Exports Surge 35%, New Loans Negative 100 Billion! CCP Claims Recovery? The Government Borrows While Everyone Else Repays, Price Hikes Driven by Oil and Chips, Net Mortgage Repayments in 'Silver October', 36 Trillion in Wealth Management Products Facing Panic Selling! Real Growth Rate at 1% with 3% Interest Rates Means Guaranteed Losses on Business Loans, Only Exports Remain, Betting on U.S. AI!
This episode provides a detailed analysis of China's core economic data for October. Although official propaganda highlights rising exports and production materials prices to claim an economic recovery, new RMB loans nationwide showed negative growth, government bond financing accounted for the vast majority of total social financing, and both businesses and households are comprehensively deleveraging. Meanwhile, the real estate market remains depressed, household loans decreased net, and bank wealth management products experienced a massive wave of simultaneous redemptions and market panic. The host points out that against the backdrop of a true GDP growth rate of only about 1% and loan interest rates remaining above 3%, borrowing money to run a real economy is bound to result in losses. China's economy has only one leg left to stand on—exports—which is highly dependent on the U.S. AI capital expenditure cycle.
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Observing things as they are, refusing fragmented perceptions. Over the past few days, the October economic data has been coming out one after another. One figure is particularly striking: the nationwide newly added RMB loans turned to minus 100 billion. Ah, it is not a decrease in growth, it is negative. This is already the third month of negative growth this year. Yet, what was the headline of that same week? It was still exports. Customs data released by the Chinese Communist Party on October 10 showed that October exports in US dollar terms rose by 35.2 percent year-on-year, while imports also rose by 41.6 percent. The October PPI rose by 5.7 percent year-on-year, exports surged sharply, and raw material prices also increased. Based on these two items, the CCP propaganda referred to this as an economic recovery. But everyone can see that if exports are rising while loans are negative, there is only one explanation: this economy has split into two halves, with one half supplying data centers in the United States. Then comes a problem. According to the CCP's surface data, when enterprises and households are all repaying debts, can these export and price figures still be used as the temperature of the economy? When calculating the third quarter last time, we already said that the Chinese economy currently lacks both money and any investable assets. Once the October data came out, ah, this statement has to be changed: it is not that no one dares to borrow anymore, it is that everyone is repaying their debts. Let us start with total social financing. The newly added social financing in October was 1.15 trillion. Bloomberg asked a circle of economists, and the median expectation given by the economists was 1.45 trillion, falling short by a full 300 billion. If this 1.15 trillion is broken down by structure, it becomes even more interesting. The net financing of government bonds in October was 1.19 trillion, meaning that the 1.19 trillion in government debt was even larger than the 1.15 trillion in newly added social financing. That is to say, only the government alone was borrowing money. This bond issuance scale of the CCP accounted for 103.5 percent of the total newly added social financing for that month. What does this mean? It means that if the government is stripped out, the remaining ordinary people combined, ah, the money obtained from the financial system that month was a negative number. Loans issued to the real economy dropped by 590 billion in the single month of October, relying entirely on corporate bonds to drag it along, plus 800 billion in entrusted loans lent out through new policy tools. This part made up for more than 500 billion, which barely managed to cobble together the figure of 1.15 trillion. Therefore, the October social financing data is very easy to read; it is entirely propped up by a single leg of government bond issuance. Let us look at the cumulative value of the first ten months. RMB loans to the real entity only accounted for 38.13 percent of the growth in social financing, whereas in the same period last year, the cumulative value of the first ten months had a proportion of around 47 percent. That is to say, it dropped by nearly 10 percentage points in a year. Some people say that enterprises really did shift from loans to issuing bonds. Can we just look at the data to finish it? Comparing year-on-year, even if the issuance of corporate bonds is taken into consideration, corporate bonds in the first ten months exceeded the same period last year by 1.27 trillion. Ah, it did indeed increase, but it still could not cover the abyss of the cumulative decrease of 1.46 trillion in household loans over the first ten months. Therefore, this is not a switch of channels; this is an overall deleveraging of enterprises and families. The People's Bank of China stated the following in its financial statistics report on October 13: newly added RMB loans were minus 100 billion, and RMB loans issued to the real entity were minus 590 billion. The same central bank released figures on the same day that differed by 490 billion. Why did this happen? Because the statistical calibers are different. What does social financing calculate? It only calculates actual loans lent to domestic enterprises and households, while the financial statistical caliber also stuffs in money lent to non-bank institutions such as securities firms, funds, and wealth management products, plus overseas loans. And the October non-bank institution loans plus overseas loans happened to increase by 490 billion, ah, which covered up a large chunk of the abyss in the real economy. With this 490 billion, the total number was shown to be minus 100 billion. Then, who was repaying this minus 590 billion? Household loans decreased by a net 430 billion in a single month. Breaking it down makes it even more obvious: household short-term loans decreased by 270 billion. This part includes things like credit cards, renovation loans, and consumer loans, ah, which are mainly used for household consumption expenditures. Meanwhile, household medium and long-term loans also decreased by 159.3 billion. Medium and long-term loans are basically mortgages. The enterprise side is the same. Loans to enterprises and institutional units decreased by a net 160 billion. What is the structure after breaking it down? Medium and long-term loans to enterprises increased by 160 billion, and short-term loans to enterprises increased by 10 billion. However, bill financing decreased by 330 billion.
