Have the Old and New Military Chiefs Rebelled? Rumors Say Chi Haotian and Li Zuocheng Demand Xi's Ouster as CMC Chairman! Xi Jinping Skipped Zhurihe — Was He Afraid of a Targeted Strike? A Magnitude-7 Earthquake in Tibet — Was the Cause Xi's Version of the Three Gorges, the "Yarlung Tsangpo Downstream Project"? (Old Beijing Teahouse / Episode 1783 / 2026 / 10 / 24)

This episode mainly discusses the reasons behind Xi Jinping bypassing the Zhurihe Training Base during his inspection in Inner Mongolia, analyzing his large-scale purges of generals and power-related paranoia over the years. It also reports on rumors that veteran military figures such as Chi Haotian and Li Zuocheng have submitted a petition demanding the removal of Xi as Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Additionally, it covers the 7.0-magnitude earthquake in Baqing County, Nagqu City, Tibet, and the subsequent concerns and allegations of cover-ups regarding the impact on hydropower projects in the lower reaches of the Yarlung Tsangpo River.

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A couple of days ago, we mentioned that Xi Jinping did not bring his "most intimate sycophant and personal scout," Cai Qi, during his inspection of Ulanqab, Inner Mongolia, sparking speculation about whether something had happened to Cai. Amidst the treacherous and unpredictable situation, there is actually something even more suspicious: this time, Xi Jinping's inspection site, the "Ulanqab Huangqi Sea, Chahar High-tech Development Zone," is less than 180 kilometers away from the "Zhurihe Base," the site of his grand military parade in 2017 when he was at the height of his power. Whether by car or private jet, even if he were carried in a sedan chair by eight men, alternating shoulders without changing the 200-jin load, it would have been very easy to reach the Zhurihe Base. However, Xi Jinping did not go to the Zhurihe Base, which is quite interesting. Looking back to 2016, when Xi Jinping pushed through military reforms, the Zhurihe Training Base was transferred from the Beijing Military Region to the Army. The base was equipped with barracks, hospitals, logistics, and other facilities for more than five divisions, and even featured buildings resembling the Presidential Office Building in Taiwan, as well as an airport capable of conducting airborne training. The following year, on July 30, 2017, Xi Jinping inspected the troops and delivered a speech at the military parade held at the Zhurihe Base to mark the 90th anniversary of the founding of the CCP, which was seen as a symbol of his control over the military—it was quite a spectacle. However, times have changed. During his inspection in Inner Mongolia, not only did Xi Jinping stay near the Zhurihe Base without entering it, but there were also no reports of him meeting with local military representatives, a sharp contrast to the grand parade nine years ago.

If you wear cotton pants over leather pants, there must be a reason, and the reason lies with those two old guys, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli. Everyone on Earth knows that in January of this year, Xi Jinping violated normal intra-party procedures and launched a surprise attack on Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli. The entire military system exploded, and many people harbor immense resentment and hostility toward Xi because of this. Precisely because there are so many people in the military system who secretly curse Xi's ancestors to the eighth generation, and they are randomly distributed across all major military regions and theater commands, Xi Jinping is so scared that he no longer dares to inspect grassroots troops. This is exactly why Xi Jinping went to Ulanqab this time but did not enter the Zhurihe base, which is 180 kilometers away—he is afraid of being ambushed. Some have conducted further verification, posting Xi Jinping's public activity records as evidence. In black and white, from January 2026 to the present, Xi has indeed not inspected local troops as per custom. Wang Youqun, a former official of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the Ministry of Supervision, also has an analysis regarding the entire military cursing Xi's ancestors: in the five years of his first term, Xi investigated and handled nearly 160 generals; in the five years of his second term, the number of generals handled may have reached 116. In his third term, in the more than three years up to January 24 of this year, the number of generals handled may have reached 142. In other words, from the time Xi took power in November 2012 to his taking down of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli in January 2026, the total number of generals Xi has handled may be as high as 418. Among them, in the four years since the 20th CCP National Congress, Xi has purged as many as 58 generals (shangjiang). These generals held almost all key positions across the Central Military Commission, the 15 departments of the Military Commission, the four major military services, the five theater commands, the People's Armed Police, and military academies. Do you see? Three terms, in stages and batches, cleared out in an orderly fashion. To put it bluntly, whether you go to the 'palace' (prison) sooner or later, you will end up there eventually.

