The CCP Begins to “Cut” the Elderly
This episode mainly discusses three topics. First, it analyzes the farce of the so‑called World Data Organization (WDO) being founded in Beijing, pointing out that its essence is a shell company and a scam; second, it inventories the large‑scale downfall and disappearance of senior PLA generals over two years, analyzing how the army’s lack of small‑team cohesion leads to a collapse of combat effectiveness; finally, it explores the "Opinions on the Development of Mutual‑Aid Elderly Care Services" jointly issued by the Ministry of Civil Affairs and ten other departments, noting that this is a dangerous signal that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is shifting elderly care responsibilities to society and abandoning fiscal guarantees.
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Not bad, it’s okay after coming in, just shift a bit, it’s fine.
Alright, friends, hello everyone, today is May 8, 2026, Friday, welcome to Zhai Shanying’s YouTube channel for chatting and relaxing. Friends at home, sleep well; friends abroad, stay awake, okay? First place, first place, every time we say you’re all first. Okay, it’s Friday, let’s start with something light. The openings lately have been too heavy, many friends said they felt depressed after watching, so let’s talk about a lighter topic.
Friends abroad might not feel much, friends at home may have a topic of interest. On March 30, 2026, a month ago, a global commercial institution called the World Data Organization (WDO) held a grand founding conference in Beijing, China. Everyone hears the name WDO and thinks it’s similar to WTO, feeling it should be a high‑end, prestigious international organization? The intuition says it should be fine.
Because on the day this organization was founded, our great fucking idiot Xi Jinping wrote a long congratulatory letter to the institution, wishing it a grand start and setting a high‑level tone—impressive, right? Then the state‑run CCTV and Xinhua News Agency loudly released news about the organization’s founding, claiming that China will become a leader in the global digital arena, and that the organization’s establishment has a milestone effect.
A CCP government spokesperson said WDO is a future‑oriented NGO. He believes that in the near future it will play a role comparable to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in the global digital field. How powerful is WIPO! This WDO has been given important responsibilities and confidence. The People’s Daily published a lengthy column titled "What Is the Deep Meaning of the World Data Organization Settling in Beijing?" Why such a name? How could such a powerful organization settle in Beijing?
At this point, everyone should feel it’s high‑end and prestigious, right? Xi Jinping’s congratulatory letter, so many agencies talking about it, all official media reporting extensively—it’s all red‑hot. Then, in the publicly available data, we see that the World Data Organization WDO is a professional, non‑governmental, non‑profit international organization voluntarily formed by units and individuals at the forefront of the global data field. Over two hundred members joined at its inception, spanning more than forty countries.
Hearing this, isn’t it still impressive? But I often say that when things are abnormal, there must be something fishy. I saw this organization, Xi Jinping’s congratulatory letter, all the coverage, the organization appears on Chinese media. However, the strange thing is that I could not find any news about it on mainstream media in any other major country worldwide—no reports, no messages, nothing. For example, because I’m based in the UK, the Western media I follow are far more numerous than Chinese media.
The result is that I didn’t find any coverage, which is odd. Such a powerful institution should have caught my attention. Why is there coverage only in China and none elsewhere? As we all know, when things are abnormal, there must be something fishy. Then I researched, and a strange thing emerged. First, through public data queries, the founding institutions of this organization are all Chinese government bodies, universities, and research departments.
No organization from a non-CCP country exists. What is the CCP Country Data Development Research Center, research institute, CCP National Communications Institute, CCP Mobile Communications Company, Tsinghua University, etc.? An international organization this impressive, with initiators all from the CCP country, is already very strange, right? Then, what is the name of the WDO chairman? It is Tan Tieniu. What does he do? He is the current Party secretary of Nanjing University in the CCP country, not the president, a Party cadre. What did he do before this job? Prior to this, he was the deputy director of the Central People's Government's Liaison Office in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, abbreviated as the Hong Kong Liaison Office.
It turns out he is a bona fide government official, a Party representative, which makes it even stranger. How can an international NGO, a non-governmental organization, have a current CCP official as its chief? Moreover, besides this chairman, who is the secretary-general actually responsible for WDO's work? It is Yang Jie, former Party secretary of China Mobile Communications Co., Ltd. Before serving as Party secretary of China Mobile, he was Party secretary of China Telecom Group, also a Party cadre. At this point, does anyone still find this unremarkable? The cat’s out of the bag.
An organization that claims to change the world, with a congratulatory letter from Xi Jinping—so impressive. Further public information shows that WDO’s official status in the data field is described as comparable, becoming a global assistance platform benchmarked against the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).
However, the place of registration for its payroll is an NGO registered with the Beijing Administration for Industry and Commerce of the CCP country. Fuck, that’s unbelievably impressive! It means that all the necessary conditions for an international organization to be established are missing: no sovereign state treaty, no public international legal personality system, no United Nations recognition, no basis in international treaties, no required diplomatic agreements, etc., none at all. It is registered with the CCP’s Administration for Industry and Commerce, which theoretically anyone could register.
Looking further down, public sources cannot locate the list of the purported forty countries and over two hundred members that the company claims to have. The complete list is invisible. Moreover, this organization is so impressive that WDO has existed for only a month and a half, yet its official website does not exist.
Continuing, public information states that WDO’s positioning is to bridge the data gap—what does that mean? It claims to unite all countries marginalized in the US‑European data standards, providing services to bridge the data gap for those nations. At this point, it’s clear: another CCP‑fabricated brag‑fest.
Since I can remember, in the 1970s, such farces were common in the CCP country. Let me tell you, every legitimate NGO worldwide at least has a United Nations registration number, a Swiss registration number, or international legal entity information, or publicly available multilateral treaty basis, a clear international legal personality, public member information, etc. Organizations previously founded by the CCP country, such as the Shanghai Economic Cooperation Organization, meet all those criteria. But WDO has none of that.
In other words, with any official letter from a CCP ministry or subordinate agency, you can, for almost no cost and within half a day, register such a company in any Chinese commercial system. This is an outright shell company, a “wild‑chicken” organization. If it were truly useful, it would already be in operation, perhaps serving as a standing host for future non‑governmental international forums in the digital field.
