The Ministry of State Security (MSS) of the People's Republic of China, responsible for maintaining the security of the political regime and countering complex threats from within and outside the country, has been entrusted with this core task since its establishment in 1983. The 10th Bureau, as a key department responsible for overseas counter-intelligence and political security, has a high level of secrecy and complexity. This article systematically reviews the 10th Bureau's historical development, organizational structure, and operational patterns, and conducts in-depth analysis of its role in global expatriate monitoring, dissent suppression, and the expansion of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) overseas influence. Through tracking leadership changes, typical cases, and inter-agency cooperation, combined with US-EU intelligence disclosures and Chinese literature, the 10th Bureau is revealed to have become a crucial supporting force and 'invisible frontline' for the CCP's global intelligence system and regime stability. This research helps fill the knowledge gap in academia regarding the CCP's overseas security forces, providing theoretical support for related policy formulation and international security research.

——Organizational Structure, Operational Patterns, and International Impact of the 10th Bureau of the Ministry of State Security

By Feng Zheng

Original Link: https://www.epochtimes.com/b5/25/11/13/n14635481.htm

Abstract Since its establishment in 1983, the Ministry of State Security (MSS) of the People's Republic of China has consistently undertaken the core mission of maintaining regime security and responding to complex domestic and international threats. Among its departments, the 10th Bureau, as the key unit specializing in overseas counter-espionage and political security, is characterized by high secrecy and complexity. This article systematically reviews the historical evolution, organizational structure, and operational patterns of the 10th Bureau, and deeply analyzes its role in monitoring the global overseas Chinese community, suppressing dissent, and expanding the overseas influence of the CCP. By tracking changes in leadership, typical cases, and cross-agency collaboration, and combining intelligence disclosures from the US and Europe with Chinese documentary materials, this article reveals how the 10th Bureau has become a vital support for the CCP's global intelligence system and an "invisible line of defense" for regime stability. This research helps fill the academic gap in understanding the CCP's overseas security forces and provides theoretical support for relevant policy formulation and international security research.

Table of Contents Introduction

• Historical Background and the Establishment of the 10th Bureau

• Leadership, Structure, and Key Personnel

• Operational Scope and Domains of the 10th Bureau

• Major Operations, Missions, and Events

• Intelligence Collection Methods and Techniques

• Collaboration with Other MSS Bureaus, CCP Military Units, and State Agencies

• International Activities and Influence Operations

• Facilities and Operational Regions

• Strategic Goals and Guiding Ideology of the 10th Bureau

• Role within the CCP's National Security and Foreign Policy System

Introduction With the rise of China's national power and the advancement of its global layout, the overseas extension of the national security system has become a core issue of concern for the international security and intelligence academic communities. As the most secretive intelligence agency with global reach under the CCP system, the Ministry of State Security (MSS) has various bureaus tasked with diversified and specialized security missions. In particular, the 10th Bureau, under the name of "External Security and Reconnaissance," is systematically responsible for the early warning, intervention, and suppression of overseas Chinese communities, exiled dissidents, and external threats. In recent years, multiple countries worldwide have continuously exposed the CCP's large-scale surveillance of overseas Chinese and dissident groups, transnational pressure, and even election influence operations, pushing the 10th Bureau to the forefront of public opinion and policy.

• Historical Background and the Establishment of the 10th Bureau The Ministry of State Security (MSS) was established in 1983, formed by the merger of the CCP Central Investigation Department and the counter-espionage department of the Ministry of Public Security. This reorganization was proposed by then State Council Premier Zhao Ziyang and approved on June 20, 1983, aiming to "protect national security and strengthen counter-espionage work." From its inception, the missions of the MSS reflected the CCP's high level of concern regarding foreign penetration and internal dissent during the reform and opening-up period. The structure of the MSS bureaus is designed to address external and internal security threats, aligning with the CCP's view that internal opposition forces are often linked with external "hostile forces."