So, what is the logic behind these three stages? The logic is that there is no logic, or rather, when one starts acting recklessly, one even slaughters their own people. The first stage, 2012–2018, the cases of Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, wiped out 7 people. The targets in this round were mainly generals promoted during the Jiang Zemin era. Former CMC Vice Chairman Xu Caihou was expelled from the Party and stripped of his rank of general in 2014; he died of bladder cancer in March 2015 while under investigation, and no prosecution was pursued according to law. Former CMC Vice Chairman Guo Boxiong was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2016. Subsequently, Tian Xiusi, Wang Jianping, Wang Xibin, Zhang Yang, and Fang Fenghui fell one after another. Wang Jianping was the first active-duty general to be investigated. Fang Fenghui was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2019. The official narrative was to 'eliminate the poisonous influence of Guo and Xu.' The second stage, 2018–2022: during these four or five years, no generals were officially handled publicly, with the only exception being retired general Liu Yazhou. In 2023, Hong Kong media reported he was expelled from the Party and the military, and in 2024, rumors emerged that he had been sentenced to life imprisonment, but there has been no official statement to this day. The third stage, 2023 to present: the most intense purge is in this third stage, involving 31 people from the Rocket Force and the Military Commission. In the second half of 2023, cases involving the Rocket Force and the equipment department were exposed. Successive commanders of the Rocket Force, such as Li Yuchao and Zhou Yaning, ran into trouble. Former Defense Ministers Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu were expelled from the Party in 2024. In May 2026, both were sentenced to death with a reprieve in the first instance; after the reprieve expires, it will be commuted to life imprisonment without parole. On October 17, 2025, the Ministry of National Defense announced in one go that 9 generals, including CMC Vice Chairman He Weidong and former Director of the CMC Political Work Department Miao Hua, had been expelled from the Party and the military. In January 2026, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were placed under investigation and were expelled from the Party and the military in September. In addition, 14 generals were removed from their positions as deputies to the National People's Congress by their respective military representative congresses, and 4 retired generals had their qualifications as members of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference revoked.

The Twitter account 'New Highland' lamented that Xi Jinping has broken both Chinese and foreign historical records, having 'toppled' 65 generals in the military during his 14 years in power. Among them, 38 have official records of being handled, while the other 27—that is, Liu Yazhou and 26 missing persons—have had no official statement to this day, effectively being 'disappeared.' Of the 7 members of the 20th Central Military Commission, 5 have been investigated. Zhang Yang is the only one officially confirmed to have died an unnatural death. It is hard to imagine that this is happening within the military during peacetime. Among these 31 people, 13 have clear official announcements of investigation, expulsion, or sentencing, while the remaining 18 were merely removed from office or had their qualifications revoked. The authorities usually do not state the reasons for these two procedures, but they are generally viewed by the outside world as a signal of trouble. Among the known cases, the only one officially confirmed as an unnatural death is Zhang Yang, a former member of the Military Commission and former Director of the Political Work Department. In August 2017, he was interviewed by the organization, and on November 23 of the same year, he hanged himself at home. The authorities called it 'suicide out of fear of punishment.' Xu Caihou died of illness while under investigation, which the authorities classified as death by illness. There are three other rumors of death, none of which have been officially confirmed. First, He Hongjun, rumored to have hanged himself while in detention, but the authorities did not mention his death when they expelled him from the Party in October 2025. Second, He Weidong, rumored to have died while in detention, with conflicting accounts regarding the cause and time of death. Third, Chang Dingqiu, rumored to have died while in detention. These three can currently only be treated as rumors. In short, the scale of Xi Jinping's purge is rare in the history of the CCP.

