Yaoyao: Why Is It So Hard to Convict CCP Agents? | Zhang Wanying
This article details the complete story of the case in which Linda Sun, former deputy chief of staff to the governor of New York, was charged with acting as an agent of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). By sorting through the details of the prosecution's allegations—such as eavesdropping on internal meetings, forging invitation letters, seeking financial gains for her husband, suppressing Taiwan-related activities, and improperly fabricating official proclamations—it explores the rigorous legal thresholds under the US federal Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) for proving foreign agent status, as well as the institutional dilemma wherein CCP infiltration through personal connections and favors remains difficult to directly convict in court.
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Hello everyone, I am Yaoyao Jiang, who loves thinking and values logic. Two years ago, when I was still working at Voice of America, I reported live from outside the federal court in New York on the first court appearance of Linda Sun, former deputy chief of staff to the New York governor, following her arrest. Let's first take a look at our report back then: On Tuesday morning, Linda Sun, former deputy chief of staff to New York Governor Hochul, and her husband were arrested at their home in Long Island, New York. Sun was charged with acting as an agent of the CCP. On Tuesday afternoon, they were released on bail at the federal court in Brooklyn, New York.
The case has more twists, turns, and reversals than the Zhang case currently in the headlines. Officials from the Chinese Consulate General in New York delivered salted duck to her parents' home on four separate occasions. Of course, reciprocating the favors, Sun also ran errands and did a lot of work for the CCP. However, no one at the time could have expected that two years later, the jury would fail to reach a unanimous verdict on even a single one of the 19 charges, resulting in a mistrial. A little over a month ago, federal prosecutors added another charge of conspiracy to commit money laundering. Last week, however, her attorney filed to withdraw because Sun could no longer afford the legal fees. Next, based on the indictment and the courtroom arguments between the prosecution and the defense, we will review the complete backstory of Linda Sun's case.
Let's first go back to an online meeting held by New York State on March 16, 2020. At that time, New York had just entered the most critical phase of the pandemic. That internal meeting was discussing public health on one hand and anti-Asian hate incidents on the other. Attendees included the head of the New York State Division of Human Rights and health department officials. The meeting was not open to the public, and that Chinese consular official was not on the guest list. The indictment states that Sun did not introduce this listener to anyone. Using her own cell phone, she stayed on the line with the official, allowing them to hear the internal discussions of state officials from the other end. Prosecutors did not obtain a complete recording of that meeting, but they did secure two sets of timestamps: at 6:30 p.m., the state government meeting began. Almost simultaneously, Sun's call with the Chinese official connected. The state government meeting lasted about 32 minutes, while Sun's phone call lasted about 36 minutes. More crucially, she messaged that Chinese consular official eavesdropping on the meeting, telling them to stay quiet. Prosecutors viewed this warning to remain quiet as evidence that Sun, fully aware the other party should not have been present in the meeting, still arranged for them to listen in on its contents. After the meeting ended, the consular official commented that it was "very useful," providing prosecutors with another piece of the puzzle. This was not an accidental dial, nor was it two calls that just happened to overlap; the other party indeed heard the meeting's content and provided feedback.
The defense attorneys' strategy in court is to sever these two layers of relationship. The first layer: the other party eavesdropping on an internal meeting does not mean the meeting contents belong to state secrets. What was discussed that day was the epidemic and hate crimes, not some military plan. The second layer: even if Linda Sun improperly brought someone in, it still cannot be determined from this that she is a foreign agent. U.S. prosecutors must also prove that she did this under the orders, requests, direction, or control of the Chinese government. Therefore, the prosecution brought out the call times and the information about muting to prove this was a covert operation. Meanwhile, the defense cross-examined who exactly made this request and who issued the instruction, attempting to dismantle the illegal foreign government agent relationship the prosecution is trying to establish. What both sides are arguing over is not whether that official secretly listened to that meeting, but why Linda Sun let her listen.
To explain why Linda Sun was able to bring a Chinese consular official close to an internal meeting of the New York State government? First, let's roll the clock back 4 years. In 2016, Linda Sun had already been working in the New York State government for 4 years. She first handled Asian American affairs and later transferred to the state's economic development department as the director of external affairs. The governor of New York at that time was Andrew Cuomo, and Kathy Hochul was only the lieutenant governor. Linda Sun had not yet entered the highest tier of the governor's office, but she was already responsible for liaison between the state government and Asian communities, foreign delegations, and consular institutions. Who wanted to see the governor or lieutenant governor? To whom should the invitation letter be sent first, and whether financial kickbacks entered the schedule—Linda Sun had the opportunity to meddle in all of it.