One of the key units is the 10th Bureau, whose mission has evolved over time. Early external analyses (around the 1990s) described the 10th Bureau as a "technology intelligence bureau," focusing on collecting economic and technological intelligence from the West. This reflected China's drive to acquire foreign technology in the 80s and 90s (similar to the practices of Russian and Eastern European intelligence agencies), shifting from purely political intelligence in the Mao era to technical intelligence. However, authoritative Chinese data and subsequent investigations show that the core function of the 10th Bureau is not simple technical espionage, but "External Security and Reconnaissance"—namely, counter-espionage and security operations facing abroad. In Chinese, it is called the "External Security and Reconnaissance Bureau," often translated as the "Bureau of External Security and Reconnaissance." Its establishment stemmed from the need to monitor and eliminate perceived threats within overseas Chinese communities and foreign entities, especially after the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, when a large number of overseas dissidents were scattered, making its role particularly important. By the late 90s, the MSS formally clarified the responsibilities of the 10th Bureau as "monitoring personnel in overseas institutions and overseas students, and investigating the activities of overseas reactionary organizations," indicating that the bureau may have been established or reorganized in the mid-80s specifically to guard against "external subversive forces" and overseas dissent.

It is noteworthy that public information regarding the MSS structure is scarce and sometimes contradictory. For example, a 1997 report from Hong Kong mistakenly positioned the 10th Bureau as a technology intelligence bureau, while a 1998 internal CCP organizational record clearly defined it as an external anti-subversion unit. This discrepancy may be due to changes in MSS priorities or intentional misleading—MSS bureau names are usually deliberately vague. Overall, by the 2000s, the 10th Bureau had been established as the MSS's overseas counter-espionage and political security department. Its establishment and evolution reflect the shift in the CCP's security strategy: from simply collecting foreign intelligence to support development, to actively guarding against threats to CCP rule coming from overseas.

• Leadership, Structure, and Key Personnel Leadership: The identities of the directors of various MSS bureaus are highly confidential, but a few high-ranking officials related to the 10th Bureau have become known. A prominent example is Ma Jian—a career MSS official who once served as the director of the 10th Bureau. During his tenure, he was explicitly responsible for monitoring overseas CCP officials and students and investigating overseas "reactionary" organizations. In 2006, Ma Jian was promoted to Vice Minister of the Ministry of State Security, demonstrating the importance of his position. In 2015, Ma Jian was detained and convicted of corruption, becoming the first Vice Minister of the Ministry of State Security to be publicly dismissed during Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign. His downfall was related to collusion with wealthy businessmen, exposing severe internal corruption and reflecting Xi Jinping's determination to clean up the security system (which had previously been influenced by Zhou Yongkang and others). Since then, the 10th Bureau has lacked a public leader for a time, and as of 2025, the director remains undisclosed. The culture of secrecy within the MSS means that directors usually only become known to the outside world when they are promoted to the level of Vice Minister or when a scandal breaks out.

Historically, the MSS is led by a Minister and several Vice Ministers, with each Vice Minister potentially overseeing multiple bureaus. The 10th Bureau likely reports to the Vice Minister in charge of counter-espionage or political security. For example, Qiu Jin, who was promoted in the early 2000s, once managed the 8th Bureau's counter-espionage investigations; although not from the 10th Bureau, his promotion trajectory illustrates the path for bureau directors. After Ma Jian's dismissal, he may have been succeeded by a senior official from within the 10th Bureau or a provincial department, but there is no public data to confirm this.

