Xiamen University's Strait Cross-Strait Urban Planning Research Institute suggests preparing for the takeover of Taiwan as soon as possible

Facing a great change unseen in a century, the international situation is changing rapidly. With the increasing possibility of Trump coming to power, the timetable for unifying Taiwan may be advanced at any time. The turmoil in Hong Kong in the past few years has shown that if the handover of power is not fully prepared, it will bring very serious consequences for the smooth handover of future social order. Since Taiwan does not have the problem of "50 years unchanged", once the mainland takes over Taiwan, its depth and breadth will far exceed that of Hong Kong in 1997. Preparing for the comprehensive takeover of Taiwan after unification is already urgent.

To this end, the Research Institute of Cross-Strait Urban Planning at Xiamen University has made two suggestions:

First, establish a Central Taiwan Affairs Committee as soon as possible.

This agency's sole objective is to serve as a "shadow government" to take over the regime in Taiwan at any time. Only clear and urgent goals can ensure the efficiency of the organization's operation. The organizational structure of the Central Taiwan Affairs Committee is completely aligned with the counterpart regime and core organizations, divided into comprehensive departments and professional departments. Among them, the comprehensive departments will focus on studying the applicable laws, currency conversion, mainland-island infrastructure docking, screening of military, public, and teaching personnel, customs and international travel policies after the takeover; the task of the professional departments is to thoroughly understand the history, current situation, personnel, and operating rules of the corresponding departments on the island, and on this basis, propose various takeover plans, including personnel, funds, and assets. As an economy that is relatively more developed than the mainland, Taiwan needs to deal with many issues that the mainland has rarely, or even never, encountered. This requires this work to be carried out as early as possible.

Functions of establishing this agency:

• Familiarize with Taiwan's current system, institutions, and laws as soon as possible. Carry out intelligence gathering with targeted measures, and deeply analyze, understand, and track the current situation and historical evolution of these institutions. Based on the lessons learned from Japanese colonization, the Kuomintang's post-war acceptance, and Hong Kong's return, propose corresponding institutional retention, institutional changes, institutional introduction, and institutional innovation, and design the systems that need to be changed in advance, as well as alternative laws. Unlike the current academic research on Taiwan, the departments of the Central Taiwan Affairs Committee should have specific and clear task orientations, with practical combat as the premise, in order to deeply and efficiently digest Taiwan's existing systems.

• Consolidate anti-Taiwan independence forces on the island. In recent years, the pro-unification forces on the island have weakened, lacking a realistic expectation of unification and a practical institutional carrier. With the Kuomintang's softening stance against Taiwan independence or even moving towards implicit Taiwan independence, the forces supporting unification have degenerated into disorganized individual actions. The establishment of the Central Taiwan Affairs Committee can integrate these forces into national actions, making anti-Taiwan independence forces systematic and institutionalized. The early weakness of the CCP and its long-term persistence were closely related to the support of the Comintern at that time. The Central Taiwan Affairs Committee can greatly change expectations on the island, making the currently distorted and isolated anti-Taiwan independence activities heroic actions after the reunification of the motherland. Through direct consultation and commissioned research by departments, and by soliciting public opinion on the island after unification, the sense of Taiwan's return can be spread to all strata of society on the island. One of the important reasons why the recent "military exercises around Taiwan" had little impact on the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese people is that the Taiwanese people believe that unification is still very far away. As long as preparations for the actual takeover of power begin, this action itself will have a significant impact on the hearts and minds of the people on the island.

• Smooth the impact of regime transition. With the growth of the mainland's military strength, the difficulty of unification itself is decreasing, and effective governance after unification will become increasingly important. Through personal consultations, project commissions, and other methods, the relevant departments of the Central Taiwan Affairs Committee can involve elites and institutions on the island as much as possible in the design of the Taiwan takeover plan. This may lead to more contingency plans for the impact of future regime transition, and the island will form stable expectations and psychological preparations. Making the Taiwanese society feel that the regime handover plan was designed with their participation will greatly reduce the cost of future real governance and form a mainstream social consensus.

Second, establish a Taiwan Governance Pilot Zone as soon as possible.

The recent turmoil in Hong Kong shows that "One Country, Two Systems" and the complete acceptance of existing systems may not be suitable for Taiwan. Taiwan should aim for complete integration with the mainland from the beginning. In order to test the effectiveness of policies in advance and train cadres for the takeover regime, it is necessary to set up a highly realistic physical environment to comprehensively simulate the management model after unification on the island. The locations can be chosen in Xiang'an District of Xiamen, bordering Kinmen, and Nan'an City of Quanzhou. These areas are backed by mountains and face the sea, have ports and airports, and their languages and cultures are similar to Taiwan's. The main geographical elements and infrastructure of Taiwan can find approximate counterparts here. This is a condition that Pingtan lacks. Especially since Kinmen and Xiamen have close exchanges, setting up an experimental zone here is most conducive to replicating and imitating Taiwan's current administrative system.

• Policy Experimentation. Within the pilot zone, simulate the real political structure of Taiwan as much as possible. Policies and laws will follow the actual policies intended for Taiwan after unification, from the abolition of the electoral system to the fate of simplified and traditional Chinese characters; from the transition of currency (including the transition of real estate, including land) to the handover of textbooks and teachers (including the college entrance examination system and academic qualifications)... Then, let various social entities, especially Taiwanese locals, propose modifications to the handover plan, and achieve rapid policy iteration within the pilot zone.

• Cadre Training. The main purpose of setting up the Taiwan Governance Pilot Zone is to simulate the real governance model after taking over Taiwan and to reserve systems and cultivate talents for the actual takeover. Taiwan has been separated from the mainland for many years. Cadres who are proficient on the mainland may have to start from scratch in Taiwan. Both the interaction model with residents and the methods of communicating with the media are unfamiliar to mainland cadres. This requires a real scenario for learning to govern Taiwan. The pilot zone can introduce retired Taiwanese military, public, and teaching personnel to assist in formulating the details of the takeover policy, shortening the transition period, which is the riskiest part of the regime change.

• Governance Demonstration. The original governance model for Taiwan after unification was Hong Kong's "One Country, Two Systems." However, after the previous "disruptions," Hong Kong as a model has little persuasive power for the island. Therefore, a new model needs to be established. Although the Communist Party's large-scale and rapid takeover of the KMT-controlled areas during the Civil War seemed overwhelming, the Communist Party had already accumulated a lot of experience in regime building in its base areas before that. Although our party now has a lot of experience in governance, the generation that took over and established regimes has passed away, and we need to start anew. Unification is just the beginning; governance is the standard for judging the success of unification.