Fang Lian Profiles: Best Actor or Reformer? The Two-Sided Wen Jiabao! US$2.7 Billion Corruption Scandal丨Political System Reform丨Best Actor丨Bo Xilai

This episode provides a detailed review of the life of former State Council Premier Wen Jiabao, from his scholarly family background and the displacement he suffered during the Cultural Revolution, to his entry into politics under the mentorship of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, his complex choices during the June 4, 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, and his later leadership in the 4 trillion yuan stimulus package, the abolition of agricultural taxes, and his political maneuvering against Bo Xilai. It also analyzes the governing style behind his nickname as the "Best Actor" and the $2.7 billion family corruption scandal exposed by The New York Times.

Video link:

Full text:

At 4:45 AM on May 19, 1989, in Beijing's Tiananmen Square, Zhao Ziyang took a megaphone and shouted that classic line: "We have come too late." With that shout, Zhao Ziyang voiced the last conscience of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and of course, it also ended his political career. But at that very time and place, just like at this very moment, standing behind Zhao Ziyang was a 46-year-old man. He didn't say a word and wasn't very conspicuous at the time, but as we all know later, his name was Wen Jiabao, a very complex political figure. On one hand, he said that without the guarantee of political system reform, the fruits of economic reform would be lost; on the other hand, his family was embroiled in a massive corruption scandal, and his various maneuvers led people to mockingly call him the "Best Actor." So, what was the real Wen Jiabao like, and how should we view his historical status? Hello everyone, I am Toronto Fang Lian. Today, let's talk about China's most fucking awesome "model student," the last reformer, and the "Best Actor" whose whole family are corrupt officials: Wen Jiabao.

On September 15, 1942, a baby was born in Yixingbu, Tianjin. However, in terms of fate, Wen Jiabao that same year could be said to have had a completely ruined start, suffering wave after wave of devastation by the Japanese, the Nationalist Party (KMT), and the CCP. Following the July 7 Incident in 1937, after the Japanese military began its full-scale invasion of China, the then-Nationalist government was characterized above all by its inability to put up a fight. On the night of July 7, Japanese soldiers took a stroll on the Lugou Bridge (Marco Polo Bridge) in Beijing, and by July 30, the Japanese military had already fully occupied Tianjin. Therefore, when Wen Jiabao was born, he was actually born in a Tianjin controlled by the Japanese. Of course, although ruled by the Japanese, for Wen Jiabao, this was already the luckiest event of his childhood. Wen Jiabao's grandfather, Wen Yingshi, was a local schoolteacher and a rather successful one at that, later founding his own primary school called Shifan Primary School. After the Japanese entered the village, this school did not stop operating and could still normally enroll students and conduct classes, only occasionally encountering minor setbacks in daily life, such as being bullied by the Japanese. Meanwhile, his father, Wen Gang, was able to continue his normal studies and schooling during the Japanese-occupied period. In April 1938, Wen Gang was admitted with excellent grades to the National Beijing Normal College in Beijing. Of course, Beijing at this time had already been occupied by the Japanese, and because he followed the Japanese educational system, Wen Gang's tuition and lodging fees in Beijing were completely free, which could be considered taking advantage of the Japanese. Soon, in 1945, the Japan surrendered, and Yixingbu was returned to the Nationalist government. Did the good days for the Wen family arrive then? Not at all; things actually got worse. With the outbreak of the Chinese Civil War, the CCP and the Nationalist Party initiated one round of elegant interactions after another. Tianjin, as a major city of 500,000 people—oh, sorry, wrong channel—Tianjin, as a major city, naturally became the focal point of contention between the two sides. By 1948, the Nationalist government, suffering successive defeats and seeing that it could no longer hold Tianjin, actually adopted a scorched-earth policy: territory that the Nationalist Party could not hold would absolutely not be left to the Communist Party, characterized entirely by mutual destruction. Therefore, in 1948, when the Nationalist Party withdrew from Tianjin, they set fire to several large villages in Tianjin, which naturally included Yixingbu, where Wen Jiabao lived. The Wen family's house, the primary school, and even the ancestral hall were burned to ashes in the great fire. Chen Changjie, the Nationalist garrison commander responsible for defending Tianjin at the time, explained the fire by saying that a small number of troops had been overly enthusiastic in defending Tianjin, for which he felt extremely regretful. Setting fire to ordinary people's homes was called being overly enthusiastic. In this regard, the two parties were completely of one mind.

Of course, after the fire, Wen Jiabao's grandfather and father did not abandon their profession of teaching. Without a school, they simply had to rent a warehouse and continue teaching students under the glorious light of the Communist Party. Having driven away the Japanese and the Nationalist Party, according to the CCP's rhetoric, good days had arrived for the Chinese people. Indeed, as for the CCP era, good days for the Wen family did arrive, but those good days required quotation marks. In 1958, an additional document titled "Opinions on Restricting the Use of Wen Gang" suddenly appeared in the file of Wen Jiabao's father. As soon as this document came out, Wen Jiabao's father, Wen Gang, was directly labeled as a member of the Five Black Categories and sent down to a farm in the suburbs of Tianjin to raise pigs. During the Japanese occupation period he could teach, and during the Nationalist period he could teach, but in the Communist period there were no books to teach; he could only teach pigs. This really was enjoying the good days. Of course, as to why the Communist Party had such strong opinions about Wen Gang and wanted to suppress him, it was probably the result of infinite collective punishment. Wen Jiabao—well, it goes without saying, his surname is Wen, and the mayor of Tianjin during the Japanese occupation also had the surname Wen, named Wen Shizhen. Although there aren't many people with the surname Wen, if you really wanted to talk about any relation between Wen Shizhen and Wen Jiabao's family, there was none whatsoever; their ancestors didn't even belong to the same branch. The biggest connection was simply that surname and that they both lived in Tianjin. The Wen Jiabao family had never benefited from this Wen Shizhen during the Japanese occupation, but the Communist Party never cared about such things; sometimes launching political purges simply requires an excuse. Therefore, after Wen Shizhen was executed by firing squad in 1951, the Wen family, sharing the same surname, was continuously harassed. First, during the Three-anti and Five-anti Campaigns, Wen Gang was repeatedly investigated, and finally stopped only because Wen Gang was too incorruptible for them to find any dirt. Afterwards, seeing that they truly could not find a reason, the CCP turned Wen Gang's "glorious" resume of studying in a Japanese school into a stain: having studied in a Japanese school and acting as a half-Japanese overseas student meant you were not a pure Communist, you were not worthy of being Chinese, and even if you had knowledge, you were not worthy of serving the Communist Party—you were only fit to serve pigs. Of course, as the CCP adhered to the principle of limitless collective punishment, the little Japanese overseas student's son, Wen Jiabao, naturally became implicated as well. Fortunately, however, this was not the Cultural Revolution, so the repercussions Wen Jiabao suffered were limited, and he was not plunged into the depths of hell.