I have talked to you all about bills before; it is when banks are trying to meet their loan quotas that they take some corporate bills to pad the numbers. Not only that, but the banks even provide interest subsidies. What is the matter? Are you saying that the CCP banks have stopped doing this now? Or is it that since it was not the performance assessment period in October, you were not in a hurry, and you will jump out to play this bill game again in December? Regardless, bills have been receding recently. As bills recede, the true face of corporate loans is revealed. Let us look at this from a wider perspective: the cumulative long-term and medium-term loans for households in the first ten months were negative 50.1 billion. In the first nine months of last year, this figure was still a positive 1.33 trillion, and October has historically been a peak season for buying houses—that is where the term 'Golden September and Silver October' comes from. Positive growth in mortgage loans during 'Silver October' can be said to be a convention. But this year, households across China are net repaying their mortgages. After talking about money, let us talk about prices. The PPI rose by 5.7 percent, and the CCP claims that deflation has ended. What is PPI? It is the producer's cost. Let us take a look at the composition of this PPI. In the sub-items of PPI, means of production rose by 7.4 percent, while means of subsistence were negative 0.1 percent. Within the means of production, the profit of a single extraction month rose by 27.9 percent, the raw material industry rose by 11.6 percent, and the processing industry also rose by 3.5 percent. However, the month-on-month PPI in October only rose by 0.7 percent, and energy alone—including oil and gas extraction, oil refining, and coal mining—contributed 0.61 percentage points, with a contribution rate of over 80 percent. So where did this 5.7 percent come from? It was imported from the price hikes of international oil, gas, coal, and storage chips. It is not that the downstream does not want to raise prices; it is that the degree of contraction in the domestic market simply does not support price hikes, but you still have to bear the costs. Let us look at the consumption side: the CPI in October rose by 0.7 percent, and the core CPI—which excludes food and energy—rose by 0.8 percent, with a month-on-month growth of zero. The price of cars fell by 1.9 percent, household appliances fell by 2.2 percent, and rents also fell by 0.6 percent. Let me do the math for you: the CPI rose by a total of 0.7 percentage points, and oil and gas alone pulled it up by 0.63 percentage points. Storage, computers, mobile phones, and other electronic products pulled it up by another 0.26 percentage points. The two combined pulled it up by 0.89 percentage points, which means it is even larger than the total increase of 0.7 percent. What does this mean? It means that if you exclude oil and chips, the prices of other things that ordinary Chinese people buy daily, when added together, are negative. Therefore, whether it is from consumption data, financing data, or micro-level corporate data, how the fuck could consumption be good? If houses were really selling, I will not even mention anything else, at least household long-term and short-term loans should not be negative, right? Then you can brag about this fucking awesome performance, okay?
