The Central Bank Didn't Print Money, But It Turned Your Stocks into Central Bank Bills! SFISF Endorses Stock Prices, 6 Trillion in Chips Locked In, Market Rescue Reaction Function Revealed—Who Is Front-Running? Dividends Become Central Bank Bills, Themes Become Lottery Tickets, Mid-Range Pricing Disappears! The Third Credit Re-anchoring After Foreign Exchange and Land Finance, Savers Foot the Bill, and the CCP Cannot Exit

This episode provides a detailed analysis of the Securities, Funds and Insurance companies Swap Facility (SFISF) policy launched by the central bank of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The host points out that this tool is superficially about bond lending, but in reality, it converts stock credit into central bank credit. By subsidizing specific institutions with ultra-low fees to buy high-dividend assets, it causes about six trillion yuan worth of chips to be locked up. The policy makes public the stock market rescue response function, yet it completely destroys the market's mid-range pricing mechanism and value discovery function. It becomes the CCP's third credit anchor-switching following foreign exchange reserve-backed currency issuance and land finance, ultimately paid for by savers with no way out.

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Observe things as they are, reject fragmented cognition. Just two days ago, the CCP's central bank conducted its third swap facility operation, releasing 100 billion yuan at once, and 31 brokerages and fund companies rushed to bid for it. Why the rush? Because the winning bid rate was only 1-in-10,000, which is 0.1%. Just three days later, on October 6, the State Council of the CCP held an executive meeting, claiming what? Claiming they wanted to improve the stability mechanism of the capital market and enhance the intrinsic stability of the stock market. Well, such fine-sounding words are just talk. What is the CCP actually doing? It is using stocks as collateral, backing stock prices with the central bank's credit, and doing this is extremely dangerous. Why mention this? Because once this thing comes out, the CCP's capital paradigm will change accordingly. First, let's talk about what the swap facility actually is. The name is very long: Securities, Funds and Insurance companies Swap Facility. Simply put, brokerages can openly pledge the stocks or stock ETFs they hold to the central bank. And the central bank lends treasury bonds or central bank bills to these brokerages, who then use these treasury bonds or central bank bills to conduct repurchase agreements in the interbank market. They get cash from commercial banks, and the borrowed cash is only allowed to be used for one thing: buying stocks. There is a detail here that everyone should pay attention to: the bonds lent out by the CCP's central bank are bonds, not money, so in legal terms, this is called bond lending, not a loan. Then why does the CCP do this? Because if cash were lent directly using stocks as collateral, what would that become? It would become self-issued currency backed by stock credit. I must say that these people in the CCP went to great lengths to bypass the regulations they designed themselves. Ah, instead of lending money to brokerages, I'll just lend bonds to brokerages, isn't that it? But these two things are actually the same; they are both central bank credit. Is cash not central bank credit? Are central bank bills not? Are treasury bonds not?

And so, it turns out to be a totally redundant and ridiculous move. The brokerage firms then pass these securities over to the commercial banks, and the banks can use these high-grade government bonds to get money from the central bank. See? Does any rule look violated here? Isn't the anchor of monetary credit still government bonds? On the surface, indeed, no fiscal discipline has been violated, but in reality, stocks can now be used as collateral for the central bank. The most noteworthy detail is who provides the money: the actual fund provider is not the central bank, but the commercial banks on the other end of the repo market. Stocks are given a credit upgrade as collateral, transforming them into central bank credit. But stocks were originally just stocks; after going through this procedure, what stands behind the stock is now central bank bills. What are central bank bills? They are the liabilities of the central bank itself, the highest-grade collateral in the entire financial system. So let that sink in—the stock hasn't changed, it's still the same stock, but its credit rating has changed. Just how damn cheap is this money? Let's take a look.

Data shows that the winning bid rate for the third operation was ten basis points, which is the cost for brokerages using government bonds for repos. Based on the interbank cost around October 30 this year, it was roughly 0.4 percent. Adding that ten-basis-point cost together, the total cost to execute a swap facility is only about 1.5 percent. Money costing 1.5 percent is only allowed to be used to buy stocks. So what kind of stocks will they buy? We'll talk about that later. First, let's look at why they had to do this precisely on a weekend. Let's continue looking at the data. Back on January 14 this year, the single-day transaction volume of A-shares once surged to 4 trillion—I remember it was something like 3.99 trillion, 2.398 trillion, anyway, roughly 4 trillion, which was a historical peak. On June 23, the margin trading balance also hit a new high; that is, the borrowed money used to play the stock market broke 3 trillion for the first time in history. Then starting in July, a massive sell-off began, and by October 29, the CSI 300 had plummeted by 18.8 percent, while the ChiNext Index had dropped by 42 percent. The CSI 300...

