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Only 59.1 billion yuan in new loans in August! Youth unemployment hits a record 18.9%, Guangzhou Panyu random attacks stabbing girls in the eyes with the police report not even stating how many were injured, Zhang Youxia's case closed for eight months with zero statements from the entire military, flying to four countries in one month with zero results and still having to help his wife off the plane! China-US interest rate spread hits a record 355 basis points

1# · OP Author:一个狠人 Published:2026-10-01 01:07 Replies:0 Views:340 Permalink:fanzei.net/d_heufth

This article reviews the political, economic, and social conditions in China in September 2026. In September, the CCP collapse index rose to 70.98, with multiple key economic data points remaining sluggish; new RMB loans were only 59.1 billion, and youth unemployment climbed to 18.9%. Politically, the cases of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli have been finalized, yet there has been zero response from the entire military; Xi Jinping's visits to four countries yielded limited results. Meanwhile, a random stabbing incident in Panyu, Guangzhou, has drawn attention, and the interest rate spread between China and the U.S. has hit a record high.

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Observe things as they are, refuse to accept things at face value. Today is China's National Day. To add some color to the CCP's October 1st, we are releasing the CCP collapse index one day early, which can be considered adding a bit of disgust to the CCP's national celebration. I have already calculated the CCP collapse index for September for everyone; the new value is 70.98, an increase of 0.11 from the 70.87 in August. I have discovered something interesting: the CCP's path over these three months is almost like a fucking TV drama. Look, in July, the CCP issued a document welding the doors shut; in August, the air ran out inside the house; and what about September? In September, that fucking idiot Xi Jinping used the exit management regulations to lock the door and went off visiting others himself. Just last month, this grandson Xi Jinping was flying all over the place. On September 1st, he was still in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan. On the 2nd, he flew directly to Cairo, on the 12th to New Delhi, and on the 23rd he landed in Washington. He flew to four countries in one month; it looked quite lively, right? There was the old Trump personally welcoming him, and the B-21 bomber formation flying overhead.

After he fucking locked China's doors, he went out for a big stroll himself. And what did he have in his pockets when he returned? A piece of paper with an eight-point consensus that had no substance. Well, don't say there was nothing; weren't there two giant pandas? Yes, and what else? An AI, a super-intelligent, uh, dialogue mechanism, and a 30 billion USD reciprocal tariff reduction arrangement. Let me lay out the scoring structure first. This month, social sentiment added 0.04, macroeconomics added 0.03, politics and military added 0.03, and the external environment added 0.01, totaling an increase of 0.11. In August, the economy and social sentiment were the protagonists, but in September, these four variables were relatively flat because the characteristic of this is not that one pillar collapsed, but that several pillars are idling at the same time. First, the economy is still idling, mainly characterized by the continued lack of borrowing; politics is also idling. After the characterization of the cases of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli was completed, the overall tone was much looser than the overall tone in January. But as usual, there was not a single statement of support from the entire military.

Not to mention diplomacy, which has been spinning in place like a top. In one month, that grandson Xi Jinping flew to four countries and didn't sign a single joint statement. As for the social side, it's not spinning in place; it's genuinely in trouble. Let's start with the economy. The official economic data from the CCP for September looks a bit better than August. The first one is the customs data from September 8th. Hey, I'm not just trying to smear these fucking idiots; you don't even need to smear them. Just laying out the real situation is the biggest smear against them. Exports in August, calculated in US dollars, rose by 25%. Hey, this is the CCP's own number. The monthly trade surplus, according to the CCP itself, reached $119.1 billion. Following that, the August PPI, or the producer price index for industrial products, rose by 3.8% year-on-year, an increase of 0.3 percentage points compared to July. The term used in the CCP's propaganda is that they have 'walked out of deflation.' This sentence has quite a bit of that Zhuang Zhou vibe to it. Is it that Zhou does not know if he is a butterfly dreaming of being Zhou, or if the butterfly is dreaming of being Zhou? Doesn't everyone think this phrasing is very much in the style of Zhuangzi?