Let us take a look at the scale of the purge in the Central Military Commission. Of the seven members of the Military Commission produced at the 20th National Congress in 2022, Chairman Xi Jinping, Vice Chairmen Zhang Youxia and He Weidong, and members Li Shangfu, Liu Zhenli, Miao Hua, and Zhang Shengmin, only Zhang Shengmin remains besides Xi Jinping. He was co-opted as Vice Chairman in October 2025, while the other five have all been investigated. Such a situation has no precedent in the history of the CCP. Let us look at the statistics from the Center for Strategic and International Studies in the United States. As of February 2026, 36 full generals and lieutenant generals of the PLA have been officially purged since 2022, and another 65 have gone missing or are suspected of being purged, totaling 101. Among the 47 general-rank commanders in office or promoted since 2022, 41 have been purged or suspected of being purged, a proportion as high as 87 percent. According to statistics from the same U.S. research center, since 2020, among the 35 three-star generals promoted by Xi Jinping, 32 have been investigated, and 29 have been purged or suspected of being purged. Some historians have pointed out that throughout history, precedents of founding emperors or dictators launching large-scale purges of military generals are not uncommon. In the early Ming dynasty, Zhu Yuanzhang implicated meritorious officials and veteran generals through the cases of Hu Weiyong and Lan Yu. According to the History of Ming, the former resulted in the execution of over 30,000 people, and the latter saw the execution of 15,000 families, wiping out almost all the founding nobility. During the Great Purge led by Stalin from 1937 to 1938, three of the Soviet Union's first five marshals died in the purge, and [Tukhachevsky] was executed, almost wiping out the Red Army's high command. However, compared to these two major purges, Xi Jinping's purge differs in two obvious ways. First is the method. Today, there are no public executions or the execution of entire extended families. Instead, it follows party discipline, military discipline, and military judicial procedures, involving case filing, "shuangkai", and transfer for prosecution. The heaviest sentence is a suspended death sentence commuted to life imprisonment, but this set of procedures is highly opaque. Many people simply vanish at meetings, and dismissal announcements give no reasons. Second is the target. Zhu Yuanzhang purged the founding meritorious officials, Stalin purged old Bolsheviks and Red Army generals whom he viewed as potential rivals, whereas the third stage of Xi Jinping's purges has mostly targeted generals whom he himself promoted and whose writs of appointment he personally signed. He Weidong and Miao Hua were once widely regarded as his confidants in the military, while Zhang Youxia is an old friend with ties to his father's generation. The previous round of "liquidating the previous regime" could be said to consolidate power, but by this round of "purging one's own people," the problem is no longer just corruption; it lies in the appointment and supervision system itself. Promotions are decided by one person's nod, and investigations are also decided by one person's nod, with the result that whoever is promoted is likely to be investigated. In short, looking at history both at home and abroad, when it comes to the scale of purges, the Emperor of the Unfinished Projects is undoubtedly the greatest. Right now, the Fifth Plenary Session is about to be held in Beijing. By convention, the plenary session will ratify the decision to expel Zhang Youxia, Liu Zhenli, and others from the Party, and fill vacancies in the Central Committee. Some generals who have been missing for a long time may receive their first official characterization in the communiqué, or unexpectedly reappear. By then, the execution figures we just mentioned will probably need to be checked again. On the other hand, after Zhang Youxia fell from power, the military's "political hitman" Zhang Shengmin was promoted to the sole remaining vice chairman of the Military Commission, but Xi and Zhang Shengmin also harbor mutual distrust and guard against each other. Zhang Shengmin served as secretary of the Military Commission's Discipline Inspection Commission for nine years. During those nine years, acting on Xi's instructions, Zhang Shengmin secretly arrested many senior military officials, accumulating rich experience in secret military arrests. If Zhang Shengmin were to coordinate and arrange for Xi to inspect the troops, Xi would worry that Zhang Shengmin might collude in secret with those in the military who are dissatisfied with Xi and launch a sudden attack on him. You tell me, isn't Emperor Steamed Bun exhausted? Aside from his wife, children, and mother, is there anyone he can trust? Furthermore, besides being scared half to death by domestic forces, Old Xi has also developed paranoid phobias regarding overseas forces. On January 3 of this year, U.S. special forces captured Venezuelan President Maduro. On February 28, a U.S.-Israeli joint force decapitated Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei and dozens of other Iranian senior officials, after which Israel carried out targeted assassinations of batch after batch of high-ranking Iranian military officials. These major events may also produce a strong psychological shock on Xi Jinping. Xi undoubtedly worries that someone inside the CCP military might imitate the U.S. or Israeli military and carry out a "targeted assassination" against him when he inspects the troops. Old Xi in his later years grows more terrified of his own shadow by the day, and who knows, one day he might just purge himself. So let's hold an emergency poll for our tea lovers: do you think Xi Jinping will drastically increase the number of names on the execution list at the Fifth Plenary Session? The choices are 1. Yes, 2. No, 3. Anything is possible. Hurry up and type your numbers in the comment section. Well, a good laugh a day keeps the doctor away. New tea lovers, hurry up and click [Subscribe] and the little bell. Welcome to join the tea house's joyful journey, look at the world from a different angle with the brothers, and lift your spirits. Note that subscribing is free. Pressing the subscribe button can bring a continuous harvest of laughter.

