Xi Jinping Humiliated Remotely by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection? Ma Xingrui’s Notice Pierces Through the Undercurrent Involving Peng Liyuan; Cai Qi and Wang Xiaohong Resist on the Same Day [Jiangfeng Perspective 20260716 Episode 437]

This episode analyzes the political shockwaves triggered by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection's (CCDI) announcement of the expulsion of Ma Xingrui, citing "power-for-sex and money-for-sex transactions," and points out the hidden connection involving First Lady Peng Liyuan. At the same time, the video reviews a series of actions, including Xi Jinping's inspection tour in Shanghai, Cai Qi being summoned for talks by party elders Wen Jiabao and Liu Jinguo, and Wang Xiaohong convening a symposium of public security bureau chiefs in Nanjing. It argues that the protective moat around Xi Jinping is collapsing, and that local factions and the officialdom are accelerating their centrifugal drift.

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Welcome back to Jiang Feng Vision, friends. In the announcement of Ma Xingrui's expulsion, the CCDI wrote an extremely humiliating phrase: engaging in "power-for-sex and money-for-sex transactions." The last time the CCDI combined "power-for-sex" and "money-for-sex" in a high-ranking official's announcement was for Zhou Yongkang in 2014, where the original text stated he "committed adultery with multiple women and engaged in power-for-sex and money-for-sex transactions." Later, Zhou Yongkang became the first former Politburo Standing Committee member at the national leader level to be sentenced to life imprisonment and sent to Qincheng Prison in over 30 years. More than a decade later, the same charges have fallen upon Ma Xingrui. The CCDI has set the specifications for Ma Xingrui's case at the same level as Zhou Yongkang's. But what truly makes Xi Jinping's back chill is not the "power-for-sex" part, but the two words added after it: "money-for-sex." What is a power-for-sex transaction? Ma Xingrui is a Politburo member who served as the top official in Xinjiang; he held official appointments, projects, and approval powers. He could use his power to trade for sex with female cadres or businesswomen below him. But under what circumstances would he need to use money to trade for sex? According to officialdom customs, "money-for-sex" refers to paying for a mistress. But does someone at Ma Xingrui's level need to pay for a mistress? He could just use his power to keep one. There is only one exception: if the person on the other side holds more power than him, and their political status is so high that his official title cannot suppress them, he can only respectfully deliver the money squeezed from the power machine into their hands. He trades power for sex with women below him, and money for sex with women above him. Since Ma Xingrui and his wife have long referred to First Lady Peng Liyuan as "Big Sister," why did the CCDI specifically write "engaging in power-for-sex and money-for-sex transactions" in this announcement? Is it merely scolding Ma Xingrui for his corrupt lifestyle, or is it intentionally leaving a back door that the entire party can understand? Between Ma Xingrui and this "Big Sister," is it really just a normal political transfer of benefits? Has the dignified supreme leader really been given a political "green hat" by the Politburo member he trusted the most?

Late on the very night this announcement was made public, rumors of a bomb began to spread through dinner parties in Shanghai, claiming that a great fire would be set in the city center to celebrate the arrival of that person. It was also said that a bomb had already been planted at the airport to see him off at the end. However, the subsequent actions of the authorities were even more panic-inducing than the rumors. A six-day no-fly zone was imposed across Shanghai, and all low-altitude drone research was halted. Residents living along the route Xi Jinping might pass were ordered not to open their windows or stand on their balconies. Subway security checks were suddenly upgraded, and matches and lighters were confiscated without exception. In a city that had been almost completely cleared out, Xi Jinping arrived in Shanghai a day early. Then, the first image the people of the country saw on the Xinwen Lianbo (CCTV News) was this supreme leader, who had just been humiliated from afar in a Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) announcement, hunched over, examining a resident's flush toilet. Was he really there to look at toilets, or did he bring Cai Qi to Shanghai to bow his head and seek reconciliation with the old comrades? On that same day, Wang Xiaohong also left Beijing to hide in Nanjing, having his most trusted personal secretary arrange the venue security and route for him. One fled to Shanghai with the Chief of the Imperial Guard, another hid in Nanjing with the 'knife handle' (security forces), and one was nailed for power-for-sex and money-for-sex deals on the level of Zhou Yongkang. These three things seemed to happen in three different places, but in reality, they point to the same outcome: the last three moats around Xi Jinping are collapsing simultaneously. As for the upcoming Beidaihe meeting, I fear only one question remains: will this political 'green hat' (cuckoldry) eventually turn into a white hat of abdication?