Beyond that, you have no idea what a shell or wild‑chicken organization can actually do. Why does such an institution have such a grand name and massive promotion across China? Those familiar with how other CCP internal departments swindle the central government will see the trick.
First, we all know the CCP’s internal system frequently cheats—cheating the higher‑ups, the lower‑downs, and private investment firms. What is the best way to cheat? We call it “raising a big flag and putting on tiger skin,” i.e., duping the idiot Xi Jinping, who knows nothing and is overly vain. After he came to power, reality showed that whatever he eats is never enough, whatever he does never works. Now intra‑party conflicts are severe and escalating, stability is poor. So this idiot—just like Trump—keeps being begged for help. He now shows the mindset of his third term: increasingly urgent attacks.
Since the pandemic began, this idiot Xi has realized that data is useful, that static zero‑COVID, stability, and locking all Chinese people in are useful—data, that word. So he will definitely prioritize it. Yet the CCP lags far behind the US and Europe in many fields.
In the data field, the US and Europe have no international organizations or conditions, only standards. The CCP can exploit this to write its own narrative. Therefore, WDO’s establishment can tell Xi that in the future data arena, when the US and Europe have their own rules, we will unite all other institutions and countries that cannot meet those rules, forming a bloc.
Then, by uniting them, we define the rules of the future world data industry ourselves and write a story. So this bogus organization, registered with the Beijing Administration for Industry and Commerce as WDO, claims in its propaganda that its future counterpart surpasses the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). If Xi Jinping were even a bit smarter, this sham institution wouldn't have been taken to such a low level. But Xi Jinping is indeed a complete idiot.
The story is well told! The CCP could, through WDO, bring the digital projects of these underdeveloped countries, especially African nations, under CCP control, giving the CCP great influence in the global data industry in the future, and so on. I guess the report I wrote made that stupid Xi Jinping’s snot bubble laugh out loud. The simplest question is, is this a legitimate international NGO? What are the criteria for an international NGO? Without even understanding that, they write a congratulatory letter, and you can imagine how excited that idiot gets.
Then, not to mention anything else, just this WDO’s level of bogusness—don’t even call it an NGO; it can’t even function as an international academic institution because such institutions require many years of deep cooperative research and development, and only after forming a solid international consensus can such a research body naturally emerge. WDO is a textbook example of a fraud.
A standard fraud framework, a shell organization—this has to be said. Xi Jinping’s learning ability and cultural knowledge are so poor that calling him an idiot is truly apt. Otherwise, even something like WDO could turn him into a spinning vortex, right? Moreover, having no self‑awareness, in the data field the CCP’s hardware and software are as bad as garbage; the hardware relies entirely on the United States, Taiwan, and Japan, and there is no software at all.
The data you want, besides the country’s own data, includes external data. With the Great Firewall built so solidly and an AI project that only distills, the CCP does not control any primary data channels in any field worldwide. So what’s the point? If you do this, you have to think for yourself—there is no self‑knowledge, nothing at all. Now WDO is fine, with Xi’s congratulatory letter and a “sword of authority,” massive media promotion, and I think this organization can now start scamming money openly at every level of Chinese government and commercial markets.
It scams, and it scams those with strong backs. Xi’s congratulatory letter—additionally, where does this attach to Xi’s face? Xi thinks this can be a good talking point for brainwashing the public. After all, most Chinese citizens don’t know what the data industry is. Why did WDO land domestically? People’s Daily ran a heavyweight article: “What’s the deeper meaning of the world data organization settling in Beijing?” Damn, you registered a shell company in Beijing; if you don’t settle in Beijing, other places won’t allow you either. Register in Shandong, but your operating location isn’t in Shandong, and Shandong won’t let you operate there.
That issue is truly impressive! CCTV, various outlets, Xinhua hype it up, and the super‑stupid CCP “Little Pink” netizens cheer! We stand up again! Don’t think that international finance, trade, telecom, and intellectual property are all done by the West; in the future, global data will be handled by Chinese people, and we will control it.
Why bring this up? Because it’s a mess of endless spin. WDO has no future, we all know that. According to CCP practice, once such an organization is formed, the propaganda is used up, and then it scams whoever it can; real work is impossible. The scammers finish the scam conference, take all the money, and how could they possibly fulfill the promises made at the conference? It can’t happen, and it’s done. So the matter is clear: the future ends here. I’m just stating this fact—look at how stupid the CCP and this party are, financially and otherwise.
An extremely internationalized organization, and Xi, this idiot, sees that the two most important positions—chairman and secretary‑general—are both held by current CCP party secretaries. Isn’t it obvious this is a bogus organization? So no more explanations; just know it. In the future, don’t expect the CCP to keep founding “international organizations,” launching satellites, etc.; the “Little Pink” netizens will get excited. Remember, look at history—have you ever been scammed like this repeatedly? Right? Today it’s a bogus organization, tomorrow it’s the Hainan Free Trade Port, the day after that it’s the C919.
The day after tomorrow, Xiong’an New Area—aren’t these all nonsense? Right? What does a bogus organization have to compare with the ITU and WIPO? What do you have? What does the Hainan Free Trade Port replace Hong Kong or surpass Singapore? What does the C919 use to join the world’s top three manufacturers? It’s all bragging. The CCP brags too much; don’t take it seriously, okay? Whoever does is a fool. Let’s start with a light topic. Just know about WDO.
People in the country should stay away when they hear this in the future. Present facts and reason, teach everyone ways to recognize the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and you will see it clearly. Okay, let's start the topic. Today's important topic, big news cannot be avoided: the hot issue is that yesterday both Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu, former members of the Central Military Commission, State Councilors and Ministers of National Defense, were sentenced to death with a two‑year reprieve by the highest military court of the CCP state. If they commit no major crimes within two years, the sentence will be commuted to life imprisonment, which must be served without parole or reduction.
What about the fate of these two individuals? In fact, it should be a true reflection of the current reality for the vast majority of senior commanders in the CCP's armed forces. According to data, now most senior officers in the CCP's military have a similar fate as these two. Based on statistics from The New York Times, up to the first quarter of 2026, only after the first quarter of 2023.
