Zhai Shanying: The CCP's rapid self‑destruct actions are unstoppable

In this video, Zhai Shanying believes that three key signals of the accelerated collapse of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime have already appeared in the first half of 2026: the central government is densely issuing laws and policies, indicating that the CCP is panicking and trying to save itself; various human-caused disasters, accidents, food safety and engineering quality issues are erupting en masse, showing that the cost of maintaining society can no longer be borne; and the international community’s encirclement of the CCP is taking shape. The second half of the video further analyzes the US criminal lawsuit against Huawei, the National Bureau of Statistics’ revision of consumer statistics methodology, and the central bank’s new personal loan regulations that block “loan‑rolling,” arguing that these policies will create larger scales of bad debt, defaulting populations, and social instability.

Ah, the Dragon Boat Festival.

Alright, friends, hello everyone. Today is June 19, 2026, Friday. Welcome to Zhai Shanying’s YouTube channel for chatting and relaxing.

Friends at home, sleep well; friends abroad, stay awake.

Today is the Dragon Boat Festival, so we’ll keep it short to let everyone go celebrate. Move the light farther away; it’s too bright and glaring. This is better.

Some people say this channel is boring, that I talk about the CCP’s downfall every day, presenting facts and reasoning. If you think I’m boring, I don’t know how you, as a citizen of the CCP’s country, have survived all these years.

You used to listen to the news broadcast every day, now you watch the CCP’s good news daily. Why can’t you accept these things? Because deep down you don’t admit you’re a fool. Don’t get angry; the language is coarse but not crude.

Why do you accept all the good news the CCP has been spouting for years? The CCP gets excited over every satellite launch or any new thing. Is it real? High‑altitude wind power, and a bunch of people get excited. Are you a fool?

That thing hangs 2,000 meters in the air, with cables reaching the ground; no one in the world can solve that problem, how can the cable’s stability be guaranteed? Weather is beyond human control. Yet Chinese people can be infinitely excited about it and stay happy watching such news.

I present facts and reason, describing some real and tragic aspects of China, and you can’t accept it. It’s uncomfortable, painful, and you don’t want to see it.

So I say you’re not really concerned about whether the CCP‑related information I present is true or false. You only care whether you’re a fool. Because you believe all the nonsense the CCP tells you, if what I say is true, it only confirms that you’ve been listening to scams for years and still think they’re real. Your mind can’t bear it, so you think I keep talking about the same stuff every day.

You’ve been watching CCP‑related content all your life and never thought there was a problem. You see me talk for a few days and you can’t handle it.

So, okay, today is the Dragon Boat Festival, we’ll talk a bit so everyone can enjoy the holiday. The point is I also have a dinner after I finish streaming, and I have to celebrate too. Sorry, everyone.

What’s interesting is that all good friends are witnesses of the same era. Even if some of them once felt proud of the CCP or its glory, later realized they had a problem and completely reversed, they are still good friends.

We are all witnesses of a historical era. After all, we only live one life; the more ups and downs we experience, the richer our lives become.

What we need to see now is the whole process of the collapse of the Chinese Communist Party and the People’s Republic of China. In 2026, this process has moved from quantitative change to qualitative change. 2026 is a crucial year.

So we are fortunate to watch it. You may have heard my predictions for many years, and now we finally see how this year collapses.

The first half of 2026 is not over yet; there are still ten days left. Even though the first half isn’t finished, we have already seen three especially significant changes that make 2026 completely different from before.

What is the first major change? The CCP is panicking, and the CCP Central Government is extremely panicked.

In the first half of 2026, the CCP is wildly issuing massive numbers of laws, regulations, policies, and plans—so many and so broad that it is unprecedented.

Moreover, the vast majority of these laws, regulations, policies, and plans are aimed at the CCP blatantly seizing the wealth of the nation’s populace and increasing the personal wealth of the ruling class. The rest are to strengthen the CCP’s dictatorial control and expand its management scope.

Why say it’s panicking? The feedback shows that the CCP itself clearly feels that it is collapsing and the danger is huge.

No one wants to die. So it is doing everything it can, trying to use the massive amount of these measures to rescue its objectively unstoppable decay.

Thus it rushes to issue these items. The related items issued in early 2026 are five times more than those in the same period of 2025.

The second big change is that natural disasters and human‑caused disasters have multiplied, with human‑caused incidents increasing far more than natural ones.

Everyone has experienced and seen this in 2026: coal collapses, chemical plant explosions, bridge collapses, blast furnace explosions, large cloth market fires, massive electric new‑energy vehicle fires, severe traffic accidents, entire residential complexes burned to the ground, and so on.

Human‑caused disasters are not over.

What else did we find in 2026? Vast tracts of farmland irrigated with severely polluted, iced‑tea‑colored water, producing grain that we all eat. Also, fish, pork, milk and other foods in the CCP’s country contain antibiotics hundreds or thousands of times over the limit.

