A Ruthless Figure: CCP Collapse Index Soars to 70.43 in May! Cross‑Province Mass Incidents in 11 Provinces, Hormuz Blockade in Its Third Month, Oil Price Breaks 10 Yuan—Unveiling the “Fake Stability Maintenance, Truly Rotten Accounting Month” Dual‑Core Shift: Eight Departments Simultaneously Ban Cross‑Border Brokers, Xi‑Kiss Meeting Anesthetic Fails, Chongqing Vice Mayor’s Mysterious “Jump”

This video analyzes the change in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) collapse index for May 2025, with a new value of 70.43, slightly higher than April. The video explores the deep-rooted reasons behind this number, including structural issues in economic data, frequent mass events in politics and society, and external environmental influences. It specifically mentions oil price fluctuations in the Strait of Hormuz and the CCP's restrictions on cross-border capital. Additionally, numerous protest events show widespread public dissatisfaction with the status quo, reflecting deep economic and social contradictions.

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Full text: Observe reality, reject fragmented cognition. Today is another release day for our collapse index. No more talk, I have already calculated the CCP collapse index for May 2025 for everyone, the new figure is 70.43, up 0.08 from April's 70.35. I know when you see that 0.08, you might wonder: just a tiny rise? Don't rush, I’ll tell you, the gold content of this 0.08 is not the same as in previous months.

Why say that? Because this month the index’s driving mechanism underwent a critical shift. I’ll first list the structure of this month’s added points so you have a global picture. Look at this chart: economics added 0.03, social perception added 0.03, political‑military added 0.01, external environment added 0.01, totaling exactly 0.08. Got it? This is completely different from April’s structure, where energy dominated and was down 36%. May is driven by two cores: one is the structural crack in economic data continuing to widen, the other is the first real appearance of the cross‑regional resonance I repeatedly mentioned last month. Diplomacy should have risen, but the Xi‑Trump summit on May 14‑15 held it down. I’ll say this: it’s a sedative, not a fever reducer.

Now let’s go point by point. We can see the trend now is not a one‑off pulse like in January‑March, but a slowly worsening trend line. First, energy: the Hormuz Strait blockade has lasted a full three months by May. Oil prices in May have been truly stimulating. The CCP National Development and Reform Commission adjusted oil prices twice within a ten‑working‑day window in May, on May 8 and May 21. On the 8th, gasoline and diesel were each raised by 32 and 31 yuan per ton, and less than two weeks later, on May 21, they were raised again by 75 and 70 yuan. By the end of May, nationwide 92‑octane gasoline stayed in the 8.8‑9.2 yuan range and could not drop below it. In Hainan it even hit 10 yuan. This free‑trade zone is truly impressive: except for wages, everything else has surged.

Next, let’s look at social financing. In April, the cumulative increase in social financing was 15.45 trillion yuan, 9.3 trillion less than the same period last year, with RMB loans increasing by 8.5 trillion yuan, a year‑on‑year drop of 2.29 trillion yuan, and household loans negative 10 billion yuan. In other words, the reason total social financing can still hold at 7.8% is not corporate borrowing for expansion, nor ordinary people taking mortgages, but the government’s aggressive pre‑issuance of bonds, forcibly propping up the system. This is a classic structural distortion of social financing.

An analogy: what is the blood of the real economy? It’s medium‑ to long‑term corporate loans. That part has been drained. The blood of households, i.e., mortgages, is also being drained. What now supports this dead structure? Solely government and state‑owned enterprises borrowing through a “IV line.” So what you see is the scissors gap between M1 and M2. This shows money is entering the financial system, but enterprises can’t spend it, or are too scared to. Where does it go? Back to banks for arbitrage.

Just talking about social financing may seem abstract. Let’s look at something more intuitive: the manufacturing PMI. The PMI released on May 31 for May was 50, down from April’s 50.3, sitting right on the growth‑recession threshold. Coincidentally, GDP is 5%, PMI 50%, the CCP really likes fives—Xi Jinping is not a “5‑volt battery,” right?

We can also see a severe structural split. State‑owned enterprises are expanding; large‑enterprise PMI is 51.1, still in expansion; but medium‑size enterprises have shrunk to 48.6, and small‑size to 48.5, both falling below the critical point, each dropping 1.9 and 1.6 percentage points from April. This picture is typical: large state‑owned and central enterprises are arbitraging, taking subsidies, inflating scale data, while small and medium private firms silently lose business and close. The so‑called “state‑driven capacity, private retreat” is exactly this. This PMI set reflects the situation well.