Wen Jiabao's father and grandfather were both teachers. Against this background, although Wen Jiabao did not come from an extremely wealthy or powerful family, he certainly belonged to an intellectual family. Influenced by this scholarly background, Wen Jiabao studied very hard since childhood and truly felt a bit like a model student. According to Wen Jiabao's own account, when he was a child, he picked up a one-cent coin by the road, put it in his pocket, and did not promptly give it to his mother. When his mother found out, she beat him with a broom, asking where the money came from while hitting him until the broom fell apart. We have all heard a song when we were kids called "I Picked Up a One-Cent Coin on the Road and Handed It to Uncle Policeman"; and indeed, Wen Jiabao was raised to be just like that. Of course, as a typical model student, Wen Jiabao also studied very hard himself, so his grades were always at the top of the class during his school days. In elementary school, because of his excellent grades, Wen Jiabao skipped a grade directly. When advancing to middle school, Wen Jiabao also advanced directly to the better Nankai Middle School in Tianjin with top grades. By middle school, based on his grades, Tsinghua University and Peking University were his to choose from at the time. However, ultimately due to his family background, Wen Jiabao could only attend the Beijing Institute of Geology. When Wen Jiabao stepped down in 2013, Southern Weekly once interviewed some of Wen Jiabao's childhood neighbors. These neighbors said that a phrase Wen Jiabao's mother frequently had on her lips was that because of his family background, his son couldn't take the exam for Tsinghua. This really illustrated what an intellectual family was all about: even though her son had already become the Premier of the country, the mother still couldn't let go of the fact that he didn't get into Tsinghua. Of course, after entering university, Wen Jiabao continued to carry out the habits of a model student. Throughout all the courses in university, Wen Jiabao only failed to get an excellent grade in one subject, and in the final semester of his undergraduate studies, he successfully joined the CCP, becoming one of the only two party members in his class at the time. Becoming a party member during university days still carried a lot of weight back then, and being able to join the party while bearing a family background like his father being a former youth student in Japan made it carry even more weight. Of course, that was not all. In the final semester, the highly motivated Wen Jiabao repeatedly submitted reports requesting to go to Tibet after graduation to make his own contribution, and even wrote two letters in blood for this purpose. In that era when jobs were assigned, everyone was desperate to run to the cities, and those desperately running to the harshest Tibet were indeed very few. Of course, such a pious model student Wen Jiabao with such good performance ultimately did not get to go to Tibet. How could the school let you go when you were such an excellent student? Amidst the collective recommendation and retention of many teachers in the school, Wen Jiabao began to stay at the school to pursue graduate studies.

However, Wen Jiabao, who was happily preparing to study for graduate school, soon encountered the recurring segment of every episode of Fang Lian Profiles, which was the Cultural Revolution. In 1966, having just started his graduate studies, Wen Jiabao had not yet had a chance to show his model student spirit to his advisor before he quickly found out that his advisor was gone. His advisor at the time was Ma Xingyuan, the vice president of the Beijing Institute of Geology. Ma Xingyuan had previously studied for his doctorate at the University of Edinburgh, and afterwards, inspired by communism, returned to China to make his contribution. This resume was of great value at the beginning of the founding of the country, and Ma Xingyuan was definitely a scarce talent in China at the time. But in the blink of an eye, when the Cultural Revolution arrived, this resume became an absolute stain, and Ma Xingyuan was named and criticized as a reactionary authority. Late at night on August 25, 1966, a group of Red Guards rushed into the Beijing Institute of Geology and subjected Ma Xingyuan to severe torture, whipping him with leather belts until smoke practically came off him. After the severe torture ended, Ma Xingyuan could only be forced to enjoy the treatment of Wen Jiabao's father, being sent down to raise pigs and having nothing more to do with teaching. This turmoil also resulted in Wen Jiabao seeing his advisor Ma Xingyuan only twice during his entire graduate studies. Of course, at this stage, his father Wen Gang also could not escape unscathed and was repeatedly criticized and denounced by the Red Guards. Big-character posters criticizing Wen Gang were pasted all the way from Wen Jiabao's doorstep to the entrance of the alley. But after all, Wen Jiabao's father Wen Gang's problem was not that serious, so Wen Jiabao's father ultimately only had his salary suspended, was dragged out to be denounced from time to time, and then continued to raise pigs.

Of course, with this background, after Wen Jiabao graduated, he was actually just like many ordinary Chinese people today. You might ask, were Wen Jiabao's grades good? Yes. Was his academic background solid? Yes. Was his ability strong? Yes. But as someone with no money, no connections, no pedigree, and even teetering on the edge of being a member of the 'Five Black Categories,' Wen Jiabao naturally couldn't expect a bright future. He couldn't do what Xi Jinping did—go straight to being a secretary for the Minister of National Defense right after graduation. A good father is far more useful than a blood-written letter or a transcript. After graduating as an honor student, Wen Jiabao was sent down to Jiuquan, to an exploration team in the Qilian Mountains. In fact, for a country that spent a lot of money to train a graduate student, if he could shine in the Qilian Mountains, that would be considered serving the motherland; after all, labor is the most glorious thing. But how could the motherland give him that chance? When Wen Jiabao first arrived at the exploration team, it was at the peak of the Cultural Revolution. The entire team wasn't exploring any mountain ranges; they were busy exploring who the reactionaries were, making revolution every day, and focusing on political movements. Faced with such fanatical Cultural Revolution activists, Wen Jiabao, who had a questionable background and was a well-behaved student, basically couldn't fit in and couldn't find any sense of presence. So, during this stage, all he could do was join nine other 'backward elements' in stoking the boilers and boiling water. A graduate student reduced to a water dispenser attendant—that is indeed a fine story. Afterward, Wen Jiabao spent 10 years in the Qilian Mountains. During this stage, he also met his wife, Zhang Peili, a top student who graduated from the Department of Geology and Geography at Lanzhou University. This person would play a major role later on. Of course, returning to Wen Jiabao himself, during his time in the Qilian Mountains, although he had a good reputation and strong professional ability, he couldn't even dream of a promotion. An 'Opinion on Restricting the Use of Wen Gang' became a tight-fitting spell on Wen Jiabao's head. And Wen Jiabao, who should have lived a plain life and been trapped in the Qilian Mountains forever, finally waited for the turning point in his life. And what was this turning point? It was Mao Zedong 'ascending' to the planet of preserved meat (Mao's mummified body). Applause, applause, applause, applause. With the end of the Cultural Revolution in China, the act of labeling people should theoretically have ended, and the tight-fitting spell of the 'Opinion on Restricting the Use of Wen Gang' on Wen Jiabao's head should have been removed. But Wen Jiabao, whose voice carried little weight, was still affected by the aftershocks of the Cultural Revolution. His father was not on the first list of rehabilitated people in 1977, and he was still not on the second list in 1978. His father was still considered a reactionary at that time, which meant that from 1977 to 1978, Wen Jiabao had nothing to do with the two large-scale cadre promotions and salary adjustments. It wasn't until June 26, 1979, that the 'Opinion on Restricting the Use of Wen Gang' was finally seen by everyone in this wave of rehabilitation and was eventually revoked. His father's experience of accidentally attending a Japanese school decades ago became a tight-fitting spell that plagued Wen Jiabao for decades. This absurdity is actually the most authentic portrayal of China during the Cultural Revolution. And Wen Jiabao, who was capable, well-educated, and obedient, ushered in his golden moment and his own rocket-like promotion after the spell was removed. In the autumn of that year, he was appointed as the deputy director of the Geology and Mineral Resources Division of the Gansu Provincial Bureau of Geology. A year and a half later, he was promoted to deputy director of the Gansu Provincial Bureau of Geology, and finally, in 1982, he was transferred to the Ministry of Geology and Mineral Resources, entering the central government. In fact, it wasn't just Wen Jiabao who entered the central government in the same year and month; there was another cadre who had been exiled to Gansu, and that was Hu Jintao. In that same year and month, he was elected as a member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League. The fates of the two were actually extremely similar: both had high academic qualifications, both were hardworking, and both had poor backgrounds. One went to build a hydropower station in Liujiaxia after graduation, and the other went to the Qilian Mountains to do surveying. More than 10 years later, the two went to Beijing together, and 20 years later, they both served as the country's top leaders.

