Zhai Shanying: Industries That Will Collapse First in the Second Half of 2026

This article starts with the May 2026 social financing data, pointing out that resident deposits, corporate loans, and resident loans are all declining simultaneously, reflecting a loss of confidence in China's future. The article further extends to issues such as A‑share index fraud, telephone scam cards, and fentanyl precursor exports, arguing that these gray‑black industries cannot be separated from the Chinese Communist Party's power system. The latter half focuses on analyzing the possible collapse of China's new‑energy vehicle industry and residential property system in the second half of 2026: the former relies on subsidies, debt, and local government investment, the latter faces massive withdrawals due to a drop in property fee collection rates, which could ultimately turn cars into scrap metal and leave houses without basic maintenance, becoming a new survival crisis for ordinary families.

Today is Tuesday, June 16, 2026. Welcome to Zhai Shanying’s YouTube channel for chat and relaxation. Domestic friends can use it to fall asleep, overseas friends to stay awake.

It will be a short episode because I have errands to run and many things to do. The first, somewhat casual topic I’ll discuss is social financing data.

I believe you have already seen the social financing data released for May 2026. This data needs no deep thought; you can already see it continues to decline. Moreover, in April and May, Chinese resident deposits decreased by more than 2 trillion yuan in total, an unprecedented figure.

I have been using the term “unprecedented” a lot lately, I can’t help it. When I talked about the unprecedented drop in resident deposits last month, it felt odd afterward because I saw that hardly anyone in the CCP’s domestic sphere paid attention to this frightening information. In the social financing data, Chinese resident deposits fell unprecedentedly. This month I saw many domestic self‑media bloggers start mentioning it. Because for two consecutive months, Chinese resident deposits fell by more than 2 trillion yuan, which is a significant matter.

Of course, it’s not only resident deposits that are shrinking; Chinese corporate loans and resident loans are also decreasing. The reason is clear to everyone: confidence in the future is eroding. So enterprises stop borrowing, stop producing, stop operating; individuals stop borrowing, stop spending. Mortgage lending not only declines, but early repayments are increasing. Even though there is no particularly major negative news coming from within the system right now, the amount of money withdrawn from banks to spend far exceeds the amount being saved.

I won’t go into much detail about the social financing figures; interested friends can look them up themselves. I have analyzed the social financing data many times and have shared the analysis method, so everyone can understand it on their own. Remember, when I analyze I always remind you: look at social financing data, CPI, PPI, PMI—not just the headline totals, but the sub‑items. See what components make up these numbers and what ultimately drives the changes.

Because if you only look at the headline, it’s useless.

Take the past two months: CPI rose. Does that mean prices went up? Does it mean Chinese people are spending more? When you look closer, the rise is due to one reason: oil prices jumped, raising transportation energy costs. Oil prices were up more than 230% year‑over‑year. Last year at this time oil was relatively cheap, and the rapid increase in oil prices pushed the overall CPI up.

But if you strip out the oil price factor, CPI actually fell more than 2% year‑over‑year. That indicates a severe recession. A month‑over‑month drop of over 2% looks decent only because oil prices are inflating the figure. Remove oil, and you see the consumer market is much colder.

Social financing is the same. The headline looks okay, but when you see resident deposits shrinking dramatically, you wonder why the total can still grow. The answer is that the growth is entirely driven by government borrowing‑related data, directly or indirectly.

Besides this data, there are other active figures I call “maliciously hidden institutions” data.

What are “maliciously hidden institutions”? I cannot yet confirm whether they are CCP entities, as there is no reliable, clear evidence. Logically, however, apart from the CCP, there is no other domain capable of doing this. Whether it is a CCP institution or an internal individual acting for corruption, I do not know. So I can only label it “maliciously hidden institutions”.

For example, non‑bank institution deposits look good, with many people investing in wealth‑management products and stock trading. Some say it’s normal because China’s A‑share market is booming, so traders are making money. Those who say that are likely blinded by the maliciously hidden data.

Let me introduce an index that most accurately measures the real condition of global capital markets, especially stock markets: the median index. For the Chinese stock market, it is called the All‑A Median Index. Look it up.

It continuously reflects the price movements of the median stocks in China’s A‑share market. If you don’t understand, ask your AI assistant what the All‑A Median Index is. Why is this index the most effective? AI will tell you it reflects ordinary stocks and ordinary investors’ losses better than the Shanghai Composite, CSI 300, or the overall All‑A indices. It is the clearest.

Remember, the All‑A Median Index.