Structure and Branches: According to expert analysis, the 10th Bureau is internally divided into multiple departments based on region or target category, with specific details remaining undisclosed. The Chinese name "External Security and Reconnaissance" literally means external protection and reconnaissance, indicating a dual responsibility: protecting overseas CCP interests and personnel, and reconnoitering hostile forces abroad. Actual work includes:

– Overseas Chinese communities and students divided by geographical region (e.g., North America, Europe, Asia-Pacific, etc.) – Overseas dissent or separatist movements (Tibetan exile groups, Uyghur activists, Taiwan independence networks, Falun Gong, democratic organizations) – Monitoring overseas CCP officials and expatriates to prevent defections or espionage activities targeting them – Counter-espionage liaison, cooperating with other bureaus or local informants to monitor foreign entities involving overseas Chinese

Each department may coordinate with overseas MSS stations or officials under diplomatic cover. Provincial State Security Departments also support the 10th Bureau's missions; for instance, MSS officials from Guangdong and Shandong served as handlers in cases of monitoring dissidents in the United States, indicating that provincial units participate in overseas operations (possibly targeting expatriates from their respective provinces). Although the chain of command is unclear, the 10th Bureau headquarters is responsible for directing these operations, integrating central and local intelligence.

Key Personnel: Aside from Ma Jian, few 10th Bureau personnel are public. Four MSS officials indicted by the US in 2022 (Feng He, Jie Ji, Ming Li, and Keqing Lu) came from Guangdong and Qingdao; although their specific bureau was not clarified, their missions align with the responsibilities of the 10th Bureau, and they may have been directed by the 10th Bureau or its provincial branches.

No public organizational chart shows the deputy directors or departments of the 10th Bureau. In the 2010s, the MSS had 18 numbered bureaus in total, and the 10th Bureau occupies an important position in the counter-espionage system. It works in coordination with the 7th Bureau (counter-espionage intelligence), the 8th Bureau (counter-espionage investigation), and the 9th Bureau (internal security and reconnaissance). While the 10th Bureau focuses on the exterior, it often forms a complementary relationship with the 9th Bureau (internal security and reconnaissance) and works closely with the 2nd Bureau (diplomatic cover).

In summary, the leadership of the 10th Bureau is mysterious, historically held by senior counter-espionage officials, and its structure is divided by global overseas Chinese regions and target groups. Its personnel are part of the MSS's overseas spy army, estimated at approximately 40,000 people globally, operating discreetly to ensure that the CCP's "eyes and ears" are spread across global Chinese communities.

• Operational Scope and Domains of the 10th Bureau Mission Scope: The 10th Bureau covers counter-espionage, political security, and intelligence collection, involving overseas Chinese citizens and interests. The official description is to "supervise and monitor personnel of overseas Chinese institutions (such as embassies, enterprises, student unions) and investigate the activities of overseas hostile or reactionary organizations." Its responsibilities span two domains:

– Protective Security: Protecting state secrets and overseas personnel from foreign spies or defection threats – Offensive Anti-Subversion: Monitoring and sabotaging overseas groups viewed as threats by Beijing

Main Areas of Focus:

– Overseas Chinese and Students: Closely monitoring overseas Chinese, especially students and visiting scholars. Chinese data states it is "responsible for"

The Tenth Bureau of China's Ministry of State Security (MSS) is responsible for monitoring overseas Chinese personnel and students, overseeing organizations like the Chinese Students and Scholars Association (CSSA), and ensuring adherence to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) line. Bureau officials and agents participate in community events to monitor dissidents and report anti-CCP sentiments, serving both intelligence gathering and political influence objectives. Mattis and Brazil note that the Tenth Bureau "manages overseas Chinese student organizations" with the intent to guide or infiltrate these groups.

– Overseas "Hostile" Organizations: Beijing views various exile and anti-CCP groups as "reactionary" or "hostile forces." The Tenth Bureau targets include:

– Democratic Dissident Networks: Such as overseas branches of the 1989 student movement and human rights NGOs. – Ethnic Separatist Movements: Tibetan exile governments and advocacy groups, the World Uyghur Congress, and Mongolian groups. – Taiwan Independence Organizations: While Taiwan intelligence is partly handled by other bureaus, the Tenth Bureau monitors and counters overseas Taiwan independence activities. – Banned Chinese Religious or Spiritual Groups: Such as overseas Falun Gong practitioners. – Anti-CCP Media and Activists: Overseas Chinese-language media critical of the CCP, and prominent dissidents (writers, YouTubers, etc.).