In June 2016, the U.S. Department of Commerce hosted the SelectUSA Investment Summit in Washington, and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office hoped to invite then-New York State Lieutenant Governor Kathy Hochul to attend an event. Upon learning of this, Linda Sun immediately sent a message to a Chinese consular official saying that the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office was inviting Lieutenant Governor Kathy Hochul to an event. They sent the invitation to one of my colleagues trying to bypass me; I am currently handling it. The Chinese official replied, thank you for telling me. Soon after, Linda Sun informed the other party again that the matter had been satisfactorily resolved. Twelve days later, Hochul attended a reception hosted by the Chinese Embassy in the U.S. and the China General Chamber of Commerce - USA, but did not attend the Taiwan-related event.
Looking at this incident alone, the defense lawyers have plenty of room for explanation. The lieutenant governor might receive many invitations in a day, and attending each event might just be a matter of scheduling. Linda Sun was responsible for external liaison and communicating with foreign consulates, which was naturally within the scope of her duties. More importantly, this set of text messages did not show that Chinese officials ordered her first. However, by 2019, Linda Sun herself summarized what she had done for the Chinese government over the past few years. In January of that year, she wrote to an official in the political section of the Chinese Consulate General: I attach great importance to my relationship with the Consulate General. During my tenure, I have done many things. I have blocked all contact between the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office and the state government, and I have rejected all requests they made. The Chinese official replied, I know, and I am very grateful for your help. Then, the Chinese official told Linda Sun, you are our most important hub connecting with the governor and his team.
That same month, Governor Cuomo’s chief of staff forwarded a guest list within the state government, asking if there were any problems with the people on the list. Seeing the names of two representatives from the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office, Linda Sun wrote a sentence in English next to them: Not friends of us. The problem lies in the word "us." Linda Sun was paid by the New York State government, but in her internal emails, Taiwan became someone who is not on our side. What the prosecution wants the jury to answer is whether the "us" Linda Sun mentioned refers to the New York State government or the Chinese Consulate General. This is also the key to resolving the first two charges in this case.
Foreign Agents Registration Act is abbreviated in English as FARA. This act does not prohibit a person from handling things or returning to Taiwan. To convict Linda Sun of failing to register as a foreign agent, the prosecution must prove that she acted under the orders, requests, direction, or control of the Chinese government or the CCP. She engaged in political activities in the United States affecting government policy, public opinion, or foreign relations. She also knew that such a relationship required registration and intentionally failed to register. FARA does not require both parties to sign an employment contract, nor does it require the Chinese government to issue a monthly salary to Linda Sun. The word "request" is already in the law. If a Chinese official makes a request and Linda Sun uses her position to comply, it may establish an agent relationship of a foreign agent.
The defense lawyers' strategy is to break this chain of logic from the prosecution. Linda Sun was in charge of Asian American and external affairs, and maintaining contact with the Chinese consulate is not unusual. The state government rejecting a certain event cannot automatically be blamed on Beijing. Chinese officials calling her the most important hub may just be polite compliments and cannot replace evidence of both parties working together. Even if Linda Sun visibly favored Beijing, the prosecution still has to prove that she did not make such a choice on her own, but rather in response to the calls and demands of the Chinese side. Therefore, a few ambiguous chat logs are not enough. The prosecution needs to prove that Linda Sun once bypassed the normal procedures of the state government to complete specific tasks for the Chinese side.
Subsequently, three invitation letters issued in Hochul's name were presented in court. One was officially approved, while the other two had no approval records whatsoever. In 2017, a delegation from Jiangxi Province was preparing to visit New York, and Linda Sun hoped the then-lieutenant governor would issue an invitation letter. She first coordinated with the governor's office and then went to see Jeff Lewis, Hochul's chief of staff. Lewis explained to the court that the state government typically did not have the lieutenant governor proactively invite a foreign provincial delegation, so this matter was unusual, but the process was at least complete. Did the office know that the relevant supervisor agreed to the invitation letter? In the end, it was also signed by Hochul. This invitation letter for the Jiangxi government delegation later became a template.
