弱小者如何战胜最强大的军队——反侵略战争的成功要素

之前从历史层面感性的聊了聊抗俄前景（某些人口中的“获胜路径”），但有的朋友想探讨这背后的支撑理论，挺好的，强有力的思想吸引强有力的人。不用扯什么克劳塞维茨或孙子的书袋，我们就从最直观的角度简单聊聊：为何弱小者也能打败这世上最强的军队，无论它叫苏军还是美军，以及哪些要素会促成这一点？当然，这个话题有一个大前提：

它得是一场反侵略战争。或者严谨一点，它至少得是一场有争议的冲突以至于其中一方认定自己遭受了侵犯。

这个前提很好理解，弱小者一般也不会去侵略别人，侵略的话结果可想而知，无需我们讨论。弱小者要战胜强大的军队，一定要借助反侵略这个杠杆，否则是无效行为。

我们先分别说说对阵双方：

1，弱小的反抗者通常无法在常规的，正面的冲突中对阵入侵者，所以他们必须转变冲突的性质以对自己有利，这样就只有一个选择：把反抗转变为低烈度的战争但同时又是高烈度的治安战。

治安战这个词并非学术用语，但能很形象的描述这个概念。我再更进一步的打个比方来定位这种烈度，那就是低于一般战争，却远远高于普通犯罪。低于很好理解，无非就是打不过就躲，就藏，就跑，保存实力避其锋芒。而高于，你可以想象一下蝙蝠侠的哥谭市，没错，就是比那种猖獗的犯罪还要可怕的冲突，且针对的目标是军队。

无法对抗入侵者军队的反抗者，基本都得把冲突拉入到这个层面才有赢的空间。

2，入侵者的军队。无论多么强大的军队，请记住，它也只是军队，有着自己天然的局限，它可以打垮敌人的军队，但一旦冲突被拖入旷日持久的治安战中，它就只能破绽百出。

因为治安战的烈度虽然低于正常战争，但却是一场无限的，超限的冲突，解决它需要很多不同的角色，不同的系统，以及长期综合的措施。它需要军队，更需要警察，医生，教师……总之，它不再是简单的战争，而成了一项庞大的社会工程，而单靠军队，根本不足以承担这个工作。

历史上的侵略者通常用两个办法来缓解这个问题。

一，进行殖民。把整个社会工程包括本国的忠诚公民，直接搬过来，换血。这个办法成功率高，但随着殖民时代的终结，这个办法不怎么被使用了，不过俄乌战争中，我们可以看到俄罗斯的某些类似作法，比如吸引本国公民去定居，同时把可以被洗脑的乌克兰儿童送到大后方进行“头脑殖民”。

二，扶植傀儡。问题是，傀儡政府天然缺乏合法性，同时又被宗主刻意压制以防威胁自身，所以这类傀儡一旦失去了宗主的驻军支持，往往容易垮台，这在历史上屡见不鲜。

总之，在一场反侵略战争中，反抗者就算十分弱小，但只要成功将冲突转变为治安战，最终获胜的概率就不会很低。

而且治安战所需的资源门槛，往往比你预计的低得多。比如阿富汗对阵苏联时，某些反抗领袖由于此前经商，积累了颇丰的身家，当然，这身家拿出来对比国家财政实在算不得什么，可在当时，即便支撑全阿富汗十几万游击队的供给，居然一个人的身家就能做到且绰绰有余。这种极低的门槛，使得反抗的可持续性得到了有效保障。

讲到这里，篇幅有点长了。直接点出此类冲突的成功要素吧：

最主要，最关键，绝对不可或缺的要素就是——抵抗意志。

有了这个要素，其它条件才能逐步具备，各种问题才会逐步解决。没有这个要素，就算本来手中有牌，也会一个个烂在手里。

侵略者的意志是坚定的，他们为了实现它不惜用最残酷的手段扫荡整个国家。

反侵略的一方必须在意志上坚如磐石，且远远的压倒侵略者，使得他们能够在一场令几乎所有人都绝望的看不到尽头的冲突中，依然能缓慢的，坚定的，犹如压路机一般的前进并碾碎敌人的意志，并鼓舞起全国的反抗精神，使得游击战的规模和袭击频率不断发展，逐步夺回整个战争的主动权，使得撤军成为侵略者最后不得不选择的唯一选项。

除了这个最主要最关键的要素，还有其余一些要素。这里就只提一个：外援。

维持治安战运转需要的资源门槛低，但资源这个东西，当然多多益善。所以，反抗者最好能获得外援。侵略者在国际上总少不了宿敌，所以争取敌人的宿敌十分必要。同时外援要有效发挥作用，地理因素也很重要。被入侵的国家最好能与支持自己的国家接壤，这样不仅方便武器装备的运输，也便于战斗人员在必要时撤到其它国家休整待战。

只要具备顽强的抵抗意志，加上其它有利条件，即便强如苏军美军，也很难在一场高烈度的治安战中最终获胜。

所以，我们又有什么理由散布乌克兰失败的情绪，鼓吹各种包头换面的投降理论呢？

毕竟，乌克兰的实力和境况，还远远没有到放弃常规战场转入治安战的那一步。

Previously, we discussed the prospects of resisting Russian aggression from a historical and emotional perspective (what some refer to as the "path to victory"). Some friends, however, want to explore the theoretical foundations behind this, which is a great idea—strong ideas attract strong people. There's no need to cite Clausewitz or Sun Tzu; instead, let’s approach this topic in the most straightforward way:

Why can weaker forces defeat the world’s most powerful armies, whether they are called the Soviet Army or the U.S. Army? And what factors contribute to this outcome?

