How to Counter China's Douyin Cognitive Warfare? Taiwan Has Found a Way Out⋯【SHE-TU Interview】Shen Po-yang

This video features an exclusive interview by Ba Jiong with newly inaugurated Taiwanese legislator Puma Shen (Teacher PUMA), delving deeply into the current state of China's cognitive warfare against Taiwan and potential countermeasures. The interview covers topics including Chinese infiltration in the legislature and the direction of the Anti-Infiltration Act; independent voters' choices outside the pan-Blue and pan-Green camps along with their divergent attitudes toward China issues; the phenomenon of influencer Wang Zhian and the theory of useful idiots; China's multilingual studios and transnational public opinion amplification tactics; countermeasures by the ruling party involving direct responses and degrading the user experience on hostile foreign platforms such as TikTok; as well as the progress in Taiwanese citizens' national identity juxtaposed with differing perceptions of the China threat.

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As a platform operated by a hostile state, TikTok poses a threat to our national security. I think the best solution would probably be to degrade the user experience. Truly, regarding supporters like those of the Taiwan People's Party, if you ask them whether they want to become Chinese, they don't want to; in this aspect I would say there is progress, but.

Hello everyone, I'm Ba Jiong. Today we have invited Teacher PUMA, who is also our newly elected legislator. I'd like to ask you, Teacher, after entering this legislature, what issues do you care about more? I think it breaks down into several areas: human rights issues are definitely something that will always be addressed; another, of course, relates to national security. And national security can further be divided into several sectors: if it has to do with Chinese infiltration today, it might lean more toward things like the Anti-Infiltration Act; if it involves the digital realm, such as the cognitive warfare everyone is familiar with and so on, it might involve the Ministry of Digital Affairs, the Ministry of National Defense, the NCC, and others. That is also a direction I might work on. For us, we now need to prepare for attacks in any form, so how we help our soldiers get prepared, I think that is also an important matter. In this election, I encountered many people who are increasingly dismissive of the CCP's cognitive warfare, feeling more and more that this is simply a fake issue, whereas doing work like what Teacher does at the Kuma Academy—how do you feel about this yourself? I feel it is becoming increasingly intense, especially over the past two years. And I think a major reason is that China has been specifically pushing this topic. A friend of mine works in child welfare, right; even if he enters the Legislative Yuan, he won't be attacked with claims like, 'Ah, you only know child welfare, you can only do child welfare and nothing else.' He definitely won't be attacked; he is professional there. But you will find that anyone speaking about China is inevitably pinned with an accusation: 'You only know how to resist China and protect Taiwan.' Right, meaning you only know how to focus on China issues. And China, since about two years ago, has been heavily pushing this angle. They will specifically target anyone studying China, saying you only know how to study China, and you don't care about anything else. Actually, I think this is also a label they have pinned on the DPP. Also, for example, in the last legislative session there were over 130 bills, and maybe not even a single one of the bills on resisting China and protecting Taiwan was passed. With so many bills addressing other matters, people still claim that they only focus on resisting China and protecting Taiwan. This in itself is a cognitive operation: they want to brainwash everyone into believing you only talk about China issues and can't do anything else. But ironically, China really is the most critical issue for us right now. So from my perspective, this tactic has actually been quite successful, hasn't it? What do you think?

I feel it has been very successful, but I think success has two elements. That is, we often talk about how China floods us with a lot of garbage information, which doesn't necessarily have an impact on Taiwan unless someone in Taiwan echoes it. If no one in Taiwan echoes it, it's not really a big problem for us. But the biggest problem right now is that the Kuomintang (KMT) has actually been echoing China's narrative all along. Of course, sometimes it's not a huge problem because KMT supporters sometimes already think that way anyway; they won't change their minds just because of China's operations. So within the KMT, there are the orthodox blue faction and those leaning more towards red, and they actually won't change much. Therefore, for us, the real target audience we want to persuade should be the independent voters, those who are a bit indifferent to politics. We hope they will pay attention to China-related issues, because after all, to defend our country, we can't have just one single party doing this work—it should be a cross-partisan effort that everyone undertakes. People who don't care about politics are precisely the ones we need to persuade most. Why has this become increasingly difficult in recent years? It's because independent voters now have other options besides the blue and green factions. When they choose options outside of the blue and green, they start listening to what these third-party politicians are saying. And if these third-party politicians are saying things similar to China's narrative—claiming that the ruling party only knows how to resist China and protect Taiwan, while completely ignoring everything else, and arguing that while China is terrible, the United States has the exact same problems because both the US and China have their own issues and we should maintain equal distance from both—when they have this third option, it means that before we even have a chance to persuade them, they are already being pulled in the opposite direction by another force. That is why I say the work over the past two years has been quite tough.