On March 18, 2018, after attending a banquet, Linda Sun was handed a list of delegation members and a sample English invitation letter by a Henan fellow townsman association leader, who hoped Hochul would sign it. Five days later, Linda Sun told the other party that the letter had been written, but Hochul had not yet signed it. A few days later, the association leader continued to urge about the signature, and Linda Sun replied that she could ask whether Hochul's signature could be used. On March 29, Linda Sun sent a document titled invitation letter reference from her personal email to her state government work email. The document contained an invitation letter written to a vice chairman of the Henan provincial government, followed by a list of the delegation members' names, dates of birth, and official titles. From late March to early April, Linda Sun handed the Henan invitation letter she drafted to the leader of the Henan fellow townsman association.
The prosecution later compared this letter with the previously officially approved Jiangxi invitation letter and found that the text in the Henan invitation letter was almost entirely copied. However, the procedures followed by the two invitation letters were completely different. The Jiangxi invitation letter was approved by the state government and signed by Hochul herself, while the Henan invitation letter had no approval records at all, and Hochul had not authorized Linda Sun to sign on her behalf. Yet, a handwritten signature of Hochul still appeared on the invitation letter delivered to the Henan side. The indictment charged that this signature was forged. On June 1, the delegation members applied for US visas. They wrote on their application forms that they came to the US to visit the New York State government, filled in Hochul as the US contact, and used Linda Sun's own mobile phone number as the contact phone number. On June 23, the delegation entered the country from San Francisco, and three days later, they met Hochul and presented a piece of Chinese embroidery.
Putting the normal Jiangxi invitation letter and the Henan invitation letter in front of the jurors, the then-governor's chief of staff, Jeff Lewis, testified that according to office regulations, only Hochul herself or he as chief of staff could sign documents in Hochul's name. As for himself, he was also familiar with Hochul's handwriting and believed that the signature on the Henan invitation letter was not genuine. The prosecution displayed this 2018 invitation letter mainly to illustrate that Linda Sun had mastered the method of producing invitation letters and knew how normal authorization should proceed.
The charge in the indictment that truly corresponded to visa fraud and the four counts of unlawful entry was another invitation letter she produced in 2019 for a second batch of Henan officials. In May 2019, the head of the Henan Provincial Foreign Affairs Office was preparing to visit the US. The head of the fellow townsman association urged Linda Sun to issue an invitation letter as soon as possible, saying that applying for a US visa takes time, and Linda Sun promised to deliver it within two days. On May 16, she issued a document named New York State Invitation Letter. The delegation first changed the dates and later replaced personnel, while Linda Sun repeatedly modified it according to the requests of the Henan delegation side. The leader of the fellow townsman association first went to Linda Sun's parents' home to pick up the document, and on September 9 went to Linda Sun's office in Manhattan to pick up the new version, subsequently accompanying him to the Chinese consulate to participate in an activity. The final letter was dated September 18, used Cuomo's governor letterhead, but bore the handwritten signature of Lieutenant Governor Hochul. The indictment stated that Cuomo, Hochul, and staff members of both had not approved this letter, and the signature was also forged. On October 15, four Henan officials obtained B1/B2 visas, and all four visa applications were attached with this invitation letter. On November 4, the four individuals entered the country from JFK Airport, and Linda Sun subsequently arranged for them to meet with the New York State department responsible for investment promotion. This invitation letter became the core evidence for the third visa fraud charge.
Because the four Henan officials later used it to apply for visas and entered the United States, the prosecution further charged Linda Sun with four counts of assisting foreigners in illegal entry, one count for each person. The illegal entry mentioned here does not mean smuggling in across the border; these four Henan officials all held visas and entered normally from JFK Airport, but the prosecution argued that their visas were obtained based on fake invitation letters. Therefore, Linda Sun knew or disregarded this risk and still helped them enter the United States, which could likewise violate the law on assisting foreigners in illegal entry.
The evidentiary threshold for entering a US court trial is extremely high. For visa fraud, it is not enough to simply prove that the documents were problematic; the prosecution must also prove that Linda Sun knew the documents were false and still submitted them into the visa process. The false content must be significant enough to influence the visa decision. Since the invitation letters misappropriated the names of the New York State government and the Lieutenant Governor and were indeed attached to four applications, the prosecution argues that she created a significant impression on US consular officials that these four individuals were coming at the formal invitation of the New York State government. Additionally, for the four charges corresponding to the four entering officials, the prosecution must not only prove that Sun intended to facilitate their entry via these letters but also that she knew or at least disregarded that this method of entry was illegal. The defense attorneys continue to focus on who forged the signatures and whether Sun actually knew it was illegal. The prosecution did not bring in a handwriting expert, and no one witnessed Sun imitating the former Chief of Staff's signature. Lewis could testify that the normal procedures were not followed and could say the signature did not look authentic, but could not prove who actually wrote those strokes. After two batches of Henan government delegations arrived in the US, one batch met with the former [Governor], and the other met with the New York State investment promotion department. The defense attorneys therefore argue that the visits and economic activities of these people were real and not fabricated to obtain visas, which proves the invitation letters were fake.