In the footage, Xi Jinping stands in an old residential compound in Huangpu District called Shiminxincun. With his hands folded in front of his abdomen and his back slightly hunched, he listens blankly as a grassroots neighborhood official explains the toilet renovation project for the compound. Afterward, he enters the home of a retired resident, looks at the kitchen, checks the bathroom, and then walks to a convenience vegetable stall in the compound. Pointing at a few cabbages and radishes, he says in his signature slow, deliberate tone that the Communist Party exists to serve the common people. If you truly believe that this imperial leader, at the height of a city-wide martial law and facing rumors of assassination, arrived in Shanghai 24 hours early just to study the flush toilets in commoners' homes, consider this: the special topic on Xi Jinping's inspection in Shanghai created by Xinhua Net that day had a main title and several sub-titles that looked like three different entry points. If you clicked on them, you would find that all three led to the exact same, word-for-word official report. Aside from that one toilet, one vegetable stall, and one retired resident's home, the state media had absolutely no other public material to work with. In other words, the public toilet and vegetable stall were merely bulletproof armor thrown to the outside world by the leader. Behind this layer of armor, in those heavily guarded mansions in Shanghai, Xi Jinping was conducting extremely secretive and extremely passive reconciliation negotiations. Why would a dignified 'Supreme Leader' need to arrive in Shanghai a day early with such a humble posture to bow and compromise to the old comrades? Because the moat he left behind in Beijing has been dug out by the roots.

If you don't believe it, look at Cai Qi standing not far behind him, his face ashen and weary. This man, known as the most loyal Chief of the Imperial Guard under Xi Jinping, is experiencing the greatest political nightmare of his life. For him, this trip to Shanghai is an incredibly precious temporary leave slip used to save his life. He is fleeing Beijing, fleeing that interrogation table custom-made for him by Wen Jiabao and Liu Jinguo. According to news from high-level circles within the wall, for the past few months, the elder Wen Jiabao has been summoning Cai Qi for talks almost every week in the name of the Party Central Committee's decision-making and deliberation coordination bodies. Each time, Wen Jiabao only appears to deliver a cold opening statement, points out the problems, and then leaves, leaving Cai Qi to the professional case handlers like Liu Jinguo, Deputy Secretary of the CCDI. Cai Qi tried to use 'confidentiality' and the 'Chairman's oral decree' as a shield, but Liu Jinguo only sneered and flipped open the case files. When Liu Jinguo slammed the cold, hard confessions onto the table, Wen Jiabao would personally return with the meeting minutes and make him sign them on the spot. This high-intensity political torture has driven Cai Qi to the verge of a nervous breakdown. This nominal Director of the General Office has effectively been completely disarmed. Following Xi Jinping to Shanghai became Cai Qi's only chance to catch his breath. Cai Qi's retreat has been completely cut off. What makes Xi Jinping feel even more desperate is that the other trump card in his hand, Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong, who controls the military and armed police forces, is also trapped in a similarly pathetic struggle as a cornered beast in Nanjing, 300 kilometers away.