So why is pork so cheap in the CCP’s country? Someone asked me why it’s so cheap. Even in a country like Vietnam, pork is much more expensive than in China. For example, elsewhere it’s 30 yuan per jin, in China it’s 6 yuan. Why can’t it be exported? Now you understand: when you try to export to neighboring countries, you’re fined heavily for being non‑compliant. The antibiotic levels are hundreds or thousands of times over the limit.

Then the fruits and vegetables sold in the CCP’s country are chemically preserved products, breeding grounds for various diseases.

Many people say the food in the CCP’s country tastes great. When they go abroad, they find it’s not that great. Why? Because it’s all chemical ingredients and flavorings, of course it tastes good. What’s the cost? The cost is that you die early, with a pile of diseases waiting for you.

So you can’t discuss these things in China. Recently friends have debated the issue of pre‑made meals. I say the debate isn’t about whether they exist, but whether they are healthy. If they help your health, you can eat them; if they harm health, would you still eat freshly cooked food? Think about it yourself.

Why do people who have left the country think overseas Chinese food isn’t as good as at home? I say yes. If overseas Chinese food were as tasty as at home, the restaurant would have been shut down long ago. Who would dare use so many additives that are so harmful to the human body?

In previous years the CCP’s country didn’t have so many disaster incidents, but the first half of 2026 already has many. Countless fatal accidents have occurred. But this is only the beginning, the start of even larger disasters in the second half.

A very important reason is that maintaining the current safety and stability of the CCP’s country requires massive funds and resources at every level—social, production, housing, food, clothing, transportation, work, and all other aspects of safety.

But the country can no longer provide such massive funds and resources.

To survive, every sector and level has to cut corners.

Someone joked that after JD.com builds many skyscrapers, the bamboo scaffolding isn’t even set up before the whole building leaks. Others recently exposed many state‑owned enterprise construction projects where the concrete crumbles like tofu when touched. How can the pillars stand?

The reason? No money.

When a country runs out of money, all its shortcuts, counterfeit and substandard practices emerge across all levels and fields. And without money, there’s no supervision either.

So think about it: under these circumstances, can human‑caused disasters be reduced? No.

Safety issues have no one to manage or supervise. Who controls what food is eaten? Who supervises?

Therefore, in 2026 everyone must remember: the People’s Republic of China has officially entered a mode of universal living without safety.

Universal lack of safety.

What you experienced in the first half are just the initial scattered phenomena. Without money to sustain society, it’s impossible to build the current over‑extended, overspending, and financially fused results. In the end we will be bitten back by it, with no way out.

Thus, for the general public in the CCP’s country in the second half of this year, it’s not a matter of cursing or not; it’s an objective situation. Anywhere, anytime, safety‑related problems may arise, even fatal dangers.

Walking under a building and a brick falls—normal. Something falling in your own home—normal. Surrounding equipment, environment, weather changes, human or non‑human factors—all can cause problems.

Because all these things rely on money to maintain. Highways don’t have big trucks falling into them because money maintains them; bridges don’t keep cracking because money maintains them; coal safety is upheld by money; chemical plants don’t explode because money maintains them.

When there’s no money, the whole society will look like this. The first reason was mentioned earlier: the central government has extracted all possible money. That’s why this scene appears.

The second big change you can also feel. Although the CCP keeps talking about net‑cleansing, cleaning…

Lang, seizure, not letting everyone see various information, but it’s still all accidents, all problems.

The third major change is the stance shown by the international community, now the whole international community, especially developed countries, collectively opposing the People’s Republic of China is extremely evident.

The most important topic at the recent summit was the development of the CCP’s mining industry. Countries such as the United States, Europe, the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, and even tiny Singapore all show in official documents a very clear shift: the description and posture toward the CCP’s state are changing.

It is all visible.

Asian neighboring countries—Japan, the Philippines, Cambodia, including Singapore, etc.—have changed their description of the CCP’s state, all hostile.

Including the current US‑Iran conflict, the ongoing Russia‑Ukraine war, the CCP‑state‑manufactured global cyber‑fraud gangs, massive exports of fentanyl precursors, the incidents of CCP‑state men gang‑raping female Chinese students in Europe, the UK and the US, and now the research in Europe and the US on how the CCP government uses multi‑layered deep subsidies to export excess capacity worldwide, among other issues.

So in 2026, you can clearly see that almost all developed countries in the world, in various documents, are just a few words away from explicitly stating: the People’s Republic of China is the axis of evil forces worldwide, the greatest stumbling block to normal human civilization development.

These countries demonstrate this with concrete actions: encirclement. A global alliance to encircle the People’s Republic of China is taking shape.

Everyone should pay attention to Singapore when they have time. A tiny, Chinese‑led, neutral country since its founding, in major 2026 events such as the Shangri‑La Summit, has already issued major anti‑China statements. Look at Singapore’s newspapers; they repeatedly condemn the various atrocities the CCP’s state carries out in Asia.

Pakistan, the only brother‑in‑arms of the People’s Republic of China written on propaganda, has clearly tilted toward the West and is rapidly distancing itself from China. Therefore, Pakistan’s ports in 2026 see no Chinese cargo at all—nothing gets out, a wasted effort.