In 2026, we see China’s stock market rising impressively. What is rising? The CSI 300 is up nicely. But how does the All‑A Median Index perform? It has been falling all the way. Over the past five months it has dropped more than 26%.

Got it? That means the typical Chinese retail investor is basically losing money. That is the truth.

The Shanghai Composite can be engineered. That’s why some traders ask me why, during this period, thousands of stocks in the CCP’s market fell while only a few hundred rose modestly, yet the overall index surged.

In other words, over 80% of stocks are down. I have said before this is a policy‑driven market, using index structures to cut retail investors’ profits. China’s capital market has long ceased to be a fair, transparent market; it has lost the basic attributes that all global markets share.

So in this market, if retail investors want to make money, it’s a matter of luck, like buying a lottery ticket. Nothing else.

Think about it: how cash‑starved is China in 2026? In the past five months, the government has introduced various oppressive taxes and fees, more than five times the amount of the same period last year. How can the Chinese Communist Party let ordinary citizens make money in the capital market under such a regime? It cannot.

Some say there is a lot of quantitative trading by these institutions now, but that doesn’t prove the CCP is behind it. True, you can’t prove it. However, looking at the history and current state of the People’s Republic of China, everyone can see that quantitative trading is used for wrongdoing—this and that—publicly, yet no one intervenes. History shows the CCP is always supporting and profiting from these activities.

Understood?

So you may lack direct evidence, but the behavior appears unchecked and rampant. When you look at history, you see that without exception the CCP is behind the scenes watching these misdeeds happen, so this must be the case as well.

The indices that the CCP’s market looks at are like things in a hot oil pan. This market has long become one of the many channels the CCP uses to defraud the public. Today’s PRC essentially has no genuine reality. Almost everything the country presents daily is illusion, falsehood, or a scam. There is truly no way out.

There is another interesting point to share.

China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology publicly released data praising itself. Look it up online; it was just posted. It says that in recent years it intercepted 6.48 billion fraudulent messages and seized 200 million high‑risk telephone cards linked to phone scams.

The ministry itself announced 200 million telephone cards as an achievement.

What does this data make you feel? China’s official population is 1.4 billion, including all newborns. The seized scam telephone cards alone total 200 million—about 15% of the population. How were these cards obtained?

Because they are useless unless activated, and activation requires real‑name registration. Does this imply that 15% of the Chinese population is involved in phone scams?

Since Xi Jinping came to power in 2013, the ministry has issued mandatory regulations requiring real‑name registration for telephone users. In the PRC, whether on landlines or mobile networks, every phone card must be verified with a real name before activation.

Think about it: the CCP’s 200 million telephone cards, all real‑name registered, have become scam phone cards. How did this happen? How were the cards activated?

Some say lower‑level companies, agents, channels, and card dealers assisted scam groups in this process. Do you think that explanation is possible? Is it nonsense?

In China’s current environment, what kind of company, channel, agent, or card dealer would dare sell telephone cards to scam groups? Whether publicly or privately, any such institution that hands cards to a scam group inevitably becomes complicit.

The channels, agents, and card vendors that are reached are clearly accomplices in facilitating telephone fraud.

Does China have such institutions that take such huge risks, risk imprisonment, and sell massive amounts of SIM cards to fraud groups? Moreover, how do fraud groups obtain the cards? Real-name registration, right.

Any regional channel or agent sells a batch of SIM cards, not to mention two hundred million cards. Here a real name and a verification, the mobile telecom company's backend can immediately detect it. How is it done? How is it verified?

Someone says fraud groups buy them in bits and pieces. How could two hundred million cards be bought in bits and pieces? The more steps involved, the higher the cost and risk of obtaining SIM cards. It must be taken directly.

Therefore, data like this, the CCP says two hundred million cards. To repeat, SIM cards used for fraud can only be sold directly by the Chinese telecom system and the higher-level departments that oversee telecom to fraud groups.

Real-name registration is the same. Because this transaction exceeds ordinary authority, the real-name verification step must be bypassed. Otherwise, think about how two hundred million real-name verifications could be completed.

In the People’s Republic of China, who besides the Chinese Communist Party has the capability to carry out something of this scale?

Recall the recent Prince Group case involving massive fraud. Why was it so bizarre? Think about that oddity and the whole picture becomes clear.

At first, when the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union all issued warrants for Prince Group’s Chen Zhi for fraud, the CCP remained silent. Cambodia stepped forward, saying after investigation the Prince Group’s operations were legal and had no issues. The CCP said nothing. We all know who is behind the Hun Sen family.