Of course, this discussion is based on a fundamental premise:

It must be a war of resistance against invasion. Or, to be more precise, at least a conflict where one side perceives itself as being invaded.

This premise is easy to understand. Weaker forces generally do not invade others—if they did, the result would be obvious, and there would be no need for discussion. For a weaker force to defeat a stronger army, it must leverage the concept of anti-invasion; otherwise, the effort would be futile.

Now, let’s examine the two opposing sides separately:

1. The Weaker Resistance Forces

Weaker resistance forces typically cannot engage the invading army in conventional, direct confrontations. Thus, they must shift the nature of the conflict in their favor. This leaves them with only one option: transforming resistance into a low-intensity war while forcing the enemy into a high-intensity counterinsurgency operation.

The term "counterinsurgency war" is not an academic term, but it vividly describes this concept. To clarify its intensity, think of it as being lower than a conventional war but far more severe than ordinary crime.

The “lower intensity” aspect is easy to understand—resistance forces cannot win head-on, so they must hide, evade, and retreat to preserve their strength while avoiding direct confrontation.

The “higher intensity” aspect means the conflict is far worse than rampant crime. Imagine Gotham City from Batman—yes, it’s even worse than that, but targeted at the invading army.

Resistance forces that cannot defeat the invading military must escalate the conflict to this level to have any chance of victory.

2. The Invading Army

No matter how powerful an army is, remember: it is still just an army, with inherent limitations. It can defeat opposing military forces, but once a conflict drags into a prolonged counterinsurgency war, the army’s weaknesses become evident.

Counterinsurgency warfare, while lower in intensity than conventional warfare, is an unending, unrestricted conflict. Resolving it requires numerous roles, systems, and long-term, comprehensive measures. It requires not only the military but also police, doctors, teachers… In short, it is no longer simply a war but an enormous social engineering project. And an army alone is insufficient to handle such a task.

Historically, invaders have typically relied on two methods to mitigate this problem:

1. Colonization

This involves relocating loyal citizens from the invading nation, effectively replacing the population. This method has a high success rate but has largely fallen out of use with the end of the colonial era. However, in the Russia-Ukraine war, we see some similar strategies, such as encouraging Russian citizens to settle in occupied territories and sending Ukrainian children to the Russian heartland for "ideological reprogramming."

2. Puppet Governments

The issue with puppet regimes is that they inherently lack legitimacy. Moreover, they are deliberately kept weak by their masters to prevent them from becoming a threat. As a result, once the occupying military withdraws, these puppet governments often collapse—something history has repeatedly demonstrated.

The Path to Victory in an Anti-Invasion War

In an anti-invasion war, even if the resistance forces are weak, as long as they successfully transform the conflict into a counterinsurgency war, their chances of ultimate victory are not low.

Moreover, the resource threshold for sustaining a counterinsurgency war is often much lower than expected. For example, during Afghanistan’s resistance against the Soviet Union, certain resistance leaders had amassed personal wealth from business ventures. While their wealth was negligible compared to a national budget, it was more than sufficient to sustain Afghanistan’s guerrilla forces—numbering in the tens of thousands—without financial strain. This low barrier to entry made sustained resistance feasible.

The Key Factor: Will to Resist

The most crucial, indispensable factor in such conflicts is the will to resist.

With this factor in place, other conditions can gradually be met, and various problems can be overcome. Without it, even a force with strong assets will see them wasted.

Invaders are resolute in their goals and will not hesitate to employ the most brutal methods to suppress an entire nation.

The resistance must be even more resolute—unyielding, unwavering—so that, even in a seemingly hopeless and never-ending conflict, they can steadily advance like a relentless steamroller, grinding down the invaders’ morale. This unwavering spirit must inspire nationwide resistance, allowing guerrilla warfare to expand in scale and frequency until the resistance ultimately seizes the initiative and forces the invader into one inevitable choice: withdrawal.

Additional Factors: Foreign Aid

While the resource demands for a counterinsurgency war are low, more resources are always beneficial. Thus, securing foreign aid is vital.

Invaders often have geopolitical rivals, so enlisting the support of their adversaries is crucial. Geography also plays a key role—if the invaded country shares a border with its supporters, the transportation of weapons and supplies becomes far easier, and fighters can retreat to allied territory for rest and reorganization when needed.

Conclusion

As long as the resistance maintains an unyielding will and secures other advantageous conditions, even formidable armies like the Soviet or U.S. military will struggle to achieve victory in a high-intensity counterinsurgency war.

So, why should we spread pessimism about Ukraine’s prospects or advocate for disguised surrender?

After all, Ukraine’s capabilities and current situation are still far from the point where they would need to abandon conventional warfare in favor of counterinsurgency.