Think about it, that friend is gone. In 2026, everyone is encircling, it is obvious.

Thus the CCP’s state is facing a series of global political, economic, and social pressures never seen in the 40‑plus years since reform and opening, mainly targeting China, unfolding silently, gradually, and resolutely.

What will the CCP do? Through frantic unlimited‑war and infiltration tactics, it will try to disrupt the global order.

A group of people surnamed Gao claim a world financial crisis is imminent. Why? China is deliberately provoking a global financial crisis. Why? Because once a global financial crisis occurs, China can shift the international pressure it faces onto the world. Everyone is half‑dead, all impacted, and the encirclement of the CCP’s state naturally cannot be consolidated.

Unfortunately, this dream is almost unattainable. This is what I mean: AI high‑technology has become a pillar for the human world. The entire human productive‑force structure and the logic of civilization development are changing. Therefore, a collective confrontation of civilized nations against the CCP’s state, even future collective beating of the CCP’s state, is an inevitable outcome. It will not change because the CCP’s idiots say whatever they want.

In the first half of 2026, presenting facts and reasoning, you can see: China, to survive a few more days, is frantically exporting all kinds of policies; massive human‑caused disasters erupt within the CCP’s society; the international community’s sharp opposing stance toward the CCP’s state has clearly formed.

That is the main theme of the first half of 2026.

However, these themes may not be the most severe in the second half, because far more dangerous situations will arise later in the year.

Even the three points of the first half could become crucial starting points for the collapse of the CCP regime in 2026. If any one expands too much, the country cannot bear it.

We shall watch and see.

In the current CCP system, what I have described and what you see in the clear first‑half‑2026 events are all completely suppressed by the CCP, not allowed for external viewing, yet you still see the outcomes. Think about how huge the underlying problem is.

Once you clearly recognize this problem, looking outward you will see many situations you do not easily notice. For example, the Zhang Youxia incident. We know this emerged in early January this year; now nearly half a year has passed. Look at whether any of the CCP’s major military regions, theater commands, or service branches have made any statement about it. Imagine how terrifying the real chaos behind such unsuppressible events could be.

But because these massive purges, killing of related personnel, and the lack of response at the grassroots level are not the hallmark of 2026, we cannot call them the feature of 2026. They are not a main development direction; they are isolated incidents.

Crazy policy output, massive human‑caused disasters, and a worldwide encirclement are the new main development directions of 2026. These are visible to everyone.

Alright, let’s wait and see. After all, a person only lives once; experiencing and seeing more in a lifetime does no harm.

Today’s opening follows the old habit of sharing a happy little story.

Ordinary citizens preparing—I've talked about it before. I keep repeating the same things, which is unfair to old users. You can go back to previous content. Under the current crisis, what ordinary citizens should do has already been covered.

Now I’ll start with a happy little story.

This month, a U.S. federal court officially began criminal prosecution of Huawei. What are the charges? Interesting. In U.S. history, no major company like Apple or Microsoft has ever faced so many serious criminal charges. Usually tax evasion is the biggest charge.

The charges against Huawei include bank fraud, telecom fraud, organized crime, trade‑secret theft, and so on—all serious criminal offenses.

It is rare to see such a large “technology” company prosecuted entirely with criminal charges. Moreover, in the indictment, the federal judge explicitly stated that Meng Wanzhou’s guilty plea statements made to obtain her return to China serve as important evidence for this criminal prosecution of Huawei.

Someone asks, Meng Wanzhou already pleaded guilty, why could she still return to China?

If you watch American TV dramas, you’ll be familiar with this. In U.S. law, there is a deal where a suspect voluntarily communicates with the federal government, pleads guilty, and in return receives probation, reduced sentencing, or dismissal of criminal prosecution. Such deals are common.

Meng Wanzhou’s return to China was such a deal. She pleaded guilty to many actions to obtain the U.S. not prosecuting her further. Yet her guilty‑plea evidence can become major evidence for the U.S. government’s case against Huawei.

This prosecution has taken a long process. Since 2018, U.S. courts have been preparing to criminally prosecute Huawei, with prosecutors gathering evidence. Up until early this year, the court reviewed massive evidence submitted by Huawei itself. In the end, the evidence Huawei offered to have most charges dismissed was found useless.

Therefore, the U.S. federal court rejected all of Huawei’s requests to dismiss the charges. The Huawei case has officially entered the trial phase.

It is currently expected that in September this year, the U.S. federal court will complete jury selection and then proceed to trial and sentencing.

If Huawei loses, even just in the United States, it will face huge fines. Moreover, it will involve confiscation of assets under U.S. global jurisdiction, a permanent ban from the U.S. market, complete removal from the U.S. financial system, an indefinite comprehensive technology embargo, and extensive restrictions on cooperation between Huawei and any institution with close ties to the United States worldwide.

