Wang Yi Jumped Ship Long Ago! Qin Gang's Power Grab Failed, Xi Jinping's Diplomatic Line Overhauled; Rumors of Zhou Enlai's Illegitimate Son Paved His Forty-Year Career? [Jiang Feng Vision 20260728 Issue 447]

The video begins by examining Wang Yi's recent meetings with the foreign ministers of Russia and Iran and his different handling of the Ukraine issue, tracing the process from Qin Gang's appointment and downfall to Wang Yi's regaining control of the diplomatic system. It also reviews Wang Yi's diplomatic career, rumors about his background, and his alleged connections to the Zhou Enlai faction. The program further compares Wang Yi's statements before and after the Russia-Ukraine war and analyzes his multi-front diplomatic activities with ASEAN, Europe, the United States, Russia, and Iran.

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Welcome back to Jiang Feng Vision. Hello friends. On July 28th, Zelensky is scheduled to meet with Trump in Washington. Will Trump continue to pressure Ukraine for concessions, or will he turn around and push Putin for a ceasefire? We will likely only know after the two men sit down. What is Beijing's stance on such a major event?

On July 24th, Wang Yi met with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov in Kyrgyzstan. I read the official press release from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs from beginning to end. The two discussed even the upcoming Russian Duma elections in September. Can you guess what was missing? Ukraine. The name did not appear in the entire press release.

Of course, let's not jump to conclusions. But there was one sentence in the press release that I found increasingly jarring: China and Russia will strengthen strategic coordination, safeguard the outcomes of World War II, and absolutely not allow Japan to rearm. Friends, Russia is currently fighting a war in Ukraine, and the Chinese Foreign Minister sat opposite the Russian Foreign Minister, focusing on Japan. What is going on here?

On the same day, July 24th, Wang Yi also met with Iranian Foreign Minister Aragchi. This time, he did not echo Iran's anti-American and anti-hegemony rhetoric. He said that the memorandum of understanding signed just over a month ago cannot be abandoned; now that the door to negotiations is open, it should not be closed again. The issue of the Strait of Hormuz must be handled properly, and relations with neighboring countries must also be improved.

These words were spoken politely, but if you think about it carefully, Iran wants to push forward, and Wang Yi's words are either encouraging it or advising it to pull back? In the past decade, Xi Jinping has relied on two key foreign cards in his confrontation with the United States: one is Russia, and the other is Iran. Yet, on this very day, Wang Yi met with Russia, and the press release did not mention Ukraine; he met with Iran and began by advising them to return to the negotiating table.

This leads to a question: Has Xi Jinping himself changed his mind, or is the Chinese diplomatic machinery no longer operating entirely according to Xi Jinping's original path? Today, starting from these altered actions by Wang Yi, let's trace back. Who trained this person who has been spearheading Xi Jinping's wolf warrior diplomacy for over a decade? Did he only change his stance later, or did he never truly board Xi Jinping's ship from the beginning?

To answer the question posed in the prologue, let's not rush to review Wang Yi's forty-year-old resume. Let's first look at another person, someone who was more like Xi Jinping's own man: Qin Gang.

This individual, who started as a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, later became the Director of the Protocol Department. During Xi Jinping's overseas visits in those years, he was the one arranging his itinerary. Xi Jinping noticed him and found him useful. In July 2021, he was sent to serve as the Ambassador to the United States. On December 30, 2022, Wang Yi stepped down as Foreign Minister, and Qin Gang was recalled from Washington to take over.

In the following year, on March 12, 2023, the National People's Congress convened, adding another hat to Qin Gang: State Councilor. He entered the leadership team of the State Council, a position half a step higher than a minister. Do the math: it took Qin Gang seventy-two days from becoming Foreign Minister to entering the State Council leadership. What does that mean? Let's compare him to Wang Yi himself. Wang Yi became Foreign Minister in March 2013 and was appointed State Councilor only in March 2018. The same step took Wang Yi a full five years, while Qin Gang took seventy-two days.

This kind of rocket speed couldn't be generated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself; it could only be propelled upwards by the very top person. Therefore, the prevailing view at the time was that Xi Jinping had finally found a successor for Wang Yi.