Later, as more Asian countries began to issue warrants for Chen Zhi, claiming the Prince Group had problems, Cambodia proactively extradited Chen Zhi to the CCP. While many countries refused extradition, Cambodia handed him over to a silent CCP.

Then the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs said at a press conference that the case would be handled publicly to give society full transparency. After Chen Zhi was extradited, where was the transparency? Once he entered China, his information disappeared. I once said he may have already been dealt with. To this day, no one knows the details.

You can see that whether it is SIM cards, Chen Zhi’s fraud, or the worldwide export of fentanyl precursors, the whole world may not realize that the vast majority of synthetic drug raw materials come from China. This has been verified many times, and even the Chinese government does not deny it.

We call it fentanyl, you can call it many other things; I won’t list the chemical names so my account won’t be banned. China even uses this as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the West, especially with the United States.

In 2022‑2023, when relations with the United States softened, China publicly pledged to strictly limit exports, and the global supply of fentanyl—i.e., the drug—immediately dropped because Chinese raw material exports fell. When relations tightened, the world instantly felt an abundant supply of synthetic drug precursors because Chinese exports increased.

Think about these facts. Add to that the myriad smuggled products—China is the world’s largest smuggling nation. So what is the most likely conclusion? We cannot be 100% certain without investigation, but the most probable conclusion is clear.

On CCP‑controlled soil, these dark, filthy, bloody businesses and illegal wealth‑generating sectors each have a flow of money that benefits one or more senior CCP officials.

The state is essentially a machine. To a rogue dictator like the CCP, the state is a machine. Thus, these high‑level groups may have their personal “reserved lands” in fentanyl, fraud, organ transplantation, etc.

When certain factors arise—profit demands, a shift in the leadership coalition, overwhelming international pressure, stricter censorship, or an abnormal outcome of domestic political struggles—some people will retreat, some will be dealt with, and some will take other actions.

For example, now there may be a pull‑back because of Iran‑related oil smuggling, which some say is linked to certain members of the Xi family; during this period, the flow may be diverted and sold to official Chinese enterprises for profit.

Then we see, for instance, fraud activity receding, fentanyl exports decreasing, industry scale being compressed, and supervision tightening.

In this situation, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology spoke up this time. After speaking, they probably didn’t expect the statement to backfire, because anyone with a functioning brain will ask: how did two hundred million SIM cards appear?

Aside from senior CCP officials shielding such activities, I cannot imagine any other force capable of executing something on this scale.

There is no way around it because our community contains too many CCP members. I have told you before that I am currently under special protection from the CCP. When a sudden surge of people report “no sound,” “card stuck,” or “no audio,” you can all guess what is behind it.

In short, I am quite pleased. It only shows that some institutions are increasingly afraid of me. For a party without any belief or moral constraints, the Chinese Communist Party can profit worldwide through rogue, bottom‑less schemes, using the state apparatus to achieve personal gain. No one else can do it. That is truly formidable, so it can only be the Chinese Communist Party.

As the old saying goes: karma. Where there is cause, there is effect.

The CCP today is the same. Where there is cause, there is effect. It scams the world, corrupts the world, poisons the world, infringes on the world, and treats all such behavior as honorable rather than shameful. Such a nation will inevitably face backlash and outcomes that its people can only endure. The populace, as slaves of the state, often even help their masters commit wrongdoing. The future fallout from the collapse of these industries will be borne by them.

Now I will discuss the two largest industries that could collapse on the largest scale in the second half of 2026. These two industries are closest to the Chinese public and are the top two spending categories for ordinary Chinese citizens.

Some say real estate is selling poorly, houses are bad. No, I am not talking about real‑estate sales issues or second‑hand housing problems. The collapse of these two industries will push Chinese families, even the nation, into a survival crisis, possibly a death sentence.

The first industry is obvious to everyone. In the second half of this year, not me but insiders in China say it is the electric new‑energy vehicle industry.

You know Chinese consumers rank housing first and cars second in spending. The decline of the entire automotive sector is visible.

According to official Chinese data, nationwide automobile sales fell 3.2% year‑on‑year in January, 15.2% in February, 8.5% in March, 19.5% in April, 20% in May, and the June figure will exceed May’s decline.

So think about it: the trend has been down, down, down.

The result differs for fuel‑powered cars and electric new‑energy vehicles, and the electric sector is facing a total collapse.

In this industry, you know people like Li Bin, founder and chairman of Nio, a celebrity in the electric‑vehicle space, who is known for bragging and making grand statements, much like Huawei’s Yu Chengdong.

