The Dictatorship Dream Is Crumbling! Xi Jinping’s Greatest Concern: the Western Theater Command May Soon Launch an Attack Against Him. “Real China”

The video focuses on the relationship between Xi Jinping and the military, claiming that anti‑Xi forces may exist in the Western Theater Command, the Central Theater Command and some units in ethnic regions, and that commanders in the Western Theater Command might even refuse to travel to Beijing for meetings. The program also analyzes the historical personal networks within the armed forces, the relationship between ethnic soldiers and religious beliefs, and reviews wars, land policies, Hua Guofeng and the “Two Whatevers” and other historical events since the CCP came to power, finally predicting that the military could become the earliest initiator of anti‑Xi actions.

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Today we discuss the current relationship between the armed forces and Xi Jinping. The most likely place for the first anti‑Xi shot to be fired is probably the Western Theater Command, as well as certain areas and units of the Central Theater Command. These are the anti‑Xi forces that Xi currently faces openly within the military.

According to information I have received from Beijing, many commanders in the Western Theater Command have already refused to go to Beijing for meetings and may announce that they intend to break away from the Central Military Commission.

Xi has always claimed abroad that the military’s support for him is crucial. He constantly says that the whole Party, the entire army, and all the peoples of the nation love Xi Jinping. How could that possibly be true now? It’s like Khamenei, or Saddam in his day, who were overthrown in a single night. Only after they died did people realize, right? Xi’s regime is the same.

Xi can manipulate party officials at will. Look at Ma Xingrui: after his arrest, within a few months he was stripped of all positions and is likely to be sentenced to death. In fact, Ma Xingrui had previously opposed Xi and looked down on him. Ma is a technocrat, and such technocratic officials generally sneer at someone like Xi.

These people deeply despise Xi in their hearts; their words and actions have already angered him. Within the administrative system, Xi has planted many spies. He thought he could control everything tightly; indeed, his administrative control is very strong. Many cannot act because they lack military power. The people Xi previously arrested, even if they seemed to have military authority, actually held only nominal positions.

The Communist Party’s forces have developed for over a hundred years. Within the entire military system, a complete mechanism of interpersonal connections has formed, and the mutual constraints among military units are very strong. But Xi must not forget that the military is fundamentally different from the administrative apparatus.

The personalities and networks of these people in the army are extremely complex, and the military’s networks are often matters of life and death. Many soldiers have fought in wars before, such as the older generation who participated in the Sino‑Vietnam War, like Zhang Youxia, who once fought against Vietnam and forged deep bonds of comradeship—bonds of life and death. Many died in the war against Vietnam.

The earliest life‑and‑death ties date back to the Communist seizure of power, the defeat of the Kuomintang, and participation in the Korean War. After 1949 the Communist Party fought a few wars: the larger ones were the Korean War and the Vietnam War; the smaller ones included border skirmishes with India, mainly in the western regions, Xinjiang and Tibet, involving western troops.

There was also the Zhenbao Island clash, a minor conflict. The later major campaigns were essentially two: the Vietnam War and the Sino‑Indian War. The Sino‑Indian War was small in scale, with limited troops and units involved.

These units have good relations, not only friendly but often kinship ties. Many generals’ villages exist within the Chinese army. For example, in places like Hong’an in Hubei and areas of public security, there were once generals’ villages. The whole village went to war, followed the Communist Party, and later the villages emptied as the youth went to fight. Some of those people became generals at the time, and they later developed large numbers of loyal units beneath them.

Therefore Xi Jinping's control over the army is fundamentally unattainable. How complex is the army? The army includes many ethnic soldiers: Hui, Kazakh, Tibetan, Mongol, and other ethnic groups. These groups may appear to believe in the CCP, but in fact several generations have been religious: some follow Tibetan Buddhism, some follow Allah, some families have ancestors who were clergy, some families previously led a mosque.

In this situation, these young people's religious foundations are deep, and they do not buy Xi Jinping's narrative at all. Moreover, these people join the army for survival, to protect their families.

I will give an example. Our family was once defeated, but someone in our family enlisted. My uncle was my father's younger brother, who died a few months ago, about 80 years old. I cannot return, there is no way. He joined the army not because he wanted to join the CCP, but for his own reasons.