The 300 index fell for twelve consecutive weeks. On October 30, the margin trading balance was left with only 2.34 trillion, meaning it had dropped by over 660 billion in just four months. Then on October 6, the Shanghai Composite closed at 3,649 points, and the transaction volume that day was 1.66 trillion. Right at this juncture, the Chinese central bank began holding a symposium on October 2, losing its composure and announcing the implementation of the swap facility, lowering rates, expanding eligible institutions, and additionally providing a tool called the stock repurchase and shareholding increase re-lending facility. What is this path? It means the central bank lends to commercial banks, and commercial banks then lend to listed companies or major shareholders to repurchase and increase their holdings of their own company's stocks, and this is also a specialized low-interest loan. This tool was originally supposed to be temporary, but now it has shifted from a temporary measure to a long-term institutional arrangement, with the rate dropping from 1.25 percent to 1 percent. On October 3 days later, this 100 billion was put into place, and then on the 6th, it became a long-term system. So what does this indicate?

What does it mean? Actually, this passage contains a massive amount of information because the CCP has openly revealed a response function. What is a response function? Plainly speaking, it is the policy response triggered when the market drops to a certain point—corresponding to that chart. The market has now fallen for twelve consecutive weeks, the tools are starting to be deployed, quotas are being increased, fees are being lowered, eligible institutions are expanding, and the re-lending rate has been changed to zero point nine as well. In the past, people had to guess—guess when those fucking CCP idiots from the rescue team would step in. Now there's no need to guess; once the market drops to the level defined by this chart, these guys simply cannot sit still anymore. Once this response function is read by everyone, all subsequent games will unfold around this function. This is the main theme of today's entire episode.

Someone might say, doesn't the Federal Reserve also lend government bonds to institutions? Yes, exactly. In August 2003, the Fed created a facility called the Term Securities Lending Facility, abbreviated as TSLF, and its structure was almost identical to the CCP's swap facility today. The main players were also primary dealers—those large banks or brokerages that trade directly with the Fed. They pledged mortgage-backed securities they couldn't sell in the market to the Fed in exchange for something else: government bonds, which they then used to get financing. But the usage is completely different. What was the Fed's tool used for? It was meant to repair the funding market. In October 2008, the balance of the securities lending facility surged directly to 236 billion dollars, which was the peak. And as soon as the market recovered, the usage of this tool plummeted. By February 1, 2010, the usage of the Fed's tool dropped straight to zero. The pricing of the Fed's tool, much like knocking on the Fed's door, carried a punitive nature.

...so the interest rate is at the upper limit of the policy range. So, under what circumstances is this tool typically used? It's only when these institutions are so desperate for cash that they will borrow this money. But the CCP's swap facility is the complete opposite; the fee is fucking only 10 basis points, which is purely subsidized. The balance grew from 50 billion in October 2024 to 205 billion this October. For 25 months, the usage of this tool hasn't dropped for a single day. What does the CCP's central bank say about it? They say the first two batches, totaling 105 billion, have already been rolled over multiple times. So, you see, for the same structure, what does the Federal Reserve use it for? It's used as a temporary stopgap when there are problems in the financing market. And what does the CCP's central bank use it for? They want to use this tool to drag the stock market along for the long term. Isn't that using the central bank's credit to backstop the US dollar? The Federal Reserve doesn't provide a backstop, and who was actually buying the stocks in the US market during that period? The companies themselves were buying them. Look at the listed companies that are components of the S&P 500.

As of last September, they had repurchased 1.02 trillion US dollars worth of shares within a year. Last year's total dividends also amounted to 671 billion US dollars. We can see this very, very clearly. Where does the core of the buying power in the US stock market lie? It lies in whether the companies are making money or not. But the core of the buying power for this A-share tool lies in the central bank's credit; the core is completely different. Therefore, what follows is also completely different. Let's talk about what the money from the swap facility actually bought. Here, we need to discuss an accounting standard, because this accounting standard determines everything, so to speak. When securities firms buy stocks, how do they usually record them? For example, for their proprietary trading accounts, when they buy stocks now, they record them under an accounting item called 'fair value through profit or loss.' Simply put, it means recording at market price, and gains or losses are calculated directly into current profits. In other words, the rise or fall of the stock price must be directly hit against the income statement every quarter, but it can also be recorded in another way.