Is it the CCP dreaming that it has walked out of deflation, or is it deflation dreaming of the CCP? It's truly impossible to tell! On September 15th, according to the CCP's National Bureau of Statistics, the value-added of industrial enterprises above designated size in August rose by 5.2%. On September 27th, another piece of data was released: the profits of industrial enterprises above designated size from January to August rose by 15.7%. Exports, prices, industrial profits—all four numbers are positive. The CCP has painted this month's picture very neatly. As per the old rule, wherever the CCP paints, we scrape it off. Let's first scrape that 3.8% PPI. If the ex-factory price of raw materials rises, do companies earn more? That depends on how much the things they buy have risen. In the same report, the August industrial producer purchase price index rose by 5.8%. The purchase price rose 2 percentage points more than the ex-factory price, meaning raw materials are rising faster than products. So, what kind of structure is this? It is entirely the mid-to-downstream enterprises footing the bill for the price hikes of the upstream. Who is upstream? It's those party-controlled enterprises of the CCP, especially energy companies.

According to the CCP's National Bureau of Statistics, the ex-factory price of the coal mining and washing industry rose by 26.6%, non-ferrous metal smelting continued to rise by 20%, and oil and natural gas extraction rose by 10.5%. It's all energy and minerals. This is entirely an imported price hike brought about by the rise in crude oil prices. The CPI, which truly represents demand, only rose by 0.8% for residents in August, and there is a high probability that this figure has been watered down. This can also be seen in the sub-data. Look at what? Look at food. The food category fell by 1.4%, and pork prices fell by 11.8%. What pushed the CPI up was entirely energy, which rose by 4.1%, and gasoline, which rose by 9.3%. In other words, oil and minerals have been rising, while the pillars of food are still falling. This is fucking cost-push, not walking out of deflation. The CCP's ability to dream is truly comparable to Zhuang Zhou. Profits are the same. From January to August, the cumulative profits of industrial enterprises above designated size rose by 15.7%. Hey, this looks good, but for the single month of August, it only remained at 4.2%. In July, the single month was still at 11.2%. It dropped 7 percentage points in one month. See that?

The two-percentage-point scissors gap has already started cutting into the profit statement. Let's talk about investment. On September 15th, the CCP's National Bureau of Statistics released that fixed asset investment nationwide from January to August was -7.2% year-on-year. From January to July, it was still -6.7%, meaning it rotted by another half a percentage point in August. In the sub-items of the data, private investment was -10.1%, infrastructure investment was -4%, manufacturing investment was -2.3%, and real estate development investment was -19.9%. Just think, China is starting to want what? To provide a 1% interest subsidy every year. Look at this data; can they not subsidize it? Do they dare not subsidize it? If they don't, it's all over. But facing this situation, even if they subsidize it, it's basically useless. Let's keep looking. The new construction area of residential buildings is -25.4%, funds available for real estate enterprises are -21%, and among the available funds, domestic loans are -33.3%. In that August period, I said four links were stalling simultaneously; the September numbers show that after stalling, they are continuing to accelerate their decline.

Let's look at consumption again. In August, total retail sales of consumer goods grew by 0.4% year-on-year. Well, in July it was up 0.6%, and in June it was 1%. Three consecutive months stepping down in three tiers—this three-month trend is very clear, forming a three-tier staircase. Moreover, the Chinese Communist Party has been quite abnormal lately, stopping its bragging about consumption. What's the matter? Did the Chinese Communist Party back down in the face of difficulties? Let's look at durable goods consumption again. Among the sub-items, retail sales in the automotive industry were minus 18.5%, gold, silver, and jewelry were minus 17.5%, and building and decoration materials continued to be minus 11.8%. What was the only item that went up? It was mobile phones. There is another figure that everyone should pay attention to, which is the youth unemployment rate released on September 17. The youth unemployment rate for those aged 16 to 24 (excluding students) in August reached 18.9% again. Well, I can only say "again"; this is another record high since the statistical caliber was revised in 2024. Seriously, I think it won't be long before they have to revise the caliber again, right? The Chinese Communist Party's intention is very, very obvious, which is to always want to keep it below 20%. Why go through so much trouble?