Next, let's look at the accounts for foreign trade. The CCP's official press release is all about hyping up the 35% year-on-year surge in exports, but it conveniently avoids mentioning the hard fact that exports actually dropped by $35 billion compared to the previous month, nor does it mention the 7.8% month-on-month decline. This isn't just about the CCP's data; if you look at the surrounding region, Japan's month-on-month export growth turned negative in September, and in October, both South Korea and China saw their month-on-month figures reverse course. Only Taiwan saw its month-on-month exports hold up with a growth rate of around 11%. Why is this? Because the rules for computing power infrastructure dictate that you must first finalize the scale of core chips before you can determine how much peripheral equipment—like cooling systems or transformers—to purchase. Furthermore, TSMC's production capacity scheduling starts at a minimum of six months out. Therefore, the surge in Taiwan's October exports was actually digesting the backlog of orders accumulated over the previous few months, while the peripheral equipment from China, Japan, and South Korea, which have shorter lead times, reversed course first. This precisely indicates one thing: the incremental growth in front-end orders is already hitting the brakes, and the procurement chain is shrinking from the periphery toward the core. This is a leading signal that AI capital expenditure is beginning to run into trouble. And what about the money earned from exports? In the first three quarters, the customs trade surplus was $935 billion, but the net settlement of foreign exchange returned in RMB was only $460.6 billion. In other words, $470 billion was not settled. The reason is very simple: the interest rate differential between China and the US. With the dollar's interest rates being high, exporters simply kept their dollars. That's why foreign currency deposits rose by 16.9% at the end of October, reaching $1.2 trillion, but they just aren't being settled. What does it mean if you don't settle? It means it cannot become domestic corporate capital or orders. So, we see a 35% rise in exports alongside a 100 billion decrease in loans. Assuming the CCP's current data is accurate, it only points to one conclusion: at best, the Chinese economy has split in two—one half is supplying overseas AI, earning dollars and keeping them in accounts without converting them, while the other half is stuck at home, head down, paying off debt. As for what happens if this AI cycle slows down, we will save that for the end.
Let's look at deposits again. M1 in October rose by 4.4% year-on-year, while in September it was only 3.2%. What is M1? It is liquid credit. But how did October's M1 increase? On the same report, non-financial corporate deposits in October decreased by 1.25 trillion, and household deposits decreased by 920 billion. However, one figure increased significantly: fiscal deposits increased by 1.4 trillion, and non-bank financial institution deposits increased by 1.58 trillion. Now you see how it rose, right? Corporate money decreased by 1.25 trillion, yet M1 went up, and it was entirely filled by fiscal deposits. Furthermore, today's figure benefited from the low base effect of last year. What was the situation in October last year? M1 fell by 1% month-on-month, meaning the base for October last year was already a hole created by a low base, so today's year-on-year figure just bounced up. Where did the Ministry of Finance's deposits come from? October happened to be tax season, and combined with 1.19 trillion in government bonds, fiscal deposits surged by 1.4 trillion in a single month. Also, that 800 billion in new policy-oriented financial instruments was fully deployed by October 28, but that money is still sitting in project capital accounts waiting to be disbursed; it hasn't become social demand deposits yet. On the other side, the 1.58 trillion flowing into non-bank deposits went into wealth management subsidiaries, funds, and brokerages—that's where it went. Let's look at another piece of corroborating evidence: at the end of October, the rediscount rate for six-month bills was only 0.5%, which is even lower than the 0.17% yield on government bonds of the same maturity. Banks would rather use bills to inflate their scale than issue loans. It's not that they don't want to issue them, but there's nowhere to put them; nobody is borrowing right now. So, with M1 at that 4.4% baseline, we can clearly see that the money is clogged in two places: the national treasury and the asset management pool; none of it is on the books of real-economy enterprises.