This method is called 'fair value through other comprehensive income,' abbreviated as FVTOCI. In plain language, it means recording at market price, but unrealized gains or losses are kept off the balance sheet. So, under this set of books, the rise or fall of the stock price does not enter the income statement; it only enters an item called 'other comprehensive income.' In other words, only when the listed company pays dividends can it enter the income statement. Moreover, once this accounting method is chosen, it cannot be changed. In the future, for example, if you sell it and make a profit on the spread, that cannot be counted as profit either. If you lose money, it directly reduces the net assets. And just these past two days, the CCP's central bank and the China Securities Regulatory Commission jointly issued a notice allowing stocks bought through the swap facility to be recorded under this FVTOCI. So everyone is thinking, what does this mean? It means this money can only buy dividend-paying stocks, because dividends are the only part under this set of books that can turn into profit. Furthermore, after buying them, you are not allowed to sell, because even if you sell and make money, it doesn't count as profit, and if you sell and lose money, it reduces the net assets. In other words, to a certain extent, this account is 'in only, no out.' And what do the data say? Let's look at the data. The investment balance of other equity instruments for securities firms was 96.6 billion at the end of 2022, 376.1 billion at the end of June 2024, reached 705.9 billion at the end of last year, and the reading for September this year is 832.3 billion. It has grown eight and a half times in four years. What's even more interesting is that the market fell from July to October this year, but this account not only didn't shrink, it actually grew by 18% compared to the beginning of the year. Although no securities firm has stated in their annual report what products the swap facility money bought or where they are recorded, this curve aligns perfectly with the timeline of the swap facility, so I judge that this is by no means a coincidence. And this accounting method has another consequence: you cannot see any losses on the income statement. The proprietary trading income of 43 listed securities firms in the first half of this year was 168.7 billion, a year-on-year increase of exactly 5%.

X. But in the first three quarters, it became 203.6 billion, and the year-on-year growth rate suddenly dropped. Because up to now, the year-on-year increase is only 8.66%, then extrapolating to the single third quarter, it was only 34.9 billion, which is more than half less than the third quarter of last year. This means that the part of the stocks related to fair value through profit or loss (FVTPL) is bleeding, while the part related to fair value through other comprehensive income (FVOCI) rose to 832.3 billion over the same period. Where is the loss? It is invisible on the income statement. Let us talk about the conversion rate of the swap facility for collateral, which is no higher than 90%. What does this mean? If you pledge 100 yuan worth of stocks, you can exchange at most 90 yuan worth of treasury bonds, and the margin call line requires it to be no lower than 75%. This means that if the pledged stocks fall below 75%, you have to replenish something. Then we can make a deduction. Suppose a securities firm pledged CSI 300 component stocks at a 90% conversion rate in July this year. By October 29, the CSI 300 had fallen by 18.83%, so 90%.

Multiplied by 1 hundred million minus 18.83%, after conversion, it only leaves about 73%, which is already lower than the 75% margin call line. There are basically only two ways for you to make a margin call: either you pledge more stocks, or you directly sell a portion of the stocks, sell the stocks and then buy treasury bonds again, and then return these treasury bonds. Then this will create two completely opposite logics. If you pledge more stocks, it is equivalent to locking more chips into this pledged pool. If you sell stocks, it is equivalent to adding to the sell-off during a decline, at which point the price may completely get out of control.

If it were in a normal market, this chain would run its course by itself, and the price would fall all the way until someone is willing to take over even if no one is bailing it out. This incidentally explains another phenomenon, which is that retail A-share investors found that once there is a deep decline, it seems that someone is always there paying money to exchange for chips, and then just as it fucking rises a little bit, they pour it out like a waterfall. Look, can this phenomenon be explained? And this fucking stupid policy also did another thing by the way, which is that it also dismantled the risk control of the securities firms themselves. Look at what the risk control of securities firms was doing before? They had to calculate the risk coverage ratio, the net stable funding ratio, and the proportion of proprietary stocks to net assets. These indicators would automatically restrict increasing positions on ordinary holdings. And the current policy of the CCP has simply dismantled this set of floodgates in half, because stocks bought through the swap facility are not counted in the total assets on the balance sheet. Then after bookkeeping in this way, the stable funds required for market risk are calculated by half, which is equivalent to dismantling half of the risk market value. And the fee rate of this tool is only one-thousandth, the accounting standards also allow buying dividend stocks, and when these three things come together, this money will only flow into large-cap stocks with high dividends.

