China Expands Technical Security Border Control, People Have Also Become State Assets
The State Council of China has promulgated the "Regulations of the State Council on Exit-Entry Administration," incorporating export controls, industrial security, and technological security into the scope of administrative measures restricting the exit of Chinese citizens. The regulations were signed by Premier Li Qiang on July 22, 2026, announced on July 31, and will take effect on September 15, 2026.
Article 4 of the new regulations stipulates that if a Chinese citizen violates regulations on export controls, technology import and export management, etc., which may endanger national industrial security or technological security, the relevant competent authorities of the State Council, such as the Ministry of Commerce, may decide to prohibit their exit.
The provisions do not directly state that "research personnel are not allowed to exit" nor do they stipulate that all engineers and technicians will be restricted from leaving the country. The actual risks are concentrated among individuals who possess controlled technologies, participate in cross-border technology transfers, technology imports and exports, research and development in key industries, and cooperation on sensitive projects. As long as the competent authorities determine that the relevant actions violate management regulations and "may endanger" industrial or technological security, they can make a decision to prohibit exit.
"May endanger" leaves significant discretionary power to administrative organs. The new regulations do not list which technologies, which positions, which scientific research collaborations, or which exit purposes will trigger border controls. Whether researchers can leave the country, whether corporate engineers can attend overseas conferences, and whether members of technical teams can take up positions abroad ultimately depend on how the competent authorities interpret industrial security, technological security, and national interests.
What is more critical is that such restrictions do not require a court judgment as a prerequisite. Once the competent authorities make a decision and notify the immigration authorities, border control can enforce it. Even if the individual holds a valid passport, visa, and flight ticket, they may be stopped at the airport or port of entry.
Article 6 of the new regulations stipulates that for individuals who are legally decided not to be allowed to exit, the deciding authority shall, in principle, inform the party in writing of the facts, reasons, basis, and avenues for relief; however, in cases involving potential impact on national security, criminal investigation, etc., the party may not be informed. National security can serve as both a reason for restricting exit and a reason for not explaining the reasons. This is the essence of the CCP's rule of law: power acts first, reasons may not be given, and avenues for relief are written on paper.
Freedom of movement and freedom of migration are fundamental human rights. Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms that everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state, as well as the right to leave any country, including his own. Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights makes similar provisions. China signed this covenant in 1998 but has not ratified it. Signing is for show to the international community, while ratification remains indefinitely postponed.
The CCP's control over freedom of movement has a long historical trajectory. During the planned economy era, household registration, food coupons, work units, personal files, and letters of introduction tied people to land, factories, and organizational relationships. After the reform and opening up, people could work across provinces, but their rights could not migrate completely. Household registration continued to determine eligibility for education, housing, medical insurance, social security, and public services for a long time. When people moved to cities, their identity remained in their original place of registration; their physical bodies entered the market, but their rights remained held by the system.
Exit controls are an extension of this same logic. In the past, the CCP restricted the exit of public officials, military industry personnel, state-owned enterprise employees, personnel in sensitive positions, rights defenders, religious figures, and ethnic minorities, often through centralized passport custody, unit approval, border control lists, and temporary port interceptions. Now, industrial security and technological security have been formally written into State Council administrative regulations, and the physical movement of technical personnel has also been incorporated into the national security apparatus.
If a person possesses key technology, in the eyes of the party-state, they are no longer just a laborer or researcher. They become a carrier of technology. If technology is not allowed to flow out, the person may also not be allowed to flow out. Scientific research achievements, engineering experience, industrial secrets, algorithmic capabilities, manufacturing processes, and the knowledge in an individual's brain are treated as "national assets" by administrative power and are guarded.
The authorities will package this system as a means to prevent technological outflow, guard against cross-border crime, and maintain national security. The problem is that the CCP has never established boundaries for its power. It interprets national security as an infinite basket into which political needs, industrial policies, external conflicts, and stability maintenance pressures can all be placed. Ordinary people's reasons for exiting must be true and legal, researchers' departures must comply with technological security, public officials' passports must be handed over to the organization for safekeeping, and rights defenders' flight tickets can be invalidated at any time. Every gate is guarded by power.
This is not merely a matter of a few researchers potentially being intercepted by customs; it reflects the CCP's underlying way of thinking and values as implemented in national governance. China's constitution nominally acknowledges "lawful private property," but legality is defined by the state, and the power of expropriation and requisition always exists; the same applies to freedom of movement, freedom of migration, and freedom of exit. Rights do not have hard boundaries independent of the regime; they are merely spaces that the regime temporarily allows individuals to use. All of this reflects that the CCP does not actually believe its rights originate from the people and that it should be accountable to the people, but rather believes that "the people are the country" and "the country is my private property."
Leninist party-states view society in a consistent manner. Land, capital, data, technology, organizations, human resources, population, labor, women's fertility, youth employment, and the brains of researchers can all be incorporated into state governance and resource allocation. In this system, people are unlikely to become inviolable rights holders; they are more often treated as statistical figures, labor, stability risks, talent resources, and assets that may be lost.
Chinese netizens use terms like "cattle and horses" and "human mines" to describe themselves. While it sounds like self-deprecation, it is an accurate description of the systemic relationship. Cattle and horses provide labor, and human mines await exploitation. Mines do not acknowledge the freedom of migration for ore, nor do owners acknowledge the right of livestock to leave the farm. The restriction on the exit of technical personnel merely makes this relationship more explicit: in the eyes of the CCP, Chinese people are not individuals possessing fundamental human rights, but rather assets within the CCP's controlled territory that must not be allowed to flow out without authorization.