前澳大利亚总理陆克文：2028年是台海局势“尤其危险的一年”

陆克文认为，2028年1月台湾总统选举可能成为台海风险的触发因素，若民进党再次胜选，习近平可能将其视为采取军事行动的导火索。他强调，威慑曾使两岸维持现状，并指出威慑失效、台海爆发战争可能冲击美国及其盟友、全球贸易和经济。他主张持续增强威慑所需的军事能力与行动意志，并称威慑也是中国军事战略中的重要概念。

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Relatedly, on Taiwan in 2028, I had something to say about that on the Ezra Klein podcast, mainly because I see 2028 as a particularly dangerous year, given the potential triggering mechanism of Taiwan's presidential election in January of that year. Who's going to win, the DPP or the KMT? I don't know. But let's just say there's a one-in-two chance that the DPP is re-elected. That's the pro-independence party.

The open question is this: in the last year of the Trump presidency, with Xi Jinping having secured or re-secured his fourth consecutive term in October 2027, if the DPP wins, does that become, in Xi Jinping's mind, a tripwire—a triggering mechanism for some form of military action against Taiwan? I think this is an elevated risk, and that's what I've been at pains to point out in my commentary. It goes back to and dovetails with the question just asked about deterrence, deterrence, deterrence. It is the best way through these very difficult questions, because people need to think through the alternative of deterrence failing, and what the consequences would then be for America, the region, and the world.

On the question of deterrence, I am a big deterrence guy. Why? It's worked. We're very pragmatic about these questions. If Mao Zedong could have taken Taiwan in 1949, Mao Zedong would have taken Taiwan in 1949. The fact that Taiwan hasn't been taken between 1949 and 2026 is because the risks of doing so have outweighed the benefits to be gained. That's the nature of deterrence, and the reason deterrence is so important as the fulcrum of our national security architecture in the region is that it's the foundation stone for strategic stability, which is in turn a foundation stone for continued economic development across the region.

If deterrence fails and war erupts, let me tell you, the world changes at that point, whoever wins or loses any crisis, conflict, or war across the Taiwan Strait. It's worth starting to paint the mental picture for the United States and the world at large of what the world would look like if a war did erupt. If Taiwan fell militarily, what would the world then look like? How would Japan respond? How would Korea respond? How would the other U.S. allies respond? Would that be the end of Pax Americana? What would happen to global trade and investment flows there and then? Could we be triggered into a global recession and depression? Quite conceivably.

Therefore, deterrence is reasonably cheap compared with the alternatives. It just requires continuing to double down on its two elements: A, capability, and B, intent, in order to give it effect.

Secondly, before folks say, “Well, that's terribly problematic for our friends in Beijing,” deterrence is a live strategy in China's military literature. I'm sure if you read the Chinese literature on deterrence, it's profound, deep, and broad, and it extends across multiple areas of Chinese military and PLA strategy, including, most particularly, the PLA and navy. This is not an alien concept in Chinese literature; this is not just a foreign imposition. The usefulness and utility of mutual deterrence becomes a formula that enables us to preserve strategic stability. So that's the question of deterrence.