Oh, by the way, there is another turning point on the insurance capital side that is also very telling. Last year, insurance funds made big purchases and block trades 41 times, borrowing this money, but this year by early October there were only 8 times left. Why did it slow down? Because the stock price was bought expensive by the fucking funds, and this profit margin became thin. As of the end of October this year, the dividend return rate of the six major banks was only a little over 3%. Insurance funds sweep up goods to eat this high interest, and if the purchase price makes dividends barely able to cover the capital cost, then there is no profit, and without profit it naturally stops. The FVOCI investment of securities firms has already reached 832.3 billion, plus the 4.1 trillion of insurance stocks, plus the 1.53 trillion of Huijin ETFs, which is 6 trillion levels of chips, and once bought, they are not sold. However, this is my estimate because possible overlaps between the three were not deducted. But the fact that these 5 to 6 trillion chips have degenerated into zombie chips is an undeniable fact. This will lead to another problem, which is completely destroying the function of price discovery, because the pricing power of stocks is directly castrated.

Now, let's see who this will actually affect, and who benefits from it depends on where this interest spread comes from. Look at this: the money people save in the bank for a year earns less than one percent in interest, while the full-caliber cost for brokerages obtaining money through the swap facility is only zero point five percent. It's even lower than the current ten-year treasury bond yield of zero point five eight percent, fucking lower than the ten-year treasury yield. Meanwhile, the dividend yield of the CSI Dividend Index in October this year was between three point eight percent and four percent. Using money at one point five percent to buy a dividend yield of three point nine percent leaves a gap of two hundred and forty basis points in the middle—meaning an interest spread of over two percentage points—and this money doesn't even have to bear the risk of stock price fluctuations. Why? Because accounting requirements allow this price difference not to be counted. Exactly, and then it can be rolled over upon maturity. Although two hundred and fifty billion multiplied by two-odd points is only four to five billion a year, which isn't a huge number by itself, this interest spread creates an asymmetry of information, and this information itself is more valuable than the money. Why say that? Because these institutions are crystal clear about one thing: on which day the bidding will take place and how much quota they can secure. This must be the most expensive piece of exclusive information in the Chinese stock market right now. Following this line further down, the stock buyback and increased holdings refinancing is another covert channel for them to carve up the money.

Take a look everyone: on November 2 of this year, the interest rate for this money was pushed down to one percent, with four hundred and forty billion already contracted and over two hundred and eighty billion disbursed. Look at how meticulously this abacus is being calculated! Major shareholders borrow low-interest money at one percent to buy their own stocks, and as long as the dividends are higher than this one percent, it's a guaranteed profitable interest spread, while conveniently locking down control rights directly. Meanwhile, the bank steadily feasts on an interest spread from the lending. As for the ticking time bomb of a market crash, oh, it's all dumped onto the stocks, and if it really blows up, the fallout is tossed to the balance sheets of the central bank and commercial banks to foot the bill. So here comes the fun part: why say this market stabilization tool not only fails to eliminate speculation, but actually reinforces the speculative mechanism? Because at this moment, the reaction function of the CCP's national team becomes something everyone knows. Thus, it forms a chain—what kind of chain? Institutions that figure out the timing and quotas will strike first, and these market-rescue buying orders will slam entirely into ETFs. You can say that a buyer holding one-third of the market's ETFs will leave visible pulses on the constituent stocks with every subscription; that is certain. Top-tier institutions with order-flow monitoring capabilities can definitely see this pulse, capital engaging in ETF subscription arbitrage can see it, and high-frequency quant funds can see it even more. Ask what happens when they see it? Well, when they see it, they front-run it. Front-running props up the index, and once the index is propped up, what do hot-money speculators get to do? They practically get a free get-out-of-jail-free card against a market crash.