Why? Because under normal circumstances Nio’s equity is essentially worthless. Nio has always operated with heavy debt. The government has invested over 110 billion yuan in Nio, and Nio’s total financing exceeds 150 billion yuan. An automotive company with nearly 300 billion yuan in investment and financing has been perpetually indebted.

The entire enterprise relies on government investment and debt to stay barely alive. So if it collapses, Li Bin would face many years in prison, and officials linked to the investment and borrowing would be in serious trouble.

That is one company.

In such a brutal environment, Li Bin continues to brag, encouraging everyone, saying “it won’t happen.” The pressure of nearly 300 billion yuan looms.

This month at a forum in Chongqing, Li Bin publicly said that China’s automotive industry will enter its most brutal final stage starting in the second half of 2026. In that period, a batch of electric‑vehicle manufacturers, component makers, and low‑end capacity projects will go bankrupt, restructure, or be acquired.

Li Bin’s “most brutal final stage” remark has been interpreted by some commentators as paving the way for his own fate. If the industry truly enters the harshest phase, only a few will survive. Li Bin may be signaling to government‑linked investors: you must find a way to get through together, make Nio one of the lucky survivors, give me more money. If I survive, you survive; if I die, none of you escape.

Whether this reading is correct is up to you to consider. Regardless, think about a typical …

A person who became famous in the market for bragging and has always been waving flags for the Chinese Communist Party’s electric new energy vehicle industry now publicly says this industry is about to collapse and enter its most brutal stage. Does this fact itself already prove that the internal decline of the electric new energy vehicle industry is far, far more severe than what people see?

Is this the same effect as the announcement Vanke made years ago internally saying that China’s real estate industry had entered its most brutal stage? After Vanke’s announcement, China’s real estate industry indeed entered its most brutal stage, and we saw the situation of a bunch of companies such as Evergrande.

Therefore, as one of the important figures in China’s electric new energy vehicle industry, Li Bin this time unusually did not lie or brag. Because the development of China’s electric new energy vehicle industry itself is extremely distorted.

According to the real financial situation, if you ignore those fraudulent reports—such as those from research institutions like JMTR Research—you will find that the entire Chinese electric new energy vehicle industry has not a single domestic company that truly makes a profit. The world’s original creation is really huge, beyond imagination. This industry is completely supported by slogans issued by Xi Jinping’s imagination, just like the current talk of massive computing infrastructure.

New‑quality productive forces represented by the new energy sector centered on electric new energy vehicles and photovoltaics were completely abandoned by Xi Jinping in 2026. You now find that “new‑quality productive forces” disappear from all documents; they are now called “new‑quality large‑scale infrastructure.”

In contrast, the photovoltaic industry, which actually made profits in earlier years and has seen massive bankruptcies and liquidations this year, still has some companies that were truly profitable a few years ago. The electric new energy vehicle industry, however, has not a single domestic company that ever truly made a profit. The companies that appear profitable on their financial statements are all deceptive. You can look at Hong Kong’s JMTR Research company; it is basically a fraud.

This is an industry that relies entirely on subsidies and policy guidance from the Chinese Communist Party government and on Xi Jinping’s ad‑hoc imagination, and it continuously loses money.

Li Bin should start preparing now. However, the Chinese government’s explicit investment scale in this industry has already exceeded the 50 trillion‑yuan level, and the market sales scale of the industry also exceeds 20 trillion yuan. In other words, when this industry collapses, the impact on the 50 trillion yuan of financial capital behind it—most of which is borrowed money—and on the 20 trillion‑yuan market is unimaginably huge.

Why does this result occur?

Many people domestically have already made a clear comparison between China’s electric new energy vehicle industry and Tesla’s development process and essential operating model. They are completely different.

Tesla follows the route that all vehicle R&D and manufacturing companies worldwide have been taking for centuries; we can call it diligent and steady. The Chinese electric new energy vehicle sector runs on bragging, gimmicks, clever tricks, and countless variations—electric fans, air conditioners, huge sofas, shortcut routes.

Therefore today’s outcome is inevitable. I used to say the creator’s rule is “you reap what you sow.”

In the current overall decline of the Chinese economy, the automotive industry is falling year‑over‑year. But traditional fuel‑car companies not only used to be profitable, their downstream service models—maintenance, operation, upkeep, second‑hand markets—can help the industry survive continuously.

The electric new energy vehicle industry is different. It is a wild garden of many independent players, each unrelated to the others. None has ever truly made a profit, and none has entered a virtuous upward‑cycle development path. Moreover, the capital market for this sector is far thinner than that for fuel cars.

