Embracing the Communist Party, Taiwan Becomes Hong Kong—The Highlight Moments of Cheng Li-wen's Visit to the US

When Cheng Li-wun visited the United States this time, it appeared on the surface to be a visit by the Kuomintang chairperson to the American political sphere, academic circles, think tanks, and overseas Chinese communities. In reality, it was much more like a lobbying tour launched in the United States by the Chinese Communist Party's united front system under the guise of the Kuomintang.

Her itinerary was extensive. Based on public information, this visit began on the West Coast of the United States, heading first to San Francisco, then to Boston, New York, and Washington, D.C., and finally returning to Los Angeles. It spanned both the East and West Coasts of the United States and lasted for more than two weeks. The public schedule included Stanford's Hoover Institution, Harvard, MIT, and Columbia University, as well as Washington think tanks, the AIT Washington headquarters, and relevant individuals from the U.S. Congress and executive branch. Of course, it also featured numerous banquets with overseas Chinese and events hosted by Chinese organizations.

If one only looked at the itinerary, this certainly resembled a formal diplomatic visit by a political party leader. The problem is that what Cheng Li-wun actually brought to the United States was not the voice of Taiwan's democratic society, nor was it the Taiwanese people's propositions regarding their own destiny, but rather a thoroughly packaged "peace narrative." This narrative sounds like peace on the surface, but in reality, it constantly pushes Taiwan into the discursive cage set up by the Chinese Communist Party: opposing Taiwan independence, the 1992 Consensus, cross-strait integration, peaceful reunification, the notion that a referendum is currently unrealistic, and the idea that things can be discussed slowly in the future.

This is not Taiwan's language; this is Beijing's language.

The most noteworthy remark Cheng Li-wun made was during her panel discussion at the Asia Society in New York, where she stated that if a referendum were held now, it would be very difficult for Taiwan to pass peaceful reunification. On the surface, this sounded like an acknowledgment of the reality of Taiwanese public opinion, but in reality, it let slip the true motivation. Because what she genuinely cares about is not whether the people of Taiwan are willing to reunify, but rather that a referendum currently cannot achieve the outcome of "peaceful reunification," which is why it cannot be done for now.

In other words, she is not respecting Taiwanese public opinion; she is calculating when Taiwanese public opinion can be manipulated enough to lead to reunification. She is not saying that the people of Taiwan have the right to decide their own future, but rather that the people of Taiwan cannot yet help her achieve the future she wants.

This is the crux of the matter.

The high point of Cheng Li-wun's visit to the U.S. was not who she met in Washington, nor what eloquent words she spoke at some university, but rather the moment when an anti-communist Chinese person wearing a shirt that read "Embrace the Communist Party, Taiwan becomes Hong Kong" raised a question at the scene. At that exact moment, all the packaging was torn away.

Why can Taiwan not embrace the Communist Party? Because Hong Kong has already provided the answer. The CCP once promised Hong Kong fifty years without change, promised that the people of Hong Kong would govern Hong Kong with a high degree of autonomy. What did Hong Kong turn into as a result? The National Security Law came down, the Legislative Council was purged, media outlets were shut down, democrats were arrested, and Jimmy Lai is still on trial in prison to this day. Hong Kong is not an abstract case; Hong Kong is the fate promised by the CCP. If Taiwan believes the CCP's peaceful promises, its ending will not be any better than Hong Kong's—it will only be much worse, because Taiwan's geopolitical value, military value, and political symbolic significance far exceed those of Hong Kong.

Therefore, "Embrace the Communist Party, Taiwan becomes Hong Kong" is not a slogan; it is a judgment. It is closer to reality than all of Cheng Li-wun's lengthy discourses on peace, prosperity, and dialogue.

Even more ridiculous and disgraceful was that when faced with this question at the scene, Cheng Li-wun did not actually answer it, while the organizers rushed to drive the questioner out. In the United States, in an occasion touted as academic exchange, in a place that should allow questioning, debate, and opposing views to exist, there appeared an order management style similar to a CCP venue: you are not allowed to ask, you are not allowed to speak, you are not allowed to disrupt the narrative already designed on stage.