Since the risk of a broad market collapse is backstopped by administrative force, they can just let go and wildly speculate on pure concept stocks with no cash flow; in fact, this turns out to be the most ideal choice. As soon as a concept gets hot, it hits the headlines, and the CCP then makes a purchase by the national team into a headline title. As soon as retail investors see the headline, where do they enter the market from? Oh, the national team has arrived. But by this time, retail investors' money has already become the exit liquidity for everyone ahead of them—isn't that just how it goes? You don't even need to look at anything else: those people who entered the market in January of this year when trading volume skyrocketed to four trillion, along with those who added leverage on June 23 when margin financing hit three trillion, during the process where the ChiNext board plummeted forty-two percent from July to October, they were basically all crushed to death, weren't they? Meanwhile, over the same period, the CSI Dividend Index rose zero point seven eight percent, and brokerages' FVOCI accounts rose eighteen percent. This is a complete food chain, where every layer rationally consumes the layer below it. So what does this tool provide? It is a safe chain of consumption, not an anchor for pricing. Eating all the way to the end, what has defensive stocks grown into? They've grown into a schizophrenic valuation system.

On one end, we have dividend stocks. Hey, in the first ten months of this year, the CSI Dividend Index rose by 0.78%. As I just mentioned, while the entire market was down 12%, this index remained completely unmoved. So, have you noticed something? These stocks are moving in the same way as those rotten debts of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). So, what has the pricing formula for dividend stocks become at this point? To put it bluntly, isn't it just the dividend divided by the government bond yield to get a multiple, and then adding some risk premium? Isn't this fucking just the pricing of dividend stocks? And what are these numerators? They are all industries with CCP monopoly licenses, and the purpose is to ensure that this dividend can be sustained. And the denominator is the government bond curve. Is there a growth factor in this pricing method? There's fucking nothing! In October 2024, when this tool first came out, the interest spread was about 350 basis points, and the two-year compression was almost one-third. The method is what? It's just to make the stock price rise. Stocks are originally priced based on corporate growth and competitive efficiency. With the CCP central bank coming in and messing things up, this function is completely gone. What's left? It's just licenses plus dividends plus central bank credit; this is just a pile of worthless paper.

On the other end, there are lottery stocks in US dollars, where the price-to-earnings ratio cannot be explained by financial frameworks and can only be explained by metaphysics. Hey, I call this type of stock lottery stocks. Let me report the P/E ratios to you, and you tell me if they are lottery stocks. The P/E ratio of the STAR 50 is 84.4 times, and the STAR Composite Index is 95.5 times. In August of this year, the P/E ratio of the CSI 2000 was 107 times. And in this year's interim reports, out of 4,600 companies, 1,100 are fucking loss-making. So, a P/E ratio of 107 times is not pricing the profits for the next ten years; it is pricing the turnover rate for the next week. The top 5% of individual stocks account for 44.81% of the total market turnover. You tell me what kind of market this is. The most miserable part is the middle segment. You see, market-oriented, growth-oriented mid-cap companies are not in the CSI 300, so they cannot get the perpetual holding of the CCP's 'national team' and insurance funds. But it's quite awkward; they don't have the volume to be collectively pulled up by hot money. So, this segment is where fund managers run away from. After running out, the money from both ends is now coming here. So, price discovery in the A-share market isn't just distorted; the middle segment is simply gone.

Why does China have to do this now? Because the anchor for credit really cannot be changed anymore. The CCP's credit anchor can be roughly divided into several stages: from 2001 to 2004, it was the stage of foreign exchange reserves. Simply put, exports earned US dollars, and then the dollars were settled and given to the central bank, and the central bank then released RMB. But at the end of May 2014, after foreign exchange reserves reached 27.3 trillion, it hit bottom directly. At that time, this part accounted for 82.5% of the central bank's assets. But what was the situation in China at that time? International capital plus trade surpluses were all crowding into China. So, whether it was foreign investment or trade surplus, enough funds could be settled. But now, it doesn't work. Now, the trade surplus has just earned some money, and the capital account starts to run away. It used to be a large reservoir, but now it has become something that leaks while being filled. I did this little math problem when I was a kid, and it really wasn't in vain. There is no condition for funds to settle. If it cannot settle, there is no condition for the formation of base money. After the decline in foreign exchange reserves, how did the CCP fill this gap? Hey, they continued to use land finance, and the purpose was to supplement this gap in reserves. This is the background of that bullshit 'de-stocking' campaign by the CCP.