Let's look at the housing market. What is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propagating? They claim that the month-on-month area of secondary home online signatures in key cities has turned to growth, and the daily average transaction area of new homes in key cities during the National Holiday surged by 33.8% year-on-year. However, according to the central bank's report, household medium- and long-term loans in October experienced a net reduction of 156.3 billion. So, do you believe the money, or do you believe the CCP's propaganda? Or should we look at the data from our own database? First, let's look at new homes. The transaction area of new homes in tier-2 cities in October fell by 31.34% year-on-year, while the inventory-to-sales ratio in tier-2 cities—meaning how many months it would take to clear the inventory at the current pace—has climbed to 44 months. In other words, the foundation of new home mortgages has already collapsed across tier-2 and tier-3 cities. Now let's look at secondary homes. Secondary home transactions themselves generate new loans because the process works like this: a buyer gets a new mortgage from a bank and pays the seller. Once the seller receives the money, the very first thing they do is settle their existing home mortgage. In this way, as a new loan comes in and an old loan goes out, the balance of home loans on the bank's books should theoretically remain unchanged. However, housing prices are still falling, so the principal of the new loan has to be calculated based on the fallen prices, whereas the principal of the old loan was borrowed back when prices were high. With this in and out, the total balance is actually shrinking instead. According to the calculation standards of the real estate agency CRIC, the mortgage default rate has risen from 0.6% in 2022 to 3.7% last year. Even if you look at the cosmetic financial reports of the party's major banks, the non-performing mortgage loan ratio of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China has surged more than fourfold this year from its previously unshakeable 0.3%, hitting 2.9%. What is even more intuitive? Foreclosed homes. Last year, a total of 719,000 properties were listed for auction. In just the first ten months of this year, newly listed properties skyrocketed by 31.6%, directly hitting 654,000 cases. This year will definitely break last year's record, because if you include failed and re-auctioned properties, the number has already exceeded 770,000 cases, and the vast majority of them went unsold. Even for those that were sold, they were mostly dumped at a 26% discount (selling at 74% of the value), which directly drives down the expectations for secondary home prices lower and lower. Moreover, mortgages and factors affecting everyone still exist. Have people noticed something? Among the 920 billion by which household deposits decreased, a portion of it was the effect produced by paying off mortgage principals. And how did the CCP spin this? The CCP then swapped this operation of trading price drops for volume into "volume picking up and stabilizing." But your foreclosed property supply in the first ten months is still skyrocketing at an annualized rate of 30%, and you are telling me it fucking stabilized? It's quite interesting now: the higher the transaction volume of secondary homes, the more net mortgages might be liquidated, because the turnover itself is a concentrated settlement of existing mortgages.
Let's talk about the industry sector. It is said that China's industrial profits for the first nine months reached 6 trillion, which seemingly grew by 15.5%—very lively, right? Now let's do some subtraction. First, let's strip away state-monopolized energy, mining, refining, hydro power, and non-ferrous metals such as the "Big Three oil companies," Shenhua, Minmetals, and the State Grid. These party-owned enterprises directly carved out 1.99 trillion—roughly 2 trillion—accounting for a full one-third of the 6 trillion in profits. Next, let's also remove the 985.2 billion from the electronics industry, which is tied to U.S. capital expenditures. Once these two major chunks are taken away, the 6 trillion pie instantly shrinks to just 3.06 trillion. And the profits of the remaining 30-odd ordinary manufacturing industries not only did not grow by a single penny, but actually fell backward by 4.5% year-on-year. How much did the PPI rise? About 5.7%, right? If you further carve out the basic chemical sector associated with rising oil and coal prices, the true profits of the vast majority of downstream and midstream factories across China are actually collapsing downwards at a rate exceeding 9%, and growth is simply impossible.