Of course, at this stage, the rapid promotion of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao was not only due to their outstanding personal abilities but also related to the historical background of that time. After the fall of the Gang of Four, Deng Xiaoping initiated a version update in personnel, and the slogan for this update was the "Three Cleans and Four Modernizations." The "Three Cleans" meant purging three types of people from leadership teams—to put it bluntly, the Cultural Revolution faction that rose to power by rebelling alongside Lin Biao and Jiang Qing. The "Four Modernizations" on paper meant that cadres should be more revolutionary, younger, better educated, and more professional; in plain terms, it meant that technocrats like those favored by Deng Xiaoping were to enter the leadership teams to refresh the blood and build up a reserve force. Although this "Three Cleans and Four Modernizations" was essentially a Cultural Revolution-style purge of political opponents, it was theoretically much better than the Cultural Revolution. After all, during the Cultural Revolution, promotion was based on loyalty, whereas now it was based on academic credentials and ability. Moreover, if you failed in a power struggle during the Cultural Revolution, you would be thrown into prison or lose your life, while most of the Cultural Revolution faction members who were "cleaned out" kept their lives and even their jobs; the level of bloodshed was far lower than during the Cultural Revolution. After arriving at the central government, Wen Jiabao's personal ability was further affirmed, and at this moment, a heaven-sent opportunity arrived for him. In October 1985, Zhongnanhai needed to select a deputy director for the General Office of the CCP Central Committee. What does this General Office do? It is responsible for receiving and sending central documents, issuing meeting notices for the central leadership, and managing the security and travel vehicles for leaders. The General Office is often seen as the General Secretary's chief secretary and bodyguard, as it nominally oversees the Central Security Bureau. Historically, well-known directors of the General Office include Cai Qi, who is now powerful and seen as the number two figure in China; Ling Jihua, whose son died in a car crash in Beijing and whose political career was ruined by his own son; and Wang Dongxing, a key figure during the fall of the Gang of Four who controlled the Beijing security forces. Originally, according to China's political landscape, such a high-level position that allows direct access to the top leadership and daily interaction with the number one leader would never have gone to someone like Wen Jiabao, who had no power base. But the General Secretary at the time was not a conventional one; it was Hu Yaobang. According to the recollections of Hu Yaobang's son, Hu Deping, his father had a basic principle when selecting personnel for the General Office: the principle was not loyalty, but rather that the person should not be someone he already knew, and ideally, few people in the top CCP leadership should know this person. Hu Yaobang once said that if everyone were familiar with the person in this position, it would become a matter of playing politics among acquaintances and cliques. This position could not be filled by someone who was always visiting others; with so many cadres, the General Office had to bring in a fresh face so that they could work properly. This forms a sharp contrast with Xi Jinping, who brought the entire Zhijiang New Army into the central government. Therefore, against this background, Wen Jiabao—a "model student" with no power base, no connections, no family background, but who performed well and was reliable—was successfully selected, became the deputy director of the General Office, and was later promoted to director. This position also made his relationship with democratic-leaning CCP figures like Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang very close; in fact, when Hu Yaobang passed away unexpectedly, it was Wen Jiabao who was by his side performing emergency rescue efforts.

When talking about the concept of the Tuanpai (Youth League faction) and democratic factions, people usually think of the Tuanpai leader Hu Jintao, but the depth of Wen Jiabao's relationship with the democratic faction within the party at that time is rarely mentioned later. However, if we look closely, his relationship with Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang seems even deeper than that of Hu Jintao, a second-generation Tuanpai figure.

So, a classic question arises: how did Wen Jiabao, who had such close ties to Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang, manage to stay out of trouble and avoid being purged during the wave of democratization in China around the June 4, 1989, Tiananmen crackdown?

First, we must mention the situation at the time. Unlike the current General Office director who is fully responsible to the General Secretary, the power of the General Secretary in China at that time was actually very limited. Whether it was Hu Yaobang or Zhao Ziyang, they appeared to be China's number one leader, but in reality, they had a supreme ruler, Deng Xiaoping, above them. This power structure made the General Office extremely complex.

In 1989, the moment that changed China's destiny, Wen Jiabao was serving as the director of the General Office. However, there were four other deputy directors. Among them were Yang Dezhong, who was responsible for security control, and Wang Rui-lin, who concurrently served as the director of Deng Xiaoping's office. These two were clearly affiliated with Deng Xiaoping's faction. In addition, there was Zhang Yueqi, who belonged to Zhao Ziyang's faction, and Xu Ruixin, a pure technocrat who belonged to no faction. At that time, the General Office was more like a patchwork of secretaries, and Wen Jiabao was the secretary-general responsible for coordinating the work. Therefore, although Wen Jiabao's position appeared highly tied to Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, within the system, he was still considered a "person of the Party" rather than a member of the Hu-Zhao faction.

Besides this, another key reason was Wen Jiabao's attitude toward the June 4, 1989, Tiananmen crackdown.

When the June Fourth (Tiananmen) incident occurred, unlike Hu Jintao, who had already been dispatched to the frontier as the "Tiger of Lhasa" in Tibet, Wen Jiabao, as the Director of the General Office and physically present in Beijing, was deeply embroiled in the vortex of June Fourth.

So how did Wen Jiabao express his stance amidst this? The answer is: he supported democracy, but was overly cowardly.

The student movement of June Fourth can actually be traced back to the 1986 student protests. At that time, students yearning for democratic reform had already launched the first wave of large-scale protests in China. This caused the fire of protest, originating from the University of Science and Technology of China in Hefei, to spread all the way to Beijing. And what was the outcome of this student movement? Hu Yaobang stepped down. Hu Yaobang was subjected to struggle sessions on January 10, 1987, for supporting the student movement. At that time, a meeting was held inside Zhongnanhai that lasted for six consecutive days. During those six days, participants took turns criticizing Hu Yaobang, with Bo Yibo even jumping up onto a table and chasing after Hu Yaobang to hurl abuses. In the end, following this meeting, Hu Yaobang was forced to resign, while Wen Jiabao, who was responsible for organizing the meeting, did not even qualify to attend it.