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Speaking of the countdown to the Fifth Plenary Session, the most sensitive issue among the top CCP leadership, besides whether Xi Jinping will arrange a successor, is a more direct and dangerous focus: who exactly holds military power? Just before the meeting, overseas forces suddenly released an explosive piece of news: military veterans represented by Chi Haotian and Li Zuocheng, along with some active-duty senior generals, have submitted a petition to the [Central Decision-Making and Deliberation Leading Group], demanding the removal of Xi Jinping from his position as [Chairman of the Central Military Commission] at the Fifth Plenary Session, the re-election of the Military Commission Chairman, and the reconstruction of the top military leadership. This "far-ahead" prophecy is explosive because it touches the most sensitive nerves of the CCP military system: the final verdict on the Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli incidents, how the Military Commission team will be reorganized, and to what extent Xi Jinping can still rely on the existing senior military leadership after multiple rounds of purges. If we observe these issues together, the Fifth Plenary Session is not just facing a few personnel adjustments, but how the top military power structure will continue to operate. According to overseas forces, the reasons why Old Xi is being asked to step down from the Military Commission Chairman position are concentrated in three aspects. First, Xi used selective anti-corruption to purge a large number of senior generals with combat achievements and capabilities, promoted a large number of sycophants like Zhong Shaojun and He Weidong, and even allowed his wife Peng Liyuan, a singer, to have a say in the military, severely damaging the military's echelon construction and talent promotion mechanism. Second, Xi's military reform was pure nonsense, disrupting the original organizational structure and command system of the troops, leading to a significant reduction in combat effectiveness. Third, and the most sensitive point, is the Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli incident.

In addition, as we just mentioned that the senior military leadership is demanding a reorganization of the military system, it must involve the upcoming Fifth Plenary Session. There is a key observation point: is Xi Jinping preparing to restore the Central Military Commission leadership team composed of multiple members, or continue to maintain the current personnel pattern? Some analysts believe that next, we must first see if Minister of National Defense Dong Jun and other generals discussed by the outside world are likely to enter the Central Military Commission and fill the vacancies of Military Commission members. If the Fifth Plenary Session does not add Military Commission members, one possibility is that Xi Jinping is preparing to postpone the reorganization to the 21st National Congress next year; another possibility is that Xi Jinping has decided to abandon the reconstruction of the original Central Military Commission structure and start anew. The key indicator is whether the Fifth Plenary Session announces formal personnel decisions and whether clear organizational adjustments appear subsequently. From an observational perspective, whether Military Commission members are added, how the Vice Chairmen of the Military Commission are arranged, whether the Minister of National Defense enters the Military Commission, and whether relevant theater and service positions continue to be adjusted will all become important clues for observing the CCP's military leadership structure.