This precisely illustrates the true nature of Cheng Li-wun's U.S. visit. It is not an exchange; it is a performance. It is not a debate; it is a united front operation. It is not bringing Taiwan's genuine public opinion to the United States; it is taking the narrative that the CCP wants the United States to hear and retelling it under the identity of the Kuomintang chairperson.

Of course, Cheng Li-wun will claim she is doing it for peace. All united front rhetoric claims to be for peace. When the CCP cracked down on Hong Kong, it also claimed it was for stability; when the CCP suppressed Xinjiang, it also claimed it was for counter-terrorism; when the CCP threatened Taiwan, it also claimed it was for national rejuvenation. Authoritarian regimes are most adept at giving tyranny a gentle name.

An even deeper meaning to Cheng Li-wun's visit to the U.S. is not just advocating peaceful reunification for the CCP, but whitewashing Xi Jinping himself.

Many people still assume that what the CCP cares about most right now is reunification, the Taiwan question, and opposing Taiwan independence. In fact, this is only the surface layer. In today's CCP politics, the ultimate political correctness is no longer reunification and peace, but glorifying Xi Jinping, protecting Xi Jinping, and avoiding pointing the spearhead at Xi Jinping.

This is why the united front strategies previously exposed by Toronto Fanglian, Teacher Li, and others are so important. It is not that the CCP cannot accept you criticizing the system a little, or criticizing a few corrupt officials, or even criticizing the CCP military, princelings, or the bureaucratic system. In Xi Jinping's logic of power, these criticisms can actually be utilized by him.

When you criticize the military, it helps him weaken the military's prestige. When you criticize the princelings, it helps him strike at the aristocratic factions within the party. When you criticize corrupt officials, it helps him perpetuate the anti-corruption narrative. When you criticize the bureaucratic system, it helps him prove that the CCP's problems all stem from the lower levels, while the great leader at the top remains wise and correct.

What truly cannot be criticized is Xi Jinping.

Because Xi Jinping's biggest political task right now is to continue proving that he is irreplaceable, continuing to accumulate leverage for his re-election and long-term rule. To him, all internal contradictions within the system can be transformed into the justification that "only Xi Jinping can solve the problem." The military is unreliable, so Xi Jinping needs to take command; the princelings are corrupt, so Xi Jinping needs to purge them; bureaucrats are lying flat, so Xi Jinping needs to personally deploy and personally command; localities are running amok, so centralization is needed; there are discordant voices within the party, so the core must be established as supreme.

Under this logic, if anti-communist figures only criticize other internal factions of the CCP without criticizing Xi Jinping, they may actually become peripheral material for Xi Jinping's power narrative. What the CCP's united front system truly wants is not necessarily to have everyone immediately praise Xi Jinping, but rather to first make opposition voices bypass Xi Jinping and direct their firepower elsewhere. As long as Xi Jinping himself is not named, as long as Xi Jinping's responsibility is blurred, and as long as Xi Jinping can still stand in the position of the "corrector," "stabilizer," and "leader of national rejuvenation," he can still extract power from crises.

Cheng Li-wun's visit to the United States was precisely doing this.

She can talk about cross-strait differences, peaceful dialogue, Taiwan's security, and U.S. interests; she can criticize the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and imply that Taiwanese society is being kidnapped by a war path. But she will not truly point out who the core of the CCP's threat to Taiwan is, she will not truly point out that Xi Jinping is the ultimate responsible person for the escalation of military pressure in the Taiwan Strait, and she will not truly tell the American people that the root cause of the risk in the Taiwan Strait today is not Taiwan refusing peace, but Xi Jinping turning the annexation of Taiwan into a part of his historical legacy.

This is her role.

