Multiple Submarine Cables in the Red Sea Suddenly Disrupted, the Xi-led CCP Suspected as the Real Culprit
On September 6, 2025, multiple submarine cables in the Red Sea suddenly broke, directly affecting internet connectivity between Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Microsoft confirmed that the SEA-ME-WE-4 (South East Asia‑Middle East‑Western Europe 4) and IMEWE (India‑Middle East‑Western Europe) two key international routes were damaged, causing Azure cloud service users in South Asia and the Gulf region to experience increased latency and performance degradation. Other operators and platforms such as Etisalat, Du, Meta, and Google also reported similar issues. The Red Sea has long been an important global internet corridor, carrying about 17% of international data traffic; its southern end at the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is heavily trafficked and one of the most vulnerable sections for cables. In recent years, the region has experienced multiple cable incidents, often resulting in weeks of network instability.
Regarding who caused this break, several explanations exist. The most common is a commercial shipping accident. Network infrastructure experts note that roughly 30% of submarine cable incidents are caused by ships dragging anchors, and the break location lies on a heavily trafficked shipping lane, leading many analysts to consider this the most likely cause.
On the other hand, the Houthi forces active in Yemen have been suspected by some external observers of being involved. In recent years they have frequently attacked commercial vessels in the Red Sea and have the potential motive to damage submarine cables. However, the Houthis deny any connection to the incident. Some Yemeni government officials have publicly stated that the event "cannot be unrelated to Houthi military actions" and have called on the international community to strengthen protection of critical digital infrastructure.
Nevertheless, when viewed against a broader geopolitical backdrop, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime also appears suspect. First, the CCP has been actively expanding its global submarine communications network in recent years, investing in and constructing several trans‑continental lines, including the PEACE cable, which bypasses many Western‑dominated nodes. Second, the Red Sea is a key maritime hub of the Belt and Road Initiative, giving China clear strategic interests in the area. Third, the CCP has previously been suspected of deliberately damaging foreign communications infrastructure using "anchor‑dragging cable cuts."
For example, around the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, there have been cases where Chinese vessels used anchoring or dragging as a cover to cause submarine cable interruptions. In 2023, the Taiwanese offshore islands of Matsu experienced near‑communication isolation after two cables were cut by mainland fishing boats, an incident widely regarded as a CCP‑orchestrated "gray‑zone operation." Such tactics are covert, low‑cost, yet capable of generating massive impact, testing an opponent's response capabilities while delivering deterrence without a formal declaration of war.
If these precedents are considered, the near‑simultaneous failure of multiple cables in the Red Sea does not appear purely accidental. Although no direct evidence has been presented by authorities, the CCP possesses both the motive and the experience to conduct such an operation. On one hand, it could weaken Western digital communication advantages in the Middle East and South Asia; on the other, it could signal to the United States and its allies that the security of global critical infrastructure is not invulnerable and that China can create disruption far from its own territory.
Historically, Red Sea cables have experienced repeated problems. In February 2024, the AAE‑1, SEACOM, and EIG cables were simultaneously damaged, at the time attributed to a shipping accident, though suspicions persisted. In January 2025, AAE‑1 suffered another fault, taking weeks to repair. These cases show that the Red Sea has become a weak link in global internet infrastructure, with each incident reminding the world that whether due to natural accidents or intentional sabotage, the consequences can be regional network paralysis.
There is currently no conclusive evidence identifying the mastermind. The mainstream view remains that a shipping accident is most likely, but intentional Houthi action cannot be entirely ruled out, nor can the CCP's history of "anchor‑dragging cable cuts" be ignored. When these factors are combined, the CCP is undoubtedly one of the most suspicious and potentially benefiting parties in this cable‑cutting event. Regardless of the final investigation outcome, the incident again highlights the fragility of the global internet. Those fiber optic strands hidden beneath the sea are the lifelines of international communication; when a critical conduit like the Red Sea experiences problems, users across the region and the world feel the impact. Going forward, preventing not only accidents but also deliberate sabotage by authoritarian regimes will be a core challenge the international community must confront.