That is not enough for the prosecution; they must also prove that Sun helped these four officials enter the US for commercial or private economic gain. Why would Sun take such a risk? The prosecution's explanation goes back to the seafood business her husband, Hu, was doing in Henan. In 2016, a New York Chinese businessman told Hu that the first batch of live American lobsters had arrived in Zhengzhou. Upon seeing the news, Sun immediately asked Hu if there was an opportunity. The other party replied yes. Hu had experience in seafood export and had operated other businesses. Getting American lobsters into China is not as simple as just finding a buyer; it also requires customs, airport, cold chain, and local connections. Sun's position as a New York State government official was exactly what could help her husband access these resources.
In the spring of 2017, Sun, Hu, Sun's parents, and Hu's business partners traveled to Henan. The indictment lists specific information. Sun told her parents that the Henan provincial side gave her young son a red envelope containing $200. She also told the accompanying business personnel, 'I think the Henan government will pay for everything,' and added that the main banquet was arranged by the Henan government, and the Henan side was preparing a special itinerary for Hu and the business owners. During this trip, Hu gained access to airports, customs, free trade zones, and wholesale markets. Later, he discussed building a seafood base with Yantai, Shandong. According to a cooperation framework, Yantai would provide land and capital, while Hu would be responsible for products and sales. One of Hu's business partners had a son studying in the US, and Hu said he could have Sun write a recommendation letter. Later, Sun actually used New York State government letterhead to write a letter for the young man, certifying that he had interned at the New York State government office and performed excellently.
Viewed in isolation, these matters could all be explained as ordinary human favors: government officials visiting, local reception of wives, introducing husbands, meeting business partners, and writing recommendation letters for acquaintances' children—in Chinese society, this would not even seem particularly outrageous. However, the prosecution has placed them into the same map of interest exchange. The Henan provincial government needed invitation letters, official meetings, and political status from the New York State government, while Sun and Hu needed Chinese market access and business opportunities. Sun used government resources to trade for her husband's opportunity to enter the Chinese business scene. This is why the prosecution added private economic interests to the four entry charges. They are not saying that the four officials paid Sun directly, but rather that helping the Henan officials enter the country and meet with Hochul maintained a relationship that allowed Hu to profit.
Meanwhile, the counterattack from Sun's defense team is equally direct. The lawyer argued that there was no contract stating that an invitation letter could be traded for lobsters, nor did any Henan officials appear in court to admit to an exchange. Did Hu and Xiao actually sell the lobsters into Zhengzhou? The prosecution also lacks complete records. To connect a business trip, a few meetings, and subsequent commercial attempts into an interest exchange still requires the jury to make a significant inference. In court, the prosecution and defense are arguing over whether this inference is sufficient for a criminal conviction, but outside the court, the way the CCP operates relationships is already very clear. It rarely writes requirements into a contract. A reception, a title, an invitation letter, a commercial channel—each can be described as 'helping out.' As these favors accumulate, the boundary between public duty and private interest disappears.
In August 2018, the head of a Henan fellow-townsmen association wanted a title from the New York State government to facilitate his direct contact with high-level provincial government officials upon his return to Henan. Linda Sun decided to let him use the title of the Asian American Advisory Council and promised to write an appointment letter using the state government's letterhead. Sun instructed him that he must never let anyone know that this letter was written privately. The head of the association prepared a script for Sun: if anyone asked about it later, Sun would say it was an appointment letter that Governor Cuomo had asked her to write but had not yet been issued. The two had already conspired on how to conceal the source, which clearly shows they knew this was not following standard procedures. However, the prosecution's most impactful evidence was not the Henan invitation. On July 5, 2019, a representative from the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office sent an email to Sun, stating that Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen would visit New York on July 12 and that the Taiwan side invited Governor Cuomo and Sun to attend a banquet held in Manhattan that evening. A few minutes later, Sun forwarded the email to a Chinese consular official, writing only three English letters: "FYI" (for your information). At the same time, she sent a text message saying, "I sent you an email, just letting you know I have blocked it." The other party replied, "Received, thank you." This set of messages is powerful because Sun herself stated that she had blocked Tsai Ing-wen's invitation. On July 6, Sun declined the invitation on behalf of the Governor's office, giving the reason that Governor Cuomo was attending a staff summer event that day. However, the actual date of that staff event was July 11, not July 12, the day of the banquet. Even more strangely, Sun said she had "blocked it," yet she did not ask her colleagues in the state government until July 10 whether the system contained information about Tsai Ing-wen's banquet. The next day, a colleague replied that there was no such arrangement tomorrow and that the event was not in the system at all. Sun replied with one word: "Perfect." On July 12, the day of Tsai Ing-wen's banquet, the indictment cited public reports and photos stating that Sun did not appear at the banquet, but instead appeared at a protest on the streets of Manhattan against Tsai Ing-wen's visit to the U.S.