The bureau collects intelligence and takes measures to eliminate "threats." U.S. indictments show that since 2011, MSS officials have directed agents in the U.S. to gather information on "democracy activists, Taiwan independence advocates, and Uyghur and Tibetan activists," which is typical Tenth Bureau activity.

– Preventing Defections and Loyalty Monitoring: The bureau works to prevent CCP officials or citizens from defecting or leaking information overseas. It monitors overseas diplomats, scientists, and students. The term "monitoring of personnel at overseas institutions" suggests that MSS "security officers" stationed in embassies observe CCP diplomats and visiting delegations, guarding against defections or contact with foreign spies. While the Ninth Bureau handles similar protective tasks domestically, the Tenth Bureau extends this function abroad.

– Economic and Technological Intelligence (Secondary): Although not its primary focus, the Tenth Bureau may collect economic and technological intelligence through overseas Chinese community channels. Early misunderstandings led to its mistaken identification as a technological intelligence bureau, as overseas Chinese scholars could be sources of advanced technology. In reality, the Third Bureau is responsible for political, economic, and technological intelligence gathering, often using diplomats and industrial spies. The Tenth Bureau supports the monitoring of overseas scholars to identify recruitment or technology transfer opportunities and may collaborate with the Thirteenth Bureau (cyber technology) if hacking into dissidents' communications is required. Analyses indicate the Tenth Bureau cooperates with cyber units to infiltrate the overseas Chinese community and participate in influence operations.

Methods and Means:

– Informant Networks: The bureau recruits members of the overseas Chinese community as informants or agents, who may be sympathizers or coerced individuals. For example, scholar Wang Shujun in New York served as a secret asset, reporting dissidents to the MSS. Assets are cultivated through patriotism, financial incentives, or threats to family members, with students and visiting scholars being key targets.

– Undercover Officers: MSS officers operate overseas under official cover (diplomatic, media, academic) or unofficial cover (business, tourism). The First Bureau manages "secret lines" (unofficial cover), and the Second Bureau manages "open lines" (diplomatic cover). The Tenth Bureau utilizes both. For instance, an officer might pose as a representative of a technology company to approach Chinese tech professionals, or a cultural attaché at an embassy might secretly oversee student groups. The approximately 40,000 overseas CCP intelligence personnel often use journalism, academia, or business as cover. They are not typically career spies but contract workers or part-time assets, reducing the risk of exposure. This "mass line" tactic is a deliberate strategy by the MSS, overwhelming foreign counterintelligence with a large number of seemingly innocuous CCP agents.

– Surveillance and Eavesdropping: The Tenth Bureau can leverage MSS technical departments for overseas target surveillance. The Fourteenth Bureau is responsible for mail and telecommunications interception. For overseas Chinese dissidents, the MSS may direct hackers to compromise their email and phone communications or install malware, often attributed to state-sponsored hackers. The FBI has linked Jiangsu security departments to hacking operations targeting Uyghur activists. The Tenth Bureau coordinates such cyber intrusions to monitor political dissent.

– Covert Operations and Harassment: Beyond intelligence gathering, the Tenth Bureau is believed to be involved in disrupting or intimidating overseas critics, including anonymous threats, organizing pro-China counter-demonstrations, and even coercive actions. Between 2021 and 2022, the U.S. accused the MSS of orchestrating efforts to disrupt the congressional campaign of a Chinese-American dissident (a Tiananmen Square survivor), attempting to hire private investigators to discredit or harm the candidate. Such bold actions demonstrate the Tenth Bureau's willingness to engage in transnational repression to eliminate overseas dissent.

– Liaison and United Front Strategy: The Tenth Bureau operates in parallel with the CCP's United Front Work Department (UFWD), which publicly co-opts overseas Chinese and influences foreign elites. The Tenth Bureau provides intelligence to the UFWD and sometimes uses United Front networks as cover for its operations. The MSS's Twelfth Bureau is specifically responsible for United Front work, indicating close coordination between intelligence and influence operations. While the UFWD uses "soft" methods (cultural events, hometown associations, business ties) to influence the overseas Chinese community, the MSS provides the secret "stick," monitoring and suppressing dissent when necessary.