By the first quarter of 2026, over a two‑year period, the functional departments of the Central Military Commission that control theater commanders, political commissars, defense ministers, paramilitary heads, or heads of military academies have already seen more than thirty generals and some lieutenant generals arrested or disappeared. In the confirmed two‑year span, only four senior commanders are known to have remained in post.
Zhang Shengmin, Eastern Theater Command commander Yang Zhibin, Central Theater Command commander Han Yan (Han Shengyan), and Defense Minister Dong Jun. Moreover, among these four, Zhang Shengmin and Dong Jun have repeatedly been reported as being under investigation and removal. The position of Defense Minister used to be held only by a Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, but Dong Jun has never been able to reach that level.
Zhang Shengmin, Yang Zhibin, Han Shengyan, Dong Jun—what about the rest? Let’s mention Zhang Youxia, He Weidong, Li Shangfu, Liu Zhenli, Miao Hua, Lin Xiangyang, Qin Shutang, Yuan Huazhi, Li Yuchao, Wang Houbin, Wang Chunning, Zhang Hongjun, He Hongjun, Wang Xiubin, Wang Zhenhua, etc.; they have all fallen, been arrested, all have been arrested. I won’t list every position because it’s exhausting. People like Wang Wenquan, Li Fengbiao, Wang Qiang, etc., were forced into retirement before reaching retirement age.
There are also many, such as Liu Qingsong, Wu Yanan, Wang Haijiang, Huang Bin, Zheng Xuan, Xu Deqing, Li Qiaoming (army commander), Chen Hui (army political commissar), Hu Zhongming (navy commander), Chang Dingqiu (air force commander), Guo Puxiao (air force political commissar), and others like Xu Xisheng, Xu Zhongbo, Xu Qiming, Xu Xueqiang, Ju Gansheng, Li Yiwei, Xiao Tianliang, Lin Jie, Yang Xuejin, Lin Huaxin—these people have all disappeared. Later, Xiao Tianliang, president of the National Defense University, Yang Xuejin, head of the Academy of Military Sciences, and Lin Huaxin, political commissar of the Academy, also disappeared.
Do you see it? China is impressive, right? From 2023 to now, in three years, nearly fifty core senior officers of the CCP’s military have been identified, and only four remain in normal positions. That means over 90% of the core senior officers have either fallen, disappeared, or been forced into early retirement—none are active.
Why is Xiong’an New Area a failure? How many times has it been talked about worldwide? Look at the old videos. I don’t want to answer this kind of question. It’s been covered many times, even this month. Look at why cities abroad emerge, do you understand? Look at why cities abroad emerge, and you’ll understand. This kind of nonsense—no city could possibly appear here: no mineral resources, no population, no commercial opportunities, no conditions, no gathering. Building a city here is just stupid. Historically, such attempts have always been barren.
I won’t explain further; I suggest you look at the previous material for many of these issues, don’t be so impatient. My explanations are thorough, right? Okay, 90% of the CCP’s senior officers are gone. Historically, when this happens, what’s the result? The entire army of that country collapses.
Do you know what the disappearance of core commanders signifies? Look at the Yue Family Army—what happened when Yue Fei was gone? The Qi Family Army—what happened when Qi Jiguang was gone? Zeng Guofan’s Xiang Army—what happened when its leader was gone? Even Chiang Kai‑shek replaced senior commanders, and the troops that fought the Communists lost combat effectiveness. So, this is the standard pattern: when soldiers go to fight, regardless of which army, they are essentially being sent to die; surviving is luck.
Going to war, the massive casualties in Korea were essentially sending soldiers to die. Right, what reward does sending yourself to die in Russia bring? Think about it: you join the army, you get a tiny amount of military merit and a small pension—no commercial value. So I ask you, what conditions would make you send yourself to die?
The military profession, once truly involved in war, is an extremely high‑risk, low‑return job. If you are willing to participate and even be at the front, remember it is not just what appears on the surface; deep emotional and spiritual trust factors are required. In normal civilian employment or administrative loyalty, remember that for thousands of years no one could make a soldier—or anyone—willingly send themselves to die.
Therefore, in militaries around the world, military academies will tell you that the most critical term for forming combat power is "small‑team cohesion." Remember this term, small‑team cohesion. This cohesion must be spontaneous. Any soldier who goes to the battlefield because of coercion or temptation will inevitably fall into a game‑theoretic dilemma or a situation of broken trust. At that point, everyone becomes timid, cannot perform in a real battle, and hopes others will charge ahead and die for them.
So those of us who have worked in the workplace know how big the difference is between a person who works with one hundred percent, even one hundred twenty percent effort, and a person who works with twenty percent effort. How much larger is the combat effectiveness gap between soldiers who desperately push forward in a hail of gunfire and those who hide behind and hope others will fight? Modern wars are quite civilized; the treatment after surrender is generally far better than death or injury. So why do many people choose to fight to the death rather than surrender in such circumstances?
Thus, on the battlefield, remember the small team—small‑team cohesion is crucial. The logic of war, the logic of soldiers sacrificing themselves, does not diminish because of weapon gaps. In the recent conflict between the United States and Iran, you saw that despite a huge disparity in weapons, U.S. fighter jets were still shot down and rescue aircraft such as an A‑type crashed.
War equals soldiers dying. No one today questions that fact in human history. Therefore, the willingness of soldiers to die, driven by small‑team cohesion, is the most important factor of combat power in every army worldwide. Consequently, you notice that some of the worst units in modern war history are those with the lowest combat effectiveness. Have you seen them? For example, the Italian army, the South Korean army of the past, and so on.
Even with excellent weapons, these forces rank among the world’s weakest because their small‑team cohesion is extremely poor. The Italian army, for instance, lacked the bond formed by training together and fighting side by side for a long time, leaving it perpetually ineffective. In 1896, equipped with the world’s most advanced weapons, the Italian army fought indigenous forces in Africa and Ethiopia and was beaten badly, with thousands of Western soldiers killed.