What else shall we talk about? Ah, wealth management. Didn't a very lively event happen last month? From October 30 to November 2, out of the 36 trillion yuan in bank wealth management products, two-thirds of the medium-to-low-risk R2 products experienced a concentrated pullback. In just two days, they wiped out half a month's returns, and dozens of wealth management companies urgently issued announcements to appease investors. We've done a separate show on this before. Previously, to boost these returns, ah, the wealth management subsidiaries outsourced their duration management, handing a whopping 2.96 trillion yuan to public mutual funds to stretch that duration. Is this structure fragile? It's fucking fragile as hell, okay? On the 30th, the liquidity squeeze from the tax payment period coincided with the Huafa default, directly triggering a double kill on government bonds. R2 products experienced a single-day pullback of 6 basis points. The key lies in the fact that there was an amplification mechanism here: if you directly bought spot bonds like local government financing vehicle (LGFV) bonds or tier-2 capital bonds, under such liquidity conditions, you would have to sell at a discount to get cash. But these bastards didn't dare to sell at a discount, because once discounted, it would smash the valuation of their own remaining asset portfolios. On the flip side, redeeming the public bond funds and bond ETFs in their hands was much more cost-effective. The wealth management companies could take cash and walk away based on that day's book net value. As for the fund managers, in order to gather cash to cope with the redemptions, they had a pretty fucking hard time; they were forced to dump these bonds at a discount in the market, so the hole from the market dumping would stay on the fund's ledger, without backfiring on the valuations of the massive stack of existing bonds held by the wealth management companies themselves. To put it bluntly, what kind of game is this? It's sacrificing your peers to save your own skin, a game where whoever runs the slowest foots the bill. So these institutions calculated with extreme precision, all tightly holding onto their hard-to-sell spot bonds and refusing to budge, while concentrating their firepower on redeeming easily liquidated funds. In just a few days, over 40 billion yuan fled frantically from bond ETFs, 75.1% of which was pulled straight out of the most liquid corporate bond ETFs. What did this turn into? Whichever asset had the best liquidity and was the easiest to cash out got slaughtered first. Once the secondary market took this beating, the panic immediately spread to the primary market where new bonds were issued. Borrowing enterprises that were originally lined up to issue bonds saw the market dumping everything; not only was there no one to take the orders, but the bond issuance interest rates were also pushed up, so they simply gave up on issuing. As a result, since October, a full 50 credit bonds have been forced to cancel or postpone their issuance. This stampede lasted until November 2, when the central bank of the Chinese Communist Party saw this and thought, holy shit, this trend isn't right, and immediately stepped in, shifting the focus of stabilizing funds directly onto overnight interest rates—meaning they first clamped down on the overnight interest rates that institutions relied on to borrow money for daily turnover. Immediately the next day, Huafa finally paid the bond interest, and only then did this redemption wave recede. And everyone, please note, retail investors hadn't even reacted yet this time; it was purely institutions fearing that fucking others would run first and leave them holding the bag, leading them to preempt and stampede over each other, causing the net value of wealth management products to drop into that pathetic state. You tell me, is this structure fragile or not?
Why did the drawdown of secondary wealth management products become such a big issue? The root cause lies in the interest rate spread. As we have mentioned before, the net interest margin of commercial banks is only around 1.3%, and for large banks, it is only around 1.25%, while the loan interest rate is already at 2.96%. To maintain such a thin margin, banks have no choice but to lower deposit rates round after round. Consequently, 36 trillion yuan of principal-seeking deposits, which do not want to lose a single penny, were driven out of the balance sheet and into secondary wealth management products, because with an annual return of less than 1%, this money simply could not stay there. Having discussed the liability side, let's look at the asset side. The credit line for local government financing vehicle (LGFV) bonds was slashed from 16 trillion yuan at the end of 2024 to less than 12 trillion yuan by the end of October this year, a drop of more than 25%. In other words, high-coupon assets are gone. This is actually the better scenario, as some LGFVs have even had their legal entities deregistered. Under these circumstances, what has the situation become? This 36 trillion yuan in wealth management funds can only compete for food with the banks' proprietary trading desks. What are they scrambling for? They are scrambling for the 0.6% 10-year treasury bonds and those '1-series' perpetual bonds. Furthermore, banks have a derivative operation—as just mentioned—using public funds and bond funds to extend the duration, which has created a structural inversion. Think about it: what kind of money is on the liability side? It is short-term capital that customers can redeem at any time, while the asset side consists of long-duration and highly crowded bonds. Therefore, the entire coupon protection buffer is almost zero. Not to mention anything else, a 4 to 5 basis point disturbance in the funding market, or negative public sentiment regarding a local state-owned enterprise like Huafa, is enough to trigger a stampede of institutions rushing to redeem ETFs first. Minsky, the economist who studied financial crises, was most interested in this kind of structure. If the majority within this financial system are borrowing short to buy long, the ability to resist risk will be very poor, and a very small disturbance could shake the entire chain.
