Safeguard releases "Behind Iron Bars": Violence and Human Rights Violations in Chinese Detention Centers are Systemic Issues
Human rights organization Safeguard Defenders has released "The Great Lockdown: China’s Secretive Custodial System," exposing the long-hidden black box system of Chinese detention centers. The report, with its Chinese PDF version initially annotated in May 2026 and officially released on June 16th in Lisbon, Portugal, is based on questionnaires from 84 former detainees. It also incorporates Chinese laws and regulations, public government documents, court rulings, media reports, an extensive interview with Australian citizen Matthew Lyddall, and a case study of the Bao'an District Detention Center in Shenzhen.
This is not a report built on emotional accusations. Safeguard Defenders presents concrete evidence: the 84 valid questionnaires came from individuals detained in at least 58 detention centers across 19 provincial-level administrative regions in China. The report estimates there are at least 2,600 detention centers in China. In 2024, 752,594 people were approved for arrest. Based on conservative assumptions, Safeguard Defenders estimates that approximately 680,000 individuals awaiting trial may have been newly admitted to detention centers that year. At any given time, Chinese detention centers may hold an average of about 340,000 individuals awaiting trial.
These figures indicate that Chinese detention centers are not extreme spaces encountered only by a few political prisoners. They are the most basic and routine interface of oppression within China's criminal justice system. Anyone who is criminally detained, awaiting approval for arrest, awaiting indictment, awaiting trial, awaiting sentencing, awaiting appeal, or even awaiting transfer to prison can be placed in a detention center. Many individuals are confined in closed facilities controlled by the police before being convicted by a court.
The report begins with the 2009 "Hide and Seek" death case of Li Qiaoming in Yunnan. Li Qiaoming, only 24 at the time, was initially reported by authorities to have died from injuries sustained during a game of "hide and seek" in the detention center. Public outrage tore away the pretense: he died from beatings by inmate bullies. The CCP subsequently introduced a series of rectification measures, including cracking down on inmate bullies, strengthening surveillance, and conducting special inspections. More than a decade later, Safeguard Defenders' investigation shows that inmate bullying remains widespread, and violence, abuse, torture, and deaths in custody have not disappeared from the system; they have merely been more skillfully hidden behind walls.
The core issues documented in the report, first and foremost, are the systematic obstruction of lawyer visits. 73% of respondents reported being prevented from meeting with their lawyers or even being unable to hire one independently. Some individuals, whose cases were labeled as "national security" matters, were unable to see a lawyer for months. Others were pressured to abandon their independent lawyers and use more compliant duty lawyers. Some lawyers couldn't even find their clients because the police deliberately registered them under false names. Chinese law stipulates that detention centers should arrange visits for defense lawyers to meet detained suspects promptly, no later than 48 hours. In the hands of the police, the law often becomes a piece of paper pasted on the wall.
The obstruction of lawyer visits directly facilitates forced confessions. Australian citizen Matthew Lyddall, mentioned in the report, stated that he was detained at the Beijing No. 3 Detention Center for nearly 18 months between 2020 and 2021. He was beaten during the first two days after his arrest and did not meet his lawyer until the day of his trial. He also described experiences of sleep deprivation, cold torture, and being forced to sign confessions. If a foreigner faces such treatment, it is not difficult to imagine what ordinary Chinese citizens endure within the same system.
Violence is even more direct. 76% of respondents reported experiencing violence from police, guards, or other detainees during their custody. 76% of respondents stated that there were inmate bullies in their cells. The report clearly describes inmate bullies: guards informally designate certain detainees to assist in managing cells, maintaining order, distributing food, explaining regulations, and supervising others. In reality, inmate bullies often wield power of punishment, distribution, and oppression. The authorities do not need to act directly; violence can still be transmitted down the cell hierarchy.
This practice is very typical of the CCP. Power likes to outsource dirty work while retaining ultimate control. Guards can pretend not to have beaten anyone, and inmate bullies can handle "disobedient" individuals for them. Detention centers can claim to have systems in place, while victims are forced to sleep by the toilets, sleep on the floor, endure beatings, humiliation, and have their living space encroached upon. In the open-ended responses cited in the report, one person stated they were held down on their bunk and force-fed during a hunger strike, with their teeth being pried out during intubation. Another person described being hooded during interrogation, having their legs burned with lit cigarettes, and being beaten in the lower back. Court judgments have also documented instances of inmate bullies severely beating, physically punishing, and abusing other detainees over extended periods.
