Europe Isn't Mobilizing, It's Delivering Arms and Settling Old Debts! Germany Spends Only Half of Its 100-Billion-Euro Defense Fund in Four Years, Russia Has Only 851 Repairable Tanks Left, Losing 6,000 Net Troops a Month and Unable to Open a Second Front, Tanks Pushed Back to the Third Row and Daren't Be Used! Putin Can Only Pick Fights by Hugging NATO's Article 5, World War III Won't Happen

This video analyzes how the so-called "war preparations" by European countries are not true mobilizations, but rather arms deliveries and the settling of old debts. Germany's 100 billion euro defense fund has only been half spent over four years, and the delivery cycles for tanks and fighter jets are long. Poland's defense budget has decreased rather than increased. On the Russian side, while military spending accounts for a very high proportion of the budget, it relies on Soviet-era stockpiles; production of tanks and artillery shells is limited, and it faces the problem of excessive personnel attrition. The article argues that Russia no longer possesses a numerical advantage and lacks the capability to open a second front. Its primary tactic is to exploit the ambiguity of Article 5 of the NATO treaty to engage in sabotage and harassment, aiming to buy time and create internal divisions. The video concludes that the most realistic outcome for Russia is to exhaust itself, rather than launching a third world war.

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Observe things as they are, and reject fragmented cognition. Last Thursday, Polish Prime Minister Tusk made a statement in the Polish Sejm that ignited the entire internet. He said that according to intelligence, Russia plans to take action against countries supporting Ukraine, using drones and missiles. The most dangerous period is late autumn and winter of this year. The next day, Putin responded at a military-industrial commission meeting in the Kremlin, saying that since some European leaders have publicly declared they are preparing for war with Russia, Russia has no choice but to respond. Well, the rhetoric was certainly tough. Then, in quick succession, Bloomberg added fuel to the fire. How did Bloomberg stir things up? They reported that the German military is making hospital contingency plans based on receiving 1,000 wounded soldiers per day. With these news items put together, headlines across the internet converged into one message: Europe is about to go to war with Russia. But as everyone knows, it is the habit of our channel to look at the ledger when things get noisy—that is, how to judge whether a country is truly preparing for war or just spending money.

Let us state the conclusion first. What Europe is doing now is not mobilization; what is it doing? It is taking delivery of goods, because the budgets were allocated over the past two years, and now is the deadline for receiving the shipments. Instead of listening to what these politicians say, you might as well look at the time series of the money, right? Let us first look at when the funds were approved, and then look at when the goods arrived. Starting with this timeline, in February 2022, the Russia-Ukraine conflict officially began. Germany established a 100 billion euro special defense fund that year, and signed a slew of orders for tanks, artillery, and fighter jets with Poland, South Korea, and the United States. How long has this money been approved? It has been over four years. How has the spending gone? Germany's timeline for spending this 100 billion is very clear. In 2024, the plan was to spend 19.8 billion, but only 17.2 billion was actually spent. In 2025, the plan was to spend 24.1 billion, but only 19.5 billion was actually spent. As of June 30th of this year, the cumulative total for the first half of the year was only 50.7 billion, meaning that in four years, only half has been spent.

Why is it so slow? Because money being approved doesn't mean the goods have arrived; in between, there is a long series of processes like bidding, production scheduling, and delivery. Look, Germany signed the contract for those 35 F-35 fighter jets in December 2022, and it wasn't until September 20th of this year that they received the first one at a factory in the United States. And this one can't even be shipped back yet. Why? Because it has to stay in the U.S. to train pilots, and according to the plan, it won't reach full combat capability until 2029. In other words, it takes a full seven years from signing the contract to being combat-ready. Furthermore, the armored brigade that Germany sent to Lithuania was announced back in June 2023, but it is not expected to reach its full strength of 4,800 personnel until the end of 2027. As of September this year, this battalion is still missing 40% of its personnel, meaning it is less than 60% manned. Now the German Ministry of Defense is at its wit's end and is preparing to force people to go. So, everyone, think about it: would a country about to go to war be moving at this pace? Poland's curve looks exactly the same—yes, exactly the same as Germany's.