From now on, just fix this number directly at 18.9%, why bother changing the statistical caliber? Once these data points are listed, the situation becomes clear: young people can't find jobs, middle-aged people are no longer buying cars or houses and aren't doing renovations either, and total retail sales dropped to 0.4%. Well, I actually think this is on the high side. Next, let's look at money. This is the August financial data released by the central bank on September 14. In August, the newly added RMB loans nationwide were 59.1 billion yuan. Well, you heard that right, the unit is in hundreds of millions. What was it in August last year? It was over 600 billion yuan, hardly comparable even to a fraction of the same period last year. Household loans saw a net decrease of 202.9 billion yuan in August, meaning residents were net repaying debt for the second consecutive month. Corporate short-term loans saw a net decrease of 160 billion yuan in August. Hu Wenda said that this 160 billion yuan is the most terrifying part, because what are corporate short-term loans used for? This is different from long-term capital investment. Generally speaking, corporate short-term loans are either for purchasing inventory or for paying wages. If this indicator shrinks, it means that the scale and volume of the entire industrial sector are also shrinking. Furthermore, the newly added social financing in August was 1.66 trillion yuan, and government bond financing alone reached 1.01 trillion yuan. In other words, among the social financing figures in August, government bond issuance alone accounted for 60%.

In that August episode, I also said that the hand issuing bonds and the hand dissolving banks are the exact same pair. Well, on September 6, this pair of hands moved again: the Ministry of Finance announced the destination of the 300 billion yuan of special treasury bonds for capital injection. Eight financial central enterprises received 360 billion yuan—Agricultural Bank of China got 160 billion yuan, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China got 100 billion yuan, and five insurance companies got 70 billion yuan. I also did two episodes on this account, which everyone can go back and check out. In a word, the banks bought government bonds, lent the money to the Ministry of Finance, and the finance department injected the money back into the banks. After a full circle, the money for this capital injection was still provided by the banks themselves. Let's look at the stock market again. In August, it touched 4,000 points—well, it was quite lively. But on September 28, the first trading day after the Mid-Autumn Festival, it gave all of it back. The Shanghai Composite Index closed at 3,823 points, the ChiNext Index plummeted by 4.53% in one go, and the Shenzhen Component Index and Shenzhen 50 all hit new lows in nearly a year within a single day. Over 4,500 stocks across the market were falling, with a trading volume of 1.7 trillion yuan, which was a volume-backed decline. And there is a particularly funny detail in all this: as soon as that fucking idiot Xi Jinping returned to China, the market started dropping immediately. That fucking idiot's physique—seriously, there is definitely something mystical about this.

Let me tell you, finally let's look at the fiscal data. This is from the Ministry of Finance's own figures on September 18. From January to August, the national general public budget revenue rose by 5.7%, the central government's own revenue rose by 9.1%, while local governments' own revenue only rose by 3.1%, and securities transaction stamp duty rose by 82%. This was the last withdrawal left for the Ministry of Finance by that wave of market activity in August. As for the local side, from January to August, the revenue from the transfer of state-owned land use rights was left with only 1.3753 trillion, a deep drop of 28.6%, and deed tax was down by 13.2%. Anyway, the situation is that any tax related to housing has experienced a double-digit free fall. But not all of the Ministry of Finance's figures fell; at least interest expenditure rose. From January to August, the national fiscal debt interest payment expenditure reached 918.8 billion, an increase of 5.4%. By the way, regarding economic discussions this month, there is also a document that needs to be mentioned separately. On September 10, the National Development and Reform Commission and the State Administration for Market Regulation issued Document No. 1303. The name of that document is fucking longer than my life: "Notice on Relevant Matters Concerning Cost Accounting for Low-Price Disorderly Competition of Important Industrial Products." This means that from now on, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is going to start calculating costs for enterprises.

Once your selling price is lower than the cost required by the CCP, it is considered dumping and you will be fined. Furthermore, the price an enterprise wants to set must first pass through the abacus of the National Development and Reform Commission. The destructive power of this thing is enormous. Hey, I made a separate episode about it, and this show is still in production. Anyway, I'll release the evidence this week. Here, let's just remember these four words first: cost accounting. Economically, this month's ledger has a plus of 0.03. Well, now that the data is covered, let's talk about something with a bit of warmth—namely, the social sensory experience item. Based on the average of the netizens' votes, the event with the widest sensory spread in September was the one in Guangzhou. Around 5:20 PM on September 14, near a hot pot restaurant close to the Gaogou Xintiandi Plaza near the University Town in Panyu District, Guangzhou, a buzz-cut man wearing a black top, blue jeans, a mask, and glasses, clutching a small knife, was randomly slashing people's faces, and specifically targeting young women, and fucking poking other people's eyes out. From the surveillance video, we can see very clearly that a girl raised her hand to block it, and then the knife slashed directly across her hand, and then the man turned and ran.