Living conditions are equally harsh. The report indicates that 12 respondents were held in cells with over 33 people, at least 10 more than the legal limit. Over half of the respondents stated that the per capita space in their cells was less than 2 square meters, below the minimum domestic standard in China. Chinese detention centers typically do not have individual beds but communal sleeping platforms. With overcrowding, sleeping space itself becomes a part of power distribution. Inmate bullies occupy the best spots, newcomers sleep on the floor, the weak are relegated to sleeping near the toilets, and conflict, illness, humiliation, and insomnia fester.
The report also reveals that 64% of respondents reported insufficient medical care, and 24% stated they had no or very limited outdoor activity during months or even years of detention. So-called "yard time" often consists of entering a small courtyard enclosed by iron bars and a roof, where one can walk in circles for a few minutes without real sunlight. Regarding food, 78 respondents found the meals insufficient and of poor quality, with no one rating the food as "good." The report notes that typical meals might consist of congee and pickles in the morning, and plain rice with vegetable soup for lunch and dinner, with meat served only occasionally. Detention center canteens become another small-scale exploitation system: many people can buy snacks and daily necessities, but struggle to buy fruits, vitamins, or stationery, and many find the prices unreasonable.
Detained foreigners also face language and communication difficulties. Safeguard Defenders points out that some foreign respondents could not understand detention center regulations, were unaware of their rights, did not receive translation or interpretation services, were not provided with written materials in a comprehensible language, and their letters to family, lawyers, or consulates were never mailed. While the CCP publicly proclaims "rule of law" and a "business environment," foreigners in detention centers cannot even understand the rules or send letters. This rogue nature of the state apparatus needs no pretense once behind iron doors.
The report's most crucial finding is that the root of the problem in Chinese detention centers lies in the "integration of investigation and detention." Detention centers are managed by the Public Security Bureau (PSB), which is also responsible for arrests, interrogations, investigations, and controlling the detention environment. The same power system seeks confessions while controlling the physical well-being of detainees. Forced confessions, obstruction of lawyer visits, creating fear, and tacitly allowing inmate bullying all serve the goals of case handling and maintaining stability. Although prosecutors are nominally responsible for supervision, the report points out that their independence and authority have long been questioned. Even if problems are identified, the police are not legally obligated to act on prosecutorial recommendations. Supervision lacks teeth, victims have no recourse, and perpetrators face no consequences.
China still lacks a specific "Law on Detention Centers." The current operation of detention centers is primarily based on the "Regulations on Detention Centers" issued by the State Council in 1990. This administrative regulation is not only low in hierarchy but also still refers to pre-trial detainees as "criminals." An individual not yet convicted by a court is already treated as a criminal in the system's language. Language is not a trivial matter. The CCP regime is adept at using vocabulary to pre-emptively convict individuals and then using procedures to fulfill its governance needs.
Safeguard Defenders also points out significant gaps between Chinese law and international standards: lawyer visitation rights are restricted, especially in national security cases where they can be blocked for extended periods; the definition of torture is too narrow and does not adequately cover psychological harm; pre-trial detention can be extended with a lack of timely judicial oversight; the maximum 37-day detention period before approval of arrest is far higher than the international recommended standard of 48 hours; and detention centers lack truly independent, unannounced external inspection mechanisms. The Chinese government refuses independent oversight and does not publish complete detention data, making the entire system inherently prone to abuse.
The case of the Bao'an District Detention Center in Shenzhen illustrates that modernization and barbaric detention can coexist. The Bao'an Detention Center, opened in 2006, has a designed capacity of 3,000 people. The report cites local media sources stating that by the late 2010s, the facility held 8,494 people, nearly three times its designed capacity. Shenzhen can have Huawei, Tencent, skyscrapers, airports, and technology parks, but it can also have overcrowded detention centers, suspicious deaths, violence, and human rights abuses. Modernization under the CCP does not automatically bring human dignity; it only makes surveillance, detention, and management more efficient.
The anti-CCP value of this report is clear. It exposes the most routine black box of the CCP's judicial system: the PSB arrests people, the PSB interrogates people, and the PSB manages detention centers; lawyers are kept out, families are kept out, and external oversight is kept out. Inside, inmate bullies, violence, hunger, overcrowding, humiliation, sleep deprivation, and medical delays are used to break people's will. The so-called "rule of law in China" reveals this face in detention centers.
This is the terrifying aspect of the CCP's stability maintenance system. It not only has tanks, batons, and cameras but also the ability to silently drag an ordinary person behind iron doors, make their name disappear from public space, allow their body to be controlled by others, and turn their fear into the silence of their families and friends. The function of detention centers has long exceeded temporary custody. They are confession factories, fear workshops, and the first secret chambers where the CCP's state violence enters an individual's body.
Original report link: [https://safeguarddefenders.com/sites/default/files/202
6-04/Behind%20Bars%20Detention%20Comp%20CH.pdf