The first contract for 180 K2 tanks was also signed in August 2022, and they won't be fully delivered until November 2025. The second batch of 180 has already been scheduled for 2030; that will be a period of concentrated deliveries. Of course, along with that comes the billing for the installments. Poland's defense budget for 2025 is approximately 200 billion in local currency, the zloty. By the 2027 draft, it has dropped to 198.1 billion—it's decreasing rather than increasing. Is this the pace of a country preparing for an immediate war? Military spending would never be flat; only a country busy paying off arms installments would have this rhythm. So, what does a real pre-war mobilization look like? It has several very clear characteristics. First, budget overruns; second, construction schedules are definitely pushed forward; third, reserves are called up in large numbers; and civilian factories are requisitioned. But up to this point in time, not a single NATO country in Europe is mobilizing reserves, nor is any country requisitioning civilian factories. Even the alarming figure of 1,000 casualties per day is old news.

Reuters reported it once last September, and then this September—on the first anniversary of that old news—Bloomberg reported the same parameter again, and this figure made headlines once more. Actually, these traditional major media outlets have a standard playbook: whenever there is big news, to complement it, they tend to pull out old material to keep the new story fermenting. This is a bit like the spread of sentiment in the A-share market. You can treat the main news as the so-called 'leading stock,' and the leader then brings up other peripheral themes; the logic is exactly the same. So, friends might ask, if they aren't going to war, why are these European leaders talking tougher than one another? We need to clarify one thing first: who are these harsh words actually meant for? I think the first audience for these words is their own treasury. Let's take Germany as an example. There is a rule written in the German constitution called the 'debt brake.' Because Germany was traumatized by the inflation in the period before the two world wars, there is this thing in the German constitution that means the federal government cannot borrow more than 0.35% of GDP in new debt each year. If they want to change this, it requires a two-thirds vote in the entire parliament. In last year's German election, the far-right AfD and the Left Party combined didn't even reach one-third of the seats. Once the new parliament opened, as long as these two teamed up, they could block any constitutional amendment. So what to do? On March 18th of last year, while the old parliament hadn't been dissolved yet, Germany rushed to pass a constitutional amendment. What did this amendment change? The part changed was that defense spending exceeding 1% of GDP would not be counted under the debt brake act. After the change, the five words 'Russian threat' directly became a budget quota. In Germany's 2027 budget draft, the federal government's net borrowing is 118.7 billion euros, of which 85.4 billion goes through this defense exception loophole. And the Ministry of Defense's budget is 109.7 billion euros, a 32.7% increase in one go compared to 2026. If you take the money that was just approved in 2025, based on a two-to-four-year delivery cycle, it won't turn into equipment until after 2028.

France is following the same path. This year, France's public debt has reached 119% of its GDP. Yet, even with such high debt, they decided just last month to add another 36 billion euros to their military budget. Moreover, France's approach is slightly different. How so? They cut some minor budgets, but defense is the only area where France is still bucking the trend and increasing spending. After talking about Europe, let's look at Russia's books. I won't even mention the disadvantages; the national strength has basically been hollowed out by the war. But if you insist on finding some Russian advantage in this situation, it's not entirely impossible. Actually, finding this advantage is quite difficult. So where is Russia strong now? I've been looking for a long time, and well, there is something. It's mainly in quantity. In the first half of this year, how much of the total federal expenditure did Russia's direct military spending account for? Take a guess: 43.8%. In other words, nearly half of it—fucking hell—went to defense. What does the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service estimate?

They estimate that Russia produced about 7 million rounds of various ammunition last year—needless to say, this definitely includes contributions from North Korea—which is a full 17 times that of 2021. Another part is the credit of the CCP. The CCP's contribution is mainly reflected in components. What do the tracking data from the Kyiv School of Economics say? They state that about 75% of the dual-use components like chips and machine tools imported by Russia come from China, and for the same items, Russia has to pay about three times the market price. What role is the CCP playing in this war? It is a parts supplier that gouges prices. Of course, North Korea is now also a weapons factory for Russia, but the way they play is different from the CCP. North Korea directly produces finished military products, while the CCP provides what? They provide mother machines and semi-finished products. But the biggest chunk of Russia's quantity advantage has an expiration date because it relies on what? It relies on the inventory left over from the Soviet Union. The rotten tanks the Russian military has been sending to the front lines these past few years are mostly not newly built; they are all pulled from those open-air warehouses and refurbished.