What was even harsher in April? The CCP National Bureau of Statistics released on May 18 a dismal figure: retail sales of consumer goods grew only 0.2% year‑on‑year, down 0.48% month‑on‑month, the worst single month in three years. Then, as if a roof leak meets a night rain, fixed‑asset investment turned negative in April, dropping 1.6% year‑on‑year. Real‑estate investment was down 13.7%, private investment down 5.2%. Real‑estate sales were even worse: sales area down 10.2% year‑on‑year, sales revenue down 14.6%, funds received down 18.4%, the whole line bleeding.

So the same old advice: while the CCP is still warming up the market, seize the sell‑off window and never, ever buy this B‑thing. By the time you regret, it’ll be too late, and you won’t even know who to sell to.

By the way, utilities are still being mentioned because they keep “marinating.” Last month I talked about coal‑power capacity pricing, remember? The guaranteed minimum ratio was raised to at least 50%, and unit capacity price went from 100 yuan to 160 yuan—essentially a thermal plant can earn standby fees just by standing there. In May this started fermenting in local ledgers. Poor‑performing provinces like Yunnan and Sichuan are even pushing toward 230 yuan per kilowatt. On May 30 another province announced that industrial and commercial time‑of‑use electricity prices will rise again from July 1. The CCP’s fart is called “optimization.” What does “optimizing electricity prices” mean? It splits electricity use into peak, high‑peak, flat, low‑valley, and deep‑valley, five tiers, with peak‑valley price differences up to eight times. In short, it extracts money from industry and commerce in ever more creative ways. This money inevitably ends up in commodity prices; if it can’t be passed to consumers, the businesses simply die.

After the cold economic data, let’s talk about the warm side: social perception. Last month I repeatedly emphasized the critical trigger for social perception taking off: five to ten second‑tier cities simultaneously experiencing chain protests. At the time I said it was just one step away. In May that step arrived. Only protest events with video evidence spanned 11 provinces in May—Shandong, Hubei, Sichuan, at least 11 provinces—no longer limited to a single industry. Manufacturing, hospitals, unfinished‑building owners, rural environmental rights—all blossomed.

Let me string it together so you feel the density: it’s truly a myriad of incidents, everything is happening, it’s blooming everywhere. For example, at Huakang Hospital in Dazhou, Sichuan, hundreds of medical staff protested for three consecutive days over wage arrears and missing social security. On May 27 in Liulang Village, Guangxi, a quarry constantly cracked the foundations of villagers’ homes, prompting protests that were brutally beaten by the CCP’s black‑skin police, the SWAT black‑skin police. Then on May 8 in Qianjiang, Hubei, the well‑known Quanyou Furniture company faced a massive workers’ strike over wages being squeezed to 80‑100 yuan, forcing workers to quit voluntarily to avoid compensation. On May 30 in Xi’an, Shaanxi, hundreds of owners of the unfinished Sunac Chenguang No.1 gathered again demanding handover.

So you see, this is no longer the point‑like outbreak of April; it’s a true multi‑point, cross‑regional, cross‑industry network resonance. Even more alarming is that the CCP’s repression tactics are escalating. Whether it’s Liulang Village in Guangxi or Feng County, it’s all SWAT police. When a regime has to deploy SWAT to suppress villagers protesting a quarry damaging their homes, it shows the CCP has reached a pathological state of “grass‑roots paranoia.” Of course, the biggest public safety incident remains the Shanxi coal‑mine illegal mining collapse.

After the streets, let’s talk about wallets. Last month the CCP was locking ordinary people’s money.

In this matter, it is truly huge. The most ceremonial strike was that eight departments on the same day dealt a lethal blow to the three major cross‑border securities firms, and up to now, all foreign‑related ETFs have basically been suspended. This time the CCP’s idea is very straightforward: to completely block the outbound capital channel. Now the trading functions of these cross‑border securities firms are only half‑functional—you can only sell, not buy. Moreover, within two years all trading software servers will be shut down. At the same time, the CCP has also summoned domestic banks, tightly sealing the foreign‑exchange outflow channel. Hong Kong authorities also demand you submit a pledge proving that your funds do not originate from China. In plain language, the CCP has welded shut the last lifeline for ordinary people to legally allocate money overseas, buy some US and Hong Kong stocks.

So we have to ask: why act now at this critical moment? The answer is simple: the CCP has learned its lesson. What lesson? Back in 2014, the CCP also launched a round of PSL loans, which in effect were QE, but the implementation relied on the three major policy banks. Those three have always been a water‑pipe for liquidity. In 2014 they pumped water for a year using PSL loans, and in 2015 the exchange rate regime was reformed. At that time Xi Jinping was at his peak, pushing for RMB internationalization, trying to lock the RMB exchange rate, spending $1 trillion yet failing to stabilize it. The CCP then still had some reserves, but after a decade of COVID‑19 avoidance and a slew of messed‑up policies, the CCP can no longer afford a 2015‑style exchange‑rate defense.

