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Why does the CCP always "prepare for war"? [Sayings Lecture Hall Enlightenment Forum Yu Maochun] EP202

1# · OP Author:余茂春 Published:2025-12-03 08:03 Replies:0 Views:15 Permalink:fanzei.net/d_nhej64

This article is presented by Yu Maochun, analyzing why the CCP is always preparing for war. It points out that its obsession with war stems from the combative ideology of Marxism-Leninism, a lack of democratic electoral legitimacy that requires military victories to create a sense of historical inevitability, and it outlines numerous major armed conflicts launched by China against its neighbors and the international community since 1949.

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Why does the CCP always prepare for war? The CCP’s worldview originates from Marxism-Leninism, framing international relations as a zero‑sum struggle between enemies and friends. Its dictionary contains no concept of peace, only perpetual containment and counter‑containment struggles. Because it lacks legitimacy from democratic elections, the CCP must use military victories and conflicts to promote a narrative of historical inevitability. From the Korean War and the Sino‑Vietnam War to militarization in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, all become fuel for internal governance. This war‑driven, ideologically fueled aggressiveness is the deep core logic of its illegal regime’s survival. If this risk is ignored, the free world will continue to face its military expansion and hegemonic projection, making global peace difficult to achieve.

Hello everyone, welcome to the Enlightenment Forum of Zhi Ding Lecture Hall, I am Yu Maochun. In March of this year, in response to President Trump’s new tariff announcement, the Chinese Embassy in the United States issued a war‑like declaration reminiscent of “wolf‑warrior” diplomacy, stating that if the United States wants war—whether a tariff war, trade war, or any other form of war—we will see it through to the end. This sentence precisely captures the consistent trend in the CCP’s discourse system: everything must be addressed through war. This obsession with war is not accidental; it originates from the combative ideological foundation of Marxism‑Leninism, the CCP’s desperate need for legitimacy, and its historical record of consistent military aggression toward neighboring countries.

Since its founding, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has adhered to Marxism‑Leninism, an ideological framework that frames politics as an endless, life‑or‑death struggle between hostile forces. In this worldview, governance and diplomacy are not about compromise or cooperation, but about zero‑sum conflict between the Communist Party and its enemies. The Cold War may have formally ended in Europe, but for the CCP leadership, ideological struggle has never ceased; the concepts of containment and anti‑containment still define China’s international interactions. Every action by the United States and its allies is seen as containment of the socialist cause and the CCP, a real threat to its survival. China’s foreign policy remains fundamentally driven by this ideology, viewing the U.S. alliance system, its military presence in Asia, trade policies, and cultural‑educational exchanges not merely as geopolitical maneuvers but as an active strategy to suppress the victory of Chinese communism. This Marxist‑Leninist siege mentality gives rise to an aggressive posture, framing every international dispute—whether tariffs, human rights, intellectual property, international migration and drug smuggling, or routine diplomatic negotiations—as a life‑or‑death battle over the destiny of all humanity.

Gaining political legitimacy through military posturing is also a major driver of the CCP’s bellicose tendencies. Unlike democratic governments that derive legitimacy from elections and accountability, the CCP’s authority rests on the utopian notion that communism is historically inevitable and must triumph, a utopia that can only be proven and realized through continual conquest and victory. In other words, the CCP lacks genuine democratic legitimacy and therefore must constantly cultivate the illusion of invincibility and historical inevitability. The Party repeatedly reminds the people of its original ideological mission to liberate all humanity, constructing the “community of shared future for mankind” that Xi Jinping speaks of. This need to project a hardline image turns military provocations into not just strategic calculations but essential tools for consolidating rule and domestic propaganda. Whether in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea, military victories or forceful standoffs are heavily publicized as proof that the Party defends sovereignty and repels anti‑China forces and conspiracies. This also explains why modern China, more than any other regime, loves to create conflicts and has waged more wars and armed clashes with neighboring states than any other power, viewing those neighbors as pawns of Western democracies or agents of anti‑China regional hegemony. By using military actions against neighbors and relentless bullying to reinforce internal legitimacy and maintain control over the populace, the CCP has become the most destabilizing factor regionally and globally. Since 1949, China has scarcely ceased war, armed conflict, and military provocation, consistently displaying hostility toward its neighbors.

Below are some of the most significant conflicts. The Korean War (1950‑1953), where China sent troops to support North Korea against South Korea and United Nations forces. The First Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954‑1955), during which the People’s Liberation Army bombarded Kinmen and Matsu in an attempt to seize islands controlled by Taiwan. The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis (1958), featuring massive artillery attacks on Taiwan‑controlled coastal islands. The Sino‑Indian Border War (1962), sparked by disputes over Aksai Chin and the southern Tibet region of Arunachal Pradesh. The Sino‑Soviet Border Conflict (1969), which saw deadly armed clashes on Zhenbao Island and elsewhere. The Battle of the Paracel Islands (1974), where China fought the South Vietnamese navy to seize control of the Paracels. The Sino‑Vietnamese War (1979), launched by China as punishment for Vietnam’s overthrow of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, invading northern Vietnam. The Sino‑Vietnamese Border Conflict (1979‑1991), a decade‑long artillery war that fired millions of shells into Vietnamese territory. The Battle of Fiery Cross Reef (1988), a naval clash between China and Vietnam in the Spratly Islands. The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis (1995‑1996), during which China conducted missile tests and military exercises to intimidate Taiwan ahead of its 1996 presidential election. The Mischief Reef incident (1995‑1999), where China built facilities on a reef claimed by the Philippines. The Doklam standoff (2017), a confrontation between Chinese and Indian troops in the Doklam area of Bhutan. The ongoing Sino‑Indian border clashes (2020‑present), including the deadly Galwan Valley clash and continued tension along the Line of Actual Control. Continuous incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone, with Chinese aircraft frequently violating the zone. Ongoing militarization of the South China Sea, with China’s large‑scale land reclamation, island building, and militarization of reefs, confronting Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and other nations.

The Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) obsession with war rhetoric is neither a recent phenomenon nor merely a diplomatic posture; it is deeply rooted in its ideological framework, viewing all domestic and foreign affairs as a perpetual struggle against internal and external threats. Moreover, the CCP's lack of political legitimacy forces it to maintain an endless false sense of encirclement and urgency, using military aggression and confrontational discourse as tools to consolidate power. Historical patterns of warfare combined with contemporary provocative actions demonstrate that China's aggressive stance will not diminish in the foreseeable future. For the international community, recognizing this mindset is crucial; diplomatic engagement with China must confront its ideological motivations and its need to gain internal regime legitimacy through external conflicts. If these fundamental drivers are not addressed, the world will continue to witness an increasingly militarized China, eager to project power and hegemony, even at the expense of regional and global stability. This is why, from Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping, all CCP leaders love to quote the ultimate war mantra, discard fantasies, and prepare for battle!

Key events timeline · Selected related nodes
1950
China Dispatched Troops to North Korea to Participate in the Korean War and Fight the United Nations Command
Between 1950 and 1953, China dispatched troops to support North Korea against South Korea and the United Nations Command, becoming one of the major external wars China participated in after 1949.
Related topics the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ideology international relations Miles Yu
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