The 21st Congress lists all lack Xi Jinping! Is Hu Chunhua the successor? After Zhang Youxia, the military changes its tone at the Xiangshan Forum, another 'person with a bow' Zhang Shengmin takes control of the core, and Dong Jun is marginalized! Liaoning officialdom sees a chain of reassignments in four days [Jiang Feng Vision 20260917 Episode 490]
This video provides an in-depth analysis of the subtle signals recently released by the Chinese political and military establishment. As the 20th Party Congress approaches, the name of Hu Chunhua has repeatedly appeared in lists of Politburo members circulating outside the Great Firewall, often pushed to high-ranking positions, while the current leader has disappeared from these lists, sparking speculation about his political future. Meanwhile, at the Beijing Xiangshan Forum, the military's tone has shifted significantly from past hardline rhetoric to an emphasis on peaceful dialogue and stability, which corroborates rumors regarding the control of military power following the incidents involving Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli. Furthermore, there have been irregularities in the public activities and meeting arrangements of Defense Minister Dong Jun, particularly the delay in his meeting with the Singaporean Defense Minister, suggesting that his status in core military diplomacy may be compromised. The article argues that these local personnel adjustments, the shift in military rhetoric, and high-level personnel rumors collectively point to signals that the era of the current Zhongnanhai leader may be coming to an end.
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Hello friends, welcome to Jiang Feng Vision.
The 20th Party Congress is still a long way off, but the seating chart for the next top leadership has already started circulating outside the Great Firewall. And it is not just one version; several versions are circulating at once. Some say Hu Chunhua will succeed as General Secretary, and Yuan Jiajun will enter the State Council. Another version widely circulated on X involves even bigger changes: Li Qiang goes to the NPC, Shi Taifeng to the CPPCC, Chen Xiaojiang to the Secretariat, and Zhang Guoqing takes charge of the CCDI; even the Vice President has been replaced. While the names vary across versions, two points are striking: Hu Chunhua is almost always pushed to the very top, while the leader who has sat in Zhongnanhai for over a decade has disappeared from the next round of top power rankings. This is worth pondering.
Anyone can draw up a list online, but if the chairs in reality in Beijing also start moving one after another during the same period, the situation changes. Yesterday we just talked about the personnel changes in the organizational departments of Fujian, Jiangsu, and Shanxi provinces; today, looking at the Northeast, Liaoning is even busier. Key positions including the Deputy Provincial Party Secretary, Shenyang, and Dalian have been adjusted within four days. This scene is like a banquet where, before the dishes are served, the place cards on the table have already been swapped. Who is prepared to sit at the main table and who is moving up half a seat often reveals news earlier than the final group photo.
But the chairs at the local level are only the first layer. Over the past two days, the Beijing Xiangshan Forum opened, and the military has placed several strange details on the table. Who stood at the front to set the tone for the entire forum? Who went to meet the most important foreign defense ministers? Who, despite being the host, failed to sit down formally with guests who had already arrived in Beijing? And in the military's public speeches this year, which words suddenly increased and which ones quietly disappeared? If you look at these things individually, they all seem like protocol arrangements, but put together, they become interesting.
Especially after the incidents involving Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, the outside world has been arguing about one question: has the leader regained control of the military, or has the gun already changed hands to those who truly call the shots? Of course, Beijing will not issue a red-headed document to give you the answer, but how the military stands, who they meet, and how they speak to the outside world will always leave traces. So today, we will put those 20th Party Congress lists on the table and follow what has actually been happening in Beijing over the past few days, checking them one by one. If it were just netizens arranging seats, it would naturally fall apart after a few steps; but if local personnel, military seating, and external rhetoric all slowly start moving in the same direction, then we might have to ask again: before the Fifth Plenum has even opened, is it possible that someone is already arranging the 20th Party Congress team in advance?