Meanwhile, overseas political commentator Cai Shenkun turned his attention to the promotions of two generals at the end of last year, Yang Zhibin and Han Shengyan. Both were promoted to full general on December 22, 2025, on the same day. Against the backdrop of ongoing personnel changes in the military hierarchy, this arrangement has indeed attracted outside attention. Han Shengyan previously served as commander of the Central Theater Command Air Force and served as the commander-in-chief of the military parade during the September 3, 2025 parade. At the end of last year, he was promoted from lieutenant general to full general, and subsequently took office as commander of the Central Theater Command. What does the Central Theater Command mean? It undertakes important defense tasks for Beijing and its surrounding areas, so this position has special significance in terms of personnel and military deployment. However, after reports of turmoil involving high-level military figures like Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, Han Shengyan was also investigated, and there is still great uncertainty as to whether he can fully clear the hurdle. Yang Zhibin's resume also has some similarities with Han Shengyan's. Both were born in 1963, served in the Nanjing Military Region Air Force system in their early years, and later worked in systems related to the Lanzhou Military Region and the Western Theater Command, having also served as Air Force Chief of Staff and other posts. Last year, Yang Zhibin was transferred to the Eastern Theater Command to serve as commander, and at the end of last year he and Han Shengyan were promoted to full general on the same day. Whether this promotion was merely to fill vacancies in key positions or signifies that military personnel layouts are being readjusted cannot be concluded at present. As for why Defense Minister Dong Jun was temporarily retained, it may be related to his handling of the Miao Hua incident. After Miao Hua got into trouble, Dong Jun may have explained his relationship with him and related circumstances to Xi Jinping, thereby temporarily saving his position. However, whether Dong Jun can continue to clear hurdles in the future still holds variables.

Synthesizing these clues, the military situation on the eve of the Fifth Plenary Session presents at least four issues worthy of continued tracking. First, after the incidents involving Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, how will officials explain the related personnel changes, and will further handling decisions be announced? Second, will the Central Military Commission add new members, and will the posts of CMC Vice Chairmen, Defense Minister, and other high-ranking generals undergo adjustments? Third, will newly promoted generals like Yang Zhibin and Han Shengyan continue to receive important appointments, or will new changes emerge? Fourth, when will Xi Jinping return to visit grassroots troops? Personnel adjustments at the highest echelons of the military ostensibly appear as positional changes, but at a deeper level involve the command system, organizational procedures, and power allocation. Following a series of high-level changes, whether the Fifth Plenary Session can provide clear personnel arrangements will become an important window for observing the next stage of the direction of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s military.

At a little past 10:00 PM on October 22, without any warning or preparation in Baqing County, Nagqu, Tibet, accompanied by a dull roar that tore the earth apart, the entire plateau town suddenly entered a vibration mode, shaking violently. Eyewitnesses described the moment of the incident as "the earth shaking and mountains quivering," "feeling the whole building shaking," and "like hundreds of yaks running at the same time." People did not even have time to put on coats before rushing out into the bitter cold, shivering in sub-zero temperatures. According to an official announcement issued by the CCP afterward, at 22:33 on October 22, a magnitude 7.0 earthquake occurred in Baqing County with a focal depth of 10 kilometers, belonging to a very shallow-focus earthquake with strong destructive power. All 10 townships in Baqing County felt the tremor, with strong tremors felt in core epicenter areas such as Maru Township and Gangqie Township in Baqing County, resulting in some collapsed houses and damaged power and communication facilities. As of 12:00 on October 23, a total of 501 aftershocks had been recorded, with the current maximum aftershock being magnitude 4.3. As for the casualties that everyone cares about most, according to official statements, as of 13:00 on October 23, the magnitude 7.0 earthquake in Baqing County, Nagqu, Tibet has caused 16 deaths and 76 injuries, in addition to 339 collapsed or damaged houses and 20 damaged livestock sheds. Of course, the CCP is a habitual offender when it comes to concealing disaster information. Among countries and regions worldwide, if there is one, counting them all, the Party Mother ranks second, and no one dares to rank first. Therefore, everyone has reached a consensus, and it is basically certain that the actual situation is more serious than the data published by officials. As for Tibet, it is even easier to cover up reports because the Tibetan areas strictly restrict foreign media reporters from entering. In Xi Jinping's words, "The magnitude 7.0 earthquake in Baqing County, Nagqu, Tibet caused heavy casualties." This phrase "heavy casualties" also appeared in Tibet less than 2 months ago, which was the catastrophic debris flow disaster that occurred on the Tibet-Nepal border on August 26, and Xi used the exact same rhetoric. As of September 26, that catastrophic debris flow disaster caused 43 deaths and 519 missing persons on the Chinese side. It seems that this phrase "heavy casualties" in the supreme leader's mouth is quite elastic.