During World War II, Italy launched a revenge campaign in Ethiopia, using aircraft, tanks, artillery, and machine guns, and ultimately resorted to massive chemical weapons—mustard gas—poisoning not only the Ethiopian natives but also bridges, rivers, and villages, achieving only a pyrrhic victory.
Consider this: without combat effectiveness, what good are your weapons? And the South Korean forces—after World War II, before the U.N. forces led by the United States landed at Incheon, they were also beaten badly by North Korean troops and easily lost Seoul. Despite having far more troops and American‑style equipment, the South Korean forces were squeezed into a defensive pocket around Busan, a tiny area in the southeast Korean Peninsula, almost forced into the sea by the North. The sole reason was a lack of small‑team cohesion. So remember, weapons are not the key; wars are fought by people.
War is about dying; soldiers fear death, avoid it, and hide, making victory impossible. The core reason soldiers are willing to die is the strong emotional bond, identity recognition, and a firm sense of a shared destiny within the small team.
Thus, militaries worldwide cultivate small‑team groups, comrade culture, hometown ties, mentor‑apprentice relationships, honor traditions, and inspirational heritage to counter the natural human instinct to avoid death. Yes, small‑team cohesion is the key to combat power worldwide. In military academies this phenomenon is called the unavoidable cause of warlordism in all armies. What is warlordism? It is the overall term for close patronage networks, emotional integration, and trust dependence that develop between superiors and subordinates in a military.
When a commander is promoted, the people he promotes are essentially his own small‑team members; when those members become officers, they in turn promote their own small‑team members. This tight warlordism gives the army strong combat power through emotion, spirit, and trust. That explains why effective combat units live, train, and fight together as a cohesive, long‑term formation.
The benefit of warlordism is that soldiers at every level feel they are part of a collective they can rely on, satisfying various personal needs, and they are willing to die for the team’s emotional, spiritual, and trust‑based bonds.
However, the downside is that reliance on personal ties creates factions, mutual protection, and internal strife, which can undermine overall combat effectiveness. Therefore, modern armies strive to balance warlordism with centralized control and state oversight. How they achieve this is beyond today’s topic; just understand the direct link between small‑team cohesion and military combat power. The Chinese military is the same: all current service branches, military regions, and academy leaders and their subordinates are fundamentally warlord‑structured at the grassroots level.
These people have long merged through comrade relationships, promoting each other, sharing tacit understanding between superiors and subordinates, jointly bearing risks, and so on, forming a dense network where senior leaders bring down their subordinates, the system reveals origins, and factions intersect. This is exactly one of the things that the incompetent, insecure idiot Xi Jinping worries about the most. He wants the CCP’s army to be 100% loyal to him, which the CCP calls political loyalty. So after becoming the top leader and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, he has been working hard to completely eliminate warlordism in the Chinese state.
Ah, the small teams disappear, so all military regions were dismantled and the major service branches were restructured, removing most of the senior leadership of the CCP’s armed forces—whether they were arrested, killed, or forced into early retirement, they are all gone. On the surface, this reduces warlordism in the Chinese state a lot. However, the Chinese army has a century‑old model of small‑team cohesion built up since before the founding of the nation, so what this idiot Xi has done by dismantling the Chinese army is only to eliminate more than ninety percent of the top leaders of each system.
But achieving his desired loyalty is very difficult, because if you investigate you will find that 95% to 99% of the officers in the combat system’s nodes have been eliminated by him himself. That means ninety percent of the leadership was directly or indirectly promoted by him. What should you do now? Continue the purges or stop?
Exactly, what should you do? These small teams have already become extremely rebellious because you have arrested their higher‑level leaders; their emotions, spirit, and trust are in a state of anxiety. What do you do? This is why, after this idiot took over Zhang Youxia, up to now the People’s Republic of China has had no military region or service branch publicly aligning with the CCP’s Central Military Commission, the PLA newspaper, etc.
Because on the surface you have Zhang Youxia, but when you look at the patronage you find that warlordism reveals that a large number of officers below are also Zhang Youxia’s protégés, and further down are still protégés. The small‑team cohesion formed among them far exceeds the so‑called political loyalty that the idiot Xi wants. If this idiot wants absolute party loyalty, he must remove all the leaders promoted by these small‑team networks at every level. In the CCP’s army, it is impossible to clear out dozens of thousands of people; it simply cannot be done. Even making the remaining personnel appear loyal on the surface is unattainable.
But clearing out dozens of thousands of people is absolutely impossible. So what can he do? He can only keep holding study sessions for the remaining leaders, making them attend training, constantly emphasizing the Central Military Commission’s responsibility system, and using the military discipline inspection commissions, supervisory commissions, and other young cadres of political‑legal committees that he promoted and who are loyal to him to supervise all levels of leadership.
He has basically shattered the army’s internal structure, using harsh measures to showcase his own military law. For example, this time both defense ministers were sentenced to death, making the current army leadership understand that disloyalty to this idiot Xi will bring consequences worse than losing a war. The point has been made clear. This will be an army without small‑team cohesion, and it will have no combat effectiveness. If you send soldiers to the battlefield to die for the loyalty to the idiot Xi, that loyalty will be essentially nonexistent.
Zeng Guofan’s Xiang Army could quickly become combat‑effective because it used a father‑son, brother‑general, hometown‑to‑hometown model, relying entirely on blood and regional ties. Thus the common people could display combat power stronger than so‑called professional soldiers. If you don’t fight hard, you are just a fellow villager; returning home you will be despised by your own people, facing huge social pressure and emotional bonds. That small‑team cohesion is the key to the Xiang Army’s combat power. It is far more effective than any “terrorist military law” imposed for loyalty to the Qing dynasty.
Therefore, as mentioned earlier, the armies that can fight worldwide are those where senior commanders live together with a group of soldiers, eating and sleeping together, undergoing brutal training, artificially creating a bond that is even stronger than brotherhood. The United States’ biggest war failure in a hundred years was the Vietnam War, the only time the U.S. military employed a system of individual rotation combat.