Furthermore, if Huawei loses, according to the usual logic of the U.S. Department of Justice when prosecuting a corporation—because it is a criminal case—it will deem Huawei’s criminal liability as resulting from directives given by certain natural persons who controlled Huawei at the time. Those natural persons will then be sued.

In that scenario, it is not that the lawsuit comes after a verdict; once Huawei is found guilty, those natural persons, such as Ren Zhengfei and others, will immediately face lawsuits in U.S. courts. The case titles will basically involve conspiracy, financial fraud, violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, and so on.

At the start of the prosecution, the U.S. court will issue arrest warrants, request Interpol red notices, and freeze all overseas assets of senior Huawei personnel.

At that point, I believe Huawei executives who brag about themselves daily will only be able to endure a soft‑detention fate that only China can provide. Their passports will become ornaments; they will not dare to travel abroad, and a domestic ID card will be enough. Who would dare to go abroad easily? Every trip abroad could mean a cold set of handcuffs.

And not only that—if Huawei loses this criminal trial, a wave of other countries will use the evidence and reasoning recognized in the U.S. case to bring criminal or civil economic suits against Huawei.

Evidence and materials from the U.S. court judgment can be shared globally. All developed countries worldwide will trust and rely on the U.S. court’s evidence.

The spillover effect of books and evidence is recognized. If the United States says it is correct, the whole world will consider it correct. Since Huawei is guilty, it is guilty everywhere.

If massive lawsuits appear in the next year or two, the great Huawei company in the minds of Chinese people of the CCP, even if it does not go directly bankrupt, global credit bankruptcy will be inevitable. Huawei's people do not even dare to leave the country. I do not know what fragile feelings those CCP citizens who are proud of Huawei have inside.

Karma, eternally unsatisfied.

Therefore, this Huawei parasite, after the US criminal lawsuit began, I think its bouncing years are really short. We can all see for ourselves, this is good news.

Huawei's specialty is naming and renaming. Things like "far ahead" and "Tao's Law". When Tao's Law was first explained, I was also one of the earliest in the self‑media to talk about it. After that, does anyone still discuss Tao's Law? Is anyone in the People's Republic of China still talking about Tao's Law?

Mr. Huang said, "Tao's Law is leftover stuff from Nvidia," and that sentence sentenced Tao's Law to death. Foreign celebrities do not speak casually.

This renaming, Huawei is definitely following the CCP's academic style. The CCP's name‑changing playbook is very familiar.

The CCP is now playing a new trick. It started in 2026. Although it has been done before, it started again in 2026, and I will explain.

When it was done before, China faced very poor data, and the reflected sectors could not be changed. The first method was to cancel the data, making it invisible. For example, youth employment rates by age, etc.

The second method was to change names and content. For example, the GDP statistical logic was changed, but it was still called GDP. The name stays the same, the logic changes. Financial data, such as how M1 and M0 are counted, the scope of M1 changed, but the name stayed M1, only the counting scope changed.

Recently there is another especially bad thing, which I have been talking about since the beginning of 2026. Consumption is definitely dead.

The CCP now cannot change that consumption is really terrible, so what to do? This time they were clever: not only did they change the connotation, they also changed the extension and the name. This renaming effect is called a double‑edged sword.

2026 is the start year of China's 15th Five‑Year Plan for national economic and social development, and the 15th Plan makes expanding domestic demand and boosting consumption the sole economic focus and pillar. The result is miserable consumption data. By May, both month‑on‑month and year‑on‑year fell, the whole year looks bad, and the first five months cannot be solved.

So they change it.

In the past, the CCP's core indicator reflecting consumption was a single metric called total retail sales of consumer goods, i.e., the "social retail" data. But that data was terrible.

In May, China's social retail data was negative both year‑on‑year and month‑on‑month. This created a dead‑end with no excuse.

If April this year is much worse than March, the CCP's excuse is that last year's base was higher. We have seen that excuse many times. Fiscal revenue is poor, tax revenue is poor, so they say last year was higher. In fact, last year was also low.

Compared with March, April is a short month and March a long month, so saying April is worse than March is normal. But May is a long month; compared with April, the month‑on‑month is still negative, and even an explanation fails.

What to do? Change the name.

At a State Council press conference, the National Bureau of Statistics added a "social services retail total" to the total retail sales of consumer goods, turning the indicator into "total retail sales of consumer goods and services".

It uses this indicator to replace the previous social retail total, representing consumption values.

Thus, at this State Council press conference, the National Bureau of Statistics announced boldly: from January to May, China's total retail sales of consumer goods and services grew 2.8% year‑on‑year.

Last year there was no such figure; how does a 2.8% year‑on‑year growth come about? No one knows. I checked all AI sources, and no one knows how this number could be produced. There was no number last year, yet this year they created one—how can it be year‑on‑year?

In this miraculous case, the services retail total grew 5.4% year‑on‑year. What is the services retail total? No one knows. Apart from announcing the growth, no one knows the figure.