Not only is the rhetoric elastic, but the emergency response is also quite elastic. What is bizarre is that the local authorities did not align with the central government this time. The Ministry of Emergency Management of the CCP at the national level upgraded the national earthquake disaster emergency response to Level III, and the corresponding Ministry of Natural Resources also initiated a Level III response for geological disaster prevention. The standard for a Level III emergency response is 50 to 100 deaths and missing persons per disaster process in a single province. Looking at the autonomous region level, the Tibet Autonomous Region Emergency Command Center initiated a Level II emergency response for the earthquake, where the Level II standard is 100 to 200 deaths and missing persons per disaster process in a single province. At the municipal level, it is even higher; Nagqu City, where the epicenter Bange County is located, initiated a Level I emergency response for the earthquake. A Level I response corresponds to a catastrophic natural disaster with over 200 deaths and missing persons per disaster process. Do you see? From the emergency response levels, one can infer how the casualty figures were reduced step by step. The process should be like this: the city at the epicenter reported at least 200 casualties, the autonomous region level cut it in half to over 100, and then at the central, national level, it was cut to under 100. The latest casualty figures released are 16 dead and 76 injured. The Party says, 'Commoners, don't overthink it.' The casualty list does not disclose names, nor where they lived; even if interested parties want to check, there is nowhere to look. If you ask again, are you trying to 'pick quarrels and provoke trouble'? So, it is no big deal, everyone disperse.

Just talking about the Tibet earthquake, there is another bizarre thing in the official CCP reports. Official media such as Xinhua News Agency all contain phrases like: 'The earthquake was clearly felt in Bayi District, Nyingchi City, and slight tremors were felt in Medog County, Mainling City, and Lang County.' Why specifically mention Nyingchi, Mainling, and Medog? Because Mainling and Medog in Nyingchi City are the core construction sites of the 'world's largest super hydropower station' and the 'Yarlung Tsangpo River downstream hydropower project' that Xi Jinping is obsessed with. The Three Gorges Dam would have to play the junior role in front of the 'Yarlung Downstream Project' because this century-defining super project is planned to have an installed capacity of 60 million kilowatts and an annual power generation of 300 billion kilowatt-hours, a scale equivalent to three Three Gorges Dams. Moreover, this dam has been under construction for over a year, and the discordant voices that do not stay in line with the 'Xi Core' have not been completely suppressed. In July this year, an academic journal under the Chinese Academy of Sciences could not help but publish a paper, publicly warning that the active faults in this area pose a lethal threat to major infrastructure. Now you understand, right? 'Tremors felt in Nyingchi, slight shaking in Medog' means 'the dam is very safe, and the project is unaffected.' The implication is that General Secretary Xi's 'personal command and personal deployment' are forever great, glorious, and correct. However, they dare not explicitly say that the 'Yarlung Downstream Project' is fine; behind this is actually a deep-seated fear, a fear that the public will associate this violent 7.0-magnitude earthquake with this behemoth built on a crustal fault zone. Why else would one say Xi Jinping is accelerating in reverse? The Three Gorges Dam only started a series of geological disasters after it was completed. Well, the 'Yarlung Downstream Project' has just started construction, and in less than two months, two major disasters have occurred in succession: a catastrophic mudslide and a 7.0 earthquake. Under these two alarm bells, the century-defining project has instantly become a century-defining disaster. This speed has to be said to be very 'Xi-style.' The CCP has always believed in the philosophy of struggle, as the saying goes, 'Fighting with heaven is endless joy, fighting with earth is endless joy, fighting with people is endless joy.' But they forgot that there is another saying: good and evil will eventually be rewarded, the way of heaven is a cycle, if you don't believe it, look up, who has heaven ever spared? The CCP's doomsday acceleration is underway. Thanks to the tea friend Lin for the generous donation to the teahouse.

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