It is an industry that depends entirely on government subsidies and market‑inflating guidance, creating a massive number of overheating enterprises that should never have existed. Now policies are exhausted, subsidies are dwindling, the guiding effect disappears, and the Chinese consumer market is shrinking, so car‑purchase demand is rapidly declining. Li Bin is right: the most brutal elimination has arrived.

Fuel cars are different; electric new energy vehicles have no universal standards. Each company does its own thing, a wild garden of many. OTA systems, remote‑control systems, remote servers, autonomous driving systems, battery‑management systems—each is a separate suite that cannot replace another.

If a company cannot operate normally, all cars under that brand are no better than scrap metal. And because the whole industry has never been profitable, bankrupt companies have no chance for restructuring. No one will acquire them, because they never earned money, so acquisition is impossible.

If the industry were partly profitable and partly loss‑making, integration might be possible. Now the whole industry makes no money; who would merge or restructure?

An investment of 50 trillion yuan. When the industry tips over in three directions, the associated financial risk is unimaginable. Especially many government‑linked investors, related city‑investment companies, and now‑forced‑to‑exit private equity funds could directly trigger systemic risk.

As for the massive unemployment that will arise from the collapse of these large supply chains—front‑end and back‑end—the Chinese Communist Party’s method of conversion and disposal is unknown.

Human society has developed for thousands of years; with progress, industries that truly develop based on market supply‑and‑demand and are sustainable are always the result of market choice. The market has supply and demand; it must emerge slowly on its own. No industry has ever grown healthily and become mainstream in human society simply by being piled up with government policies.

But Xi Jinping, together with a group of CCP bureaucrats, impulsively created a new‑quality productive force represented by new energy, attempting to replace traditional oil and natural‑gas energy with extremely low‑energy‑density sources—electricity, solar, wind.

When I speak of energy density, I mean low power‑generation density. Solar, wind, etc., can only serve as auxiliaries to oil and gas. The CCP wants to turn them into the dominant human‑controlled energy that replaces oil and gas.

Moreover, the CCP’s attitude toward this industry’s development is not the steady, diligent approach of global industrial firms, but a constant encouragement of clever shortcuts, satellite‑launch‑style hype, and massive exaggeration. Therefore, actions that would be prohibited under Chinese advertising law have never been penalized in the electric‑vehicle field.

They want the new‑quality productive force to cover the whole CCP nation, push it worldwide, replace all fuel cars, thereby showcasing the CCP’s industrial novelty without even looking at physical principles, using it to strike at Western traditional industry. The final result is now visible: they have shot themselves in the foot.

Look at how many surprises the collapse of this industry in the second half of this year will bring to the CCP nation, especially to the many people who have been foolishly buying domestic electric new energy vehicles for over three years.

Good advice cannot persuade the damned. It’s like telling people to sell their houses when they can. What happened to those who listened to me sell houses three or four years ago? I told you three or four years ago not to buy electric new energy vehicles—what were you thinking? Just to save a little on electricity bills. All desire squeezed rationality out of existence.

Is this even a car? What the hell is in your head? To what extent must desire swell before someone decides to buy a domestic electric new energy vehicle? Buying a Tesla is fine; buying a Tesla is fine. Buying these domestic electric new energy vehicles—there are no words.

When the nest is empty, can there be any eggs left? If the skin is gone, where will the hair attach? When the industry collapses, the cheap‑buy‑cheap‑win you chose will be a big loss.

If you bought the electric new energy vehicle with a loan, congratulations. The automaker goes bankrupt, your car becomes scrap, and the loan may not be fully repaid. How wonderful, paying a loan for scrap metal.

Why can’t you buy it? Still asking why? More than three years ago I told you why electric new energy vehicles should not be bought. See my earlier videos.

The second‑largest consumer product—the automotive industry—will enter this tragic situation in the second half of the year; that is already a huge bad omen. An even bigger bad omen follows.

No one will talk about it, so I will share some public data.

According to official data from the China Institute of Market Research, from 2024 to 2025 the withdrawal rate of projects managed by the top 50 property management companies in China rose 37% year‑over‑year, with 80% of withdrawals being residential.

Starting in 2022—actually beginning in 2020—but the growth became double‑digit in 2022. In 2023, 2024, and 2025, each year the withdrawal rate of projects for nationwide property management firms, especially the top 50, increased by double digits and accelerated.

From January to September 2025, across three quarters, there were 127 publicly announced large‑scale property project withdrawals nationwide. By the first quarter of 2026, a single quarter saw over 100 large‑scale property project withdrawals, almost matching the total of the previous three quarters.