Our old family house has a plaque that reads "Honorable Household," hung under the eaves of the main hall. Our house has side rooms, a living room, a hall, and front and rear side rooms; the old home in Shangyu, Zhejiang still exists, totaling over 600 square meters, which converts to more than 7,000 square feet. It is a Jiangnan courtyard, with many fruit trees, courtyards at the front and back, and the main building is two stories.

This house was probably built by my grandfather during the Ming‑Qing transition, over a hundred years ago. My uncle deliberately enlisted because the CCP's campaigns were too severe. Many families and clans in our hometown were exterminated; once labeled a class enemy, the house could not be protected. Our family owned little land; the land was seized by the CCP, the shops were also seized.

My uncle enlisted to obtain that plaque. As long as he had the plaque, the local CCP thugs usually dared not come, because he was a military family, a family serving the state. I once talked to my uncle about this, asked why he enlisted. He said, "I did it to protect this family."

My grandfather's family was not classified as landlords, because our land was in the old house area of Yuyao, some of which was grain land for our own consumption, so it was not labeled as landlord. Jiangnan is relatively wealthy; people with a modest amount of money are generally not labeled landlords unless they are extremely rich. My maternal grandfather's family became large landlords and later were completely plundered.

That is how the CCP works: it jumps to conclusions at the slightest provocation. Not being labeled a landlord makes the situation a bit better. When someone in the family enlisted, the house was later preserved, and it remains preserved to this day.

Therefore in Xinjiang and Tibet, many enlist to secure grain, to avoid arbitrary CCP manipulation, and to give local authorities a reason to hesitate about their families. Having a family member in the army acts as a protective umbrella. But these people are absolutely not pro‑CCP elements; do not assume they are, they are not at all.

This story was told to me by a certain director in Xinjiang, whose name cannot be disclosed. He knows the CCP very well. His parents were from Sichuan, and in the 1950s they came with the troops to the construction corps near Yili in Xinjiang. He is about my age, born in the 1960s. His parents fought in the Sino‑Indian border war and later settled in Xinjiang.

He is a second‑generation official, later promoted directly, becoming a high‑ranking officer in the construction corps. He told me that among the soldiers there, the CCP is very careful with ethnic soldiers, but it also cannot do without them, because having ethnic soldiers makes united‑front work easier; language and culture are shared.

He also said that when young soldiers march out for drills, sometimes a large vehicle will crash into them. That place is very harsh. How far has Xinjiang gone? Household knives have to be locked with chains, kitchen knives also locked, inspected daily. I asked if that is true, and he said yes, it is real.

So the western region is very difficult to handle; Xi Jinping is extremely hard to manage there. Moreover, these people have faith and often do not fear death. Once they decide to deal with you, they will put their own lives aside. Tibet is the same. Recently, a devout Tibetan caused an incident right in front of the United Nations building; this is factual.

Thus the place Xi Jinping fears most is the West; the West is the most dangerous for him. The Central Theater Command's Henan region is also hard to handle. Do not just call Henan scammers; Henan is the Central Plains, the birthplace of Chinese culture, where Yan and Huang originated. This place is hard to manage; once you turn against it, you are finished.

Henan is a populous province, with nearly 100 million people, and also a severe poverty zone. Xi Jinping now also faces the Northeast. The Northeast was once overseen by Zhang Youxia, who stayed there for a long time. Zhang Youxia is from the Northwest; his father is from the Northwest, he grew up in Beijing, and later spent a period in the Northeast, overseeing Shenyang and the surrounding military region.

Therefore the Northern and Eastern Military Regions are also beyond Xi Jinping's control. Now everyone agrees that this person will bring a huge disaster to the country and the nation. As long as he exists, the country will not be well, and generations will suffer. He wants to continue this, generation after generation—how could that be acceptable? So this person must be removed.

I estimate that this person has no way out, no retreat, and even the possibility of future exile is very small; the chances of fleeing to Russia or North Korea are also very low. Xi Jinping now faces a life‑or‑death battle, so he keeps bragging.

After 1976 there was a wave of climax, blowing the trumpet for Hua Guofeng. Do you all remember? Hua Guofeng and Mao’s handshake, "you handle it, I feel at ease"? That poster was actually drawn, depicting the photo. At that time Hua Guofeng wanted to boost his succession image and legitimacy, increasing his legitimacy within the CCP and among the people.