However, Wen Jiabao's subsequent behavior could be considered a gesture of taking a stance on the matter. After Hu Yaobang was purged along with Deng Xiaoping and other elders, many people deliberately kept their distance from Hu Yaobang to clear themselves of any association. Yet, according to memoirs by Hu Yaobang's son Hu Deping, Wen Jiabao frequently visited Hu Yaobang. Hu Yaobang even told Wen Jiabao more than once, "You are still working, still using [us], it's good." However, Wen Jiabao's visits were calculated; he belonged to the type who would visit conservative old guard figures like Chen Yun and Bo Yibo in the morning, and then visit Hu Yaobang in the afternoon. Procedurally speaking, not a single flaw could be found in his approach.

As for the rest of Wen Jiabao's story, it brings us to April 8, 1989. On this day, Hu Yaobang suffered a sudden heart attack during a Politburo meeting at Huailingtang. According to records by Hu Yaobang's daughter Manmei, it was Wen Jiabao who was in charge of directing the emergency rescue at Huailingtang and accompanied the ambulance to send Hu Yaobang to the hospital. Confronted with Hu Yaobang's unexpected death, the Chinese people at the time were filled with righteous indignation, universally believing that Deng Xiaoping and the CCP had failed or even secretly harmed Hu Yaobang. Consequently, on April 17, the first wave of the student movement erupted in China.

At the very beginning of the movement, Wen Jiabao was relatively supportive of the student movement and managed it with a relatively loose hand. Saying that Wen Jiabao managed it loosely is not giving him undue credit; although the first wave of the student movement had already erupted on April 17, the overall scale at the time was very small, so the central leadership did not attach much importance to it. They viewed the student movement as a part of Hu Yaobang's funeral arrangements, and therefore the CCP assigned Wen Jiabao, who was in charge of Hu Yaobang's funeral, to handle the student unrest.

However, the student movement quickly escalated as more and more Chinese took to the streets and began hunger strikes. Hu Yaobang's death transformed directly from an ordinary student protest event into a showdown between the reform-and-opening faction and conservatives led by Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng on one side, and the democratic faction led by Zhao Ziyang on the other. Wen Jiabao, possessing little political weight, was kicked out of the core decision-making power at this juncture. For instance, on the afternoon of May 17, 1989, at the critical meeting where Deng Xiaoping decided to impose martial law, the only representative from the entire General Office of the Central Committee present was Wang Ruilin, a deputy director from Deng Xiaoping's faction. Wen Jiabao did not attend at all, and he only learned about the outcome of the meeting when Li Peng briefed him that evening.

Even so, Wen Jiabao still had opportunities to express his stance, and his earlier performance remained supportive of democracy, standing on Zhao Ziyang's side—except that his stance was insufficiently resolute, belonging to the sort who would jump off the vehicle as soon as things looked unfavorable.

The first instance of him taking a side occurred on the aforementioned May 19, when he accompanied Zhao Ziyang to the June Fourth site to meet with the students. According to records in Zhao Ziyang's memoirs, on May 19, Li Peng opposed Zhao Ziyang and Wen Jiabao going to the site, and even demanded that Wen Jiabao join the General Office of the Central Committee to prevent Zhao Ziyang from going. However, Zhao Ziyang flatly refused and insisted on heading to the scene. Fearing that Zhao Ziyang would steal the spotlight, Li Peng had no choice but to follow along resentfully. What was Wen Jiabao's attitude at that moment? According to the recollections of Zhao Ziyang's political secretary Bao Tong, Wen Jiabao directly rejected Li Peng's demand, not only refusing to stop Zhao Ziyang from going to the scene, but also accompanying Zhao Ziyang there.

Yet very soon, after Zhao Ziyang finished his visit to the site, he was forced to take a leave of absence under the pressure of Deng Xiaoping and a group of elderly cadres. At this point, Wen Jiabao's attitude underwent a 180-degree reversal.

During the few days when Zhao Ziyang was forced to take leave, he sought out Wen Jiabao once. At the time, Zhao Ziyang's downfall was a soft ouster; no one in the central leadership told him explicitly that he was removed from office, and Deng Xiaoping did not immediately strip Zhao Ziyang of his posts, yet all of Zhao Ziyang's power had already been stripped away. Worried that the conservatives might later launch a counterattack by claiming it wasn't them who forced him out, but rather that he quit of his own accord—thus inverting black and white—Zhao Ziyang approached Wen Jiabao, hoping to convene a Politburo meeting to clarify the matter. However, Wen Jiabao politely declined Zhao Ziyang's request.

At that time, Wen Jiabao first told Zhao Ziyang that the General Office of the CCP Central Committee had been pushed aside, and that all these deployments had not passed through him; everything was arranged independently by the conservatives Li Peng and Yang Shangkun. Then he tactfully said to Zhao Ziyang that if he insisted on holding a meeting, it could be done, and the General Office could also issue this notice to call everyone over. However, Wen Jiabao expressed that if this were actually done, he had a premonition that the consequences would be very bad, and he hoped Zhao Ziyang could consider it carefully. To put it bluntly, it was like a leader asking you to book a meeting room and summon a meeting, and you telling the leader that you could help book the meeting room, but you suggested not doing so.

Under normal circumstances, Wen Jiabao certainly would not have dared to talk back to Zhao Ziyang like this, but this was no longer a normal situation.

Later on, as the situation gradually became clearer and the conservatives gradually gained the upper hand, Wen Jiabao's attitude also began to become clearer. An incident happened at that time, which was later considered the most crucial event that changed Wen Jiabao's destiny: he did not help recall Wan Li.

Of course, Wan Li had to be mentioned here. As an elder of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Wan Li had previously stood by Zhao Ziyang's side. Wan Li's position at that time was the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC). Although this position did not seem to have much power, within the political system designed by the CCP, that power was very great. According to the CCP's statement, supreme state power in China belongs to the people, and the NPC is the representative of the people. Therefore, NPC Chairman Wan Li had the power to revoke decisions of the State Council. In other words, Wan Li could have revoked the martial law decree issued by Li Peng at that time. But very coincidentally, at the critical moment when June Fourth broke out, Wan Li, Zhao Ziyang's biggest ally, was visiting Canada and planned to continue visiting the United States. Therefore, Zhao Ziyang hoped Wan Li would return quickly. Wan Li's return might not necessarily be useful, but at least there was a glimmer of hope. On the other hand, Li Peng firmly prevented Wan Li from returning. Li Peng clearly wrote in his diary that Wan Li should not return immediately, otherwise he would inevitably be used by those who supported turmoil and opposed martial law. Of course, a side note here: Jiang Zemin also intercepted Wan Li in Shanghai back then, preventing him from returning to Beijing immediately, which was also an important bonus for Jiang Zemin's later promotion.