However, one thing seemed strange at the time. While Qin Gang took over as Foreign Minister, on January 1, 2023, Wang Yi was promoted to Director of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission Office. This office is the Party's body responsible for foreign affairs, and the Party governs the government. Thus, Wang Yi was still sitting above Qin Gang.

If this arrangement had proceeded smoothly, the path would have been quite clear: Wang Yi would set the direction from the top, and Qin Gang would build his team below. Once Qin Gang had gained enough seniority, he would also take over the Central Foreign Affairs Commission Office. On that day, China's foreign affairs would truly have passed from Wang Yi's hands to someone cultivated by Xi Jinping himself.

But this arrangement only lasted for half a year. The first to tear a hole in Qin Gang's political armor was the sudden explosion of rumors about Fu Xiaotian. This prominent host of Phoenix TV's

The line of Zhou Enlai and Chen Yun was closer to the CCP conservatives. They also opposed endless movements that handed China over to Mao Zedong, and were willing to do business, negotiate, and compromise with foreigners. But once reforms threatened the rule of the Communist Party, the status of the red families, and planned control, they would immediately hit the brakes.

Therefore, what the CCP conservatives want to protect is the mansion of the Communist Party, and the rules by which the old cadres and red families live together and share the rooms.

Mao Zedong later launched the Cultural Revolution, mainly targeting Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, who were engaged in economy and order. But it was not just this group that was impacted; various levels of government, ministries and commissions of the State Council, and a large number of old cadres were overthrown by the rebels. Because in Mao Zedong's eyes, this entire bureaucratic machine could block him from giving orders alone.

Then why wasn't Zhou Enlai completely overthrown like Liu Shaoqi? It wasn't because Mao Zedong trusted him, but because such a large country as China needed someone to maintain the government's operations, and someone to receive foreign envoys and handle international negotiations. Zhou Enlai obeyed Mao Zedong while trying his best to preserve this state machinery, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was one of the places where Zhou Enlai left the deepest imprint.

Xi Jinping sent Qin Gang in, intending to place someone he cultivated into a Ministry of Foreign Affairs woven over decades of marriages, personnel relationships, and departmental connections, a system passed down from Zhou Enlai's era. But the problem is, a minister can be appointed from above, but this network below cannot be changed simply by changing a minister.

Moreover, there seems to be a layer of natural relationship between Wang Yi and the Chinese diplomatic system that outsiders cannot explain, but insiders all understand. Wherever he goes in this system, someone will receive him; whatever situation he encounters, someone will pave the way for him.

As for Qin Gang? He relied on the trust of Xi Jinping alone, yet he had to break into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Wang Yi had managed for decades. It is not surprising that he found himself in a difficult situation as minister.

Speaking of this, the long-standing rumor about Wang Yi's background is no longer just a piece of gossip. There has always been a saying outside the Great Firewall that Wang Yi is the crown prince of the CCP conservatives. This statement is quite interesting. If you think about it carefully, a crown prince must be the son of the most core figure of that faction.

In the old Chinese diplomatic system of the CCP, who can truly be called the leading figure of the conservative faction and who has led the entire diplomatic team all the way? After much deliberation, isn't it still Zhou Enlai? So, is what this statement is really trying to say that Wang Yi is Zhou Enlai's son?

Of course, this is just a rumor that has been circulating outside the Great Firewall for many years. But the fact that a rumor can circulate for so many years in Beijing's diplomatic circles itself indicates that, in the eyes of many, Wang Yi's roots in the Chinese diplomatic system cannot be explained by ordinary career history alone.

Don't rush to laugh. Just looking at their appearances, these two people are indeed quite interesting. Those thick eyebrows, that forehead, that facial structure, and even the way they pursed their lips and kept a straight face when they were young, all show a certain resemblance. No wonder some people joke that genes, sometimes, can't be hidden at all.

Around his background, there is even a complete and quite bizarre version concocted outside the Great Firewall. This version claims that Wang Yi's birth mother was the singer Wang Kun, who played Xi'er in the opera "The White Haired Girl." To hide the child, Zhou Enlai entrusted him to an old secretary by his side. This secretary later served as the Party Secretary of the Foreign Affairs College.