Regarding the incident of Wang Zhian coming to Taiwan, I have actually been following him on Twitter for two or three years, back when he hadn't started his YouTube channel yet. Yes, I felt he was a very strange person even then. I think his visit to Taiwan was perhaps half a failure and half a success, but in the so-called Chinese-speaking market—the overseas Chinese market—he is extremely successful. Yes, when I went to Europe and America last year and chatted with some local Chinese people, many of them were his fans and supporters. Really, there are quite a few in Europe, and even some big influencers are his fans. Did he come to see you? He didn't come to see me. Although there isn't one single piece of public evidence proving he is an agent of the CCP, I think that propaganda comes in different forms—whether you are a 'self-motivated' pro-CCP person, paid, voluntary, or yes, actually receiving money. But regarding his packaging, what impact do you think he has on our democratic world in Taiwan, or even on the entire anti-CCP community? I think people sometimes wonder if he might be sent by China. Or, because he actually returned to China in the middle of all this—yes, and to me, for a so-called rebel, returning to China is a very dangerous thing. Especially since he is already recognized by the authorities as such a person, the fact that he could return to China and then come back out, I find that a bit unbelievable. But I think we need to be cautious; of course, we should only speak based on the evidence we have. We should also think in reverse: even if he isn't one, even if he has absolutely no connection to the Chinese authorities today and is not their propaganda tool, if I were China, I would definitely want to utilize him because he perfectly fits the packaging China wants to set. Yes, you might criticize our government sometimes, but at critical moments, you are actually transmitting a different kind of ideology. To me, I feel this person is someone who can be utilized. It's just like when people were wondering back then about Hong Kongers coming to Taiwan—some of them were truly anti-CCP and really wanted to do something, but how would I know if they were spies? It's the same problem. Regardless of whether China is actually utilizing him, I know that even if he isn't, he already fits China's requirements. If it were me, I would also want to reach out to him. Whether that contact would be successful or not, I don't know, but in the theory of cognitive warfare, there is a very harsh term—so everyone please note, I am not targeting him, but there is a harsh term called 'useful idiots.' I am absolutely not saying he is an idiot, just that in our research, there is a group of people who may have no connection to the authorities, but their actions perfectly align with what the authorities want to achieve. I think the anti-war scholars in Taiwan are very similar. They say, 'I am a leftist, I am anti-war, I hope to defeat American imperialism.' Honestly, China might have nothing to do with them, but they perfectly meet China's requirements. If I were Chinese, I would love such people. I think Wang Zhian might have the same question. When he came to Taiwan, he was reaching out everywhere, and they sent out invitations for his program, asking me if I wanted to discuss something or other, but I didn't agree because I was really busy at the time. But to me, look at China—they now have something called a 'multilingual studio' that started in 2023, using various different languages. This multilingual studio has been cultivating different influencers around the world in 2023 and has already reached 100 million in reach. These influencers are divided into four categories. Some are specifically for discussing travel, but at critical moments, they have to speak up for China. Others are critical of China, but at critical moments, they speak up for it. This is in their public documents, telling you that they are cultivating these various types of influencers around the world. Honestly, many people fit this setting. Of course, we will never know for sure, but even if he isn't, China might still want to do something. For example, he is also very active on Twitter recently. If it were me, I would certainly want to get in there and help amplify his voice, help forward his content. If he says something unfavorable to Taiwan today, like saying Taiwan is suppressing freedom of speech, and the Chinese internet army tries their best to amplify his remarks, doesn't he just become a 'useful idiot'?