During this period, Wen Jiabao actually did something similar, just that his obstruction was not as resolute as Jiang Zemin's. On May 21, 1989, the second day of martial law in Beijing, Hu Qili, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau belonging to the democratic faction, came to Wen Jiabao with a telegram draft, asking him to send the telegram. The telegram was requested by Zhao Ziyang, and its content was to ask NPC Chairman Wan Li, who was visiting Canada, to terminate his visit and return to China ahead of schedule. After reading the telegram, Wen Jiabao replied that without the secretary's signature, the General Office of the CCP Central Committee could not send this telegram. In the end, Hu Qili could only turn to Zhao Ziyang for a signature, and very sensibly ended up not using the General Office of the CCP Central Committee, but sending the telegram through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs instead.

This sentence became a turning point. If previously Zhao Ziyang asked Wen Jiabao to hold a meeting and Wen Jiabao only offered a soft resistance, on this matter, Wen Jiabao directly began to state his position.

Afterwards, Wen Jiabao also began to completely lean toward the conservatives. After the martial law, the Standing Committee members went separately to find the heads of various departments for individual talks, asking them to state their position on martial law. When they found Wen Jiabao, he immediately issued a document on behalf of the General Office of the CCP Central Committee, stating that he supported the central leadership's policies and Comrade Deng Xiaoping's decision. Afterwards, Wen Jiabao also demanded that party members immediately stop all parades and demonstrations, demanded that party members continue to study the important speeches of Comrades Li Peng and Yang Shangkun on May 19, and instructed his relatives not to go out on the street or go to Tiananmen for demonstrations. In contrast, other high-level central officials, such as Bao Tong, Hu Qili, and Rui Xingwen, refused to state their positions, while Yan Mingfu delayed the talk time. This behavior later became the watershed between Wen Jiabao and other bureaucrats during the liquidation of Zhao Ziyang's faction.

From June 23 to 24, all of Zhao Ziyang's titles—General Secretary, member of the Political Bureau Standing Committee, member of the Political Bureau, member of the Central Committee, and First Vice Chairman of the Military Commission—were stripped away. Afterward, Zhao Ziyang was placed under house arrest. Standing Committee member and Political Bureau member Hu Qili, who had brought the telegram draft to Wen Jiabao, along with Secretariat member Hu Qili, were purged together. Rui Xingwen and Yan Mingfu, who failed to readily state their positions, were also dismissed. Among them, the most miserable was Bao Tong, Zhao Ziyang's political secretary and the staunchest supporter of the students, who was directly locked up in Qincheng Prison and served 7 years in prison. Meanwhile, Wen Jiabao, who jumped ship, was not severely affected.

Of course, regarding this act of jumping ship, one could say that Wen Jiabao was very slick and perhaps never supported democracy and freedom at all, merely putting on a performance when Zhao Ziyang was in power. However, I think Zhao Ziyang's later evaluation of Wen Jiabao speaks volumes. His comment on Wen Jiabao was: Wen Jiabao has a somewhat better awareness of reform, but he is extremely cautious and works under the tradition of respecting the party's top leader; it seems he will not accomplish any major feats in terms of reform. Wen Jiabao supports democracy, but he lacks courage and it is hard for him to accomplish much. This evaluation is indeed fair and objective, which was very clearly reflected during Wen Jiabao's term in office.

Of course, this brings us to the various actions taken by Wen Jiabao after he came to power. As for why Wen Jiabao was able to succeed as Premier, the mainstream view is that his capabilities were indeed quite strong and he had gained the appreciation of Zhu Rongji. After the June 4, 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, Wen Jiabao was slightly impacted; he managed to keep his position as Director of the General Office of the CCP Central Committee, but he was not promoted for three years. It was not until October 1992 that he was promoted to alternate member of the Politburo and member of the Secretariat, and in 1993, he became a deputy head of the agricultural group led by Zhu Rongji. At the time, this was actually a bit of a demotion disguised as a promotion, but fortunately, Wen Jiabao's abilities were outstanding, and he earned the appreciation of Zhu Rongji while working under him, eventually being officially promoted to Vice Premier in 1998.

Of course, the most important thing Wen Jiabao did during his entire tenure as Vice Premier was dealing with the 1998 Great Flood. In 1998, China experienced the largest flood since the founding of the People's Republic. Unlike Xi Jinping, who directs things remotely from the center and only spouts famous quotes, Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji at the time personally went to the front lines for disaster relief. However, under the glory of Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji, the actual commander-in-chief of the disaster relief was Wen Jiabao; he was the leader who spent the most time on the front lines. Starting on May 29, 1998, Wen Jiabao rushed to places like Wuhan, later went to Hebei in June, and in July, he accompanied Zhu Rongji to travel across Jiangxi, Hubei, and Hunan. According to data released by the CCP, the 1998 Great Flood ultimately caused 4,150 deaths. Some believe that the death toll being that low for such a disaster was a great merit, while others argue that the disaster occurred precisely because of corner-cutting in water conservancy projects and improper disaster relief command. But regardless of how the outside world evaluated it at the time, Wen Jiabao was indeed busy running back and forth on the front lines throughout the flood control period. This performance further gained the recognition of Zhu Rongji and the unanimous approval of the CCP elders.

According to multiple sources verified by renowned sinologists Bruce Gilley and Andrew Nathan, because of his effective water management, Zhu Rongji strongly pushed for Wen Jiabao to become Premier at a Politburo meeting in the autumn of 2000, stating that no one could challenge his judgment. Of course, the challengers Zhu Rongji referred to here mainly meant Li Changchun and Wu Bangguo, who were favored by Jiang Zemin. Zhu Rongji's support at this time was crucial; after all, looking at the political landscape at the time, Wen Jiabao, who belonged to the Tuanpai (Youth League faction), had a relatively thin background. If one were to ask who could support him, the only person within the central leadership who could empathize with him was Hu Jintao, who also came from a humble background and was part of the Tuanpai. However, at that time, Hu Jintao's voice carried little weight, so without Zhu Rongji's support, it would have been impossible for Wen Jiabao to become Premier.

And what was Wen Jiabao's performance like after he took office as Premier? He did indeed accomplish some things.

The first thing he did was to cut taxes. Unlike the current situation where Xi Jinping is constantly engaging in secondary taxation through social security, the first thing Wen Jiabao did after taking office was to abolish the agricultural tax. Recently, Chinese people have been suffering miserably due to mandatory social security payments, but the vast number of laborers are actually only the victims of the second round of CCP persecution. Long before this, the first round of victims were actually the farmers. Although the Communist Party started its rise by using the banner of a peasant party, once it came to power, it was also the most ruthless in exploiting farmers. Chinese farmers were long subjected to high agricultural taxes. According to the "Agricultural Tax Regulations" from 1958 to 2000, farmers were required to hand over 15.5% of their harvested grain to the CCP. Of course, in addition to the direct agricultural tax, farmers also had to pay "three withholdings and five overall planning" fees, which were expenses for various rural road and bridge repairs and family planning. With the superposition of various arbitrary charges, the actual cumulative tax rate for farmers at that time could reach over 30%. Moreover, not only were the taxes high, but the methods of tax collection in rural areas at the time were also very brutal, which in some ways was no different from outright robbery. For example, in 2004, "Law and Life" reported that a farmer named Li Nianpu in Sichuan had his family's only cow taken away directly by village cadres because he did not pay the agricultural tax in time. In 1993, a farmer named Ding Zuohuan in Anhui was beaten to death by local cadres for refusing to pay the "three withholdings and five overall planning" fees. It can truly be said that harsh taxes are fiercer than tigers.