The rumor even says that this matter was hidden so deeply that even Mao Zedong did not notice it. Wang Yi therefore took his mother's surname, Wang, grew up among the children of people in the diplomatic system, and it was only natural for him to later join the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It sounds plausible, doesn't it?

What's even more amusing is that the CCP's own party media sometimes cannot resist adding fuel to the fire. Huanqiu Renwu once wrote in an introduction to Wang Yi that Wang Yi carries a certain legacy of Premier Zhou. Their original intention was probably to praise him for having the diplomatic demeanor of Zhou Enlai back then, but people outside the Great Firewall immediately found it amusing. Does this word "legacy" mean he learned Premier Zhou's style, or that this demeanor was inherited from the womb?

They originally intended to praise him for inheriting Zhou Enlai's diplomatic tradition, but it sounds like he inherited his eyebrows and facial structure as well. Is the party media refuting the rumor, or accidentally adding another episode to the story?

But next to the rumor lies a second layer, a hard connection that anyone can verify. Wang Yi's father-in-law is Qian Jiadong, one of Zhou Enlai's secretaries who managed Zhou Enlai's foreign affairs, security, propaganda, and Hong Kong and Taiwan affairs, and worked with Zhou Enlai until his later years.

Wang Yi's mother-in-law, Chen Yan, served as the Deputy Director of the Asian Affairs Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Looking at Wang Yi's own career path, after graduating from Beijing International Studies University in 1982, he joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His first post was in the Japan Division of the Asian Affairs Department, precisely the department where his mother-in-law had been deputy director.

He then rose through the ranks as section chief, deputy director, and director, all within the confines of the Asian Affairs Department. People's Daily, when compiling his resume, wrote that in 2001 he became the youngest vice minister in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at that time. Several positions he held set young records for their respective ranks.

Of course, he has his own abilities, but think about it again, what is most abundant in the CCP officialdom is capable people. What is truly rare? It is having someone promote you at a critical moment.

In 2004, Hu Jintao appointed Wang Yi as ambassador to Japan. After 2008, he went on to head the Taiwan Affairs Office. By the time Xi Jinping entered the highest leadership in 2012, Wang Yi had already served as Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador to Japan, Secretary of the Party Committee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office. He was already an established diplomat who could stand on his own in matters concerning Asian diplomacy, relations with Japan, the North Korean nuclear issue, and Taiwan affairs.

So the question arises, a person rooted in the conservative faction, who has been shouting the

That's strange. The supreme leader's line is still the old one. Who is Wang Yi working for with this business of persuading to stop, paving roads, and setting up negotiation tables?

The best way to find the new boss is to see what work he has done over the past week. From July 21st to 24th, in just four days, Wang Yi was constantly meeting people in Manila and Kyrgyzstan. If we lay out these meetings one by one, you will see that these are not scattered diplomatic pleasantries, but rather someone handing him the reins to manage the vital lifelines that China must secure in the next phase.

The first lifeline is ASEAN and the South China Sea. From July 21st to the morning of July 23rd, Wang Yi met with the ASEAN Secretary-General, the Foreign Minister of the Philippines, and the Foreign Minister of India in Manila, and also presided over the China-ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting.

The Philippine Foreign Minister directly brought up the South China Sea issue in front of him. China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs' official press release was quite blunt, accusing Philippine personnel of colliding with Chinese law enforcement vessels in the Ren'ai Reef and warning the Philippines not to be a tool for external forces.

Notice this combination: on one hand, taking such a hard line on the South China Sea; on the other hand, the same person, in the same venue, discussing free trade areas, investment, and the digital economy. Putting these two faces together reveals the meaning: the South China Sea can be contested, criticized, and slammed on the table, but the dispute must not be allowed to overturn the entire relationship with Southeast Asia, nor should ASEAN be pushed into the arms of the United States.

The second lifeline is Europe, and the export of Chinese capital. Still in Manila on July 23rd, Wang Yi met with the newly appointed British Foreign Secretary, Ed Miliband.