From July 14 to 15, the national symposium of directors of public security departments and bureaus was held in Nanjing, Jiangsu. This type of meeting usually takes place once in Beijing at the beginning of the year to deploy the year's work, and another symposium is held locally around the middle or second half of the year to check on progress and reassign tasks. Xinhua News Agency only released a brief, several-hundred-word dispatch, which was not unusual by past standards. Therefore, what truly deserves a magnifying glass from us is who appeared at this meeting, and what words Wang Xiaohong shouted the loudest. At the beginning of Wang Xiaohong's speech, he still used the highest-level loyalty rhetoric, firmly supporting the Two Establishes. This phrase is extraordinary in today's political context. Over the past period, more and more shrewd local officials have quietly adjusted the weight of their loyalty vocabulary in public speeches, with some only mentioning profound understanding and others leaving only the Two Safeguards, quietly omitting the glaring Two Establishes to leave themselves a retreat route at any time. But Wang Xiaohong did not retreat; he still dangled this highest-level loyalty rhetoric in front of the entire public security system. He wanted to tell all the provincial public security directors sitting below that he is still the minister of public security, Xi Jinping remains his unshakable supreme backing behind the scenes, and the political wind direction of the public security system has not changed. And Wang Xiaohong is by no means the only one desperately guarding the full-strength loyalty rhetoric in the cold wind. On the exact same day the meeting was held in Nanjing, the newly published front page of People’s Daily carried a report on Cai Qi attending the graduation ceremony of the Central Party School, which similarly and high-profilely featured the firm support for the Two Establishes. This sends an extremely strong signal to the outside world that Xi Jinping is currently trying his best to protect the last and most important two personal guards around him. Peripheral figures can be cut off and used as sacrifices to appease the fury of party elders, but Cai Qi and Wang Xiaohong are bottom lines that absolutely cannot be touched. Without Cai Qi, Xi Jinping's orders cannot even be transmitted out of the red walls of Zhongnanhai; without Wang Xiaohong, he cannot even control how many local guards outside Zhongnanhai are still obedient. Therefore, this meeting in Nanjing was essentially a high-profile job-preservation conference.

However, the table in Nanjing happened to seat two people who made the entire meeting look extremely subtle and even somewhat dramatic. The first is one of the hosts, Jiangsu Vice Governor and Director of the Provincial Public Security Department Hu Binchend. Before Hu Binchend was transferred to Jiangsu in May 2025, his title was member of the Party Committee of the Ministry of Public Security, assistant minister, and director of the General Office. What documents the minister of public security reads every day, which local officials can directly pass messages to the minister, which major cases can be sent into the minister's office, and even the core rhetoric of the ministry—the director of the General Office fully grasps all of it. In other words, Hu Binchend is the close chief of staff who guarded the office, managed classified documents, and arranged the daily life-and-death schedule for Wang Xiaohong in the headquarters of the Ministry of Public Security. This national meeting falling in Nanjing had at least one practical benefit for Wang Xiaohong: the venue's security arrangements, guard routes, personnel reception, and document circulation were all handled single-handedly by Hu Binchend, the old subordinate he trusts the most and who is most familiar with his work habits. When rumors swirl around him and his sense of political security drops to freezing point, choosing a city like this is clearly more reassuring than picking a place at random. The second person worth noting is Xin Changxing, Secretary of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee. According to organizational relations, Xin Changxing appearing to accompany or secure a national meeting falls under the normal duties of a provincial party committee secretary. However, in various personnel schemes circulating outside the wall, Xin Changxing's name has repeatedly been placed on the observation list for future central adjustments, and he is even regarded by many as a potential candidate to take over the Political and Legal Affairs Commission or the public security system in the future. On this end of the round table is the incumbent minister Wang Xiaohong, who is still desperately trying to preserve his position and remains shaken; next to him is the former chief secretary Hu Binchend, who managed core secrets and knows the inside story of the Ministry of Public Security best; and at the other end of the table is Xin Changxing, the Jiangsu provincial party committee secretary who is rumored to be the future successor. This is clearly an old big boss, his close tactician, and a successor preparing to take power, sitting at the same table sharing the spoils and probing each other with tacit understanding. Therefore, the true value of the Nanjing meeting is that he is still very important right now, and Xi Jinping is still trying his best to protect him. One is Cai Qi, the grand steward wielding central power, and the other is Wang Xiaohong, the political and legal giant who holds millions of police officers and is known as the supreme chief catcher of the realm. Looking across the entire China, aside from Xi Jinping, who else could make these two men sleep so uneasily? One has to use toilet inspections to hide in Shanghai, and the other has to use routine meetings to hide in his chief secretary's turf. What on earth are they afraid of? The answer is very simple, because a bloody, living example is placed right before their eyes.