She is not here in the U.S. to express Taiwanese public opinion to the CCP; she is here in the U.S. to package the CCP's will for America. She is not explaining in the U.S. why Taiwan needs peace; she is explaining why the United States should accept peace under Beijing's definition. She is not protecting Taiwan; she is helping Beijing lower American society's vigilance regarding the CCP's annexation of Taiwan.

This is also why her itinerary within the overseas Chinese community is particularly noteworthy. San Francisco, Boston, New York, Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles—these places are not only concentrations of overseas Chinese in America, but also key areas long cultivated by the CCP's overseas united front. Overseas Chinese associations, chambers of commerce, hometown associations, alumni associations, cultural organizations, peaceful reunification promotion systems, and various groups that appear to be non-governmental but actually maintain close ties with Beijing have long formed a complex political network in the United States.

By constantly talking about her process of visiting Beijing at these events and displaying her political capital in interacting with high-level CCP officials, Cheng Li-wun was essentially telling this overseas pro-China network: she is a person approved by Beijing, she is someone who can represent the Kuomintang in continuing toward Beijing, and she is a cooperative partner for Xi Jinping's route in Taiwan.

This is the true message her visit aimed to convey.

To Americans, she talks about peace. To the overseas Chinese community, she displays Beijing's endorsement. To the internal Kuomintang, she releases a signal: the pro-U.S. route is no longer the main axis, and the true entrance to power lies in Beijing. To the CCP, she proves her usefulness: she can bring Beijing's words to the United States, package the CCP's narrative as the peaceful proposition of Taiwan's opposition party, and make the U.S. policy circle mistakenly believe that a "mainstream rational voice" willing to accept Beijing's conditions exists within Taiwanese society.

This is even more dangerous than simply being pro-China.

In the past, the internal Kuomintang would at least maintain a balanced rhetoric of "being pro-U.S. and friendly with China," still talk about "One China with respective interpretations," and still pretend that the people of Taiwan had a say in Taiwan's future. Cheng Li-wun's approach is different. Her focus is not on "respective interpretations," but on opposing Taiwan independence; not on Taiwan's subjectivity, but on cross-strait reunification; not on the people of Taiwan deciding Taiwan's future, but on the notion that the people of Taiwan are not yet ready for peaceful reunification, so waiting, management, and manipulation are required.

This is no longer the ambiguous route of the traditional Kuomintang, but the public manifestation of a pro-communist reunification route.

Many might argue that Cheng Li-wun is merely talking about peace and cannot be labeled a fellow traveler of the CCP. The problem is that nearly all of the CCP's dangerous operations against Taiwan use peace as their prologue. Peaceful exchanges, peaceful development, and peaceful reunification all sound very gentle, but behind every single word hides a premise: Taiwan must ultimately enter China's political framework, and tai

The people of Taiwan cannot truly possess the right to reject the Chinese Communist Party.

If the people of Taiwan say no to reunification, the CCP says this is Taiwan independence. If the people of Taiwan say maintain the status quo, the CCP says this is division. If the people of Taiwan say they will decide their own future, the CCP says this is manipulation by external forces. If the people of Taiwan say they do not accept one country, two systems, the CCP says you have been brainwashed by the Democratic Progressive Party. In the end, so-called peace means you must accept the CCP's goals, and the CCP is simply not attacking you for the time being.

This is not peace; this is the extension period of a threat.

The greatest danger of Cheng Li-wun's visit to the United States lies in her attempt to package this extension period of threats as a rational, moderate, and responsible political line. She wants to make Americans believe that as long as Taiwan does not provoke China, as long as Taiwan accepts the 1992 Consensus, as long as Taiwan lowers its self-awareness of sovereignty, and as long as the United States does not excessively support Taiwan, the Taiwan Strait will be peaceful.

But the reality is exactly the opposite. What truly undermines peace in the Taiwan Strait is not Taiwan's democracy, nor is it the unwillingness of the people of Taiwan to be reunified. Rather, it is Xi Jinping making the reunification of Taiwan his historical mission, binding the CCP's legitimacy to nationalist mobilization, normalizing military threats, making gray-zone harassment routine, and—after demonstrating the Hong Kong model to the whole world—still demanding that Taiwan believe Beijing's promises.