This meeting had a background: just a week prior, the British government had formally nationalized British Steel, previously owned by China's Jingye Group. A significant foothold for Chinese capital in Europe was directly taken by the British government.

Wang Yi demanded that Britain provide Chinese enterprises with a fair, just, and non-discriminatory business environment and not to securitize economic and trade issues. The calculation behind this statement is not difficult: the United States is already tightening restrictions on technology, investment, and supply chains. If Britain and Europe completely follow the US, the remaining space for Chinese enterprises in the Western market will shrink even further.

Therefore, the European front must be protected. There is no expectation of becoming friends, but they must not be allowed to become complete enemies.

The third lifeline consists of the two meetings mentioned in the prelude: Russia and Iran. Now, let's put them back into the context of the game: on July 24th, Wang Yi met with Lavrov, continuing to talk about China-Russia relations and strategic coordination, and maintaining a common stance on the issue of Japan. The essential elements of China-Russia relations were all preserved, but the Russia-Ukraine war was not mentioned in the official press release.

On the same day, when meeting with the Iranian Foreign Minister, Wang Yi was much clearer: do not tear up the agreements already reached, do not close the door to negotiations; the issue of the Strait of Hormuz must be handled properly, and relations with neighbors must also be improved.

Over the past decade or so, these two countries have been at the forefront, specifically challenging the US order on behalf of China. Now, Beijing's demands on them have changed: Russia cannot collapse, but Beijing is not prepared to continue bearing the endless diplomatic cost of the Ukraine war; Iran cannot fall either, but it also cannot set fire to the entire Gulf, oil prices, and China's most crucial oil shipping routes.

This is not about brotherly affection; it's about settling accounts.

The fourth lifeline is the United States. On July 22nd, Wang Yi met with US Secretary of State Blinken in Manila. China's official press release contained statements on both sides: on one hand, demanding that the US respect China's core interests and abide by the one-China principle; on the other hand, stating that both sides should implement the consensus reached by the heads of state, leverage political and diplomatic channels, and prepare for high-level exchanges in the next phase.

Translated into plain language, the US remains the primary adversary, and issues like Taiwan, technology, trade, and military pressure have not diminished. However, the dialogue channels must not be severed, high-level exchanges must not stop, and deals that can be made should still be made.

Alright, the four lines have been laid out. Step back and look at the route this combination of four lines represents. It is neither pro-US nor anti-Russia. It is a compromise plan, one that both the elder statesmen of the CCP and the conservatives can nod to. The Hu-Wen faction wants to reconnect China with the US, Europe, ASEAN, and the intermediate countries. Given China's economic situation, it can no longer afford the cost of a complete break with its major markets.

The conservative faction wants to preserve Russia as a shield, preventing the US from freeing up its hands to put all its pressure on China.

What do both sides oppose? They both oppose Xi Jinping's doctrine of endless struggle. This path, if continued, will only deplete China's market, technology, capital, and diplomatic space.

Therefore, Wang Yi is not defecting to a new boss. He is taking on a task that both sides have co-signed: coming from the old diplomatic system, the conservatives will not see him as an enemy; willing to stabilize the US, Europe, ASEAN, and the Middle East for the new route, the Hu-Wen faction is also willing to continue using him. He is precisely the person that both sides can temporarily use and temporarily trust in this transaction.

Let's review this line from the beginning. Qin Gang's downfall indicates that Xi Jinping's attempt to seize control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was unsuccessful. In the summer of 2024, Wang Yi began to isolate Ukraine from the China-Russia relationship and re-establish negotiation channels with Ukraine, Europe, and the United States.

To this day, he maintains Sino-Russian relations, removes the war from official press releases, persuades Iran to return to the negotiating table, and continues to arrange the next stage of high-level exchanges with the United States.

Therefore, Wang Yi did not jump ship recently. The changes you see in the press releases, the omission of the word Ukraine, and the polite calls for peace are merely ripples left on the water after he jumped.

Once you understand how Wang Yi turned around, you will also have a general understanding of which direction the elder statesmen of the CCP are preparing to steer China's great diplomatic ship.