These large projects are far larger than most people imagine. For example, China Overseas Property withdrew 55.6 million sqm of large projects in 2025; Caisheng terminated several tens of millions of sqm; Yongsheng Services terminated over 42 million sqm. The residential population covered by the announcements of just these three companies reaches 1.5 million households, 3–4 million people.

This is the scale of withdrawals after

No one is taking over property projects. All property management is withdrawing from projects, and among the top 500 property companies in China in 2025, 50% are fully exiting.

The reason is simple: they cannot survive.

Why can property companies not survive? According to publicly available data from the Chinese government, the average property fee collection rate for the top 500 property companies was 89% in 2021, dropped to 84% in 2022, 80% in 2023, 74% in 2024, and is estimated to fall below 60% in 2025.

Since the top 500 property companies virtually monopolize property management for most good residential projects in first‑, second‑ and third‑tier cities, it follows that last year almost all good residential projects in those cities failed to collect property fees from about 30% of units. This figure is expected to be even worse this year.

Research on listed property companies in China shows that the breakeven collection rate for highly efficient listed firms is 80%. Less efficient firms need a breakeven rate of 87%–90%.

In other words, a residential complex must collect about 85% of the total property fees for an average listed company to break even. Yet in 2022 the average collection rate for the top 500 Chinese property firms was only 84%, fell below 70% last year, and is projected to drop below 60% this year.

Property companies are businesses too; they cannot survive.

Therefore the issue is not whether you can buy or resell a house, but that many domestic residential complexes are about to be left without any property management.

Property companies are going out of business. In China, property firms are essentially standard labor‑intensive enterprises. According to 2023 annual reports of listed Chinese property companies, labor costs account for 50%–70% of total costs. These costs do not disappear whether owners pay or do not pay their fees.

If a property company cuts labor by more than 20%, the frequency of safety hazards in the community will exceed normal levels. Greater labor reductions raise the probability of hazards even further. No property company can shoulder such massive risk. What happens if an elevator crushes someone?

When property companies withdraw, the maintenance of elevators, fire systems, waste disposal, access control, public lighting, water‑pump rooms, power distribution rooms, landscaping, parking management, accounting, and common‑area upkeep will all fall into a void of no management.

Especially once a mature project loses its property management firm, it is extremely difficult to find a new compliant manager. All compliant firms are businesses that will investigate why the previous manager left. If the reason is a low fee collection rate, everyone knows the venture is unprofitable and will lose money. Neither the project nor any government directive will attract a new compliant manager.

Property management is highly specialized. For mid‑rise and high‑rise buildings (over ten floors), no owners’ committee can perform the functions of a property company. No one knows how to operate the pump room, public lighting, elevators, or fire systems.

Moreover, an owners’ committee cannot directly become a property manager because it cannot be registered with the street‑level property management filing system. If a community suffers a risk due to property‑management failure, the street office— the lowest level of government— would be held responsible for approving an unqualified manager.

Thus the collapse is terrifying.

Consider the difference between a well‑maintained car and a neglected one. What happens when you can’t brake?

If you live abroad—in Europe, the United States, Japan, or South Korea—you will notice how frequently residential buildings, especially those over ten stories, are serviced. They undergo comprehensive maintenance every year.

You may recall when I started livestreaming on this channel about three and a half years ago, nearly four years ago. My 18‑story residential project had workers constantly on the exterior, scaffolding reaching the roof, essentially wrapping the whole building. The building was only ten years old and still brand new. Yet a ten‑year‑old project required a full year of maintenance.

Why? Because after ten years the exterior walls, waterproofing, water supply, drainage, fire systems, elevators, and central air‑conditioning all reach their safety inspection cycle. Many components—sealants, rubber strips, coatings, etc.—reach the end of their service life after ten years and must be inspected, maintained, and replaced.

It’s akin to changing a car’s oil and filter.

The materials used in Chinese residential construction are generally far inferior to those in the high‑end projects I lived in while in the United Kingdom. After ten years, many elements need inspection and replacement. How many items does Chinese real‑estate need to check?

Domestic residents have never seen such thorough upkeep; they simply never performed it. When basic property fees can’t even be collected, who would fund such work?

So, as I mentioned, what is the result of driving a regularly serviced car versus a long‑neglected one? The risk of the latter is obvious.

After fifteen years, Chinese residential buildings—let alone after ten years—are far less efficient and safe than Western counterparts. Safety becomes a serious concern, and the responsibilities of property companies increase. If fees cannot be collected, there is no company to assume those responsibilities.

That explains why 50% of the top‑500 property firms are exiting the Chinese residential property‑management market.