I searched all official CCP sources and could not find the statistical standard for this "social services retail total," its specific methodology, survey method, or values. You could calculate something—100, 200, 3000? No.

Only one definition from the National Bureau of Statistics says the figure reflects the comprehensive value of non‑production, non‑business services provided by enterprises, industrial units, and individual households to individuals and other units, including transportation, accommodation, education, medical care, sports, entertainment, etc. Nothing else.

So the CCP must really hate people like me. They brag, they lie, and you ask why someone like me exists? If you seriously and earnestly expose their lies and bragging, isn’t that a full revelation?

Besides that definition, in the entire official system of the People's Republic of China you cannot find this number, there is no corresponding figure, no breakdown, no component share—nothing.

Consequently, under these circumstances, from January to May this year, the original social retail data grew only 1.4% year‑on‑year, while the services retail total supposedly grew 5.4%—just words. Therefore, the National Bureau of Statistics' combined "consumer goods and services retail total" shows an overall year‑on‑year growth of 2.8%.

With that 2.8% it becomes easy. Plug in the numbers: 1.4% multiplied by 62% plus the so‑called services retail 5.4% multiplied by 38% equals exactly 2.8%.

What does this mean? In China's new indicator "total retail sales of consumer goods and services," traditional social retail accounts for 62%, and the new services retail accounts for 38%.

A service retail share of nearly 40% in an important economic indicator has never been found in any of the National Bureau of Statistics' statistics. Logically, shouldn't this be one of the core consumption metrics? Yet you have never seen its industry breakdown, proportion, or numeric feedback—nothing.

Before June 2026, you had never seen a value for this, nor knew how it could be compared month‑on‑month or year‑on‑year. How can you compare without numbers?

When it appeared, the figure became one of the leading numbers representing national consumption. Yet you still cannot find its statistical logic, scope, or implementation plan—none at all.

When something abnormal occurs, there must be a monster. What does that mean? This thing is fabricated.

Because the social retail data is so poor, the 15th Five‑Year Plan makes consumption a core focus again. Who will see this fabricated figure? The CCP's face is gone. But they want to change the real consumption situation, improve the data, and cannot do it. Because it is simply impossible. The people are squeezed by heavy taxes, become extremely poor, and cannot increase consumption.

How to make the data look good? Add a services retail component. This services retail has no clear definition; whatever they say is what it is, they can fabricate as they wish. If it looks good, the Five‑Year Plan won't become a joke. Thus the "total retail sales of consumer goods and services" data appeared.

The year‑on‑year growth for the first five months jumped from about 1% to about 3%, giving both substance and appearance.

But can this figure reflect the real consumption of ordinary Chinese people? We all know it cannot. The people remain poor, society continues to decline, life stays bad. The CCP only changed a data indicator and inserted a number. To outsiders, and to the 200‑kilogram idiot Xi Jinping, who knows nothing, the data looks good, policy seems fine, and everything is fine.

Some economists say the decline in total retail sales year‑on‑year and month‑on‑month is because automobile consumption, a large item, fell too quickly. That big item’s rapid decline drags the data down. Then they say other items did not decline much, so overall there was not much decline.

Isn't that nonsense? Even nonsense has a sound. People have a fixed amount of money. If this month nobody buys cars, that money is free, right? Shouldn't other consumption numbers rise? The problem now is that this month nobody buys cars, car consumption plummets, other numbers do not rise significantly, so overall consumption falls.

It doesn't add up; the nonsense doesn't add up.

Of course there is no solution; Chinese people are that foolish. Most "little pinks" (nationalists) will believe any expert who calls them foolish.

Alright, that's all I have to say. If you are willing to listen, listen carefully. If you are willing to listen, reflect on yourself and think about your own problems.

No more to say, due to time, we will now introduce the next topic.

This topic is simple; what is it called in the circle? It is called a "nuclear‑bomb‑type policy." A nuclear bomb is about to explode, how terrifying.

This nuclear‑bomb‑type policy, people outside the financial circle apparently do not feel. I see no domestic news reporting it, nor overseas news, I don't know why. Perhaps because it is a very small regulation.

Unlike the previous ones I mentioned, which involved many ministries, this regulation is simple: only one ministry, the People's Bank of China, issued a rule called "Regulations on the Disclosure of Comprehensive Financing Costs for Personal Loan Business."

The name is quite a mouthful. Personal

Loan business, explicit comprehensive financing cost regulation. It's quite simple: all banks must clearly display the comprehensive cost of personal loan business, so borrowers know.

Why is this called a nuclear bomb?

Because this regulation, combined with the central bank's previous regulation "Personal Loan Management Measures," together are terrifying.

What is the direct result? A certain type of person will grow wildly, to an unimaginable extent. Who? Those who borrow to repay other loans.

Starting August 1, the aforementioned "Personal Loan Business Explicit Comprehensive Financing Cost Regulation" is being strictly enforced across all financial institutions in China—state-owned, private, and third‑party—all under a 24‑hour verification system backed by information technology and big data.

How does this regulation lead to that result?