Before Wen Jiabao took office, he had mentioned something called the Huang Zongxi Law. This Huang Zongxi Law states that at the beginning of a dynasty, the tax burden on farmers is often relatively low, but as the dynasty develops and officials become redundant, the tax burden on farmers increases, eventually leading to the collapse of the dynasty. After Wen Jiabao took office, the first thing he said he wanted to do was to abolish the agricultural tax. Wen Jiabao specifically criticized certain counties in China at the time, saying that a county with a population of only 120,000 to 130,000 had as many as 5,700 people living off the government payroll, and the burden on farmers was unbearable—"those who eat are many, those who produce are few." Wen Jiabao was actually very keen at the time to perceive the problem the CCP was about to face, which was the high tax burden caused by official redundancy. And indeed, through the continuous efforts of Wen Jiabao and Hu Jintao, by January 1, 2006, the agricultural tax was officially abolished in China, and in the same year, the "three withholdings and five overall planning" fees also officially disappeared. This policy was indeed beneficial to the country and the people.

However, this move did not actually solve the Huang Zongxi Law. The reason China was able to reduce agricultural taxes was mainly because the industrial structure had changed; China had upgraded from an agricultural country to an industrial one. By 2004, agricultural taxes accounted for less than 1% of the CCP's total fiscal revenue, so it didn't matter if they disappeared at that time. Local governments subsequently continued to collect taxes and fees through land finance to make up for these deficits. The Huang Zongxi Law is essentially a problem of excessive tax burdens caused by redundant officials, and these issues did not disappear with the abolition of agricultural taxes. Of course, having said that, compared to the current Xi Jinping, Wen Jiabao was much more human.

Another major achievement during Wen Jiabao's era was the 4 trillion yuan stimulus package. On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, and the global financial tsunami broke out. Facing this financial tsunami, Wen Jiabao led the State Council to launch a 4 trillion yuan stimulus plan. The government began large-scale investments in infrastructure and supported some emerging industries. The results of this plan are difficult to evaluate. At the time, it prevented China from bearing the full brunt of the financial crisis and thus falling into economic turmoil. In 2008 and 2009, the two most ferocious years of the financial crisis, China still maintained a high GDP growth rate, with annual growth remaining above 9%. However, at the same time, this 4 trillion yuan plan also opened the floodgates for massive government investment in China. Today, Xi Jinping is relying heavily on technology to avoid a recession, which to a certain extent is a carbon copy of Wen Jiabao's 4 trillion yuan rescue plan. Later on, during several major disasters in China, such as SARS, the Wenchuan earthquake, and the Wenzhou train collision, Wen Jiabao always rushed to the front line. Overall, his performance was quite commendable, far superior to Xi Jinping, who only knows how to engage in cover-ups and censorship today. Furthermore, Wen Jiabao was clearly much more tolerant. In 2008, an article criticizing Wen Jiabao as an “actor” began circulating on the internet, and this article was ultimately not deleted. Of course, most of the major achievements during Wen Jiabao's era overlapped with Hu Jintao's, so they will not be elaborated upon in detail here. However, looking across the entire period of Wen Jiabao's administration, there is one initiative he spearheaded that deserves to be singled out for sharp commentary. What was this matter? It targeted Bo Xilai. Currently, many people believe that Bo Xilai's main rival is Xi Jinping, so rumors have long persisted that the relationship between Bo Xilai and Xi Jinping is extremely poor, and that Xi Jinping has been targeting Bo Xilai everywhere while the two engaged in covert struggles. Yet, when sorting through the facts, the person who hated Bo Xilai the most and blocked his path to higher office and wealth was actually not Xi Jinping, but Wen Jiabao. As the son of CCP elder and conservative old-timer Bo Yibo, Bo Xilai naturally enjoyed a smooth official career after June Fourth. Before June Fourth, he became the vice mayor of Dalian, and later served as the governor of Liaoning Province. In February 2004, the then-Minister of Commerce, Lu Fuyuan, was suffering from cancer and unable to continue serving centrally, so it was decided to send Bo Xilai to take over as Minister of Commerce. Originally, this was a crucial step for Bo Xilai to advance further. According to Bo Xilai's own plan, his next step would be to succeed retiring Vice Premier Wu Yi in 2008, and become premier in 2012, sharing dual-emperor rule in China with Xi Jinping. But in the process of this promotion, he ran into Wen Jiabao. At the time, the Ministry of Commerce was subordinate to the State Council system, so Bo Xilai was subject to Wen Jiabao's indirect management and Vice Premier Wu Yi's direct management. In May 2004, Bo Xilai began accompanying Wen Jiabao on a visit to five European countries, making a prominent public appearance on the world stage. According to subsequent reports, during the visit, Bo Xilai was extremely high-profile, which caused extreme dissatisfaction with Wen Jiabao. According to a report by the Asahi Shimbun, Wen Jiabao once directly warned Bo Xilai, demanding that he keep a low profile, but Bo Xilai continued to act as he pleased, causing Wen Jiabao great displeasure. Of course, I do not think his high-profile nature was the main reason for Wen Jiabao's dissatisfaction with Bo Xilai. After all, according to records at the time, his high profile consisted of praising Wen Jiabao profusely for his diligence in front of European Union officials. As the saying goes, flattery never fails; how could anyone possibly be displeased because someone else buttered them up? I think the greater reason stemmed from the revenge of the Communist Youth League faction (Tuanpai). First, unlike Xi Jinping's father, Xi Zhongxun, who showed sympathy for Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang during June Fourth, Bo Xilai's father, Bo Yibo, was basically a running dog of the conservatives. He once stood up and cursed Hu Yaobang for hours during an internal meeting, to the point where other veteran cadres could not bear to watch. Moreover, unlike Xi Jinping, who roamed the streets as a hoodlum during the Cultural Revolution, Bo Xilai's behavior during the Cultural Revolution was characterized by extreme filial piety that caused uproarious laughter. During the Cultural Revolution, to demonstrate his loyalty, he even savagely denounced his own father, Bo Yibo, at a struggle session, and at one point broke three of his father's ribs. All of this made the Tuanpai, led by Wen Jiabao, extremely unhappy. Of course, this mindset of Wen Jiabao and the Tuanpai is not merely my speculation. According to confidential U.S. diplomatic cables disclosed by WikiLeaks, it was mentioned that Bo Xilai always wanted to be promoted to Vice Premier, but Wen Jiabao consistently opposed it. The official reason given by Wen Jiabao was that Falun Gong practitioners had sued Bo Xilai in places like Australia, Spain, Canada, the UK, and the US; he had too many lawsuits and his international image was too negative, making him unsuitable to represent China at a higher level. But the actual reason, as written in the report, was that Wen Jiabao opposed what Bo Yibo and Bo Xilai had done during the Cultural Revolution, and it was for this reason that he blocked Bo Xilai's further advancement. Ultimately, in 2007, Vice Premier Wu Yi's dissatisfaction with Bo Xilai reached a climax. That year, Wu Yi even directly sent people to investigate the Ministry of Commerce, except that this investigation did not take down Bo Xilai, but instead struck down a department head. That year, Guo Jingyi, the head of the Treaty and Law Department of the Ministry of Commerce, was sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve for corruption. Of course, this was also within expectations, given that Bo Yibo's influence was still present, but Wen Jiabao and Wu Yi did not stop there.