Just the day before Xi Jinping set off for Shanghai, on July 14, official media officially announced that Political Bureau member and former Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region party secretary Ma Xingrui was expelled from the Communist Party, removed from public office, and handed over to judicial authorities. Everyone has seen the official notice: family corruption, power-for-sex and money-for-sex transactions, and illegally accepting huge amounts of property. But how much money is hidden behind the words "huge amounts" is something the official press release will never tell you. According to insiders outside the Great Firewall, the internal code name for the Ma Xingrui case is Project 530, which is tied to six major cases underneath it. Ma Xingrui himself is one case, and his legal wife Rong Li is another. The funds involved for this couple together reached a staggering 1 trillion RMB. If all converted into 100-yuan bills, where a stack of 10,000 yuan is 1 centimeter thick, and 100 million yuan stacked up is 100 meters high, the 1 trillion yuan of Ma Xingrui and his wife is 10,000 sets of 100 million, which is 1,000 kilometers—about stacking them all the way from Shanghai to Beijing. His life secretary, who later became confidential secretary Li Guanglu, is also another case, with the amount involved for just one secretary reaching as high as 6 billion. His fourth sister Ma Fengxia and fifth brother Ma Xingqun each constitute a case, with each exceeding 10 billion. For these two cases, even the handling caliber has already been negotiated under the table: keeping one house and 3 million yuan for living expenses, with the rest confiscated entirely and a sentence of three years suspended for four; the judgment has already been written before anyone has even set foot in a courtroom. Finally, his four mistresses from different periods were also listed as separate cases. The home of a Political Bureau member was not a residence at all, but a 24-hour frantically operating power-based money-printing factory, with annual reports reaching a trillion-yuan scale.

Now look at the trial arrangements for the case. The case was designated to be tried in Tianjin, in order to prevent suicides or prison-break-style rescues, and it also has to be finished before the Fifth Plenary Session of the CCP Central Committee. Because the last sentence of the notice is written in black and white: the disciplinary punishment of expulsion from the party will be ratified when the plenary session of the Central Committee is convened. Therefore, Ma Xingrui's case file is a political exhibition piece prepared for the Fifth Plenary Session. The Ma couple called First Lady Peng Liyuan "Big Sister," and Xi Jinping genuinely protected him; at last year's September 3 military parade, he was specially made to show his face on the podium. They protected him all the way until today, only to protect him into a 1-trillion project and an entire family being investigated. This is the question that Cai Qi and Wang Xiaohong think about every night before going to bed: if the leader protects Ma Xingrui like this and still cannot protect him, why on earth would he be able to protect me? The aftermath of the highest-level power vacuum is irresistibly transmitting to the local levels. Recently in Shandong, Tianjin, and Shanghai, unusual movements in local official circles and among the people have been stranger than ever. In some drone shows and public events, symbols and color elements of the Republic of China (Blue Sky, White Sun, and a Wholly Red Earth) have appeared one after another—something that in the past would have been enough for local officials to lose their official posts. Yet the local government's reaction this time was bizarrely slow, and some people were even feigning ignorance and adding fuel to the fire behind the scenes, which makes it clear. But they will vote with rumors; local officials dare not rebel, but they will take sides by feigning ignorance. Local factional power bases have keenly smelled that Beijing's limit is approaching. They can see that the core figure in Zhongnanhai is now just a puppet tied with a rope by the elders, watching the toilet in an old Shanghai neighborhood; his deterrence has dropped to freezing point. Local officials are no longer afraid of Beijing because they know that Beijing's public security apparatus headed by Wang Xiaohong and propaganda pen headed by Cai Qi are currently unable to protect themselves. This silent thunder surrounding the toilet grand chief of staff and the police apparatus is a done deal, and the upcoming Beidaihe is merely stamping the final seal on this already-written abdication decree. Thank you for watching today's Jiangfeng Horizon.

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