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"Epic Fury" Destroys Iran! Beijing's 4000‑billion Strategic Bet Shattered? 【Zhi Ding Lecture Hall Enlightenment Forum Yu Maochun】 EP234

1# · OP Author:余茂春 Published:2026-03-27 07:32 Replies:0 Views:28 Permalink:fanzei.net/d_c4psmc

The video analyzes how Beijing has long regarded Iran as a core strategic pivot in the Middle East, investing massive funds and resources to support its regime. However, with the recent "Midnight Hammer Operation" and "Epic Fury Operation" launched by the United States and Israel, Iran's nuclear facilities and military‑industrial system have been severely damaged, sharply reducing its value as an anti‑US strategic pivot. Yu Maochun points out that this shift not only exposes the fragility and lack of coordination of the "CRINK axis" when faced with military strikes, but also marks a major setback for China's long‑term strategic bet in the Middle East. Beijing's strategy of balancing multiple relationships is now facing a severe challenge.

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For more than a decade, Beijing has steadily advanced a long‑term plan to make Iran a key pivot in China's Middle East strategy. Yet recent events show that this concept is now facing a major setback. Among the United States' main adversaries, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) occupies a rather unique position. Unlike Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, or Venezuela, the CCP remains deeply integrated into the global free‑trade system. Beijing, leveraging the massive national capital accumulated through this system, has become an anti‑US financial backer, gradually establishing strategic ties with several regimes hostile to the United States. However, the actual strategic impact of this network is uneven. Despite the CCP pouring large amounts of strategic material and financial‑trade resources, Russia's war in Ukraine has become a prolonged stalemate, Venezuela's importance is diminishing, and while North Korea and Cuba remain challenging, their overall influence is relatively limited. In contrast, Iran has always been seen as the most anti‑US hostile and active, and the most strategically valuable node. In other words, for Beijing, Tehran is not just one of many partners, but a core component of China's overall geopolitical layout.

The Chinese Communist Party’s investment in Iran can be described as quite substantial. In March 2021, China and Iran signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement, which includes a massive commitment of about $400 billion under the Belt and Road Initiative framework for long‑term infrastructure and energy investments. In 2023, Iran was formally brought into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, further integrating it into a regional security cooperation architecture led by China. In the energy sector, China has become the largest buyer of Iranian oil, purchasing roughly 90 % of Iran’s oil exports. For China, this accounts for about 12 % of its total oil imports, but for the Iranian economy it is a vital lifeline. Iran’s geographic location is also of great significance; it sits between the Persian Gulf and Central Asia, serving as a key node linking the overland “Belt” and the maritime “Road.” Strategically, Iran offers China a potential energy transport corridor that could allow Beijing to reduce its reliance on sea lanes dominated by the U.S. Navy. Politically, it enables China to establish a more pronounced forward presence in a region long influenced by the United States. Moreover, Iran serves another layer of China’s strategic interests: by supporting regional armed proxies and maintaining tension in the Middle East, Tehran objectively ties down U.S. strategic attention. The United States, which devotes considerable resources to the Iran issue—including its nuclear program and widespread armed networks—finds it harder to concentrate its entire strategic focus on another larger challenge, namely the Chinese Communist Party’s ambition to dominate the Indo‑Pacific. This was Beijing’s original strategic logic.

However, the “Midnight Hammer” operation in June last year and the “Epic Fury” operation at the end of February caused a major shift in the strategic landscape in a short period. Joint U.S.–Israeli actions severely damaged Iran’s enriched‑uranium facilities, weakening its military‑industrial system and weapons stockpiles, and undermining Iran’s strategic credibility as a potential nuclear‑armed state. Iran’s ability to use a “nuclear edge strategy” as a protective umbrella for its regional activities has therefore been greatly reduced. More notably, these events exposed the so‑called “CRINK axis”—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—and its limitations in actual strategic coordination. When Iran faced sustained military strikes, its alleged strategic partners offered no significant support, leaving Iran to bear the blows alone. For Beijing, the strategic consequences are not negligible. An Iran with diminished military capability and increased internal pressure will find it difficult to continue serving as a reliable strategic fulcrum that disperses U.S. attention; its capacity to create regional instability and tie up U.S. resources will inevitably be constrained. At the same time, Belt and Road projects linked to Iranian ports, railway corridors, and energy infrastructure will face greater uncertainty and security risks. The land‑based energy route that China originally envisioned to bypass U.S. naval control now appears far less certain. China originally bet on a confident, hard‑line anti‑U.S. Iran that would continue to pursue nuclear capability, but the reality is that Beijing now has to confront a partner that has been heavily damaged and whose strategic value has clearly declined.

In addition, Beijing has long tried to balance two contradictory policies: on the one hand strengthening relations with Arab countries, especially the Gulf monarchies, and on the other maintaining close ties with the Iranian regime. China often positions itself as a neutral economic partner, yet it continuously deepens strategic cooperation with Tehran. Against the backdrop of Iran’s weakened power, this balancing act is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. Regarding the “Epic Fury Operation” at the end of February, the Chinese government’s response was swift and uniform. In a call between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, Beijing condemned the related military action as “unjust and in violation of international law.” However, this stance again highlights the hypocrisy and long‑standing contradiction in China’s foreign policy. Beijing has never condemned Russia’s actions in Ukraine and has consistently refused to directly criticize the violent acts carried out by Iran‑backed armed groups, including Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack on Israel. This disparity further reinforces the impression that China emphasizes sovereignty and international law when it aligns with its own interests, but remains silent when its partners are involved. From a broader geopolitical perspective, this shift also carries symbolic significance. Recently, US President Trump will travel to Beijing to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping; before this meeting, the United States has already demonstrated its capability and resolve to directly weaken a key pillar of China’s global strategy. The lesson is clear: a grand strategy built on fragile and authoritarian proxies carries high risk. On the Iran issue, China once believed it had found an ideal strategic partner—geographically pivotal, ideologically aligned, and willing to challenge US regional influence. Today, that strategic bet has clearly failed.

Key events timeline · Selected related nodes
2021-03
China and Iran Sign Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement
China and Iran signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement, with China committing to provide approximately $400 billion in long-term infrastructure and energy investments under the framework of the Belt and Road.
Related topics international relations Iran
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