Alright, let's start with those chairs in Liaoning that suddenly started moving all at once a few days ago. Personnel changes in Liaoning began in Dalian on September 12. With central approval, Li Qiang assumed the roles of member of the Liaoning Provincial Party Standing Committee and Secretary of the Dalian Municipal Party Committee. Let's make a quick clarification here: seeing the name
Let's first look at the welcome banquet on the evening of September 15. The person who stood on stage to deliver the address this time was Han Zheng. At first glance, this arrangement seems unremarkable; Han Zheng is the Vice President of the country, and attending an international forum is a high enough title, which makes sense from a protocol perspective. However, the most interesting aspect of CCP politics is that you cannot just look at how impressive a business card is; you have to look at how much that card is actually worth within the Party. Han Zheng is no longer in the Politburo, let alone the Standing Committee. Looking back at previous sessions: in 2019, it was Xu Qiliang who stepped forward, who was then a member of the Politburo and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission; in 2024 and 2025, the protagonist at the banquet was Zhang Youxia, also a member of the Politburo and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission. These individuals held military ranks and, behind them, held a vote in the Politburo. Looking further back, at the 8th Xiangshan Forum in 2018, the person who came out to speak was Li Zhanshu. What was Li Zhanshu's position then? A member of the Politburo Standing Committee and Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress—part of the core circle around the leader. That year was not some 20th anniversary, yet they still invited a Standing Committee member.
Therefore, some people this year are using the 20th anniversary of the founding of the Xiangshan Forum and the appearance of the Vice President to explain the elevated protocol. This explanation sounds plausible, but when you compare it with history, it doesn't quite add up. If they really wanted to pursue a high political protocol within the Party, it's not as if there is no one left in the Beijing Politburo; there are several Standing Committee members, even more Politburo members, and no shortage of cronies promoted by the leader himself. Yet, they ended up choosing Han Zheng, a member of the Jiang faction who has already retired from the Politburo. This choice itself is worth noting.
What is even more interesting is what Han Zheng said after taking the stage. Let's pick a few phrases: "Oppose the frequent use of force or threats of force, advocate for resolving disputes through dialogue and consultation, and prevent the escalation and spread of conflict. China wants to be a stabilizer for world peace." Taken in isolation, these are, of course, common clichés in diplomatic settings. But the point is that this is the Xiangshan Forum, a major international security stage hosted by the Chinese military itself. Who stands at the very front to set the first tone for this stage makes a difference in weight.
Let's compare it with last year, and the flavor becomes even more apparent. At the 2025 Xiangshan Forum, Dong Jun spoke publicly about the Taiwan Strait, saying that the People's Liberation Army was ready at any time to thwart any external armed interference. That tone is very familiar; everyone has heard it so much over the years that their ears are calloused—struggle, anti-interference, war preparation. The louder the table is slammed, the more stable the military power seems to be. This year, when Dong Jun delivered the keynote speech again, the most prominent words in the official press release were changed to "new security concept," "multilateralism," "dialogue and consultation," "common security," and "deepening cooperation." The high-intensity military deterrence regarding the Taiwan Strait was no longer placed at the center of the entire forum.
I need to clarify the timeline here: at the 2024 Xiangshan Forum, Dong Jun's speech was also relatively restrained. So, one cannot say that they suddenly learned about peace overnight. What is truly interesting is that the hardline tone of the 2025 round was once raised again, and by 2026, the first full appearance after the Zhang and Liu incident, the entire public narrative shifted back toward stability, dialogue, and cooling down. I think this change is more worth watching than replacing a provincial governor. When local officials are replaced, it can be attributed to age, resume, or job rotation; when the highest level of the military experiences a major incident and the external political language is adjusted accordingly, we begin to touch upon a more core question: who can decide today what language this military uses to speak to the world?
What did the person who loved to emphasize the military most in the past stress? The Party commands the gun, the system of responsibility of the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, absolute loyalty, and the ability to fight and win wars. This set of things has, of course, not disappeared from the documents today; the military newspapers still shout what they should, and meetings still study what they should. But on this big stage facing the world, what Beijing chose to display this year is a different face. Han Zheng came out to talk about peace, stability, and dialogue at the national level, and Dong Jun, in his position as Minister of National Defense, talked about multilateral security governance, openness, and inclusiveness. Bilateral relations with high political content from the military are once again being handled by the Vice Chairmen of the Central Military Commission. This arrangement looks a bit like repackaging the external image of the Chinese military. It is as if the national leader is responsible for diplomacy, the Minister of National Defense is responsible for professional security cooperation, and the military is returning to a framework that looks more like a national defense institution.