Think about it: suppose I take a loan domestically. Why can many "borrow‑to‑repay‑borrow" people survive? I take a loan, or I withdraw the loan cash from a bank, or I transfer a loan from a platform like Jiebei to a bank card and then use the card to repay China Merchants Bank.

Under the new rules, both methods are prohibited.

If you go to a bank ATM to withdraw cash that originates from a loan, after August 1 the ATM will record a serial number for each bundle or single note. If the cash is used not for consumption but to repay a new loan, you will be penalized and your account frozen.

Second, if you take a loan—say from Huabei—and deposit it into a bank card to repay other institutions, the entire process is under bank‑system supervision and cannot be done. New loans are absolutely prohibited from being used to repay any other financial institution, including online‑loan lenders.

Thus, "borrow‑to‑repay‑borrow" becomes impossible under the new rule; it is completely blocked.

What will happen next? On June 18, 2026 Bloomberg published a survey. Currently, more than 100 million people in the People’s Republic of China are in overdue debt and cannot repay. Personal non‑performing loans total at least CNY 2.22 trillion, up 21 % year‑over‑year, a historic record.

Additionally, a report from Zhejiang University’s Institute of Finance shows that each year Chinese financial institutions handle personal non‑performing loans ranging from CNY 2 trillion to CNY 3 trillion.

The overdue personal loans and debt mentioned here are not corporate‑related liabilities that individuals are personally responsible for; they are direct consumer credit defaults.

According to the Zhejiang report, this category includes credit‑card debt, consumer loans, mobile‑installment plans, auto loans, micro‑finance loans, etc., but explicitly excludes mortgage loans, which are secured by property and therefore not counted in the unified personal‑debt‑overdue category.

Consider this: excluding mortgages, over 100 million people in China are already overdue or unable to repay loans—a frightening situation.

The survey also shows that almost all overdue borrowers have exhausted every possible source of cash—company funds, family, relatives, friends—before turning to financial institutions, and then continue to fall behind.

Consequently, the likelihood of these people ever clearing their overdue balances is negligible; they have virtually no source of funds.

In this context, loan overdue rates have risen 21 % in a single year—over one‑fifth—an extremely alarming growth rate.

These over‑100‑million individuals generate CNY 2‑3 trillion of bad loans each year. Yet this massive amount exists under a premise: a huge number of people can still borrow to repay other loans without being overdue.

Therefore, the current overdue cases are only the tip of the iceberg. The real iceberg is the far larger population of "borrow‑to‑repay‑borrow" borrowers, estimated at least 300 million people.

These individuals continuously shuffle credit‑card credit, online loans, and various credit tools, using precise mobile‑calendar reminders to calculate which platforms can extend credit each day. Because they have no overdue record, they maintain creditworthiness and keep borrowing new money to roll over existing debts.

They form an invisible army.

These people constitute the main force of the personal‑lending market in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) state. They are not on the overdue list nor the credit‑default enforcement list because the CCP’s original financial system contained a loophole that allowed "borrow‑to‑repay‑borrow." Everyone knows this loophole, and it let them operate.

Now, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) is closing that loophole just as the State Tax Administration closed the "Golden Tax Phase IV" loophole—using big‑data and information systems to seal the "borrow‑to‑repay" channel completely.

So after August 1, what happens to those who relied on borrowing to repay other loans? Their loans mature, and they cannot obtain new funds. Even if they can obtain new funds, they cannot use them for repayment.

The outcome is predictable: just as the Golden Tax Phase IV caused many enterprises to collapse, after August 1, the 300 million‑plus Chinese borrowers will, in most cases, inevitably become overdue and eventually fall into the credit‑default abyss.

This is a massive push of these borrowers into a large‑scale movement.

It is expected that each month in China will see 30‑50 million former "loan‑shuffling" individuals entering the financial system’s overdue list. Their outstanding credit balances will quickly turn into non‑performing assets.

Thus, the current 21 % year‑over‑year increase could swell to 210 % or even 2 100 % by year‑end. The default curve will shift from linear growth to an explosive surge.

That is why it is called a "nuclear‑bomb‑level" policy.

Correspondingly, a massive wave of bad‑loan storms will hit financial institutions. China could see, in a short period, over a hundred million "credit zombies"—people who cannot sustain themselves without the "borrow‑to‑repay" mechanism, effectively becoming dead‑weight.

When a large portion of these people become credit‑defaulters, the CCP’s severe punitive mechanisms will strip them of basic participation rights in modern society.

The current credit‑default system makes it impossible for them to find employment that would allow debt repayment, because many formal jobs require a clean credit record at onboarding. Moreover, financial‑sector account freezes for defaulters prevent even basic online borrowing.

Their numbers could exceed a quarter of the nation’s total population, creating a fundamental survival crisis and potentially becoming the largest and most critical source of social instability.

Now you understand what "nuclear‑bomb‑level" policy means, right?

Indeed, some say they can’t comprehend how many such "stupid" policies China has rolled out in just a few months of 2026.