Therefore this time it directly chose a suffocation strategy. Why? Because it has brought PSL back again. Officially it is for urban renewal, planning to release 15 trillion yuan over five years. In 2008, 4 trillion yuan was released in one year—what were the results? Now with this 15 trillion, don’t even talk about $1 trillion; if it were truly unleashed, given the current international political environment and the scale of liquidity, even $2 trillion would not protect the RMB exchange rate. So the CCP naturally chose to block all possible outbound capital routes before pouring more liquidity.

While it blocks your escape routes on one side, it prepares to attack your pocket on the other. The liquidity‑injection path is said to rely on real estate, i.e., urban renewal; the funding source is still housing. What is being promoted? Housing pensions. The CCP’s authorized excuse is a three‑piece bundle of housing inspections, housing pensions, and housing insurance. In May, 22 pilot cities have already started promotion. In short, the CCP has run out of surplus grain and is now eyeing the tiles on its roof.

What else? There are also outbound restrictions on tech personnel. In April, a startup founder was barred from leaving the country because his $2 billion merger deal was deemed a threat to national security. This month, in May, even people and technology trying to go abroad are blocked. As soon as you are identified as a high‑tech talent, you may be restricted at the border and forced to surrender your passport. Whether private or state‑owned, a person’s body is the biggest DVI. The CCP now treats people as its assets.

Now let’s talk about the most watched event last month: the Xi‑Trump summit on May 14‑15. It’s been more than twenty days since the old man left, and the assessment can be summed up in one sentence: grandiose in display, underwhelming in substance. The display was indeed massive—Trump arrived with over a hundred top US CEOs, including Elon Musk, Jensen Huang, Tim Cook, Jeff Bezos, Goldman Sachs, and other longtime friends of the Chinese people. But the substantive outcomes were pitifully few: a Boeing order for 200 aircraft and a purchase of some US soybeans. Besides that, there were two empty dialogue mechanisms, right? A trade committee and an investment committee.

What is this dialogue mechanism? Basically, it’s an acknowledgment that we can’t share the same pot, but if anyone wants to flip the table, they should make a sound. That’s essentially it. The mechanism is about setting a lower bound of management rather than sending a positive signal. Neither side expects any cooperative myth; at most they keep the situation from spiraling out of control. So it’s not an improvement, but at least it’s not a deterioration. This item gets a mere +0.01.

Some may ask: since the summit is so hollow, why not deduct points from the CCP? Why not lower its pressure score? Because the summit’s essence is anesthesia, not treatment. One can say there is no structural loosening at all. The 150‑day countdown for MCH has already started, meaning the CCP has virtually no path to acquire lithography machines. In other words, the tech containment has nothing to do with the summit; it’s a strategic‑level issue.

However, the summit does have a larger significance as a template. Later there will be a Washington meeting in September, an Aramco‑related event in December, and several more meetings between the two this year. What does “template significance” mean? It means that none of the problems can be solved; the only way to stay alive is endless talks to sustain the regime and maintain stability, until the anesthetic wears off, after which the pain returns. So the purpose of the meeting is to give the CCP a strong dose of anesthetic—pain is temporarily unnoticeable, but the root causes remain untouched.

What are the root causes? Semiconductors are still choked, foreign‑trade orders are still being eroded by tariffs, and the US‑China strategic confrontation remains unchanged. When the anesthetic fades, the pain returns.

Finally, about the CCP’s internal system. Last month, two provincial heads in Liaoning fell in quick succession—an illustration of grassroots governance in a reality show. In May, the script moved to Chongqing. This month, the CCP’s domestic focus is Chongqing. Why? On May 7 at 10:52 am, Chongqing’s vice mayor and public security bureau chief An Jiang died of a sudden illness, with officials announcing he died despite rescue attempts. Overseas Chinese media reported it as a “free fall.” I must note that this “free fall” claim is unverified as of now; the official CCP line is sudden illness, and we can only watch the spectacle.

One thing is certain: how deep the water is in Chongqing. Mayor Huang Hua and Party Standing Committee member Luo Lin were taken away, and former political‑legal committee secretary Lu Kehua was sentenced on May 8 to a death‑suspended sentence for bribery exceeding 189 million yuan. In a directly‑governed municipality, the entire political‑legal system—from the committee secretary to the public security chief—has been hit. This matches the phrase that emerged from Liaoning last month: it’s no longer fear of being investigated, but fear of not being able to afford the investigation. The fiscal hole has become so large that any opened account triggers a thunderstorm no one can handle.