A month later, the new political affairs head from the Taiwan side wanted to have a coffee with Sun or come to her office to introduce himself. Sun did not reply to the Taiwan side first; instead, she sent her proposed handling of the matter to the Chinese consular official. She said, "You know I have successfully prevented all formal and informal meetings between them and Cuomo and Hochul. I myself only maintain the minimum relationship with them. I think it is best not to let him come to the Governor's office, so as to avoid the Taiwan side claiming that New York State recognizes Taiwan, but I want to confirm whether you also agree with this approach." In the end, Sun did not let the Taiwan official enter the Governor's office and only agreed to meet at a chain takeout restaurant near the office. After the meeting, she sent a message to the Chinese official saying, "The Taiwan side does one thing better than you: they often take the initiative to find offices of other elected officials to have coffee and expand relationships." She added at the end, "Not everyone is like me." The prosecution used this set of evidence to argue that Sun used her position in the state government to prevent New York State officials from contacting the Taiwan side, which falls under the political activities mentioned in FARA. However, proving that she did something beneficial to Beijing is not enough to prove that she was an agent of Beijing. The prosecution must also prove that Sun took these actions under the orders, requests, direction, or control of the Chinese side, rather than as decisions she made herself. And this is exactly where the prosecution and defense are clashing the most fiercely.
The prosecutors emphasized the sequence of her actions: every time Taiwan sent an invitation, she immediately forwarded it to the Chinese side; after the matter was handled, she reported back; and when encountering a new request from Taiwan, she first asked the Chinese side what to do. This was not normal communication between two sides, but rather treating Chinese officials as objects to whom she needed to seek instructions and report results. Meanwhile, Sun's lawyers tried to pull the Tsai Ing-wen matter back from Chinese orders to New York conventions. New York State does not have its own foreign policy, and there is no convention for governors to meet with the Taiwan president. Avoiding a meeting that could trigger diplomatic controversy could be the state government's own decision. Sun's remark about "blocking it" could also just be her exaggerating her role to an acquaintance, which does not prove that the other party had issued an order beforehand.
After Tsai Ing-wen's banquet, Sun Wen's differing attitudes toward Taiwan and China continued to be documented in emails. In August 2009, New York State prepared a proclamation honoring American and Taiwanese military personnel and veterans; the only modification Sun Wen requested was removing the term "Republic of China" to avoid causing an international incident regarding New York State recognizing Taiwan. The final version indeed removed the relevant wording. In September of the same year, Taiwan invited Cuomo to attend Double Ten Day celebrations. When the governor's office asked for Sun Wen's opinion, her response was not to send congratulations and not to dispatch any representative. In January 2020, Tsai Ing-wen won the presidential election, and Taiwan's representative to the United States wrote to Governor Cuomo hoping he would issue congratulations; state government staff handed the letter to Sun Wen for her opinion. She simply replied that no letter should be written, as it would trigger a political storm. Three months later, as New York faced a critical COVID-19 situation, Taiwan donated 200,000 masks to New York State through its office in New York. After the masks arrived, Taiwan hoped Hochul would make a phone call to express thanks and followed up multiple times via email, but the state government did not promptly arrange a public acknowledgment. During the exact same period, China helped arrange the shipment of 1,000 ventilators to New York. Chinese consular officials waited two hours for Cuomo without receiving a thank-you call and immediately complained to Sun Wen. Sun explained that the governor was in a meeting with the health commissioner and apologized for wasting their time. Chinese officials reminded her that Cuomo needed to thank the Chinese government. The next day, Cuomo thanked the Chinese government and relevant officials in both public remarks and on Twitter. The head of the company responsible for transporting these ventilators also messaged Sun Wen, asking if she could help publicize the company's name. Sun then went to that Chinese consular official and asked her to include the transport company's name when publicizing the ventilator donation. The official agreed and also had Sun take photos of the ventilators being delivered to various hospitals. Later, this company billed the New York State government over $700,000 for providing transportation services.