According to online rumors, he ran into the western district cafeteria of the Guangdong University of Technology and was pinned down by the police. The area around there, I must say, I am quite familiar with; it's surrounded by universities and can be considered one of the densest areas for universities in China. Then came the police (Public Security) briefing from Panyu's thugs that night, which I will read to you: "A 35-year-old man surnamed Li used a knife to injure people. Police officers quickly arrived at the scene to handle the situation, sending the injured to the hospital for medical treatment. After treatment, none of them have life-threatening injuries." That's the entire text. As for information on how many people were injured? None. Where were the injuries? Still none. What was the motive? Still none. As for whether it was an indiscriminate attack? Even less so.

Radio Free Asia went to ask about this matter, and this bunch of CCP dog police (Public Security) started playing dumb and refused to answer. The versions online are still quite chaotic. A Mr. Liu, who claimed to live nearby, said that there were five injured people, mostly young women; some said seven, and the highest estimated around thirty-some. Hey, some also said it was a private gang. The CCP police (Public Security) said there was only one attacker. Honestly, I really don't know which one is true. I have now placed the urgent briefing from this bunch of CCP police (Public Security) in the same category as unverified overseas news. I believe doing so is relatively mild; I estimate that right now, a lot of people directly treat this fucking urgent briefing from the CCP as a rumor, and its trust weight is probably even lower than what I give it. But this is precisely the problem itself: an open incident in a downtown shopping mall, and the information given by the CCP is completely insufficient for anyone to judge its authenticity. Since the information is insufficient, people will naturally fill in the blanks. The version that spread most fiercely is this: it is said that the attacker left a note saying that his savings had been frozen for 1,600 days.

If we count back 1,600 days from now, where exactly does that land us? April 18, 2022. That is the exact moment the Henan rural bank scandal broke, when 400,000 depositors saw 40 billion yuan in savings vanish into thin air. I cannot verify this specific claim, but you can assign it the same level of credibility as an official police report from the CCP. But notice one thing: why did this rumor spread? Because from 2022 to today, these Henan depositors have experienced it all—being tagged with red health codes, getting beaten up, being blocked at train stations, and having courts refuse to file their cases. This is why, even if the rumor sounds a bit dubious, it still gets traction because it is dragged down by the reality of the CCP's history. But to be honest, no matter the circumstances, I fucking despise the perpetrator from the bottom of my heart. If you have a grievance, take it to the source—go to the municipal government. Learn from the Yang family. Dammit, attacking young girls on the street—that is not the act of a decent person. The first standard move the CCP took was to have universities like the P L University City send out threatening messages to students, warning them not to spread rumors online and that spreading rumors would be dealt with severely.

What was the students' reaction? They couldn't post on WeChat or Xiaohongshu, and videos disappeared from major platforms. Initium Media had an article on September 28 that I think was excellent; the title was 'Indiscriminate Attacks and the Disappearing Public Discussion.' There is a sentence in it I want to share: 'People can no longer perceive how the social justice system operates, or if it is operating at all.' I think that is a very accurate statement. Beyond Guangzhou, there were several other withdrawal bills in September. On September 10, at 11:15 AM, a cargo ship docked for repairs caught fire. There were 42 people on board; 12 were evacuated, and 25 went missing. That evening, the report stated that all 25 had been found, but none showed signs of life. The cause of the fire has not been announced to this day. And as if it weren't bad enough, natural disasters didn't stop either. July was floods, August was mudslides and floods, and September brought a typhoon. In early September, Typhoon Saudel flooded Fujian; in Huating Town alone, over 100 houses collapsed. And for this casualty count, the CCP followed its fine tradition and reported exactly zero.