The Tenth Bureau covers the entire spectrum of overseas Chinese security intelligence, acting as China's overseas secret police and counterintelligence agency. It rigorously monitors students at Western universities and exiled dissidents. Its tools range from traditional espionage techniques (recruiting agents, dead drops, encrypted communications) to modern cyber espionage, reflecting the integration of internal and external security within the MSS. The bureau views the overseas Chinese community as both a potential asset and a threat, ensuring that "the Party's eyes reach every Chinese person abroad."

• Significant Operations, Missions, and Incidents Due to the MSS's high level of secrecy, the Tenth Bureau's specific operations are usually only exposed when revealed by foreign counterintelligence agencies or through internal leaks. Below are several notable missions and incidents related to the Tenth Bureau's responsibilities:

– Surveillance of Dissidents within the United States (2011–2022): In 2022, the U.S. Department of Justice publicly indicted four MSS officials and one CCP agent for a decade-long surveillance operation targeting Chinese dissidents, human rights leaders, and democracy activists. The CCP agent, 73-year-old scholar Wang Shujun from New York, infiltrated Chinese democratic communities to secretly report to the MSS. Court documents revealed he was instructed to collect personal information on Hong Kong democracy advocates, Uyghur and Tibetan activists, and Taiwan independence supporters. MSS officials remotely guided his targets and reporting content, even instructing him to write "diary-style" conversation records. This operation, dubbed "Fox Hunt" by the U.S. (distinct from the Ministry of Public Security's program of the same name), exemplifies the Tenth Bureau's typical modus operandi: using insiders within the community to monitor overseas Chinese dissidents. The FBI stated this case "reveals the Chinese government's serious attitude towards silencing critics, with targets spanning the United States and the globe." This is likely the most explicit case of the Tenth Bureau targeting overseas Chinese dissent to date, involving collaboration with provincial MSS offices in Guangdong and Shandong.

– Harassment and Coercion of Overseas Dissidents: Multiple incidents indicate coordinated intimidation or repatriation of dissidents:

– Conspiracy Against Congressional Candidate (2021): According to U.S. Department of Justice documents, a CCP MSS agent (Lu Jianwang) hired a private investigator in New York to disrupt the campaign of Xiong Yan (a U.S. military veteran and Tiananmen Square survivor). The agent suggested using "honey traps" or violent means to discredit or harm Xiong Yan. This plot was foiled by the FBI, demonstrating the MSS's willingness to use dirty tactics across borders to punish anti-CCP stances, reminiscent of the Soviet KGB during the Cold War. Such actions targeting participants in U.S. elections highlight how the Tenth Bureau's activities have encroached upon foreign politics, extending beyond mere surveillance.

– Transnational Repression ("Fox Hunt"): The CCP government's global fugitive repatriation efforts are primarily led by the Ministry of Public Security, with occasional MSS involvement, particularly concerning political figures. In 2020, the U.S. accused seven individuals (including suspected MSS assets) of stalking and harassing a Chinese exile in New Jersey to force their return to China. FBI officials stated such operations aim to "limit freedom of speech, attack dissent, and maintain Communist Party power." While the Ministry of Public Security typically uses legal means (like Interpol red notices) for such actions, the MSS is responsible for covert surveillance and intimidation. The Tenth Bureau naturally participates in locating dissidents and coordinating covert coercion.

– Disappearances of Booksellers and Tycoons: Although details are scarce, the MSS is suspected of involvement in the disappearances of several mainland Chinese or Hong Kong citizens overseas. For example, Swedish bookseller Gui Minhai disappeared in Thailand in 2015 and was later detained in China. In 2017, billionaire Xiao Jianhua was allegedly abducted in Hong Kong. Such operations may be carried out by provincial MSS bureaus (e.g., Guangdong) as part of external security work. Before 2020, Hong Kong's special status meant MSS activities were not publicly acknowledged, but the Tenth Bureau, possibly in conjunction with the Fourth Bureau (Hong Kong and Macau affairs), may have operated covertly to apprehend politically sensitive individuals. These incidents illustrate the extreme functions of the Tenth Bureau—cross-border kidnappings that violate host country laws, reflecting directives from Beijing's highest levels to "spare no effort" in eliminating threats.