These open-air warehouses can be counted vehicle by vehicle via satellite. Before the war, in February 2020, their tank inventory was 7,342 units. As of June 9th today, only 2,088 remain. And of those 2,088, only about 851 can still be refurbished; the rest are basically beyond repair. Let's do some mental math: the inventory last October was 2,887, and this June it's 2,088. That's a decrease of 799 in eight months, meaning about 100 are scrapped per month. So it's simple: 851 divided by 100 is 8.5 months. In other words, by March or April 2027, Russia's heavy equipment will basically hit rock bottom. Even if we calculate based on the earlier scrapping rate of 46 per month, it can only last until the end of 2027 at most. Once it hits bottom, they will have to rely on new production. Russia's new T-90M tank can only be produced at a rate of about 250 per year. It really matches Putin's temperament.

In the leaked production schedule documents, the peak output is 428 units in 2028, while Russia's total tank production—refurbished plus new—in 2024 is just over 1,500. This means that once the inventory is exhausted, Russia's annual supply of tanks will drop by more than 70%. Artillery shells are heading in the same direction. Let's look at Europe. The largest artillery shell manufacturer in Europe, Rheinmetall—what is the NATO standard? The NATO standard is the 155mm shell, and their annual production capacity is gradually climbing. In 2022, they could only produce 70,000 rounds per year, but the company's goal is to reach 1.1 million rounds by 2027 and 1.5 million rounds by 2030. Note this: this 1.5 million figure was originally supposed to be achieved by 2027, but it has now been pushed back by three years. So European production capacity must also be discounted. After discounting, I estimate that the actual production of 155mm shells by the EU, plus the UK and Norway, will be between 1.8 million and 2.5 million rounds next year, and between 2.3 million and 3 million rounds by 2028.

As for Russia, if you convert the 152mm and 122mm artillery shells used by the Russian military into a combined equivalent based on their destructive power, the annual output is roughly 2.2 to 3.2 million rounds. This is basically Russia's production limit; there is no other way. The way this war is being fought, Russia is short of both manpower and money, and its domestic oil refineries have been fucking blown to pieces, making it very difficult to increase production capacity further. Another key account to settle is the cost of air defense. Back in September of last year, twenty Russian drones flew where? They flew into Poland. NATO fighter jets used air-to-air missiles costing hundreds of thousands to over a million dollars each to shoot down decoy drones worth around ten thousand dollars. No one can afford this exchange ratio. Many so-called experts say what? Ah, they say the cost of Russian drones is extremely low, while the cost of NATO's air defense systems is astronomical, thus creating this strategic asymmetry. The solution? Ukraine had already fucking figured it out. The Ukrainian military used interceptor drones to shoot down how many in one month? 3,500 Russian suicide drones, and one interceptor drone costs about 2,100 dollars.

Now, Europe is also widely utilizing Ukraine's low-cost drone technology and is conducting extensive drone networking, with the timeline concentrated at the end of 2027 to 2028. This industrial chain is actually not that difficult; drone production doesn't take that long. This stuff isn't rare earth minerals, nor is it aerospace technology. You ask how much processing is needed from mining to smelting? None. What are drones actually? They are just batteries and chips that don't need to be very advanced. You can just install 10-plus nanometer chips, and for Europe, the production of this stuff is absolutely effortless. These three accounts simultaneously point to a specific interval, and my conclusion is this: Russia's numerical advantage in artillery shells, tank regeneration, and air defense costs will begin to reverse in 2027, and by 2028, it will basically be leveled out. This is just an abstract comparison of numbers, but I can say this: Russia's numerical advantage is actually not much different from the CCP's numerical advantage. Just relying on their large stockpiles to say Russia has an advantage, I also think it's fucking unreliable. If you could win a war just by having a numerical advantage, Russia wouldn't have fought the war into this fucking state, right?