Now, let's string the October bills into a chain. Where is the source? Isn't it still land? Everyone should have an idea of how badly the land market has fallen. When land sales stop, local governments have no money. Once local governments have no money, they can only rely on issuing bonds to replace the hidden debts of LGFVs to keep themselves alive. But China has now set a strict rule for bond issuance: the borrowed money can only be used to pay off old debts, and no new investments are allowed. As a result, the credit line for LGFV bond issuance was directly cut by a quarter, and consequently, infrastructure investment in the first three quarters fell to 4.2%. Let's look at the construction industry data again: the PMI index for new orders in the construction industry in October fell directly to 40%. 50% is the boom-bust line, and October is a traditional peak season. Yet, even in this peak season, the index dropped by 5.7 percentage points in a single month. There is simply no one working at construction sites now. Upstream costs like oil, gas, and coal are still rising, while the industrial capacity utilization rate in the third quarter was only 73.1%. What other tricks do the midstream and downstream sectors have? There are no tricks; they can only lower prices to clear inventory. Because costs cannot be passed downward at all, nor can they be moved. Added to this, payments from local governments and state-owned enterprises have also slowed down, with the accounts receivable period stretching directly to 70.6 days. The profit margins of midstream private enterprises are being squeezed from both ends. Now, I dare say that the account books of China's small and medium-sized enterprises likely look like this: cash flow is all tied up in accounts receivable, and the upstream, which is the CCP's state-owned enterprises, is also essentially revenue. Don't look at the CCP holding a bunch of monopoly resources, appearing as if it is a highway robber; can you make money just by robbing? Even if you do the job of a highway robber, you can't just make money by holding a gun. You at least need people to pass by, right? People aren't taking out loans and aren't using this road anymore, are they? And those who do pass by must have money on them, right? Without money, manufacturing enterprises themselves have a pile of inventory backlogged, and they aren't even taking out those fucking loans anymore. Can the CCP, as the robber, collect money? Keep dreaming! China's private entrepreneurs just lack a voice, but they aren't fucking idiots. In this situation, what is the most dangerous thing? Just staying deadlocked. You report that the profits of state-owned enterprises and enterprises above designated size are rising, so report it; anyway, the reports are all compiled by the CCP itself, you can write whatever you want. Other state-owned enterprises don't give me money, and I don't give them money, that's it. So the accounts receivable for enterprises above designated size are also rising; it's not that they don't want to pay. Just look at this price war and the loan data—is it even possible for them to pay?
Finally, let's talk about policy. The third-quarter monetary policy implementation report from the People's Bank of China (the Chinese central bank) is written this way: it calls for maintaining determination in total volume and interest rates, using only outright reverse repos, plus a short-end interest rate anchor to protect bank liquidity. Why not just lower the LPR directly? Because even if you lower it, no one is borrowing. Private investment and interest rates are lying flat on the ground, and everyone is busy paying off debt. Even if you lowered the interest rate from 3% to 0.25%, it would be useless; it wouldn't make someone who is currently paying off a mortgage turn around and borrow another loan. Furthermore, for China right now, the issue of interest rate cuts is a false proposition in itself. Given the fragile state of Chinese commercial banks' interest spreads, changing a few basis points at the front end would cause the entire bank asset structure's yield to wobble, and it would also shake the 36 trillion yuan in wealth management assets, pushing them further. What if they don't cut it? Then mid-to-downstream enterprises and the household sector will continue to be passively deleveraged under real interest rates of over 3%. Based on my judgment, China's real GDP growth is at most around 1%. With 1% real growth against a 3% loan interest rate, borrowing money to engage in real industry is a guaranteed loss-making business; this is the fundamental reason why no one is borrowing money. It is not a confidence problem; it is an arithmetic problem. As long as this real growth rate does not exceed the debt interest rate for a single day, the central bank's structure of suppressing interest rates and raising bond prices to make banks hold government bonds is one that they dare not dismantle for a single day, because if they dismantle it, the banks' balance sheets will inevitably explode. So, look at how the money moved in October: 1.19 trillion yuan in government bonds were issued, the money went into the national treasury and project capital accounts, and non-bank deposits rose by 1.58 trillion yuan, but it was used to buy government bonds and bond funds; it went around in a circle and not a single cent entered the pockets of residents. The old engines of the economy are completely finished: selling land, local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) borrowing money to build infrastructure, and residents taking out mortgages to buy houses. These three wheels were just slowing down last year, but today they have stopped completely. Now the entire Chinese economy is standing on one leg: exports. And this leg is betting on the continuation of the US AI capital expenditure cycle. So theoretically, there is only one path left: the central government must actively break its own balance sheet and distribute money directly to residents and social security to repair household net assets. But the CCP is not only failing to repair the household sector's balance sheet, it is also plundering through social security, non-tax revenue, and individual income tax collection. Just watch, the day the US capital expenditure cycle stops and the export leg is pulled out, what remains will be an economy where the government is left alone to take on debt while everyone else is paying it off. When that time comes, the first things that won't be able to hold up will be the fiscal ledger and the central bank's ledger. Alright, that's all for today.