– Infiltration of Western Academia and Industry: The Tenth Bureau also participates in blurring the lines between intelligence gathering and influence operations. A typical pattern involves recruiting overseas Chinese students or scientists in the West to act as informants for laboratories or corporations, stealing technology or proprietary information. Although most technological espionage is attributed to CCP military cyber units or MSS technical bureaus, the Tenth Bureau provides the human network. For instance, MSS officials have approached Chinese scientists, transmitting research data back to China. In 2018, Xu Yanjun, a deputy division chief of the Jiangsu State Security Department, was arrested in Belgium on suspicion of stealing aerospace technology and recruiting insiders at General Electric. While this was a provincial bureau case, it reflects the MSS's global efforts in technological theft. The Tenth Bureau supports such missions by providing travel cover, background checks, and secure communication channels.

– Collaboration with United Front Work Department Influence Operations: The Tenth Bureau plays a behind-the-scenes role in influence operations in countries like Australia and Canada. In 2019, Australian defector Wang Liqiang claimed to have assisted CCP intelligence in interfering in Taiwan's elections and infiltrating Hong Kong's protest movement, involving...

Assist pro-CCP candidates and control student unions. Although its credibility is questioned, Australian security agencies have confirmed extensive CCP espionage activities. A 2023 Canadian intelligence leak alleged CCP interference in elections, primarily through the United Front Work Department and diplomats, with the MSS providing intelligence support. Although the 10th Bureau does not appear publicly, it is highly likely to monitor ethnic Chinese political figures and report back to Beijing on targets to be "cultivated" or suppressed.

– Counter-espionage effectiveness: In terms of defense, the 10th Bureau has achieved certain results in preventing foreign spy penetration. CCP official media occasionally disclose cases of breaking spy rings or arresting double agents. In 2021, the MSS announced the arrest of a Chinese national double agent; although details were scarce, it can be inferred that they were contacted overseas, and the 10th Bureau likely monitored and eventually detained them. The MSS claims that foreign intelligence agencies continuously attempt to penetrate China's scientific research fields and national security agencies through overseas channels to actively sabotage. Whenever a suspected Chinese CIA asset is exposed (such as the US spy network from 2010-2012), the 10th Bureau played a key role in monitoring the overseas Chinese community. After Xi Jinping took office, he emphasized "striking hard against moles and foreign spies," and after 2017, the authority of intelligence agencies increased greatly, significantly enhancing the capabilities of the 10th Bureau.

The 10th Bureau's operational strategy is clear: protect the regime at all costs, crossing national borders. Whether through espionage, sabotage, or kidnapping, the targets are individuals and groups that Beijing fears may organize opposition or weaken the CCP's authority. Such incidents trigger international backlash—FBI arrests, diplomatic scandals, etc., which rarely reveal the nature of this situation. Countries such as the United States have publicly accused the MSS of "conducting aggressive actions on a scale and pace unseen in decades globally," calling CCP spies "a super version of the Soviet Union." The 10th Bureau is the core of this global influence, responsible for many of the most controversial overseas espionage cases in recent years.

Uncertain or speculative links: Some incidents are only speculated to be related to the 10th Bureau, lacking official confirmation. For example, reports of Uyghur exiles in Turkey being oppressed or Chinese churches in Canada being monitored make it difficult to determine whether the 10th Bureau, a provincial bureau, or the United Front Work Department was operating. This report marks such connections as "unconfirmed." However, overall evidence shows that most Chinese intelligence activities involving overseas Chinese or overseas dissidents are related to the 10th Bureau.

