.S. Therefore, I think in all aspects, the second U.S. administration continues the China policy of the first U.S. administration without any change.

Well, finally, I'd like to ask Professor Miles Yu, after every summit meeting between heads of state, it actually takes a period of time to settle before the achievements of the summit can be truly confirmed. If there are a few indicators to confirm whether this U.S.-China summit is a success, where do you think the key lies? Just the final minute or two.

薊The key issue is that the United States must constantly monitor how much of its own promises the Chinese Communist Party has fulfilled. For instance, since May, the Chinese Communist Party said it would continue to sell rare earths to the United States, but the Chinese Communist Party hasn't done that at all. Therefore, I feel that in many aspects of U.S.-China relations, there is a lot of work to be done regarding these commitments. This is why Secretary of State Pompeo said something very important when he was Secretary of State: he said we must start with distrust, and then we verify. This goes even a step further than what Reagan proposed back then to Gorbachev of the Soviet Union—trust, but verify. I think this is a more correct approach.

Well, we are very grateful to Professor Miles Yu for accepting Voice of America's interview, once again providing an in-depth analysis of the U.S.-China summit of heads of state. Thank you very much.