Finally, in 2008, according to reports by the Asahi Shimbun, Wu Yi decided to break with Bo Xilai. Wu Yi paid the price of retiring completely to exchange for the end of Bo Xilai's political career. In 2007, although Bo Xilai was promoted to the deputy state level and entered the Politburo, he was demoted to Chongqing, beginning to distance himself from the central government. Under normal circumstances, after spending two terms away from the center in Chongqing, he should have retired. Of course, Bo Xilai, having arrived in Chongqing, was not willing to give up; he was still extremely arrogant and hoped to advance further. During this time, he launched the later infamous

Of course, compared to Bo Xilai's high profile, Wen Jiabao was also known for his own high-profile style. This brings us to Wen Jiabao's other nickname: the "Best Actor." Unlike Hu Jintao, who governed for so many years without leaving behind any famous quotes, save for the phrase "no tossing about" (bu zheteng), Wen Jiabao left behind an abundance of famous quotes, public statements, and high-profile moments. Wen Jiabao's most classic remark was actually the one he made before stepping down: "Without the success of political structural reform, economic structural reform cannot be carried through to the end, and historical tragedies like the Cultural Revolution could potentially happen again." Some believe this was Wen Jiabao's final appeal, while others believe it was his final performance. So, how should one view this matter and the nickname "Best Actor"? In fact, Wen Jiabao's governing style is truly unique among all leaders since the founding of the People's Republic of China. A prime example is when he published a poem titled "Looking Up at the Starry Sky" directly in the People's Daily on September 4, 2007. How much real substance did this poem have? Not much, really; I even find it hard to understand what he was trying to express. Beyond that, there were even more reports highlighting Wen Jiabao's performative nature. For example, during the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake, Wen Jiabao first shouted in front of the ruins of a primary school in Dujiangyan, "I am Grandpa Wen Jiabao; children, you must hold on, you will be saved." Later, in a temporary classroom at Beichuan Middle School, he wrote the four large characters "Disasters breed a nation's prosperity" (duonan xingbang). The very next day, while the disaster was still ongoing, this blackboard and the characters on it were sealed behind glass by the local cultural relics bureau. When the Wenzhou train collision occurred in 2011, Wen Jiabao was in charge of coordinating disaster relief, yet he only arrived at the scene on the sixth day. As for why he arrived so late, his explanation at the press conference was, "I want to tell everyone the truth: I was ill, lying in a hospital bed for 11 days, and only today did the doctor reluctantly allow me to travel." However, at the same time, the Chinese government's website still featured news of him meeting with Japanese Speaker of the House Yohei Kono just a few days prior. It seems the doctor's refusal to allow travel only applied to leaving Zhongnanhai. Furthermore, Wen Jiabao loved to quote classics. At the 2008 press conference, he opened by saying, "What the people worry about, I think about; what the people think about, I act upon." At a 2010 press conference, he quoted Qu Yuan: "I cherish the beauty of my ideals, and I will not regret it even if I die nine times." Of course, there are hundreds of such quotes; his cultural repertoire was indeed fucking awesome. However, what truly cemented Wen Jiabao's status as the "Best Actor" was the publicity surrounding his tears. According to recorded reports, Wen Jiabao shed tears during the 1998 floods, the 2003 SARS outbreak, the 2005 agricultural tax reform, the 2008 snowstorms, three times during the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake, the 2010 Yushu earthquake, the 2010 Zhouqu mudslide, and the 2011 Wenzhou high-speed rail accident. In his 10 years as Premier, he shed tears exactly 10 times. Seen in this light, Wen Jiabao is just a high-spec version of Xi Jinping. Xi Jinping also tries hard to appear as if he loves the people and tries hard to appear cultured, but looking at it, it all seems like a clumsy imitation of Wen Jiabao. So, is Wen Jiabao doing this just for show, like Xi Jinping? In my view, to say that all of Wen Jiabao's actions were purely a performance would be incorrect. Judging from his various experiences, he likely truly supported democracy and freedom in his heart, and he genuinely hoped to help poor farmers through his governance. Performance aside, when disasters actually occurred, unlike Xi Jinping who only makes speeches from the center, he did actually rush to the front lines of the disaster areas. I think the reason Wen Jiabao acted this way was to fulfill a dream of his own—a dream of cosplaying as a democratically elected leader. What kind of person would act like Wen Jiabao? Probably a democratically elected president, mayor, or prime minister. Since I, Wen Jiabao, lacked the power to change the system and could not make China a democratic society, I would govern as much as possible like a democratically elected leader. To a certain extent, this could be considered a roundabout way of realizing his dream. Therefore, I do not believe that all of Wen Jiabao's actions were merely a performance, nor do I think his final remark—that without the success of political structural reform, economic structural reform cannot be carried through to the end—was said just to amuse everyone. He likely truly thought this and wanted to do it, but he lacked the courage to do so, lacked the ability to do so, and he didn't even have the ability to manage his own family.