By October 2020, a New York State press release referred to Taiwan as a "country." Sun Wen told Chinese officials that she nearly had a heart attack when she saw it, but fortunately, she had already instructed the press team to correct it immediately. The official responded by expressing gratitude for everything she had done to promote understanding and cooperation between the people of China and the United States. The prosecution laid out these emails one by one to establish a consistent pattern: Taiwan received delays, downgrades, and obstruction, while the Chinese consulate received swift responses, public gratitude, and post-event debriefs. A single incident might be explained away by scheduling conflicts, but when several occur, it becomes increasingly difficult to dismiss them as coincidence. Sun's defense attorney countered that New York State was never going to treat China and Taiwan with complete parity in the first place. China is a UN member state with a consulate general in New York, whereas the U.S. has no official diplomatic ties with Taiwan; the state government is naturally more cautious regarding titles, meetings, and official statements, and this cannot be used as proof that Sun Wen took orders from Beijing. This is precisely why the prosecution could not merely prove disparate treatment—different diplomatic statuses inherently lead to different treatment. The prosecution had to take it a step further to prove that Sun Wen was not executing decisions made by the United States and New York State, but was letting Chinese officials participate in determining New York State's choices.
The 2021 Lunar New Year video provided the prosecution with that very opportunity. In January 2021, a Chinese consulate official asked Sun Wen if Governor Cuomo could record a Lunar New Year video. Sun replied that Cuomo probably could not, but Hochul should be able to. She then proactively asked if the official could send over the topics they wanted Hochul to mention, promising she could ensure they made it into her speech. The official said it should mainly focus on New Year greetings and could mention the world's joint fight against the pandemic in 2020, keeping it from being overly political. That morning, the two spoke on the phone for about ten minutes. A few days later, Sun confirmed that Hochul was willing to record it and again asked if the Chinese side had any topics they wanted to add. During internal drafting within the state government, one speechwriter advocated addressing the issue of Uyghurs in Xinjiang being held in re-education camps, but Sun Wen explicitly stated that this could not be allowed to happen. The final video did not mention the Uyghurs. After it was finished, Sun showed the contents in advance to the Chinese consulate official and commented that Hochul was much more compliant than the governor. The prosecution used this exchange to prove that the Chinese side did not merely receive a New Year greeting video, but gained access to influence the public remarks of an elected American official. Chinese officials stated what they wanted said, and Sun took those requests back to the state government to implement. When someone inside the state government sought to raise the Uyghur issue—the topic Beijing least wanted to hear—Sun blocked it, and she ultimately delivered the finished product to the Chinese side. This constitutes precisely the political activity covered under FARA: acting on behalf of a foreign government to influence what American officials say to the public. Sun Wen's defense, on the other hand, emphasized that the consulate offering a few festive talking points for a New Year video does not prove she controlled Lieutenant Governor Hochul. The final speech was still produced and approved by the state government, and Sun did not have the authority to unilaterally direct Hochul. As for the Uyghur issue, a Lunar New Year message was never meant to be a human rights report, so omitting it could equally have been an editorial decision.
On July 15, 2020, half a year before the Spring Festival video incident, Linda Sun voluntarily accepted an interview with the FBI. The agents introduced her to the requirements of FARA and specifically discussed how the CCP uses the nostalgic sentiments of overseas Chinese to promote pro-Beijing views and suppress voices supporting Taiwan through free travel and honors. The agents explicitly warned that if an individual acts on behalf of the Chinese government without registering, they might be in violation of FARA. This warning related to the legal concept of acting willfully; violating FARA is not as simple as forgetting to fill out a form. The prosecution must also prove that Sun knew her actions triggered a registration obligation and still chose not to register. The defense attorney, however, separated the concepts of knowing the law from knowing oneself to be an agent. The FBI telling Sun what a foreign agent is does not mean she admitted to being one; she could know the law exists while sincerely believing her work fell under state government duties and did not require registration.