Soldiers served their term and then returned home, regardless of who they were. As a result, combat personnel and junior officers were constantly rotating like a revolving door, leaving no trust or emotional connection between officers and soldiers, leading to constant conflict. After all, going to the front line means certain death; a stranger only increases that risk. Discipline became extremely difficult, and during the Vietnam War many U.S. soldiers threw grenades at their own officers from behind.
This case of Vietnam’s failure has now become a classic example in military academies worldwide. Armies that have lost small‑team, zero‑echelon structures have no combat power, a consensus among militaries worldwide. I won’t go deeper; it’s already clear. Xi demands 100% loyalty from the CCP’s army, and after eliminating all the warlord‑like factions, such an army’s combat power is like tofu dregs—nothing. The current CCP army cannot even handle a large‑scale armed conflict, let alone an invasion of Taiwan.
Absolute political loyalty requires soldiers to be depersonalized, de‑emotionalized, and distrustful. Absolute political loyalty means no emotions, no trust—who would willingly go to die? They may obey on the surface, but would they really sacrifice their lives for a few wages and a bit of honor?
What is the one thing that makes Xi Jinping even more of an idiot? Right now you feel that this sentencing of the two defense ministers to death, a chicken‑for‑the‑monkey display, shows the consequences of not being absolutely loyal to his politics. But it’s very foolish, because the result of his actions creates consequences below. The next time the CCP really gives weapons to soldiers, how many people in the small teams linked to those two defense ministers and their entire system have deep feelings and trust? Xi sentencing them to death will generate a huge hatred. It’s likely that the result won’t just be a small trouble like someone throwing a hand‑grenade at a leader.
When a soldier threw a hand‑grenade at a leader in the United States, the officer was a stranger, there was no grudge, it was probably a temporary conflict. Now it’s different: Xi has eliminated so many people and then sent so many political‑work cadres to supervise and monitor below, creating an unknown amount of accumulated resentment. So by that time, not only hand‑grenades but missiles will be thrown in bulk as a normal state. Ah, have I made myself clear this time? Why do I call Xi an idiot? Even the most advanced weapons in war are in the hands of soldiers, right? No soldier can have any personal affection for the idiot Xi or for Xi himself.
But those who have received benefaction or even life‑saving help from old leaders have deep feelings. Those old leaders who helped, who carried the thunder, are absolutely trusted. So if, for example, I or my family were persecuted by the idiot Xi, my heart would be full of hatred. When the opportunity arises, the more advanced the weapons I control, the more the chance for that hatred to act.
Alright, let me tell you, this time Xi is super‑idiot, he should have raised those two defense ministers high and gently set them down, providing a soothing effect for all the small teams below. Because of Zhang Youxia, you’ve made it so intense that the army is about to flip over for you.
All soldiers, have you ever fought a war? Who has feelings for you? You haven’t even trained together, who has feelings? You just raise them high and set them down gently—how nice! Then they might still have some benefaction, okay? Yet you sentenced two to death, isn’t that idiotic? Apart from that, we’ve covered the big issues. Loyalty to North Korea’s Kim Fatty—let me say it again, don’t compare to North Korea; everything North Koreans have—clothing, food, shelter—is because of Kim Fatty. Kim Fatty has ties with China; China gave North Korea those necessities. Without Kim Fatty’s relationship with the CCP, North Korea would have starved that day—no electricity, no energy, half the country would die.
North Korea is mountainous, lacking food, people can’t survive, so why does that country risk death? Not because of anything else, but because everyone can survive thanks to a stupid Kim Pan‑bang who has a relationship with Xi, so the CCP aids that country. The people of a country are parasites; don’t compare any North Korean issue with the CCP. Say that again, okay? I don’t want to repeat. Ah, don’t bring these things up; just look carefully. The two countries exist in completely different ways, what’s the point of comparing them? Alright.
Now I’ll continue, perhaps a bit heavier, because last time I talked about fertility, this time it’s about healthcare. But this heaviness is a bit lighter than before, which is good. A friend asked me something, and when I investigated, the question turned tragic. You may know that if you are hospitalized in the CCP’s country, there is one thing you hate the most.
If you are a domestic person, you can tell me what you hate: hospitalization starts around six in the morning, when the hospital begins rounds. Every hospital does rounds around six in the morning, waking people up at the most restful time, then you have to wait a long time for a doctor—or several doctors—to come to your bedside, ask about your condition, look at your chart, maybe for a minute or two, then the doctor leaves. But during the waking, waiting, and questioning, your sweet sleep is destroyed.
Isn’t hospitalization for recovery? Don’t you need better rest? Does anyone know why in the CCP’s country all major hospitals have doctors do this most annoying and hated thing? A domestic friend asked me, saying you know a lot, why? I really don’t know. Fortunately, I have a friend who works at a well‑known tertiary hospital in the country, now a dean. I asked him, and he turned out to be a surgery director.
I then discovered a very interesting hidden truth. Using the information he gave me, I looked up artificial intelligence and found a miracle created by the CCP’s country. A miracle truly created by the CCP’s country: let me tell you, all major countries in the world, except the People’s Republic of China—including North Korea—do not have to conduct morning rounds that wake patients at six, forcing doctors to waste their best time. The only country where hospitals do this is the People’s Republic of China.
Do you all understand? Then why is it like this? Doctors suffer even more than you, because doctors in the People’s Republic of China are different from doctors worldwide. What are doctors in the People’s Republic of China? They are standard cattle and horses, cattle and horses, not learned from the Soviet Union, not from the Soviet Union. I’ll explain shortly and you’ll know. At first there was Soviet learning experience, later there wasn’t. Why? Because in the People’s Republic of China, apart from civil servants, the vast majority of people, including employees of public institutions and state‑owned enterprises, are slaves of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), cattle and horses. Doctors cannot be exempt either.
So why are the vast majority of doctors in the CCP‑ruled country different from the rest of the world? They are not intellectual workers, but high‑load assembly‑line physical workers. Hospitals in the CCP‑ruled country are not centered on curing patients, but on profit efficiency and administrative efficiency. For example, what does a typical day look like for a chief physician at a top‑tier (三级甲等) hospital in the CCP‑ruled country?