This brings us to another issue for which Wen Jiabao has been criticized: corruption. On October 25, 2012, just two weeks before the leadership transition, The New York Times published a bombshell article titled "Billions in Hidden Riches for Family of Chinese Leader." According to the disclosures by The New York Times at the time, although Wen Jiabao himself was penniless, his family's assets had reached $2.7 billion. While that might not rank high on today's rich lists, in 2012, it was a staggering amount. China's richest person in 2012 was Zong Qinghou, whose net worth at the time totaled only $10 billion. $2.7 billion would have ranked in the top 20 on the Chinese rich list back then. So, how did the Wen family acquire this wealth? According to The New York Times, it was primarily through the operations of his wife, Zhang Peili. As early as 1992, just after Wen Jiabao had escaped the fallout of the June 4th incident, Zhang Peili began working as a government official while simultaneously entering the jewelry industry, engaging in the integration of government and business. Zhang Peili's method was to act as both the athlete and the referee. In China, as we know, all kinds of jewelry, whether jade or diamonds, require a jewelry appraisal certificate. Around 1992, Zhang Peili headed a state-owned company, the China Gems and Jewelry Corporation, and subsequently used this company to establish the National Gemstone Testing Center and the Shanghai Diamond Exchange. However, in the following year, 1993, the state-owned enterprise she managed helped found a jewelry retail company called Beijing Diamond (Dai Meng De). Why was it called Dai Meng De? The English word for diamond is "diamond," and "Dai Meng De" is its Chinese phonetic transcription. Although the company appeared to be founded by a state-owned enterprise, one year later, her brother Zhang Jianming and two of her government colleagues bought 80% of the company's shares under various names; a state-owned enterprise was transformed into a private company overnight. Even more terrifying was that at the time, the only institution in China capable of issuing diamond appraisal certificates was the National Gemstone Testing Center, which was headed by Zhang Peili. This meant that Zhang Peili controlled both the appraisal rights for jewelry and diamonds in China and the sales channels; thus, she earned the title of "Diamond Queen." Eventually, Beijing Diamond went public in 1999, and this alone netted Zhang Peili over $8 million in profit. By 1998, as Wen Jiabao rose to the position of Vice Premier in charge of finance, Zhang Peili's close friend Duan Weihong, under Zhang's orchestration, bought about 3% of Ping An Insurance shares and transferred them to Wen Jiabao's mother, Yang Zhiyun, through a transaction. By 2007, these shares were valued at $120 million. Yang Zhiyun, who once would have whipped Wen Jiabao for taking even a single penny, was now holding $120 million. It turns out it wasn't that she wouldn't take money, but that she looked down on small change—she wanted $100 million. As for Wen Jiabao's younger brother, Wen Jiahong, according to The New York Times, he was also raking in money at the time. He long operated a business responsible for sewage treatment and waste recycling, which received hundreds of millions in government subsidies annually. At the time of The New York Times' disclosure, his company was valued at $200 million. Of course, besides this, Wen Jiabao's son and daughter were not idle either. In 2005, when Wen Jiabao had just become Premier, his son, Wen Yunsong, co-founded a private equity fund, New Horizon Capital, with several Chinese classmates from Northwestern University in the United States. At the time, Wen Yunsong was only 30, yet New Horizon Capital raised over $100 million in funds. How could a young man in his early 30s raise $100 million? Naturally, it was because of Wen Jiabao's reputation. Furthermore, the 21st Century Business Herald once hinted that Wen Yunsong held Ping An Insurance shares through a businessman named Zheng Jianyuan. These shares were valued at 3.3 billion RMB at the time. On the other hand, Wen Jiabao's son-in-law, Liu Chunhang, established an offshore consulting company in the British Virgin Islands in 2004, receiving as much as $900,000 in consulting fees from JPMorgan Chase alone each year, and so on. An old saying often speaks of a family of absolute loyalty, but in Wen Jiabao's case, it is a family of absolute corruption.

So, did Wen Jiabao know about all of this? And did he participate in it? Current reports suggest that he did not know and was not actively involved. There are three pieces of evidence for this. First, in that New York Times article, the anonymous source providing the information explicitly stated that Wen Jiabao was unaware of this matter. He did not know the scale of his family's corruption. Later, internal U.S. government diplomatic cables disclosed by WikiLeaks also indicated that Wen Jiabao intensely detested his family's actions, but felt powerless to control them and unwilling to manage them. Of course, the most detailed account comes from Shen Dong, a well-known Chinese red capitalist. His family had long acted as the white glove for Wen Jiabao's family. Duan Weihong, mentioned earlier as helping Wen Jiabao's mother acquire shares, was actually Shen Dong's wife. In his book Red Roulette, he also mentioned that Wen Jiabao was unaware of this, that Zhang Peili kept everything hidden from him, and that Wen Jiabao only found out about it later. Upon learning of it, he was extremely angry, threatened to divorce Zhang Peili, and even prepared to become a Buddhist monk. However, in the end, CCP elders stepped in to prevent all of this. Moreover, Shen Dong stated that Zhang Peili firmly believed the entire New York Times incident was not a coincidence; almost every high-ranking leader's family had similar problems, and this was an intentional leak and smear campaign by political rivals—a retaliation from Bo Xilai's faction, whose people in Hong Kong handed several boxes of materials to the New York Times reporter. Looking at it now, Wen Jiabao indeed resembles Li Dakang from In the Name of the People. In the show, Li Dakang's wife also used Li Dakang's name to engage in corruption everywhere, while Li Dakang himself remained unaware of it. As for Zhang Peili's claim that corruption was widespread among officials, that was indeed the norm in China at the time, and arguably even in China today. Just look at Xi Jinping's younger brother and elder sister, one holding Australian nationality and the other Canadian nationality. Furthermore, considering that 2012 was precisely the year Bo Xilai fell, it is entirely possible that the New York Times article was Bo Xilai's retaliation. However, corruption is corruption, and there is really no room for justification here. Even if Wen Jiabao did not support it and was completely unaware, it is impossible to say he bore no responsibility at all. Compared to Hu Jintao, his management of his family was clearly much better than Wen Jiabao's. Hu Jintao himself and his family members basically had no major corruption scandals, and U.S. consulate evaluations even rated Hu Jintao as relatively clean. Within the CCP, being relatively clean is already an extremely high evaluation. Of course, Hu Jintao was not without problems; his issue was not poor family governance, but rather poor governance of his subordinates, whose corruption was rampant.

With that said, our discussion on Wen Jiabao is basically complete. I previously made an episode on Hu Jintao as well, and by comparing them, we can see that whether it is Hu Jintao or Wen Jiabao, their characteristics are very distinct. It can be said that they were constrained by their era. Earlier on, they suffered persecution during the Cultural Revolution, and their fathers also suffered during that period. After the Cultural Revolution ended, both were promoted by the reformist figures Hu Yaobang or Zhao Ziyang. Therefore, they themselves intensely loathed the Cultural Revolution and held a certain inclination toward democracy. Moreover, coming from grassroots backgrounds, when in power, they truly understood the hardships of the common people, and their governance naturally produced policies that benefited the country and the people, especially ordinary citizens. However, they were similarly unable to implement fundamental reforms, lacking both the determination and the power to reform, making them the kind of people Zhao Ziyang described: those who only had the will to reform, but lacked the capability to do so. Of course, this is actually normal. Think about it: whether it was Hu Jintao or Wen Jiabao, if they possessed a pioneering spirit and that ruthless drive, they could not have avoided China's two major historical events. If they had such a spirit, they would have already broken their own biological father's ribs during the Cultural Revolution, and once the Cultural Revolution ended, Deng Xiaoping would never have employed them. If they had possessed immense reformist passion, they wouldn't have survived the June 4, 1989 Tiananmen crackdown either. Ultimately, they would either have ended up like Bao Tong doing advanced studies in Qincheng Prison, or been put on ice like Hu Qili. In reality, the era determined that these two leaders, Hu and Wen, could only desire reform yet remain powerless to enact it. But even leaders like them were far more human than other CCP leaders. This is also the reason why the Hu-Wen administration could become China's golden era; after all, while falling short of the best, it was still better than the worst. Finally, thank you everyone for watching today's program.

I am Toronto Fang Lian.

I hope you will like and support my video.

This can increase the weight of YouTube's recommendations for me.

See you in the next episode.