Even as the central government sees household incomes falling and consumption weakening, it forces all flexible‑employment workers into expensive employee‑based social security instead of cheaper urban‑rural schemes, to keep the social‑security pool appearing funded.

When private enterprises are already struggling, the CCP Central Committee uses Golden Tax Phase IV to strangle private‑sector tax revenue. Even if private firms employ retirees, regulations require them to enroll those workers in social security and pay corresponding income taxes.

When city‑investment companies are heavily indebted, the government forces them to separate from local governments. After separation, they lose any possibility of refinancing, and local guarantees disappear, leaving them to collapse.

The PBOC’s implementation of the "Personal Loan Business Explicit Comprehensive Financing Cost Regulation" appears to standardize the lending market and reduce future massive personal‑credit defaults, guiding normal consumption behavior and encouraging people to live within their means.

However, like previous policies, it will quickly generate a massive credit‑default population, creating widespread social instability.

If you force these people to pay employee‑based social security, how can they survive without income?

That’s why, for example, the most famous 30,000‑person influencer building in Hangzhou is now vacant, a dead‑end construction with no rent. Within less than a year, the entire 30,000‑person influencer tower is empty. Those in Hangzhou should know which building I’m referring to.

With the economy in this state, you still demand social‑security contributions. Enterprises are already struggling; credit‑aggregate data shows private firms are not borrowing at all, essentially giving up on survival. Then you forbid them from borrowing to repay other loans, turning everyone into credit‑defaulters subject to enforcement. City‑investment firms also die.

What is the sole purpose of this approach?

In 2026, a flood of such massive regulations serves only one function: it allows the central‑government departments responsible for these areas to shift blame.

The national tax system forcibly collects taxes and then passes the buck; the social‑security system uses this policy to collect contributions, monitors daily, calls it "all‑day" supervision—if you don’t pay, you can’t work. Adding social‑security makes the system appear alive.

The central government lets local debt escape from city‑investment consolidation reports, making government debt look tidy, and the central authorities stay unscathed.

Banks are prohibited from "borrow‑to‑repay," which on the surface looks like policy implementation and market regulation, and temporarily makes banks’ financial reports look good.

These are the effects.

From the central government’s perspective, under the brilliant leadership of a 200‑kilogram idiot, responsibility can be avoided. On the surface, there is no problem.

But what is the purpose of unification? It was given to lower‑level local governments. How do you solve it?

It’s like Hangzhou now: a building for 30,000 people is completely empty. So many people who survive online rely on themselves—how do they cope with the local employment environment? So many enterprises can’t continue operating, the people they employed are out of work, how is that crisis resolved? How are the bad debts of city investment companies dealt with? So many individuals cannot survive by borrowing to borrow, how are the social instability factors addressed?

I don’t want to.

The central government issues policies, the departments wash their hands, and everything is fine. No one cares about the hidden risks this creates for the lower levels. Why? Because all the problems that arise below are lumped together as stability‑maintenance issues. Maintaining social stability is the responsibility of local governments. If they can’t handle stability, then they have to deal with it themselves.

Look at the domestic videos of this year’s Dragon Boat Festival, including those from Shanghai, Harbin, Xi’an. When you look at tourist spots and crowded places back home, rows upon rows of police, urban management officers, and soldiers are standing.

When I was in China, I never saw such a scene. The Dragon Boat Festival is just a festival—does it have to turn into this? A tense, fearful Dragon Boat Festival. You gather so many people—what are you afraid of? Local governments, even big ones, provincial capitals or municipalities, what are they afraid of? They line up so many people to watch.

They fear instability, they fear it becoming like this.

So think about it: the pressure keeps mounting, and if these people can’t survive, what will happen?

I have lived in China for many years and have never experienced what is shown in the current domestic videos. Can you verify whether these videos are fake, whether they really depict the Dragon Boat Festival? If they are not fake and truly rely on these police, what does the public feel during the holiday? We don’t know.

Any questions? Let’s chat a bit more. I have to go attend Dragon Boat Festival activities.

I truly don’t understand—under normal circumstances, a country this poor should be tolerant. Stop imposing taxes, let businesses survive; stop forcibly collecting social security, let citizens live; stop forcing people into borrowing‑to‑borrow, let borrowers survive.

The CCP is strange. In the first half of 2026, it shifted the blame upward, making every policy force people below to a point where they can’t survive, hoping they die early. Can they really die? And each policy kills masses of people.

That’s why I say we are witnessing history. When fate arrives, people cannot gamble with heaven. Do your best, accept destiny. When destiny arrives, that’s the reality. China has reached a stage where it should collapse.

So it’s not only Xi Jinping accelerating; everyone is accelerating, forcing everyone into a corner. All things push the lower levels into desperation. What is the result of desperation? We will see.

The appreciation of the renminbi has no relevance here. Is the renminbi even a currency? Can you freely exchange it, freely deposit and withdraw? Can you freely transfer it abroad? If not, treating it as a currency comparable to others is foolish.