Without property management, the safety, traffic flow, fire protection, lighting, water, electricity, gas, elevators, and common‑area upkeep of these residences will have no professional oversight. This is a fatal issue for many current communities.

How extensive is the problem? Housing built and sold before 2010 accounts for roughly 30%–40% of China’s total residential stock—about 10–15 billion square meters—housing 250–400 million people. In other words, 250–400 million people live in these potentially unsafe homes, and many of these projects are already experiencing property‑company withdrawals.

What is the scale?

In 2026, China’s housing‑renovation plan, primarily funded by homeowners with supplemental government subsidies, aims to renovate 1 million units, totaling no more than 100 million square meters.

Currently, for housing older than fifteen years, the amount needing renovation is 10–15 billion square meters. In 2026, less than 100 million square meters will be renovated.

Imagine: in 2026 homeowners must fund their own renovations, paying out of pocket. Can you picture that?

The current situation: electric new‑energy vehicles are collapsing, the second‑largest industry is failing, cars are turning into piles of scrap metal, and loans still need to be repaid—already a tragic scenario. Now imagine your daily residence: the entrance plastered with flyers, frequent water cuts while showering, occasional power outages, elevators breaking down midway. Exaggerating, what if you return home after a month away to find strangers living in your apartment? What a scene.

No one is managing it. Stairwells may be covered in dog feces, trash left uncollected. What do you do? You have to figure it out yourself.

Official data shows a rapid increase in the rate of property‑company withdrawals. You can verify these numbers online. In 2026, the total area of residential complexes from which property firms have withdrawn will be eleven times the total area of the government’s 2026 housing‑renovation projects.

Can you imagine? Renovating 100 million square meters, while the withdrawn‑property‑company projects already exceed 1 billion square meters. Three companies alone account for about 150 million square meters. The nation will renovate only 100 million square meters per year, yet the withdrawn‑property‑company project area is eleven times that.

As China’s economy continues to deteriorate, only communities inhabited by government officials or those with internal connections may retain funding. Many ordinary‑citizen neighborhoods—especially those that are not high‑end and where residents cannot afford or refuse to pay property fees—will see an increasing number of unpaid fees. What the future holds, we cannot predict.

So in 2026, see for yourself. For ordinary Chinese, the two biggest expenses are housing and cars. Many focus on depreciation and affordability, forgetting that houses, like cars, require maintenance.

A house left unmaintained for fifteen years becomes a ruin. If property companies disappear, imagine the scenario. If you expect the government to shoulder all responsibilities, ask where the money will come from, how it will be borrowed, and who will bear the burden.

That’s all for today. I have to attend to other matters.

It’s rotting. Developers collapse, yet you still have to service loans. You’re not just paying the loan; you also have to pay property fees. Without paying fees, even living in the house for two years becomes a major problem.

Many Evergrande defaults can be “free‑riden,” but what do you get for free? No water, no electricity, no gas—what do you gain? Have you noticed the increasing number of exploding projects?

The explosion in Liaocheng’s Yanggu County, Shandong—did you see it? Rubber‑based products claim that the nationwide explosion could cause major issues for related industries in the second half of the year. When an explosion threatens the entire industry, officials say only three people were lightly injured.

Injury, no serious injuries or deaths. Everyone should know that.

In many places, residential building explosions happen, from the Northeast all the way to southern cities. So people wonder, what would happen if property management is absent? What would be the result of a lack of property management? What happens when no one looks after the building?

Being unable to pay property fees creates a negative loop. Negative things keep turning.

What is the way to live for domestic buyers of new energy vehicles in the second half of the year? Immediate benefits, basically. Want to buy a car for a thrill, think buying a car gives face, no need to take the subway. So the cost paid for face is just like taking out a mortgage to buy a house. What’s the difference between a car loan and a house loan?

Fuel cars and electric cars are different. If you take a loan to buy a fuel car, you can keep driving it. If you take a loan to buy an electric new energy vehicle, unless it’s one of the few companies that survive, if you buy another brand, your car will soon become uncertain in value.

Now coal mines explode every day, recent incidents happen daily, there’s nothing that can be done.

I don’t know about physical silver; I don’t hold silver, I buy gold. I do it to hedge risk, as I have always told everyone.

I don’t know the current status of the Iran agreement. Because I haven’t seen the full memorandum, I don’t know what Friday’s agreement looks like. The memoranda from Iran, Pakistan, and the United States under Trump are all partial; I can’t match them up. Everyone claims they won; see how Friday’s agreement turns out.