This is the root cause of the lack of peace in the Taiwan Strait.

Therefore, Cheng Li-wun's trip to the United States should not be viewed as ordinary opposition party diplomacy, nor should it be seen as the Kuomintang explaining its political line to the United States. It is more like a flank lobbying effort by the CCP targeting the US policy circle: carried out by Taiwanese political figures using a Taiwanese identity to say what Beijing wants to say, packaging reunification as peace, packaging surrender as dialogue, packaging anti-war sentiments as anti-Americanism, packaging diaspora activities as United Front networks, and packaging academic seminars as political propaganda.

The reason why "Embrace the Communist Party, Taiwan becomes Hong Kong" became the highlight of this visit is because it pierced through all of Cheng Li-wun's rhetoric with a single short sentence.

To be more precise, the moment that dissident from mainland China merely mentioned "Xi Jinping is a dictator" and was immediately interrupted by the audience in the seats shouting "NO! NO! STOP! STOP!", the nature of Cheng Li-wun's trip to the United States was already defined.

This was not an ordinary exchange venue, nor was it a normal academic discussion. It superficially took place in the United States, but what actually operated was a CCP-style meeting order: Xi Jinping cannot be named, Xi Jinping cannot be criticized, and Xi Jinping cannot be called a dictator. As long as anyone touches upon this name, the scene immediately enters a state of defense, someone immediately intervenes, and someone immediately tries to suppress the issue.

This precisely shows that what Cheng Li-wun's trip to the United States truly seeks to protect is not just the rhetoric of "peaceful reunification," but the core of power that is Xi Jinping himself.

The people of Taiwan cannot afford not to answer, even if Cheng Li-wun chooses not to. Nor can the Americans afford not to see it.

If Taiwan embraces the Communist Party, Taiwan will not become more peaceful; Taiwan will only lose the right to choose peace. If Taiwan accepts the peace defined by Beijing, Taiwan will not avoid war; Taiwan will only lose its freedom first without the sound of gunfire. If Taiwan believes Xi Jinping's promises, Taiwan will not gain security; Taiwan will only become the next Hong Kong buried by promises.

What Cheng Li-wun's trip to the United States truly exposes is not how many people she met, but how far a certain faction within the Kuomintang has traveled: from pro-US and friendly with China, to using China to counter the US; from One China with respective interpretations, to prioritizing opposition to Taiwan independence; from the people of Taiwan having a voice, to the people of Taiwan only being allowed to express themselves when it favors reunification; from party diplomacy, to lobbying for the CCP's United Front.

And what this truly serves behind the scenes is, on the surface, the CCP's reunification goal, but in reality, it is the continuation of Xi Jinping's personal power.

Because as long as the Taiwan issue continues to be packaged as the core task of national rejuvenation, Xi Jinping can continue to tell the party: I cannot step back, I cannot step down, I must remain in power. As long as the Taiwan issue remains unresolved, he has a reason to demand obedience from the military, a reason to suppress the princelings, a reason to purge the bureaucracy, and a reason to label all opposing voices as undermining the grand cause of national rejuvenation.

This is the most alarming aspect of Cheng Li-wun's visit to the United States.

She is not simply striving for understanding for the Kuomintang in the United States. She is striving for space for Beijing in the United States, striving for a narrative for Xi Jinping, and striving for legitimacy for the CCP's United Front system to enter the US policy circle and Taiwan's diaspora communities.

And that anti-communist Chinese person who was driven out used a T-shirt to speak the most honest words of the entire visit:

Embrace the Communist Party, Taiwan becomes Hong Kong.

This sentence is not an insult to Cheng Li-wun, but a reminder to the people of Taiwan. Those who should truly feel ashamed are not the people raising questions, but those who help the Communist Party maintain a monolithic chorus on American soil, those who treat Taiwan's freedom as a bargaining chip, and those who clearly see the fate of Hong Kong yet still try to push Taiwan down that exact same path.