Morning outpatient clinic, noon surgery, afternoon surgery, evening consultations, night charting, and other time spent on teaching, research, handling inspections, administrative assessments, holding administrative meetings, etc. So although the work schedule is different, doctors in the Republic essentially operate beyond the 996 or 007 work regimes.
Therefore the six‑o’clock morning ward round is not something the doctor decides on his own; he also likes to sleep in, sometimes works until one or two in the morning and wants a few more hours of sleep. But the high‑load medical system of CCP hospitals, as mentioned earlier, starts outpatient work at eight in the morning for four hours; besides the six‑o’clock round, at seven he must review all the materials for the surgeries scheduled that day. Outside of the six‑o’clock round he has no other fixed time to check the patients he’s seen.
International public data shows that chief physicians at Chinese top‑tier hospitals normally see about sixty outpatients in a four‑hour morning session, a figure that has been stable for nearly five years. Some can see over a hundred. In the afternoon there are multiple surgeries, which is routine. In addition, such chief physicians usually manage fifteen to twenty‑five inpatient beds, and during peak periods the number of patients under their care can exceed thirty due to added beds.
Most countries, not just Western developed ones but also Thailand, Malaysia and similar nations, have doctors in comparable positions seeing only about ten outpatients a day, often with no surgeries at all. They usually manage only ten to fifteen inpatients, yet they still complain about being overworked. According to international public data, the daily workload of CCP doctors is roughly five to six times that of doctors in Europe and the United States.
Of course, it’s the same for nurses. In most countries the nurse‑to‑patient ratio is about one to four, meaning one nurse cares for four patients. In CCP top‑tier hospitals the ratio is about one to thirty, with one nurse looking after thirty patients. Why? Simple: the CCP diverts the vast majority of funds that should go to healthcare and social welfare, as well as fiscal spending, into stability maintenance, ineffective fixed‑asset investment, or debt repayment.
China’s actual spending on social welfare is only about one‑fifth or less of that of normal countries, and medical spending is included in that. This means that even though many hospitals are nominally public, they must survive on their own revenue. The fiscal subsidies for most public hospitals in China cover only about ten percent of their basic operating costs; the rest must be generated by the hospitals themselves from patients, turning what should be a public service institution into a self‑sustaining enterprise that must generate its own income.
Moreover, because of political factors influencing the populace, the state‑mandated registration fees are set artificially low, creating a mismatch between the fees and the intellectual contribution of doctors. Each doctor must also meet strict income targets imposed by the hospital.
Thus a doctor who sees a hundred registered patients a day does not earn much; he must perform a large number of high‑revenue examinations and surgeries to make up the shortfall, allowing him to meet the hospital’s income standards and secure basic earnings. Consequently, most Chinese doctors fall into a vicious cycle of seeing many patients, ordering many tests, and performing many surgeries. This model is unique to the People’s Republic of China; even the former Soviet Union and North Korea did not have it.
Even so, United Nations public data shows that this CCP‑originated system is extremely busy, exhausting, and frantic, yet still yields the lowest average hourly wage for hospital doctors worldwide. The original report states that doctors in the People’s Republic of China, using a labor‑intensive physical logic to earn intellectual‑work income, receive the lowest hourly wages globally—can you imagine?
The CCP, in order to maintain political stability, requires doctors to be responsible for the safety of the patients they manage, holding meetings and creating a climate of fear. Therefore, doctors can only use the roughly six‑o’clock window—the only time they can control—to personally examine every patient they have seen, minimizing medical risk and focusing on the patients scheduled for surgery that day. Do you all understand? In fact, they don’t want this any more than you do; why is hospitalization in China like this?
Just like the fertility issue I mentioned last time, the Chinese Communist Party has used up all the social welfare expenses worldwide, whether in capitalist or socialist countries, both different systems, but the costs for social welfare have been completely spent. Socialist low prices, low guarantees, universal healthcare, universal services; capitalist high benefits, high welfare, high treatment, but the state uses its fiscal revenue to subsidize, the CCP has none of that. The medical system in the CCP's country is completely marketized, capitalistized, the state gives no money, everything is earned from patients, so doctors have to implement a standard assembly-line brick-moving mode.
Therefore, hospitals, to survive, can only make doctors do more examinations and surgeries, so every hospital's overmedicalization and patients' wasted money are burdens that all patients must bear. So my buddy told me about sleeping in the morning, which is not something a hospital can consider or solve; it's far too small, too trivial to measure. Every doctor in the CCP's country, especially those in top-tier (Grade‑III) or secondary (Grade‑II) hospitals, works frantically on the assembly line.
Some doctors have to perform a dozen highly similar surgeries a day, leaving no time for genuine medical research, pathology studies, treatment method development, or innovation of diagnostic standards. Most doctors in the CCP's country are extremely skilled surgical craftsmen, and in international exchanges it has been found that a CCP doctor’s annual number of surgeries exceeds the total number of surgeries a doctor in other countries performs in a lifetime.
To satisfy the bureaucratic promotion system the CCP currently imposes on hospital doctors, they also have to frantically produce various papers. The vast majority now can only plagiarize and cobble together fake results to publish. This has led to the CCP's country having the highest absolute number of medical papers in the world for several years, ranking first globally. In stark contrast, in all the heavyweight fields that could change clinical practice, the research in recent years has been produced entirely by European or American doctors or research groups, with none from China.
Under this hospital model in China, bad money drives out good money, because a large number of young medical graduates from CCP‑run universities, whether they have just entered the system or not, see this extremely low‑income, low‑output model in hospitals and, if they can, quit, go abroad, or join research institutes, corporations, etc., but they do not take hospital positions. Those doctors who have to stay in the system have no other options.
They are either short on money or lack alternatives, so they endure, comply with the bureaucratic system, and are best at finding compensation in gray areas. Thus, the core talent in the CCP's real medical system—people who could lead the system upward—are now scarce. My friend told me that the directors of top‑tier hospitals say the system is severely collapsing, calling it the biggest problem in Chinese healthcare: there are no real talents, good people, and young professionals simply do not enter.