If we follow the US side’s claim, they won, it stays open forever, and 50% of Iran’s oil revenue goes to the US each year. I can only evaluate based on the US memorandum’s result. If that’s true—50% of Iran’s oil revenue to the US—then the US definitely won, which is impressive. Iran would permanently stop nuclear weapons, half its oil revenue goes to the US, Gulf states would bear the losses Iran suffers in this war. If that’s the memorandum version, it’s quite a feat. But I can’t assess these memoranda now; we’ll see the final outcome.

Just now I mentioned the property fee issue. It must be paid. You didn’t hear this earlier; it’s official government data, the collection rate can’t reach the target. This year it’s 60%. That means in a community with 1,000 households, the expected property fee revenue is 10 million, but only 6 million is collected, while 8.5 million is needed to break even. The property management company can’t cover the 1.5 million shortfall itself. Last year they collected 70% and already had to cover 1.5 million. This year, at 60%, they’d need to cover 2.5 million to balance. Which property company will do that? None will.

Why can’t they collect the fees? Obviously because the economy is declining. If the economy were strong, no excuses would be needed; everyone would pay. But with a downturn, residents find countless reasons to trouble the property company and refuse to pay. Both sides get stuck.

Many residents can legitimately claim reasons not to pay, the property company can’t collect, so it quits and withdraws. The community then has no management. A tragedy ensues, with no solution.

The maintenance fund may also have been siphoned off by the company. That’s a big problem now. Both sides have grievances, and there’s no remedy. To understand the issue, look at the data from the Middle Finger Research Institute: once a property company withdraws, what happens to your community? Serious problems arise immediately.

Water cuts, power cuts—who will fix them? The sewer gets blocked, an entire floor or a doorway floods with sewage—who will repair it? Once the property company is gone, problems appear.

And garbage. Daily trash—do you find a garbage company yourself? Does the owners’ committee hire one? How do you handle all that waste? The garbage collection fee must be paid by all owners for the committee to pay the collector. If they don’t pay, what do you do?

So without property fees, garbage becomes a nightmare. There are videos online showing a property company ignoring a community for three months, making it uninhabitable. The houses can’t even be sold because no one will show them. The entrance is full of trash. Later news reported the government stepped in to clean up, but they said after cleaning, there was no one and no money to maintain it. Three months later the same situation returned. The result was a cockroach infestation, with no solution.

Can Xiong’an real estate still be traded? I don’t know what to say. Xiong’an still has houses, I’m at a loss for words.

Again, if you organize an owners’ committee, you must collect property fees to function. And the committee isn’t made of professionals; even if they collect fees, they still need a property company to handle technical tasks. Do they know how to maintain a pump room? This issue will only grow.

When a property company withdraws, no one manages the building, no one manages the garbage—there’s simply no one to handle it. This is a huge problem.

People often think property doesn’t need maintenance, but houses do need upkeep. You realize this when you live abroad; houses absolutely require maintenance.

If you don’t pay property fees, sell your house before the property company withdraws. If many people don’t pay and the company leaves, your community becomes full of trash, as recent news reports show—real estate agents won’t even show the property. No clients come because the community is inaccessible. Even if the price is low, no one will buy.

This is a vicious cycle.

Think about it: cars and houses are the biggest assets. If in the second half of the year these two sectors start collapsing, can you imagine the scenario?

There is massive property withdrawal here. The management area I just read out—three companies manage 150 million square meters, which is far more than the Chinese government’s annual renovation project of 1 million dilapidated homes covering 100 million square meters. That’s just three property companies. Imagine the gap.

The housing slated for disposal is 10 to 15 billion square meters; the Chinese government can’t even handle 1 billion in a year.

So the future of Chinese housing isn’t about whether to sell three years ago. Many now say second‑hand houses can’t be sold. It’s not about selling or not. The next step is massive housing facing a market where no price, however low, can sell. As soon as the property company leaves, your house becomes unsellable at any price. How do you sell such a house?

Someone asked about unemployment benefits. Look at China’s definition of unemployment. China has employment, “buffer” employment, flexible employment, and “awaiting” employment. If you resign voluntarily, or there’s an internal arrangement with the company, or you submit a resignation, sorry, that doesn’t count as unemployment.

Check the conditions for receiving unemployment insurance in the People’s Republic of China. You’ll find many stringent requirements; otherwise you can’t receive it. There’s no way.

That’s all for today. Going out to handle affairs—does the scene look a bit better than before? The curtain was used as a background, the back was too bright, the camera auto‑selected light, and the overall lighting was poor. This might improve.

Thank you all for listening to my rambling today. I wish all good friends a sound sleep at home, and overseas friends may have their wishes fulfilled. See you on Friday, thank you all.