Then this transaction chain turned into the central bank lending to banks, banks then issuing mortgage loans to urban investment companies, and only then did the credit of urban investment companies and local finance become entirely pinned on land. In 2021, land revenue came in a bit, but hey, it couldn't be sustained anymore. And after this land could no longer be sold, look, the anchor for the monetary credit of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s central bank started to change again, because in a country's credit system, you must have a core asset pool that can hold value, be appraised, and generate profit. Since land is no longer viable, only one alternative remains: equity. So, at the end of 2024, this group at the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) came up with a very interesting set of trading rules, putting market value management directly into the performance assessments of heads of central enterprises without even trying to hide it. The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) directly issued administrative requirements, requiring what? It's called a valuation improvement plan for companies with long-term price-to-book ratios below one. To put it bluntly, isn't that just an administrative order to manipulate stock prices? Coupled with the swap facility, the buyback and refinancing, and the ADF, your direction is singular: to turn these equities held by the CCP into the next pool of collateral, and then use the central bank's credit to reprice this pool. So, do you see it? Three times the credit anchor has been changed, and the interest rate is getting trashier each time. From the US dollar to selling land to the central bank backing its own credit, what does your final anchor become? Is it just the securities credit itself? Who is responsible for this bill, I don't think I need to say, right?

Let's look at the data. By the end of September this year, RMB deposits reached 349 trillion, and household deposits in the first three quarters increased by another 9.39 trillion. At what cost are these funds sitting in the bank? One percent. If banks use this money for repurchases, they earn 0.4 percent; while brokerage firms use it to buy dividend stocks, earning 3.9 percent. So, there is a gap of two or three percentage points between the savers and the dividend assets. This is the price of financial repression. What is financial repression, simply put? It is keeping deposit interest rates at a low level; this is under administrative regulation, allowing this interest spread to flow into the hands of those who have obtained the quota, and then it is intercepted layer by layer. Let's look at purchasing power. In September this year, the CPI grew by 0.9 percent year-on-year, while the PPI grew by 5 percent year-on-year. Your deposit interest is only 1 percent a year; compared to the rise in industrial goods, the real interest rate has already inverted by more than 4 points. So, savers are not being taken away by inflation tax, but by interest rate repression. This is just an update in the form of this game, and the money of the whole society is thus guided by Chinese accounting rules toward companies with monopoly licenses, dividends, and no need for growth.

And growth-oriented enterprises that truly need equity financing cannot get any reasonable valuation in this pricing vacuum. Companies with poor cash flow, on the other hand, can borrow money at 1 percent to buy back their own shares and prop up the stock price. So what is my conclusion? The swap facility and the market stabilization mechanism are not liquidity policies; they are collateral policies. Although the CCP central bank has not directly printed money, turning stocks into collateral that can circulate at the level of the central bank's credit is harder to exit than fucking printing money, because exiting means what? It means taking back the grade of the collateral. And what is this stabilization tool exchanged for? It is exchanged for price discovery. Your 6 trillion in chips are locked up, so the remaining market can only trade at the two ends: old-fashioned assets or high-tech assets, another large dumbbell structure. And in the middle segment, no one is bidding at all. That's interesting. The CCP has now turned the CSI 300 from an index into what? A policy variable, because you have 6 trillion in locked chips, and this scale is simply too huge. What it corresponds to is what? You must have a range that cannot be broken, and you must also add a reaction function with a floor. And now there is this official promise from the CCP central bank. Doesn't this now belong to the same nature as the RMB exchange rate?

Your profit and cost distribution rely entirely on approval, and then it constitutes a completely new information exploitation chain. Look, the people who get the quota are definitely the first to know the timing of the stock pressure. The remaining retail investors can only line up according to the distance of information, and those at the end are the providers of exit liquidity. So the scene we are very likely to see next is what? It is that the quota continues to increase, the rate continues to be suppressed, and the participating institutions continue to expand. However, I am thinking about one thing now: if the US capital expenditure cycle ends completely, how the fuck should the CCP protect this plate? Every step you, the CCP, take is reinforcing this structure, but at the same time, every step makes this exit an even more impossible thing. We can't go back to the rubber explosion incident the day before yesterday, that would be lively. Alright, that's all for today's report. If you like the program, the article the day before yesterday, if you want to support me, you can join the membership channel. The membership channel listens to the program every season. Welcome to join the friends of good people, see you in the next program.