Because of this, most hospitals in the CCP's country operate at a loss year after year, due to dwindling fiscal subsidies, the DRG and DIP medical insurance policies imposed by the government, and the aggressive drug‑price‑cutting centralized procurement system. Consequently, hospitals, to survive, resort to increasingly ruthless tactics on patients. And at this point, think about it: is checking a bed at six in the morning really a big deal?
In fact, it’s not just fertility, education, or healthcare. Whether it’s the central government of the People’s Republic of China or local governments, funds for livelihood are spent only when absolutely necessary, because fundamentally the Chinese Communist Party never cares about Chinese people dying. History shows countless times that it deliberately lets millions or even hundreds of millions die without serious consequences. So maintaining basic livelihood is just a façade project for the CCP.
What the Chinese Communist Party wants is to keep all possible earnings in its own hands, which is why I have consistently insisted on this program—to overthrow this rogue party at its core. I believe that on this vast land of Huaxia, the people have been enslaved for too long, yet civilization has progressed to this point, and this land no longer needs a dictatorial system that bases its survival on enslaving the people. Otherwise, it would be a huge disgrace to this land, right? There’s no other way.
Just know it, there’s no other way! You know it and you can’t change it! Stop resenting doctors; they suffer even more than you! Now let’s discuss today’s core topic, a trend change. It’s not as terrifying as it sounds, it can’t be fully realized, but the trend itself is terrifying! I keep telling everyone that the economy is getting worse, the elderly are left uncared for, the “crow’s mouth” effect! In recent years, the CCP’s pension and social security system has relied on central government funding, but the outflow channels of the social security pool are too wide.
The pool can’t hold the water; the CCP’s social security and the central government can’t support current pensions, so in recent years you’ve seen the CCP exploit the populace, using money to fund pensions, extending the contribution period, delaying retirement—thus shortening the benefit period—creating completely useless personal pension insurance that everyone must pay for, forcing all flexible‑employment workers to enroll in employee social security, etc. But the outflow pipes are too wide, and the inflow can’t meet the demand. What’s the solution? A recent major development.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has issued the toughest regulation to date concerning the pension system. On April 29, 2026, eleven central ministries and commissions—including the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Natural Resources, the Ministry of Housing and Urban‑Rural Development, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, the National Health Commission, the State Administration of Radio and Television, the General Administration of Sport, the China Disabled Persons’ Federation, and the National Aging Office—jointly released the "Opinions on Promoting Mutual‑Aid Elderly Care Services," which is presented as an official government regulation and falls under the category of higher‑level law.
What does this regulation mean? You can read the text yourself: the eleven top‑level ministries and commissions of the CCP are jointly promoting a method called mutual‑aid elderly care across the country to help Chinese seniors, which sounds fairly positive. Looking at the details, according to the regulation, what is mutual‑aid elderly care? It is a system where residents of a community, town, or neighborhood support each other by providing voluntary, non‑profit elderly‑care services. It includes three specific components: first, younger seniors assist older, disabled, single‑living seniors who are in difficulty.
Second, community workers, building managers, village cadres, and rural team leaders must become regional heads of mutual‑aid elderly care, offering services such as visits, meal assistance, cleaning assistance, mobility assistance, emergency assistance, proxy purchasing and handling, mobile medical visits and medication delivery, and spiritual comfort. Third, rural areas will fully implement mutual‑aid happiness gifts and mutual‑aid happiness homes, converting existing township elder‑care homes, rural happiness homes, and idle schools into mutual‑aid elderly‑care communities.
The logic of the three points is clear: who implements mutual‑aid elderly care? The main group is younger seniors. What does the CCP define as "younger seniors"? Past CCP documents have not given a precise definition; two different documents have used the ranges 60‑69 and 60‑74. So, in the current system, the lower bound is clear—anyone over 60 is a younger senior—but the upper bound is uncertain, whether 69 or 74. Nevertheless, seniors roughly in the 60‑70 age range are expected to provide care for older seniors.
Who provides them with assistance and supervision? Community staff, building managers, village cadres, and rural team leaders. Where is it implemented? In cities, it should be within existing elder‑care facilities; in rural areas, it will be in newly built, centralized mutual‑aid elderly‑care communities. The regulation sets a timeline: by 2030, the urban‑rural community elder‑care service system with complete mutual‑aid functions should cover at least 70% of the nation’s current overall coverage, i.e., higher than 70%.
In plain language, this means that once you turn 60—regardless of retirement status, as long as you are not yet 70 or 74—you cannot simply rest. The CCP calls this a "semi‑mandatory" regulation: it is presented as voluntary, but if you refuse or are uncooperative, village cadres, rural team leaders, or community staff will have many ways to pressure you into compliance. They have numerous methods to make you appear to be "voluntary."
What does "voluntary" entail? Caring for older seniors, and this care must be both voluntary and non‑profit—no profit can be made. You may be reimbursed for any costs you incur, but you cannot earn money; you work for free. The care targets nearby older, disabled, single‑living seniors who are at high risk of death. The CCP’s target date is 2030, when more than 70% of regions nationwide should have rolled out this program.
Impressive, right? On one hand, the CCP spends tens of trillions of yuan each year on infrastructure projects that generate no direct economic value; on the other hand, it leaves seniors who are not covered by fiscal or social‑security safety nets to fend for themselves, shifting the government’s responsibility onto society.
The CCP has once again created a world‑first. In reality, similar models where younger seniors care for older seniors exist in many countries, but those models differ fundamentally from what the CCP is doing. In those countries, the entire system is backed by state finances—often called a "productivity value bank"—and there are clear laws governing these banks, such as Japan’s volunteer labor banks and Switzerland’s time banks.
These banks use a well‑known mutual‑aid time‑voucher mechanism: not only younger seniors but anyone can participate. When someone has a need, the bank matches it, and the caregiver receives "time credits" from the state, recorded on a time‑bank card. These time credits can be saved for one’s own old age or transferred to parents or relatives living in other regions or countries.
When using these time credits, for example, if you care for your father who lives in another city, you use the time credits you earned. If that city lacks suitable caregivers, the government assigns personnel to provide care for the senior using the credits. The cross‑regional government bears the cost.