The issue of unpaid wages continued to burn in September. On September 18, workers at the China Railway Seventh Group in Zhengzhou began demanding their wages. On September 20, Longfor, considered the most stable operator in China, also started having problems. At Longfor's Chengdu project, the 3,000-level Tianjie, over 80 workers protested for unpaid wages. These CCP bastards now know that Chinese society is a powder keg. On September 18, the Study Times, a newspaper guided by the CCP Central Committee, published an article. What kind of article? These CCP idiots have already labeled public opinion as a high-risk flashpoint for social conflict. Then, in the same week, the approach coming out of the Guangxi Civil Affairs Department was the same classic containment policy: unregistered grassroots organizations must register, and those already registered must establish a Party branch. Now, even the property management and the CCP want to stick their hands in. The goal is stated very bluntly: to prevent scattered wage protests and rights defense from forming organized collective protests. That is a direct quote. There is another piece of news here, and although it is small, I think it is enough to refute the view that Chinese students today have no spirit of resistance.

There is this incident: on the night of September 23, students at Anyue Middle School in Ziyang, Sichuan, were triggered because they were only given one day off for the Mid-Autumn Festival, so they started shouting from their dorms and cursing. A student representative ran straight to the school gate and started giving a speech on the road. Honestly, we didn't have that kind of guts when we were in school. The result was that the school changed it to a three-day holiday the next day. See that? We need to use this realization provided by the Study Times, and we must fully recognize the CCP's own realization. Aren't you afraid of public opinion? Well then, use public opinion to light fires everywhere and let the CCP's funds burn. The social sentiment score has increased by 0.04. Next, let's talk about politics and military affairs. The main course for September was September 27, when the CCP did three things. First, the Politburo held a meeting in advance; usually, this meeting is held at the end of the month, but this time it was a full nine days early. Why the rush? Because that idiot Xi Jinping was flying to Washington on the 23rd. The meeting set the Fifth Plenary Session to be held from October 26 to 29, with the theme still being 'comprehensively strengthening Party discipline.'

On the same day, Xinhua News Agency issued a bulletin stating that Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli had been expelled from the Party and the military, their qualifications as 20th National Congress delegates were terminated, and they were transferred to military procuratorial organs. I will read a few lines of the bulletin's characterization for you: they abandoned their original aspirations and mission, were at odds with the Party, lost their Party spirit and principles, seriously violated political discipline and rules, engaged in cliques, and the amount involved was exceptionally large. In the August episode, I said that neither Party membership nor military status was mentioned at all. At the time, I thought it was being held back to establish authority at the Fifth Plenary Session, but it turned out they didn't wait for the Fifth Plenary Session; they handled it right before he went abroad. This timing is very telling: a head of state goes abroad for three days and has to finalize the case of the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission before daring to board the plane. You figure it out. On the same day, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection announced that former Shenzhen Mayor Qin Weizhong was under investigation. He had just resigned as mayor on August 24th, and was taken down 28 days later. Caixin counted again, and this is the 50th centrally-administered cadre officially announced to have fallen this year so far. The record for the full year of 2025 is 65, so by this calculation, the 72 we extrapolated in the August episode is basically a sure thing. There is another detail about the Qin Weizhong affair: Shenzhen is supposed to host the APEC leaders' meeting in November, and Trump is coming too. The mayor who was supposed to host it got taken down first. The civil service system is in this fucking state, so what about the military? After Zhang Youxia's bulletin came out, I checked the PLA Daily again. It was the same as in August; there were editorials and commentator articles, but not a single statement of loyalty from the theater commands or military branches. From the filing of the case on January 24th to the finalization on September 21st, it has been eight months. An entire military has chosen collective silence regarding the expulsion of its own Vice Chairman from the military. Looking at Xi Jinping, that fucking idiot himself, the images he left for the world this month are as follows: when he got off the plane in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on August 30th, he was holding Peng Liyuan's hand the whole time. Then, on September 12th, at the opening ceremony of the BRICS summit in New Delhi, Modi stopped his speech twice to ask if this fucking idiot was okay. Everyone saw this scene. He didn't even attend Modi's banquet that evening. Then, on September 23rd, when he got off the plane in Washington, his right hand was tightly gripping the handrail, and his left hand was holding Peng Liyuan. The funniest part isn't even this; the CCP's CCTV directly edited out the part where he got off the plane. Some say this fucking idiot had another stroke; anyway, there are all sorts of rumors. My judgment is that this fucking idiot probably doesn't have any major issues, but his chronic illnesses and minor problems may have worsened. The strangest thing is that at the state banquet in the United States, Zhou Hongxu, the Director of the Central Guard Bureau, was there. He attended the state banquet table in his capacity as Deputy Director of the Ministry of Public Security, acting as the Director of the Guard Bureau. The last time was in 2015, so I won't speculate on his health; it would be best if he fucking dropped dead. Let's just talk about the image itself: a man who just expelled the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission from the military has to bring the Director of the Guard Bureau with him when he goes out, and has to hold his wife's hand while walking. These images are the entirety of the September political and military situation. Therefore, for the political and military situation, I cautiously add 0.03. Finally, there is the recurring segment: the Political Star. There is no suspense for the September Political Star; it is awarded to that fucking idiot Xi Jinping himself. I have also drafted the award speech: he flew to four countries in one month—Bishkek, Cairo, New Delhi, and Washington—using his actions to interpret what it means to be blindly and frantically busy. In Bishkek, he signed the declaration of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit; in Cairo, he signed more than 20 cooperation documents, but not a single one of those documents contained a monetary amount. In New Delhi, he was absent from the host's banquet; in Washington, he received the highest level of reception from Trump. He traded two giant pandas, a super-intelligent dialogue mechanism, and a $30 billion reciprocal tax reduction arrangement for a talk without any joint statement, without any joint press conference, without Taiwan, and without chips. Of the eight total consensuses, only half a sentence had the CCP as the subject, and it was about the WWII alliance, which has nothing to do with the CCP. 48 hours before going abroad, he expelled his own Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission from the military, and at the state banquet table, he brought his own Director of the Guard Bureau. He proved one thing to the whole world: a fucking idiot can be the head of state who travels the most and achieves the least. Then, as soon as the plane landed back home, the country's stock index plummeted. Emperor You Xi, you are truly fucking awesome.