How do you think the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) cognitive warfare this year differs from last year? I think the difference is that the amplification has become much more frequent. Because China knows that if they manufacture it themselves, it won't be as polished, and they might not have a deep enough understanding of Taiwan's local customs and sentiments. For example, if the Kuomintang (KMT) attacks the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) on a specific issue today and does so quite effectively and accurately, China will immediately step in to amplify it. If the KMT's original reach was 300,000 or 400,000, they will boost it to 2 million or 3 million. I think this is China's main tactic right now. But returning to the important point you just made, it is true that opposition parties have the right to criticize the ruling party, and some of their criticisms are valid. If you haven't done a good job, you should be criticized. So, how should we respond? There are two approaches. One is to ignore whether China is amplifying it or not; we face the issues head-on, admit what we haven't done well, and explain how we will modify and correct it. I think this is something that should be done regardless. Then, regarding when to tell everyone that there is Chinese internet army manipulation, I actually think you don't need to tell everyone about every single incident. Sometimes, after you respond positively and the matter is settled, everyone realizes, 'Oh, so that's what happened. Well, it wasn't done well, but now we are improving. Here is how we are improving, and please come back to check on us in a month.' That actually ends it. You don't necessarily have to talk about China's operations. But sometimes, China's operations are completely fabricated out of thin air. For example, if they attack you today by saying that all DPP officials are corrupt—like what is all over TikTok—no matter how much you come out to clarify, saying 'I am not,' or confronting them directly by saying, 'We don't have any current corruption cases,' people aren't going to listen. At this point, you must tell everyone that this is a massive operation by China. And for this massive operation, just informing the public is not enough; you actually have to find a way to block it. Because if you don't block it, it will be overwhelming. I have met many young people who have left comments on my page saying, 'You DPP members are just corrupt.' I know TikTok loves to push this narrative, so I tell them, 'Tell me, what is the most recent corruption case? I will tell you how we handled it, which shows our attitude toward corruption.' They mentioned Chen Shui-bian. At first, they couldn't name a case, then they mentioned Chen Shui-bian. I thought, 'That was quite a long time ago,' and I happen to be very familiar with the Chen case. I think this is the success of brainwashing: constantly using this rapid-fire method to tell everyone that there is a problem here, and that this problem has not been solved, and so on. This mechanism, I think, has become stronger recently. In the past, the problem wasn't this big because Facebook and YouTube, at least, are not Chinese platforms. They would still try to block some accounts, although, to be honest, they are almost unable to keep up. Look at YouTube; they told me they can barely keep up. YouTube is deleting 200 channels a day. There are so many Chinese channels—200 channels a day, not videos, but channels. They said the speed at which they delete them cannot keep up with the speed at which China generates them. You can imagine that while we work so hard to record and edit, they are just churning out 200 channels a day. You can't block them. But at least they are foreign platforms, and they are making an effort to block this. However, when more and more people use TikTok, that is their platform. They decide what to push. For us, it's as if China is directly operating an official channel on our television networks, and everyone loves watching it because it's full of singing and dancing, but they are constantly feeding you political messages. I think the point is not just to expose it and tell everyone; the key is that you must block it in the first instance. If you don't block it, by the time everyone has been brainwashed and you tell them, 'Oh, this is China's cognitive warfare, please be aware,' it will have no effect at all.