Another incident that the CCP used to boast about then got slapped in the face: on May 20 a relatively small story broke, but it serves as a perfect slice—Xi’an City Wall Investment Group, the city’s investment platform, defaulted a second time on a Shandong trust product. Although an extension had been approved, the default persisted. The principal of 148 million yuan could not be repaid, nor the interest. Yet the CCP bragged: on one hand, it claimed zero new defaults on publicly issued credit bonds in the first quarter; on the other hand, non‑standard assets like trusts and city‑investment financing continued to default. This is classic self‑deception or outright debt evasion—pushing city‑investment debt off the government balance sheet, saying it’s not the government’s debt, so the default isn’t the CCP’s problem. No matter how nicely the nominal debt is dressed, the underlying rotten loans will still explode one by one. This item therefore adds another +0.01, as it remains the status quo. I am not biased just because I dislike the CCP.

Okay, all four variables have been covered. Economic factors get +0.03, social perception +0.03, political‑military +0.01, external environment and diplomacy +0.01, totaling +0.08. Friends, vote as usual; I’ll also count a modest low‑lever adjustment. So based on the April index of 70.35, the May index settles at 70.43.

How should we understand May? On the surface, it appears to be a month of successful stability maintenance. The Xi‑Trump hand‑shake happened, and I don’t know whether the traditional system can hold after that. PMI barely stayed above 50, publicly issued bonds boasted zero defaults, and CCP state media have been shouting “steady and improving” as if on drugs. But if you peel back the layers, the core structure of the month is clear: two driving cores are pushing up. Social financing is a completely structural distortion, mass incidents are beginning to resonate across regions, and a layer of anesthesia is pressing down. The Xi‑Trump summit’s role was to temporarily relieve external pressure on the CCP. Yet beneath, the two red ice blocks remain: the MCH 150‑day countdown continues, semiconductor equipment is still locked, cross‑border securities have been cut off, and the foreign‑exchange gate is welded shut. So only the CCP’s sense of pain is suppressed, but the disease remains.

Not good at all.

To be more specific, the social financing pipeline relies entirely on the government and state-owned enterprises borrowing to stay alive, while the blood of enterprises and residents is being siphoned away in reverse. In April, RMB loans fell short by 2.29 trillion. Also, the perceived crack has expanded from a point to a network spanning 11 provinces, and even the SWAT police have started deploying nationwide. The CCP's SWAT "black‑skin dogs," you’re really worthless—aside from beating villagers, what else can you do? A bunch of trash.

So the 0.08 increase is numerically lukewarm but fundamentally a gear shift. From the single‑core economy of April, we have moved to a dual‑core situation in May: structural distortion plus cross‑regional social resonance. These two factors are far harder to cure than a one‑off oil price shock. Why? Because they are chronic, growing out of the structure itself, not something that disappears after a gust of wind. This kind of structure is even more stubborn. Everyone knows chronic diseases share a common trait: they persist, and no strong medicine can cure them. It’s a continuous internal bleeding process that turned a trauma into an internal injury.

Although this month appears relatively calm on the surface, the structure is anything but calm. That’s the 70.43. Is it endangered? Not yet. The CCP can still take a stroll. But is it healthy? It’s all IV lines, and the IV bags are filled with anesthetic.

I also recall a few things to share. This damn surreal situation, the idiot “repair bottom” probably knows better than anyone how empty he is. Otherwise why would he confiscate students’ passports? Why would he block the tiny opening for ordinary people to buy a bit of US stocks? A truly confident person wouldn’t even get up at night to lock every door and window tight—that’s the simple logic. And those who lock themselves up so tightly aren’t afraid of outsiders coming in to kill them; they’re afraid the people inside will see the truth and run away.

Now for some external fun. The CCP has rolled out some AI tool to scan for dissidents, right? I won’t go into other details, but even if the CCP knows who a dissident is, what can they do? Your grassroots wage arrears are already as bad as a third‑generation grandson’s debt; if that gets flagged, the highest “secret‑density” will be within the CCP system itself—what then? Will the idiot “repair bottom” be arrested or not? Even if the CCP scans out a bunch of rebels, what then? Do they arrest everyone, or what?

I’m not looking down on the CCP; everyone still needs to protect themselves and not easily reveal their true thoughts. A little sarcasm here and there, a spring‑autumn style, teasing these idiots is fine. Using this kind of ironic tone to make them busy translating is perfectly okay.

Alright, that’s all for today’s rant. If you like my show, click the little bell below. If you want to support me, you can join the membership channel, which offers four in‑depth episodes each month. Welcome to join the hardcore crew, and see you in the next episode.