At this point, the prosecution brought the salted duck into the courtroom. They encountered several protesters who, with great sincerity and creativity, brought salted ducks, claiming they were secretly prepared by the Consulate General. Let us introduce the chef, Neil. In July 2021, an official from the Chinese Consulate General in New York had a private chef prepare six Nanjing salted ducks for Sun and her family. Another six were sent in November of the same year, and more were delivered in March and November 2022. Beyond that, there were concert tickets, performance tickets, six tickets for the Guangzhou Ballet's performance at Lincoln Center, and tickets for sports events with access to VIP boxes. In court, the prosecution also displayed a text message from Sun to a Chinese official saying, "I want to eat salted duck," followed by a licking-lips emoji, adding that she would have the duck as a late-night snack. The salted duck quickly became the most famous detail of the case because it was absurdly specific and carried a sense of personal intimacy. Normal diplomatic exchanges involve souvenirs; few people have a private chef prepare six ducks at a time to be sent to an official's home, knowing the other party likes to eat them in the middle of the night. The prosecution presented these gifts not because the Foreign Agent Act requires proof that Sun received bribes; the crime of being a foreign agent does not actually require a quid pro quo of duck for favors, nor does it require the prosecution to put a price tag on every action. The gifts served three purposes here: first, they proved that Sun's relationship with Chinese officials had long exceeded ordinary official contact; second, they showed that this relationship brought continuous benefits to her and her family; and third, they refuted the claim that she was only passively handling her work. It proved that the two sides were not only communicating frequently but had also entered each other's private lives.
Sun had also undergone New York State professional ethics training, which explicitly told civil servants that they could not accept gifts of value from those attempting to influence government decisions, including travel, dining, entertainment, and tickets. She took this training once in 2018 and again in 2021, allowing the prosecution to argue that she was not unaware of the boundaries, but rather chose to cross them time and again. In his closing argument, Sun's attorney, Abe, conversely used the salted duck to mock the prosecution. He said the government had almost made the salted duck the center of the case, and if Sun would do everything the prosecution described for a few ducks, that sounded as unrealistic as it was absurd. The limited value of food placed alongside the grand accusation of betraying New York State was indeed disproportionate. However, the defense's joke only dismantled the crudest understanding that the duck was payment; it did not explain why the two sides were so intimate. The salted duck could not prove an agency relationship, but it gave that relationship warmth, scent, and a home address.
What truly caused Sun to lose her job was not the salted duck, but a gubernatorial proclamation she no longer had the authority to obtain. In September 2022, Sun had already left the Governor's office and transferred to the New York State Department of Labor. In January 2023, the Chinese Consulate General in New York made a request to Sun, hoping the New York Governor's office would produce an official proclamation celebrating the Lunar New Year, have it framed, and have Sun present it to a senior consular official at an event. At this time, Sun no longer had the authority to request proclamations from the Governor's office, but she still found a former colleague responsible for producing proclamations and asked them to handle it privately. This staffer did not seek approval from a supervisor, nor did they register the proclamation in the state government's online tracking system. Sun even sent this staffer a private gift basket; the basket was not sent to the state government office but to the home of a relative of the staffer. Sun said she also sent a bottle of wine, but the former colleague later indicated that the wine was never received. After the proclamation was completed, the staffer did not send it to the Chinese Consulate but to Sun's home on Long Island. In mid-January, Sun attended the Lunar New Year event held by the consulate with the proclamation, and the senior consular official invited her onto the stage, introducing her as the Deputy Commissioner of the New York State Department of Labor. Sun then displayed the proclamation in public. On February 8, the Chinese consular official hosted a banquet at their home for Sun and her family. The New York State Inspector General's office soon began an investigation. Investigators asked her if she had continued to apply for proclamations after leaving the Governor's office. Sun first replied, "I do not apply for proclamations now." The investigators produced the emails, and only then did she admit that she had done so at the request of the Chinese side without authorization. The investigator in charge of the questioning later said in federal court that Sun began to sweat and appeared nervous at that moment; she tried to appear calm, but I knew she was lying. In March 2023, Sun was fired by the New York State government.
The prosecution put the matter involving Linda Sun at the very end of the timeline with a clear purpose: first, she did this even after the FBI had already reminded her of the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) law, and after Sun had once again completed state government ethics training; second, she had already left the governor's office, yet was still willing to mobilize connections for Chinese officials; third, she failed to register the congratulatory proclamation application in the filing system and lied when initially questioned. These details help the prosecution prove Sun's knowledge and intent. The defense argued that Sun might have lied for a congratulatory proclamation, but this cannot be retroactively used to deduce that she joined the foreign agent conspiracy since 2015, and one cannot extrapolate from her poor performance at the very end that every prior instance constituted a crime. At this point, the prosecution had presented the main evidence accusing Sun of acting on behalf of China from 2016 to 2023. Although these events occurred in different years and varied in content, the process summarized by the prosecution was nearly identical: the Chinese side made requests, Sun utilized her state government position and connections to handle the matters, and after completion, reported the results back to the Chinese side. The prosecution argued that this recurring process demonstrated a long-term foreign agent relationship between Sun and the Chinese side. The defense countered that the prosecution merely pieced together a few instances of normal government liaison work violating internal procedures and private interactions into a grandiose criminal narrative.