There is another important item not included in this conclusion, and that is missiles. Andrius Kubilius, the EU defense commissioner in charge of the military industry, provided a set of data in April of this year. What did he estimate? He estimated that Russia produces about 1,100 cruise missiles a year and about 900 ballistic missiles, while how many cruise missiles can the EU produce in a year? About 300, and ballistic missiles are zero. Looking at this weapon stockpile data, it is impossible for Russia to occupy any NATO territory. However, it is still possible to annoy European infrastructure from far away. But we must draw a huge exclamation mark next to this number, plus a question mark. Why? Because Russia also has a tradition of fucking bragging, and the Western camp also has a tradition of scaring itself. Let's use a historical comparison as per the old rules: in 1958, what did the US National Intelligence Estimate say? The Soviet Union might have 100 intercontinental missiles by the 1960s, and 500 by 1961 to 1962. Kennedy, who was a senator at the time, started preaching about this missile gap everywhere from August 1958, all the way until the 1960 presidential election. As it turned out, once the satellite photos from reconnaissance planes were obtained, in September 1961, the new assessment changed this number to no more than 25. But even this was an overestimate, because the Soviet Union only had four truly usable intercontinental missiles at the time, while the United States had 57 in its hands. So, you see, this threat direction is real, but the numbers were blown out of proportion. Why blow up the numbers? To get military funding. And the only way to debunk the numbers has always been one way: to check them one by one, to count them one by one, and only after counting the inventory can we confirm whether the Russian military actually has that many intercontinental missiles. Many people always feel that however much equipment Russia produces, the front line swallows it up, and it gets cleared out every month, leaving no foundation. I broke down and calculated this statement, and generally speaking, it is correct.

The most realistic way to look at this is the balance sheet of military manpower. Let's take a look: on January 8th of this year, Russia recruited a total of 234,000 contract soldiers. That averages out to about 29,000 per month, which is a full 10% drop compared to the same period in 2025, meaning their war potential is shrinking. At the same time, losses on the front line have completely overshadowed reinforcements. In June, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Syrskyi, stated that Russia's monthly losses were around 30,000 to 35,000. Now, you might say, 'Don't just look at the Ukrainian side of the story,' but this has been verified by cross-referenced sources. On April 15th, British Defence Secretary Healey explicitly stated that for four consecutive months, the Russian military's reinforcements have failed to keep up with their losses. Western intelligence also estimates a net reduction of about 6,000 troops per month, which is directly reflected in the total numbers. By the end of June this year, the total number of Russian troops in Ukraine was 721,000. After grinding through more than half a year, they have only increased by a mere 11,000 or so, and that's even counting those North Korean cannon fodder idiots. As for missiles, they are basically firing them as soon as they are produced, with no inventory being built up at all. The Deputy Chief of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine put it very bluntly last month: he said that Russian missiles basically never make it into storage; almost all of them are taken straight from the assembly line and used. Russia used the Iranian Shahed blueprints to build their own long-range suicide drones, which the Russians named 'Geran.' They have an inventory of about 6,200, which sounds like a lot, but from January to August of this year, the Russian military has been launching an average of over 5,800 per month, so that 6,200 would only last a little over a month. However, when it comes to tanks, the situation is exactly the opposite—they do have an inventory. Why? Because from 2022 to 2024, the number of tanks written off per month was around 100 to 150, but last year, that figure saw a cliff-like drop. There is an open-source organization called Oryx; what do they do? They count tank losses one by one based on actual photos. As of May last year, Russia had lost roughly 4,000 tanks. By May of this year, that figure had become 4,390, meaning only 390 were written off in over a year, averaging just over 30 per month. By this summer, the monthly write-off rate was only about 15. Now, you might think, has the Russian tank become tougher? No, it's that the Russian military is fucking afraid to use them. The front line is fucking crawling with suicide drones—the kind where you put on goggles and control them directly, and they explode on impact. As soon as a tank shows its head, it gets blown up. So, what has the Russian military changed their tactics to? They've switched to a tactic where groups of three to five infantrymen crawl forward. What did the spokesperson for the Ukrainian Joint Forces, Trehubov, say last week? He said that Russian tanks have been relegated to the third line, so yes, the number of tanks is indeed being saved up. But what kind of stuff are they saving? It's a bunch of tanks that don't dare to go to the front line. Fighting a war like this, where they don't even dare to drive military equipment to the front, what the fuck kind of Third World War are they going to fight?