Don't get me wrong, I am not saying that this military has really become a national army. The CCP's Party-army system is still there, and the system of responsibility of the Chairman of the Central Military Commission has not disappeared from paper. But in politics, sometimes what is most worth watching is exactly what they are willing to perform. In the past, they loved to perform that the gun only listens to one person, but now they are willing to pull the image toward words like national peace and professional defense. This change has observational value, especially when placed next to the rumors outside the Great Firewall that the leader has long lost actual military control; the Xiangshan Forum becomes a very good litmus test. If military power were still operating entirely according to the old personal military-strengthening route, after Zhang and Liu went down, the most likely scene would be stronger personal authority, heavier declarations of the system of responsibility of the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and louder volumes of struggle. As it turns out, what was amplified first this year was stability, dialogue, and avoiding the use of force. This cannot be used to determine who holds military power based on a single slogan, but at least it gives us another piece of material that can be placed on the table for comparison.
The more interesting aspect of the Xiangshan Forum is not just the change in rhetoric, but also the change in who meets the truly important guests. This brings us to Dong Jun. Watching this grand game of chess in Beijing, with pieces being moved around on and off the stage, it is exhausting for everyone to keep track. But no matter how the political situation changes, building a strong physical foundation during the cool autumn season is the capital we have to witness history. Friends who watch the show regularly know that Purity Hall's Xuanbao Black Ginseng has always been my great helper for regulating energy; it is gentle, easy to absorb, and helps refresh the mind and replenish vitality. With the Mid-Autumn Festival approaching, from now until September 29, Purity Hall has specially launched a limited-time super-value Mid-Autumn combination: 4 popular products in a family set, originally priced at $344, now available at an introductory price of only $300. There are also double gifts: orders over $500 receive original ginseng, and orders over $3,000 receive an additional premium original ginseng; the more you buy, the more you get. Please support Jiang Feng, click the link in the information bar below, and enter the exclusive discount code JF at checkout to enjoy free global shipping. Take advantage of this special offer to add a layer of healthy protection for your family and yourself.
Alright, let's get back to the main topic and continue looking at Dong Jun's table. As mentioned earlier, the tone of this year's Xiangshan Forum has changed, but in a place like the military, listening to what is said is not enough; one must also look at something more practical: who meets the guests with real weight. First, let's clarify Dong Jun's situation. He has not disappeared in the last two days. On September 15, within a single day, Dong Jun officially met with the defense ministers of Myanmar, Brunei, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia, and also met with the ASEAN Secretary-General. On the 16th, the Xiangshan Forum opened, and he attended as usual and delivered a keynote speech. So, looking at Dong Jun now, the question is no longer whether he is still there—he is certainly there, and he has plenty of activities. What is truly worth watching is which table he is sitting at now, and which tables are starting to be occupied by others.
Let's look at Vietnam first. Phan Van Giang, who came to Beijing this time, holds significant status; he is both the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defense of Vietnam. The relationship between the Chinese and Vietnamese militaries also possesses a layer that other countries do not have, which is further linked to the relationship between the two parties, the public security systems, and regime security. On September 16, it was Zhang Shengmin, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, who officially met with Phan Van Giang. Dong Jun certainly had contact with Phan Van Giang; they had public exchanges at the opening ceremony, and there were images of it on site. However, so far, the session with a complete official press release and a formal sit-down talk was conducted by Zhang Shengmin.
Looking at what was discussed, the flavor becomes even stronger. Zhang Shengmin started by talking about the consensus reached by the top leaders of the two parties and two countries, then brought up the "3+3" strategic dialogue involving diplomacy, national defense, and public security, and specifically mentioned political security, as well as the need for timely coordination of positions and mutual cooperation when encountering important security issues. This has already exceeded the scope of ordinary military-to-military exchanges. What was discussed at this table was security cooperation involving the party, military, and public security lines operating together. As for the "3+3" mechanism, when the first ministerial meeting was held in March this year, the three Chinese representatives were Wang Yi, Wang Xiaohong, and Dong Jun. In other words, at that time, Dong Jun occupied the military corner. Half a year later, when the same Vietnamese defense minister arrived in Beijing to discuss this set of political security cooperation, it was Zhang Shengmin who stood at the forefront. It is certainly protocol-appropriate for a Vice Chairman of the Military Commission to receive a Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister of Vietnam. But what is truly worth watching is not whether Zhang Shengmin can meet him, but why Dong Jun has started to stop sitting at this table.