Finally, let us talk about the external environment. Regarding the preparations for war in September, we already covered half of it earlier, and we just need to add a few numbers. After the Trump-Xi summit, aside from that stinky January 10th deadline, not a single major red line between China and the US has moved. The US Department of Commerce's 50 percent affiliate penetration rule automatically resumed as scheduled on October 9. The deadline set by the EU for the Chinese Communist Party is October. Ursula von der Leyen's original words were that the EU's bilateral trade deficit with China averages 1 billion euros per day, which has reached a critical point. Therefore, the 45 percent anti-subsidy tax on electric vehicles will still be collected. But where is the even bigger issue? It is in the interest rate differential. On September 26, the yield on 30-year US Treasury bonds broke 5.5 percent, the highest level since 2004. The yield on 10-year Treasury bonds was 5.2 percent, while China's 10-year Treasury bond yield did not dare to budge at all; it fucking stayed dead, lying around 1.67 percent. The interest rate differential directly hit 355 basis points, which is also an all-time record. The central parity rate of the RMB on September 28 was 6.74. The Chinese Communist Party is fucking draining the blood of enterprises to feed the RMB exchange rate! The meager profits that export enterprises make from foreign exchange settlement have all been eaten up by the exchange rate, so well, part of the reason for the handover on September 28 is precisely this. Therefore, everyone should pay attention to this external environment addition of 0.01.

Although it is only 0.01, undercurrents are actually already surging internally. To use Mao's words, things are changing. Well, the four variables have been covered: social decline plus 0.04, macroeconomic plus 0.03, political and military plus 0.03, and external environment and diplomacy plus 0.01, totaling 0.1. The regression index for September is finalized at 70.98. So how should we understand September? Actually, it can be summarized in two words: idling. Let me string it all together for everyone. In August, the country's newly added loans were 59.1 billion, meaning the wheel of money creation within the financial system has stalled. Zhang Youxia has been crying while finalizing cases for eight months, and the entire military has given zero named statements of loyalty; this is the political machine where orders are sent down without even an echo. Then there is that fucking Winnie who visited four countries in a month with zero results; this is the diplomatic machine idling. The highlight for October will be the Fifth Plenary Session. As for the work, you go ahead and keep doing it at noon. Well, as for the accounts, I will keep recording them for everyone.

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