"But how do you think we should fight TikTok? Take my own short clips on YouTube, those Shorts—I might get one or two million views, but the moment I post them to TikTok, it's 30,000, 50,000, and they throttle the traffic and block it right away. Right, right, right, nobody else can see it. So how do we block it at the very first moment on a platform like TikTok? There are many approaches. Of course, to mention the most basic one first: since TikTok is a platform operated by a hostile state, it poses a threat to our national security. So in theory, at the very least, you require it to be regulated by our laws. First, demand that it establishes a local presence. There are two ways to do that: one is to set up a branch or subsidiary here and become subject to our legal regulations. The other is a partial local presence, meaning they at least have a liaison window where we can file reports, saying, 'We found this issue, please deal with it.' That's one approach. But you will find that, actually this year, they don't have a window in Taiwan. Their window in Singapore—actually, this is a bit paradoxical—they did hire a PR firm in Taiwan to act as a window. Yes, yes, yes, I was approached before. Right, right, right. As for which PR firm it is, let's not name names. And indeed, we reported some manipulated fake news and such to them, and they accepted it, and they did delete those accounts. But when did they delete them? Only after the election was over! You're just helpless. So sure, they have a window, and yes, they processed it, but processing it only after the election means it's completely meaningless to us. Even if they establish a local presence today and have a window, I bet the exact same thing will still happen. So a local presence cannot completely solve the problem; it can only, at best, expose things. If they could fully establish a local presence and let our laws regulate them, then at least we could tell them, 'When you distribute content, you might have to ensure fairness, you might need to do this and that,' and there would be legal oversight. But I think all of that is secondary talk. The point is, suppose we go to Shanghai today, or go to Singapore, and say, 'We want you to establish a local presence,' they simply won't care about you at all. They can just ignore you. Because even if you completely ban it from app stores in Taiwan today, people can still circumvent the Great Firewall and download it anyway, right? So I think everyone needs to flip their thinking. It's not about negotiating with TikTok, um, because honestly, they have too many ways to bypass it, and a local presence is only a half-baked solution. I think the best solution would be to ruin the user experience. That is to say, because for everyone—for them, they use this as a United Front tool. What they want most is to reach young people, and young people only keep using it over and over if the user experience is great, right? Today, they have TikTok Shop, where people buy things, or people watch videos inside. The videos at least need to run smoothly, right? You can't have it crash abruptly while scrolling. So I've always thought the best way in Taiwan would be to change its user experience if it refuses to discuss establishing a local presence with us. The specific details involve bandwidth and things like that. But people will definitely have concerns, saying, 'Can we just directly throttle its traffic and its bandwidth?' Theoretically, there must be legal authorization. So I don't think that's the best way either. Instead, we should openly list and discuss it: suppose a social media company is willing to cooperate properly and discuss things with Taiwan, and can ensure media fairness and so on, then when it uses bandwidth, it naturally gets faster channels. That is, there is commercial incentive; our bandwidth providers can be paid by them, and they get high-speed lanes. But if a platform is full of scams and you don't deal with them at all, then sorry, before you handle it, you must face restrictions. That way, when people use it, the user experience actually deteriorates. Alright, now you can establish a local presence, and establishing a local presence means you must be regulated by Taiwan's laws. If we don't do this now, it really will become a massive problem. Even if it is determined that you might suffer badly in public opinion or from the opposition parties, yes, of course they'll say—just like recent events—clearly it's a very simple matter, but they insist on framing it as you suppressing free speech. But what I want to tell everyone is that China is the biggest fraud syndicate. It keeps brainwashing us, and it constantly wants to reshape Taiwan's public opinion, because once public opinion is shifted, that's when it can launch an attack, um. So for everyone, indeed, public opinion will surely say, 'Oh, you're gagging free speech again' or whatever. But I think this is the governing party's responsibility. We can't just blame everyone for attacking us every time. Instead, we really need to explain it properly to the public. If we didn't explain enough in the past, we must explain more now. Even if we have corresponding countermeasures this year, they might escalate again next year. That's inevitably how it goes—as virtue rises one foot, vice rises ten. So how on earth do we cultivate..."