Dong Jun, as Minister of National Defense, was promoted by the top leader and placed in the military's external facade. In the past, Dong Jun was always at the core of such occasions involving the security of the two parties' regimes and military coordination. But now, on this line with Vietnam that has the most political weight, Zhang Shengmin has moved forward, while Dong Jun has retreated to the level of general defense minister talks and daily national defense affairs at the forum. This is not some kind of redistribution of labor; it looks more like Dong Jun is being squeezed out, bit by bit, from military diplomacy that carries real political weight. So, when looking at Dong Jun now, one should not just count how many defense ministers he met in a day; what really needs to be counted is whether he can still touch the most important matters.
The Vietnam line has already landed today, but the Singapore line is still hanging. And I find this one even more interesting because the Singaporean government made its words very clear in advance. On September 14, the Singaporean Ministry of Defence announced Chan Chun Sing's visit to China, stating in black and white: visiting China from September 15 to 17, attending the Beijing Xiangshan Forum, at the invitation of Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun. During the visit, he will also meet with Dong Jun and other high-ranking officials of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. By the 16th, Chan Chun Sing himself spoke at the Xiangshan Forum, and at the very beginning, he mentioned again that he was attending the forum at the invitation of Dong Jun and the PLA. This is very clear: the inviter is Dong Jun, and the preview also explicitly named a meeting with Dong Jun. However, as of the 16th, while Dong Jun met with many foreign defense ministers in one go, this formal bilateral meeting with Chan Chun Sing has yet to take place.
The person who officially met Chan Chun Sing first was Shi Taifeng. It must be noted that Shi Taifeng meeting Chan Chun Sing is not in itself a new thing. Shi Taifeng met him last September, and the two sides discussed cooperation such as the training of Chinese and Singaporean leaders. In addition to being Minister of Defence, Chan Chun Sing also serves as Singapore's Minister-in-charge of the Public Service, so he and Shi Taifeng already have a working interface. The truly interesting part is on the other side: this year's visit was clearly stated by the Singaporean official side to be at the invitation of Dong Jun, and even before he departed, a meeting with Dong Jun was announced in advance. As a result, after the guest arrived in Beijing, the old channel with Shi Taifeng was completed first, while the session with Dong Jun has yet to land. This is what is worth watching.
Actually, there are three possible ways this could play out next. If, before Singaporean Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen (Chen Zhensheng) leaves Beijing on the 17th, Dong Jun is arranged to hold a complete and official meeting with him, with official readouts released by both sides and all necessary topics discussed, then this matter can be put aside for now. At the very least, it would show that Dong Jun’s normal defense and diplomatic functions are still operating as usual, and his absence over the past couple of days might simply be due to different scheduling arrangements. The second scenario is if it gets dragged out until the very last day on the 17th to squeeze in a make-up meeting, and the duration is very short with lackluster content. That would carry an extra nuance: the host is still the host, and the meeting still happened as scheduled, but the political ranking is no longer as prominent as it originally appeared. To put it bluntly, he can still meet, he is just no longer at the front of the line.
The third scenario is the most worth watching: if Ng Eng Hen leaves China on the 17th and the meeting with Dong Jun previously announced by Singapore never takes place, then the problem becomes significantly more serious. Because by then, several conditions will be simultaneously on the table: the Singaporean government announced Dong Jun’s invitation in advance, announced the meeting between the two in advance, Dong Jun himself has been engaging in normal public activities and even intensively meeting with defense ministers from other countries, and yet he somehow misses the Singaporean defense minister whom he officially invited. It will then be very difficult to brush this off with the excuse that "Dong Jun is busy." Before a foreign government publicly announces a visit arrangement, both sides usually align their schedules long in advance. If a bilateral meeting already written into an official press release ends up disappearing entirely, what is truly worth investigating is what changes happened in between, and who has the capability to alter an already finalized schedule.
Therefore, looking at Dong Jun next, we shouldn't just ask whether he shows up or not; we should ask how much political weight remains in the occasions where he does show up. This question might be much more interesting than whether Dong Jun has run into trouble. And if the seating arrangement on the military side is indeed beginning to be reshuffled, when we look back at those few lists from the 20th National Congress circulating outside the Great Firewall, a repeatedly appearing name in them cannot be bypassed.