What this actually does is create a genuine exchange basis for labor contributed to elder care. Workers who provide labor are guaranteed by national law and credit systems, so they do not have to worry about default or breach when using the bank’s credits. The CCP’s conditions lack this premise—this is a world‑first. The CCP has not stipulated any labor‑income benefits for younger caregivers in any regulation, nor provided any solution or responsibility for unforeseen issues arising from such public‑service activities.
There is no comparable system abroad where the state provides a safety net for workers when they need elderly care. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) does this, superficially claiming that other countries have it, and we just imitate it, essentially shifting the state’s responsibility for elderly care entirely onto society, using state power to guide or even force social resources to self‑rescue.
Of course, regarding this currently the harshest tactic of the CCP, don’t panic, because the CCP cannot fully implement it as described; it’s a day‑dream. It likely reflects pressure from the upper echelons on the lower ranks, for example, the idiot Xi Jinping demanding that elderly care must be done despite lack of funds, with too many seniors dying and social stability risks emerging, and eleven ministries then embark on this foolish endeavor—an ugly move that cannot solve stability issues.
In reality, most elderly care for the very old is not ordinary; the vast majority require intensive services—bed‑ridden care, medical care, disability care, night‑time care—tasks that low‑capacity seniors simply cannot perform. Even seniors in their sixties or seventies, if they want to help, can only look on, deliver a meal, help buy medicine, chat a bit, which does not meet the real needs of the high‑age elderly.
Moreover, the crucial point is that the service targets are high‑risk individuals. Even if you contribute voluntarily, the potential risks are huge. If, during care, the cared‑for senior dies unexpectedly, the child could sue and bankrupt you. Such severe consequences would deter even low‑age seniors from being executed, and no one inside the system would take on such work.
All countries are the same: the key to caring for the very old is money and professional nursing. Without these two, everything else is nonsense; any mutual‑aid scheme is nonsense. Yet the CCP’s so‑called mutual‑aid elderly care completely ignores money and professional nursing, merely shifting responsibility from government to the public through an article or regulation—an utterly delusional fantasy.
If this cannot be done, why do I call it dangerous? Because the enactment of this regulation is a very dangerous signal. The CCP has always enslaved and exploited the populace, but previously many measures—delaying social‑security contributions, postponing retirement age, creating personal pension schemes, mandating disability insurance, requiring flexible‑employment workers to pay employee social insurance, etc.—added new layers of exploitation onto an already exploitative foundation. At least there was already a social‑security system; the CCP merely altered the clauses. Personal disability pension insurance exists worldwide; the CCP just blurred the terms.
Originally, there were both urban employee social security and rural resident social security; the CCP simply forced everyone to convert rural resident coverage into urban employee coverage, among other things. Where is the danger in this mutual‑aid elderly care? It is “original” because, abroad, we know that such a system relies on a labor‑point bank—a mechanism for preserving and utilizing productive value. The CCP’s “originality” lies in removing the crucial component.
That scheme could be implemented because the government has funds and credit guarantees. Removing those turns it into a purely social mutual‑aid effort, a voluntary, non‑profit activity by low‑age seniors. The CCP essentially abandons all responsibilities the government should bear. Will this lead to the government abandoning other duties? Will we see mutual‑aid road construction, mutual‑aid house maintenance, mutual‑aid low‑income assistance, mutual‑aid unemployment aid, and so on?
The CCP government is remarkable: it collects the world’s highest taxes—both direct and indirect. Other countries may collect one or the other; the CCP collects both and creates the most complex, chaotic fee‑collection system. It continuously commits abuses across sectors—electric‑bicycle replacements, social‑security reforms, limitless exploitation of the people—already terrible. After amassing so much revenue, the state’s fiscal income rises, but its expenditures for public services remain minimal. Previously, hospitals might cover 10% of costs; now, having taken the money, the CCP simply abandons even elderly care.
Everything is pushed onto society. So if this signal appears, and we see the CCP using “mutual‑aid” terminology in other fields, we know the exploitation and oppression are entering deep water—its fiscal system and internal governmental struggles will prevent it from returning any of the collected money to society.
If it doesn’t use the funds itself, it’s exploitation. What then? The people’s labor is taken, and the state expects the people to solve everything themselves. This is an extremely dangerous signal—understand? Therefore, we can only watch the speed of quantitative and qualitative change, hoping the CCP government will be overthrown soon so that the wealth plundered from the people can be reclaimed.
Ah, let this great land of Huaxia regain its brightness, otherwise this bizarre policy coming out makes the outlook so damn sad and shocking. What do you need the national government for? You took all the money, do nothing, really this is insane. If anyone's interested, you can check out this policy yourself. The fact that such a thing can be issued is truly an endlessly absurd matter, okay? Ah, let's chat a bit, anyone has questions we can talk a bit, then we'll wrap up because today’s time ran long, beyond what everyone wanted to discuss.
Hmm, this country can't be looked at. I always speak facts and reason; if you look at every sector this country has built, set it aside and analyze the real data, you’ll find the rot is beyond rotten, just a gilded exterior—high-rise buildings, roads, everything inside, if you break it down, is filthy beyond repair. All the profits that should be there, the Chinese Communist Party took them all.
The CCP took them all, so think about it, it's hard to imagine, they took everything, turning it into this state, okay? Ah, gossip on Sunday, broadcast on Sunday afternoon. Now it’s broadcast twice a week, on Tuesday and Friday for gossip, and on Sunday for random talk, whether you listen or not doesn’t matter! I don’t know about BYD fast charging, let’s not talk about that, you’re still talking about electric new energy vehicles? Still talking about BYD fast charging, I’ve said it countless times! Regarding electric new energy, its energy density is damn low, the power supply can’t be sustained, it’s a false premise, the whole world is abandoning it.
You see, let’s talk about this again, okay? Then fine, if there are no more questions, that’s it for today. Thanks everyone, it’s been tiring. Friday, thank you all for listening to my rambling. Wish friends at home sweet sleep, friends abroad get what they wish for, that’s twice. From now on, each week at this stage will be twice, okay? It’s always twice. Thank you all, thanks, gratitude, thanks thank you.