So the key question is: does Russia actually have the capability to fight in Ukraine while simultaneously opening another front in Poland or the Baltic states? Let's do the math. To deploy a force with even a modicum of deterrence on NATO's eastern flank, I would conservatively estimate you'd need 150,000 to 200,000 troops. But what is the current state of the Russian military? They are losing a net 6,000 men per month; the available manpower is, in other words, a negative number. The Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service reached a conclusion on April 21 of this year, stating quite bluntly that as long as the war in Ukraine continues, the possibility of Russia launching a conventional war against NATO can be almost entirely ruled out. In other words, for this scenario to hold, there are only two paths: either Ukraine ends one day, or Russia conducts another mobilization on the scale of the 300,000 troops from September 2022. Since there is no manpower to open a second front, what is Russia mainly doing in Europe now? Well, it is mainly engaged in dirty, chaotic sabotage. According to U.S. strategic statistics: Russian sabotage and harassment incidents in Europe totaled three in 2022, twelve in 2023, and thirty-four in 2024. Most of the perpetrators are temporary workers recruited online, and the cost of pulling off a job is in the range of a few hundred to a few thousand euros. But this year, the attacks have clearly become more ruthless; they have started playing for higher stakes. On August 4, a drone carrying explosives landed where? It landed next to a cargo plane at an airport in Germany that was transporting ammunition to Ukraine. However, it didn't detonate. The German government officially determined in early September that it was Russia's doing. Why does Russia now favor this kind of "smash and grab" tactic? This depends on how Article 5 of NATO operates. What is Article 5? It is that collective defense clause stating that if one member state is attacked, it is considered an attack on all. To trigger Article 5, you must first determine that an armed attack has occurred, and then all 32 member states must agree. After they agree, regarding how much effort each country contributes, the treaty states that each country shall take such action as it deems necessary. A drone that is unclear whose it is, or a fire where the mastermind cannot be traced—these do not rise to the level of an armed attack. But every time Russia does this, the member states have to argue over whether or not to respond. You see, spending a few thousand euros to provoke these allies into a public squabble on the spot—for that fucking idiot Putin, this is a profitable deal. Dictators who are fucking idiots usually have one characteristic: they are useless at doing anything productive, but when it comes to sowing division among people, they are absolutely professional. The intelligence reported by Tusk is an upgraded version of this strategy: disguising drone and missile strikes as accidents, disgusting you again and again, repeating it over and over, and letting everyone see that NATO cannot respond. Added to this is the huge variable of the United States; isn't the Trump administration currently evaluating whether to cut one-third of U.S. troops in Europe? It is expected to be decided by November 6 of this year. This hasn't happened yet, but it is clear that this fucking idiot Putin is still waiting. So what is my judgment? This strategy is basically just frantically "touching porcelain" (staging accidents for compensation) while staying glued to the red line of Article 5's collective counterattack. He is not trying to seize NATO territory at all; this is purely fucking meant to disgust you, simply utilizing the EU's political rules to increase the communication costs within the EU. But this work, at most, can only delay things for a while. However, Putin is also fucking playing with fire, because this threshold is also being pushed higher bit by bit. It can be said that the most realistic path to war is not someone premeditating an attack, but rather some probe that fucking goes wrong.