Among the several widely circulated versions, the rankings of names are not identical. Some people bet on Yuan Jiajun, while others bet on Chen Gang. Where Li Qiang is placed and where Shi Taifeng is placed also vary across different rosters. However, there is one name that almost inevitably appears no matter how the list is arranged, and that is Hu Chunhua. Over the past few days, people outside have been bringing up the foreign affairs event on September 11: Wang Huning met with the President of the National Assembly of Angola, Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos (De Almeida), in Beijing, and the official readout concluded with the sentence "Hu Chunhua and others attended the meeting." Although Hu Chunhua has had precedents of accompanying Wang Huning to foreign affairs events during his years at the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) (meeting the President of Tajikistan and the President of Serbia in 2023; the President of the National Assembly of Cambodia in 2024; and the President of Colombia in 2025), what is truly worth watching is that Hu Chunhua's name has recently been repeatedly pushed back into the spotlight. After the 20th National Congress, when he dropped out of the Politburo, the outside world briefly felt that this political path was basically heading to the CPPCC for retirement. Yet over the past year or so, especially leading up to the Fifth Plenary Session, Hu Chunhua's name has once again frequently appeared in various succession projections. While the various versions of the 20th National Congress lists differ, many of them push him toward the highest positions.
There is a very interesting aspect here: when political figures truly return to the gaming table, they usually don't hand you a red-headed document first stating that "this person is reinstated." What emerges first are often very fragmented things: slightly more foreign affairs activities, a slightly higher ranking in official media, who they appear with, and what work they participate in. These details all seem unremarkable at first, until one day people suddenly realize the places where they appear are increasing, and only then do they look back and ask: When did this person come back? Hu Chunhua is currently in such a very interesting observation period.
As we mentioned yesterday, within the Leading Group for Inspection Work of the CPC CPPCC National Committee Party Group, Shi Taifeng is the leader and Hu Chunhua is the deputy leader. Placed alongside these recent personnel changes, Hu Chunhua has at least not been sitting quietly in the back rows of the CPPCC as he did over the past two years.
Looking further outward, another rumor has been very lively recently: some say that senior figures like Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, and Zeng Qinghong privately held a so-called "theoretical discussion meeting" (wuxuhui), discussing political lines, the retirement system, and even bringing the over-emphasis on national security in recent years back to a more moderate approach. Whether this meeting actually took place, we do not know. But I think the two words "theoretical discussion" are worth discussing for a couple of minutes.
In this system of the Chinese Communist Party, before many major changes truly take effect, what counts as the "correct narrative" usually shifts first. Back when Hua Guofeng was still sitting in the chairman's seat—holding all the hats of Party Chairman, Premier, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission without missing a single one—when trouble truly began, it wasn't because someone suddenly moved his chair away one day; what changed first was the intra-party view on the political line. The "Two Whatevers" became increasingly untenable, and the discussion on the criterion of truth slowly pushed another set of narratives to the forefront. Once the entire bureaucratic system began to accept the new answers, no matter how many hats Hua Guofeng wore, it was only a matter of time. This is a very realistic aspect of Chinese Communist Party politics: the person may still be sitting there, but the political line may have already moved on ahead.
So today when we look at Beijing, we can use the same method. Don't just stare at who announces their retirement on a certain day or who suddenly loses a title. First, look at what this machine is willing to do right now. A while ago, there was a crackdown on cross-regional profit-driven law enforcement, pressure on local authorities to stop arbitrarily arresting businesses, and state-owned enterprises were pushed to start paying back money owed to small and medium-sized enterprises. Policies on the private economy were also being revised step-by-step to cause less trouble. Now there is another piece: the tone of the military's external statements at the Xiangshan Forum has been reined in. Putting these changes together, it is hard to view them as just a few drafts changing a few words. This is also why several different versions of the 20th National Congress roster have recently popped up outside the Great Firewall. What people truly care about has long ceased to be mere fill-in-the-blank games like whether Yuan Jiajun or Chen Gang will become premier. The most fascinating aspect of these lists is that they all collectively bet on a major directional shift: the era of that person in Zhongnanhai might truly be coming to an end.
If this direction is wrong, it will be very easy to verify next. If Hu Chunhua's appearance is just overseas hype, his political exposure will soon stop at the current level. If Shi Taifeng is merely performing his normal duties, his cross-departmental roles will not continue to expand outward. If Liaoning is just an ordinary reshuffle, once the chairs below are arranged, it will stop right there. Therefore, everyone shouldn't rush to put away these lists for the 20th National Congress; keep them on the table. Every time Beijing moves a chair from now on, we will take them out and check against it; every time the military changes its rhetoric, we will check again. Who steps forward, who slowly retreats to the side—these pieces will eventually piece themselves together into a complete picture.
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