Cultivating a core value, or do we have the ability to fight back, to infiltrate them in return or something? Theoretically, of course we can, but because their network has a Great Firewall, that is the most troublesome part. Their wall is such that the firewall is already there as soon as you enter through the submarine cables. So, it is extremely difficult to send information in. I have met many overseas human rights groups that are constantly trying to find ways to send accurate information into China, because they are not fighting them; just by throwing accurate information in, it creates chaos for them, because the CCP likes to tell lies. But for you to send accurate information in, first, it is certainly not easy because of the Great Firewall. Second, and more importantly, when the person who receives the important information inevitably wants to pass it on, the risk for that person emerges, because they might be targeted or even face life-threatening danger. So many people say, 'Well, if you do that, because it is an authoritarian country, you are creating a high moral hazard inside.' That is why I feel that if we are to discuss this matter comprehensively today, the vast majority of China's internet army is, after all, the People's Liberation Army. Yes, and since it is an act carried out by the People's Liberation Army, what we in Taiwan should be responding with is national defense. It is essentially political warfare, or something similar, or perhaps cyber, electronic, and information warfare—though cyber is more about hacking—but this is a matter for the Ministry of National Defense, something our military should face directly. We should announce to the public to what extent they can act and to what extent we should be able to act. To me, this is basically no different from a state of war. If we just keep retreating and saying, 'Oh, this should be handled by this ministry, or this should be the NCC, or this should be the Mainland Affairs Council,' their capacity is simply insufficient, because the other side is fighting you with war-level specifications. You are here saying, 'Oh, this is a rumor about the Council of Agriculture, please have the Ministry of Agriculture come out and explain.' How can they respond to the spread of rumors and conspiracies at a war level? This kind of public opinion warfare and information warfare is not something they can handle.

Teacher, do you feel that in recent years, Taiwanese people have become more united or more divided? I think a very special point is that I still feel there has been progress. Why do I say this? Because in the past, to be honest, if you asked people whether they were Chinese or Taiwanese, many people could not answer well. That was because, after all, many people felt that we also share Chinese culture and so on. But now if you ask people whether they are Chinese or Taiwanese, more and more people say they are Taiwanese. The number of people who say they are both Chinese and Taiwanese has truly become very, very small. At least during the era I grew up in, many people still called themselves Chinese. So just this step alone, I think we have made good progress. I can say that for at least 80% of people in Taiwan, if you ask them whether they want to become a part of China, their answer is no. Even for supporters of the Taiwan People's Party (TPP), who often might have some opinions about me, I believe that if you ask TPP supporters whether they want to become part of China, their answer is no. In this regard, I would say there is progress. Um, but, the belief that we do not want to be part of China and that we are Taiwanese is different from the view on whether the country of China actually harbors hostility toward us, or just how bad China really is. These are two different things, right? The current division in Taiwan, which is what you just asked about, is at that second layer. Um, that is, many people think China is not a threat, it is fine, and it is better to negotiate with them nicely. Isn't America also that bad? Isn't America also going to sacrifice us? Oh, this equilateral triangle argument comes out again, right, right. It is clear that America has not said it wants to annex us, while China has said it wants to annex us, but they always have this narrative. This one, on the contrary, is divisive, and this division is becoming more and more severe. Therefore, the themes promoted by China—because they already know that trying to persuade Taiwanese people to become Chinese through that cultural aspect is becoming increasingly unfeasible, and talking about "cross-strait family is one" is losing its market, though some people still talk about it—if they start talking about how America and Japan are actually both bad, and by the way, in 2023, they added India to the mix, saying India is also bad, claiming that all these countries are actually in chaos and want to sacrifice Taiwan, and so on—this aspect of the narrative is growing stronger. And on this issue, Taiwan has become very divided. So when we tell people today, hey, we don't want to be Chinese, everyone agrees, um. But I don't want to say that right now, if you say you don't want to be Chinese, but China is already brainwashing us and trying every means to turn us into Chinese, um, many people just feel, right, right, it's fine. We are stuck right here. So there is progress, but there is also retrogression. Yes. Well, thank you very much to Teacher PUMA for coming here today to give a lecture to everyone. No, no, thank you, thank you. And if anyone is interested and has the opportunity, please go check out more courses from Black Bear Academy. Yes, that's right. What are we promoting recently? Recently, we are promoting map reading and open-source intelligence (OSINT) collection courses. They are just as popular as before, running every month, so everyone is welcome to come and learn OSINT collection. That's the end of today's video.

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