So the key question is: does Russia actually have the capability to fight in Ukraine while simultaneously opening another front in Poland or the Baltic states? Let's do the math. To deploy a force with even a modicum of deterrence on NATO's eastern flank, I would conservatively estimate you'd need 150,000 to 200,000 troops. But what is the current state of the Russian military? They are losing a net 6,000 men per month; the available manpower is, in other words, a negative number. The Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service reached a conclusion on April 21 this year: they stated very bluntly that as long as the war in Ukraine continues, the possibility of Russia launching a conventional war against NATO can be almost entirely ruled out. In other words, for this scenario to hold, there are only two paths: either the war in Ukraine ends one day, or Russia conducts another mobilization on the scale of the 300,000 troops seen in September 2022. Since there are no troops to open a second front, what is Russia mainly doing in Europe now? Well, it is mainly engaged in dirty, chaotic sabotage. According to U.S. strategic statistics: Russian sabotage and harassment incidents in Europe totaled three in 2022, twelve in 2023, and thirty-four in 2024. Most of the perpetrators are temporary workers recruited online, and the cost of pulling off a job is in the range of a few hundred to a few thousand euros. But this year, the attacks have clearly become more ruthless; they have started playing for higher stakes. On August 4, a drone carrying explosives landed where? It landed next to a cargo plane at Germany's Bitburg Airport that was transporting ammunition to Ukraine. However, it didn't detonate. The German government officially determined in early September that it was Russia's doing. Why does Russia now favor this kind of low-level, destructive approach? This depends on how NATO's Article 5 operates. What is Article 5? It is the collective defense clause stating that if one member state is attacked, it is considered an attack on all. To trigger Article 5, one must first determine that an armed attack has occurred, and then all 32 member states must agree. After they agree, regarding how much effort each country contributes, the treaty states that each country shall take such action as it deems necessary. A drone that is unclear whose it is, or a fire where the mastermind cannot be traced, does not qualify as an armed attack. But every time Russia does this, the member states have to argue over whether or not to respond. You could say that spending a few thousand euros to provoke these allies into an on-the-spot infighting session is, for that fucking idiot Putin, a profitable deal. Dictators generally have one trait: they are useless at doing anything constructive, but when it comes to sowing division among people, they are fucking absolute professionals. The intelligence reported by Tusk is an upgraded version of this tactic: disguising drone and missile strikes as accidents, disgusting you time and time again, repeating it over and over, and letting everyone see that NATO cannot respond. Added to this is the huge variable of the United States; isn't the Trump administration currently evaluating cutting one-third of U.S. troops in Europe? A decision is expected by November 6 this year. This hasn't happened yet, but clearly, that fucking idiot Putin is still waiting. So what is my judgment? This strategy is basically just crazily "touching porcelain" (staging accidents for compensation/provocation) while sticking tightly to the red line of Article 5's collective counterattack. He isn't trying to seize NATO territory at all; this is purely fucking disgusting you, just using the EU's political rules to increase the cost of communication within the EU. But this work, at most, can only delay things. However, Putin is also fucking playing with fire, because this threshold is also being pushed higher bit by bit. It can be said that the most realistic path to war isn't someone premeditating an attack, but rather some probe that fucking goes too far.

Looking at Europe's bottom line, the so-called European intervention exists only on paper in one document: the letter of intent signed by France, the UK, and Ukraine in Paris on January 6th of this year. What is the content? It discusses sending a multinational force to Ukraine after a ceasefire, with a discussed scale of 15,000 to 30,000 troops, primarily stationed in rear areas like Kyiv and Odesa, not on the front lines. The constraints on each country are also very rigid. Article 35 of the French Constitution stipulates that deploying troops for more than four months requires parliamentary approval, while the German military requires Bundestag approval to operate abroad. Poland and Italy have explicitly stated they will not send ground troops. In a 15-country poll this May, opposition to sending troops prevailed in Germany, France, Poland, and the UK. Furthermore, the prerequisite does not even exist yet, as there is no ceasefire. So, what it boils down to today is simply continuing to send money and weapons to Ukraine. Then, on September 5th and 6th of this year, US special envoy Wycoff and Kushner met with Putin and then Zelensky, respectively, but they didn't negotiate any framework. So, the statement that Europe is preparing for war, in practice, means continuing to send money and weapons to Ukraine and making contingency plans for rear-guard forces after a ceasefire. Beyond that, it means shooting down drones within their own airspace. To this day, I haven't found a single mainstream political figure advocating for a fucking war with Russia. However, this war preparation is still a spectacle, and behind this spectacle, the European trajectory is upward, even if it is climbing slowly. Look, the money was approved in 2022 and last year, and the goods are scheduled to arrive between this year and 2031. Russia's trajectory is clearly going downward, still relying on Soviet stockpiles and human lives to hold on; it's basically un-winnable. Even that quantity advantage that those inside the country brag about for Russia will be completely gone by the end of 2027. So, I don't know how this so-called World War III with Russia is supposed to be fought—will Putin charge at the front with Wagner bringing up the rear? If this timeline is pushed back further, that new batch of European equipment will basically be fully fielded between 2028 and 2030, while Russia's stockpiles will be further hollowed out as its economy declines. In 2027, Russia loses its quantitative advantage in weapons; by 2028, it won't even have that quantity advantage anymore. So, don't count on Russia fighting any fucking World War III. Putin doesn't even have a chance of extricating himself from the Ukrainian battlefield; what is more likely is that Putin will drag Russia down and drag himself to death—that is the high-probability event. Alright, that's all for today's rant. If you like the show, please click the link below. If you want to support me, join the membership channel. The membership channel features four in-depth episodes every month; welcome to join the 'Good People' group. See you in the next episode.