Over nearly a month of trial, the prosecution and defense called nearly fifty witnesses up to closing arguments. Prosecutor Alexander Solomon stated that Sun treated the Chinese government and CCP officials as her bosses, confidants, and teammates, while Sun's defense attorney argued that the prosecution failed to present a single piece of evidence that could directly substantiate an agency relationship, with no co-conspirators testifying in court, no Chinese officials admitting to having directed Sun, and no documents specifying that both parties reached an agency agreement. On December 12, the case was handed over to the jury. In a U.S. federal criminal case, a conviction does not rely on a majority vote; all twelve jurors must unanimously agree. On December 18, the jury sent a note to the judge stating that they had fundamental disagreements regarding the evidence and legal interpretations among members and could not reach a consensus. The judge did not immediately end the trial, instead ordering them to resume deliberations. A few days later, a juror had to leave due to a pre-arranged schedule, and the judge replaced them with an alternate juror, instructing everyone to deliberate from scratch, but the outcome remained unchanged. On December 22, the jury again notified the judge that their opinions were firmly deadlocked and unable to be unified on any of the nineteen charges, with not a single charge receiving unanimous agreement from all twelve members, prompting the judge to declare a mistrial. A mistrial does not equal Sun being innocent; the jury did not determine Sun was clear of wrongdoing, nor did they issue any valid verdict. It only meant that the facts presented by the prosecution, while sufficient to bring the case to trial, failed to persuade all twelve jurors. The jurors may have believed Sun favored Beijing, deceived colleagues, bypassed procedures, and even believed she voluntarily did many things on behalf of the CCP, yet they still could have disagreed on the legal requirements of FARA. This is also the distinction between U.S. criminal trials and CCP political determinations.
However, the prosecution did not end the case there. In court, the prosecution stated they would seek a retrial as soon as possible. On September 2 of this year, more than eight months after the mistrial, the prosecution added a money laundering conspiracy charge jointly faced by Sun and her husband, increasing the total number of charges in the indictment from nineteen to twenty. Last week, Sun's defense attorney applied to the judge to withdraw from the case, with a simple reason: Sun could no longer afford the legal fees for a second trial. Ironically, none of those Chinese officials who once called Sun a crucial hub and constantly sought her help stood in court to testify for her. Today, she can no longer even afford legal fees, nor does she see the CCP footing the bill for her—treating her as one of their own when they needed her, but making themselves scarce when trouble struck. Since Sun has no money to continue hiring lawyers, the U.S. government must likewise continue to invest huge amounts of taxpayers' money and massive judicial resources to re-prepare witnesses and evidence, re-running the nearly month-long trial. As long as a new set of twelve jurors cannot reach unanimous agreement, the case could still end in another mistrial. This is precisely the most heartbreaking aspect of the Sun case. Such CCP infiltration rarely leaves behind a black-and-white agency agreement; those directives are hidden in private text messages, and benefit delivery is broken down into reception tickets, salted ducks, and business opportunities for her husband. Judging from the details described in the indictment, the cost paid by the Chinese side was not high, yet the U.S. government has to spend years investigating, prosecuting, trying, declaring a mistrial, and retrying. This is the procedure that a rule-of-law society cannot bypass, and also an institutional disadvantage for the U.S. when countering CCP infiltration: the law-abiding side must make evidence public, subject it to cross-examination, and prove every single criminal element, whereas the infiltrating side can hide malice within personal favors and exchanges within relationships. Therefore, the biggest takeaway the Sun case gave me is that proving a CCP agent guilty under the law in the U.S. is as difficult as ascending to heaven. Coupled with this case, regarding recently arrested Zhang, what do you think is the probability of her being convicted? Please write your judgment in the comments section and briefly explain the reasons. Alright, we will chat about this much today. If this episode was helpful to you, please give a thumbs up, turn on the little bell, forward it, and welcome to subscribe to this channel as well.
I am Yaoyaojiang, who loves thinking and values logic. See you in the next episode!