李侃如憶朱鎔基：改革、入世與政治遺產

李侃如回憶了他對朱鎔基的印象，稱讚朱鎔基勤奮、才華出眾、對下屬要求嚴格，也是一位懂得把握政治分寸的政治人物。他還講述了兩人約在1999年或2000年前後的一次交談：朱鎔基詢問美國如何才能真正信任中國，李侃如則談到中共更名可能有助於消除美中互不信任。李侃如認為，朱鎔基離任後，部分改革設想未能落實。

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My overall impression was that he was one of the most impressive leaders I had met, Chinese or otherwise. He was an extraordinary individual. He worked hard, was brilliant, and had a vision of where he felt China needed to go. He was a very tough taskmaster with the people supporting him.

I knew a number of his subordinates. They all commented on what a privilege it was to work for him, and how terrified they were when he was angry. He had high standards. I also thought he was a good politician: he knew how far he could push and when he had to hold back. If he had the final say, I think a lot more would have gotten done. I think he had a major impact on China. Some of the things he tried were subsequently rolled back after he stepped down.

He was a very impressive gentleman. I had the privilege of meeting with him on various occasions. I wasn't a personal friend by any means, but I had the privilege of talking with him both privately and publicly, and I was always very impressed.

We sat down on our couch and just started chatting. In the course of that conversation, he asked me what it would take for the United States to really trust China. He felt we had reached a point where we could deal with each other and get a lot done, but there still wasn't fundamental trust in each other's intentions.

I answered candidly. I grew up in the Cold War in the United States, and my sense was that Americans would never fully trust a Communist Party leadership. I told him frankly—this was in 1999 or just after the turn of the year to 2000—that the Chinese Communist Party had changed so much that it could legitimately call itself the Chinese Social Democratic Labor Party, or something like that, and still be true to what it was trying to do and what the party was doing.

I thought that changing the name would help a great deal in removing distrust between the United States and China. He looked at me and said, “Interesting idea.” Then he said, “Of course, we can never do that, because this is our brand, and we cannot change our brand.” That's the kind of conversation you really did not have with premiers in China, but it was the kind of thing you could have with this premier.

I think the premier felt that, over time, China could get to almost all of that. But once he left office, especially after about 2005 or 2006, politics in China changed enough to make parts of that agreement unattainable in reality. The Chinese never rejected them; they just didn't carry them out. Some of those were quite significant parts, so I think that was when things began to unravel. My own feeling is that if someone of Zhu Rongji's talent had stayed in place, those changes would have been attainable.

It would have been tough, but the changes that had occurred in China over the decades from Mao Zedong's death until Zhu Rongji stepped down as premier were phenomenal. These other things were an extension of those changes, allowing China to continue integrating with the global system, benefit from it, and have an impact on it. Some of it was implemented, and some was not. I don't think you can always say the criticism wasn't fair, because in the end some of these things did not happen. But with somewhat different leadership, I feel they probably would have happened. I don't think it was overreach. It was ambitious, but I also think it was necessary. Frankly, I think China would be better off today if all of it had been implemented.