Here’s something strange. The CCP had six banks—Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Bank of Communications, and CITIC Bank—set up an offshore renminbi trading center in Shanghai, claiming it would replace Hong Kong’s offshore renminbi center.

Why? The original offshore rate in Hong Kong was shaped by international speculators. China wants tighter control over the offshore renminbi rate, so it builds a Shanghai‑based offshore rate center within the Chinese banking system to guide global offshore renminbi trading.

What does that mean? In Hong Kong, the renminbi‑to‑dollar rate is 1:7, which the central government thinks is too low. In Shanghai’s center, the rate might be 1:6.9, making the renminbi higher.

Just look at it. After this policy was announced, as someone in finance I was thrilled. Why? I don’t know which idiot thought this up—so stupid.

Do you know why Singapore, Hong Kong, and basically every offshore renminbi center around the world have almost identical rates daily? The differences are only beyond the third decimal place. Everyone in forex knows a term: arbitrage.

Whenever a large rate gap appears, do you realize what a crazy money‑making opportunity that is? It creates a manufactured spread between the renminbi and international rates, and arbitrageurs go crazy profiting.

Why do global forex markets only show differences after the third or fourth decimal place? Market demand eliminates such arbitrage. Once a currency becomes an arbitrage tool, its official international function diminishes.

The CCP, knowing that arbitrage is widely recognized, still wants to build a tool for international arbitrage and openly tells everyone that the world often misperceives the renminbi rate, so China will set up a Shanghai center to correctly guide the renminbi‑foreign currency rate.

When this center was announced, I was stunned. How to arbitrage? One side 1:7, the other 1:6.9—buy here, sell there, that’s arbitrage. So it lets big international financial institutions pick up money.

Retail investors can’t play this game because Shanghai’s clients are mostly large international financial institutions, not retail. No company would be foolish enough to open a new offshore renminbi account at China Construction Bank when they already have HSBC or Standard Chartered. Opening a corporate account is hard for ordinary firms. Thus, the actual arbitrage benefits go to big international banks.

It gives those banks a chance to make money out of thin air. That’s why I say the Chinese Communist Party’s thinking on this is incomprehensible.

Taiwan opened a CCP information‑window intelligence site; you can check it, but it’s not very meaningful. Why? Because probably 90‑95% of the visitors are CCP spies.

Look at how many trolls are on my channel and how many CCP agents comment—it's obvious.

CCP spies are extremely skilled, engaging in hybrid warfare and deep infiltration. So the Taiwanese CCP information‑window likely has a majority of CCP spies. Taiwan’s approach is correct in principle, but achieving effective results through it is difficult.

Let me tell you a small story. I don’t know if you’re aware, because I travel worldwide.

As a Chinese citizen with long‑term visas for the US, UK and other developed countries, I can transit through most countries without needing a visa for that country, just using my long‑term visas.

But there is one Asian country—just one—where, despite holding those long‑term visas, I cannot even land at the airport. The airline won’t let me. That country is Taiwan, the Republic of China.

Why bring this up? It shows how severe the split is between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China. With a PRC passport and those long‑term visas, I can transit through any Asian country without a visa, but Taiwan won’t allow it.

If I don’t have a Taiwan visa, no airline will issue me a ticket for any flight transiting through Taiwan, regardless of where the flight originates. Interesting, right?

My frequent travel made me realize how unique Taiwan is.

The CCP still claims Taiwan is part of the PRC, that Taiwanese companies are Chinese companies, that Taiwanese universities are Chinese universities. Yet any Asian country will let you in with a Chinese passport and overseas visas, while the Republic of China does not. You say it’s part of you? Can you at least let people with Chinese passports transit?

They can’t even do that, yet they brag.

Chinese people can go to Taiwan, but they must obtain a visa from a Taiwanese office first—same logic as applying for visas to other countries. Without a visa, you can’t go.

I am currently in Dubai, facing many problems. You know I’m in Dubai late at night because I am a target of the CCP. I even say seriously that wherever I go I know who is around me.

People used to tell me that even in airport lounges, someone could walk in and ask me directly. Dubai is the CCP’s major base in the Middle East, with over 500 agents deployed there. Some law firms, like those founded by people with a Peking University law background, are the largest Chinese law firms here, and about a third of their staff are CCP agents. I can’t recall the name. All state‑owned and private‑enterprise lawsuits here are handled by that firm, which is full of agents, massive numbers of agents.

Of course, I also have many connections here, especially with some UAE royal families. So some people warned me that the CCP would not dare to assassinate me directly here. But many of my contacts…

When you need to find someone to do something, you are heavily restricted. Some institutions around us are also being threatened, using other forces. But we are still trying.

If we can resolve the matter by early July, we will share good news with everyone.

That's all for today. Happy Dragon Boat Festival to all, wishing your families peace and safety. Enjoy the zongzi. Thanks to the ancient seniors of the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods.

Friends in the country, enjoy the zongzi. Friends overseas, may your wishes come true.

Thank you all, that's it for today. Thank you.