Later came the "Two Whatevers": support every decision made by Chairman Mao, follow every instruction of Chairman Mao. Later Deng Xiaoping overthrew the "Two Whatevers", sparking a huge debate called the Great Discussion on the Standard of Truth. This became the basis for the CCP’s later shift in national and political direction, a discussion about what truth is. It was launched by Deng Xiaoping at that time.

Now China stands at a crossroads, needing to swing the direction back. Everything I said before has been validated. I said Xi Jinping will eventually go the North Korean route. I put forward this view while I was still in the country, before Xi amended the constitution.

The reason I made that judgment then was that my partner gave me a clue. He was familiar with Xi from childhood; Xi is about ten years younger than him, perhaps about the same age as Xi’s older sister. They may have been classmates, and the two families were close; the He Long family and Xi Zhongxun’s family had a good relationship before.

In that context, when he talked to me about Xi, I knew that his rise to power would be a disaster. I remember that Xi had not yet amended the constitution. At a class reunion I said this person would bring disaster to the country.

If classmates at home are watching my videos now, they will know my videos circulate widely domestically. Many domestic friends often cut a segment of my video and send it to me with a smiley, meaning they see my video spread everywhere inside the country.

So now Xi Jinping has to pass two hurdles. One is the Red‑generation/military‑generation hurdle, the second is the domestic and international hurdle. Internationally, this Iran war woke Trump up.

Everyone remembers I once said Trump made a huge mistake, that in the Iran war he didn’t hit hard enough the first time. About 10,000 targets were hit by the two countries, one side about 13,000‑14,000 targets, the other a few thousand. I said the strike wasn’t hard enough; if I were in charge I would hit at least 30,000 targets, wiping out every discovered target, leaving it with no retaliation capability. Look, Iran still has retaliation capability now.

It’s like performing a second surgery now. In the first surgery, all necrotic tissue should have been cleared, just like a doctor does. He didn’t clear that tissue, so now it’s very passive. Trump keeps negotiating with it, negotiating many cease‑fire agreements.

With these evil dictatorial states, after so many years, negotiations are useless; any agreement does nothing. Only knock them down, hit them hard.

I also recall that day in 2019 when Trump signed a document with Liu He in the White House. That day I was protesting Trump in Washington. Why did I protest? I said you’re signing an agreement with the most evil, untrustworthy, bottomless organization in humanity—what’s the point of that agreement? It’s a piece of waste paper, a joke.

In the end it’s also a joke. Which CCP agreement has ever been fulfilled? None. Whenever the CCP wants to do something, it overturns everything it previously said. All historical documents of Hong Kong were nullified, just like that.

The CCP also demands the United States respect the "One China" principle, saying it was the Sino‑U.S. Joint Communiqué signed in the 1970s at the Jinjiang Hotel. Including joining the WTO, the CCP told the people “join me to conquer the world, you’ll get land to share.” After conquering the world they divided the land, set up people’s communes, reclaimed all land, leaving the people landless.

Land‑less peasants could only work in production teams. When I was a child I saw a production team on the edge of a town in my hometown. My aunt, my mother’s older sister, a daughter of a wealthy Jiangnan family, was later demoted to a peasant, carrying a hoe to work in the production team every day—very pitiful.

Many peasants followed the CCP, many CCP generals and officials died or were injured in various campaigns, and those who survived later got rich. But people from poor regions remain poor. Look at the Dabie Mountains, an old revolutionary base where every household joined the army, followed the CCP—what happened later? I’m stating facts: after reform and opening up, many places saw theft and prostitution.

As a Shanghainese, I know how many bicycles were stolen from our family in the 1980s—at least fifteen. Many were from Shandong and Anhui migrants in Shanghai; they were poor, couldn’t afford bicycles, so they stole locals’ bikes and sold them to fellow migrants.

A bicycle then could cost over 1,000 yuan. I recall a brand called AmiNi, a joint‑venture made in Suzhou, high quality, stolen within days of purchase. They would sell good ones for 100‑200 yuan, bad ones for a few dozen, stealing five or six bikes a day, making a living that way.

Women also turned to prostitution, also very pitiful. If you now go to the Dabie Mountains and see how people live, it’s a half‑animal existence. Following the CCP leads to no road.

Now Xi Jinping is going to return to that era again. We are waiting for which war zone will suddenly erupt, anti-Xi will appear at any time. The first to appear will be the army. Everyone watch closely, hoping the first shot of anti-Xi can be fired as soon as possible. As long as someone fires the first shot, that person will become a hero of the Chinese nation and a national hero.