• Intelligence Collection Methods and Techniques The 10th Bureau completes its missions by combining traditional espionage methods with modern technology. Known and inferred methods include:

– Human Intelligence (HUMINT): HUMINT is the core of the 10th Bureau's operations, including recruiting agents within target communities, cultivating informants, and deploying cover officers. Most agents are overseas Chinese, as they are easier to contact due to shared language and culture. The bureau often uses students to monitor classmates or recruits community leaders to report on political attitudes. Face-to-face meetings are often conducted within China; for example, New York agent Wang Shujun was instructed to go to China to meet with handlers, using home visits or academic conferences as cover to ensure secure communication.

– Secure Communications: 10th Bureau officers use encrypted apps, emails, and coded language to contact assets. In US dissident monitoring cases, handlers directed agents via "encrypted communication apps and emails," and agents wrote encrypted "diary" documents for remote access by the MSS. Cloud email drafts, steganography, and dead-letter boxes are commonly used methods. MSS officers frequently change phones and accounts to evade detection, often using end-to-end encryption on Chinese platforms (QQ, WeChat), although these are easily intercepted by Western signals intelligence. The 10th Bureau may collaborate with the technical departments of the 13th and 14th Bureaus to provide encryption and cybersecurity support.

– Electronic Surveillance and Cyber Operations: HUMINT is supplemented by cyber espionage. The 10th Bureau can request hacking or electronic eavesdropping. Chinese cyber units (including MSS-linked hackers such as APT40, APT17, etc.) often target the emails, chat groups, and phones of overseas Chinese dissidents when arrested. Cybersecurity reports have revealed malware attacks targeting Tibetan and Uyghur activist communities, suspected to be planned by national security agencies. In 2020, the US indicted two Chinese hackers cooperating with the MSS, involving the global theft of COVID-19 research data. The Tianjin State Security Bureau (an MSS provincial agency) is linked to the APT10 hacker group, showing that provincial bureaus possess cyber capabilities. The 10th Bureau may coordinate with such units to implement monitoring of target communications or overseas Chinese forums. DNS hijacking, phishing attacks, and mobile spyware have all been used against overseas Chinese activists, reflecting a high degree of technical integration.

– Field Surveillance: MSS officers and local informants conduct field surveillance on targets, including attending public events (rallies, meetings) and tailing targets. Typical missions include monitoring participants in overseas Tiananmen Square incident commemorations. There have been reports of CCP agents leaving threatening notes at the doors of dissidents in the US or installing GPS trackers, which aligns with MSS intimidation methods, although Ministry of Public Security personnel were also involved at the time. 10th Bureau overseas operations may cooperate with local private detectives or ethnic Chinese employees to reduce the possibility of direct exposure of CCP officials. Western counter-intelligence agencies believe the MSS uses the vast overseas Chinese community as "eyes on the ground," where ordinary tourists or students can be mobilized to observe dissident activities, achieving "crowdsourced" surveillance.

– Technical Equipment: The MSS uses various espionage devices. The 13th Bureau is responsible for the research, development, and provision of spy equipment. The 10th Bureau may use miniature recording devices, hidden cameras, IMSI catchers (mobile phone interceptors), and mail interception. Chinese data states that the 14th Bureau is responsible for "mail inspection and telecommunications control," implying that the MSS can intercept international mail or packages. Incidents of missing mail when dissidents send materials are suspected to be MSS interference. In 2019, Poland exposed an MSS 2nd Bureau officer carrying suspected electronic spy equipment, with technical means overlapping with the 10th Bureau.

– Open Source Intelligence (OSINT): Monitoring the overseas Chinese community relies heavily on OSINT, including news, social media, and publications. The 11th Bureau, through its public-facing China Institute of International Relations (CICIR), conducts extensive open-source analysis, studying political trends among overseas Chinese to provide target priorities and strategies for the 10th Bureau. Social media monitoring is particularly important; the MSS tracks dissident networks on platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, WeChat, and Telegram. In recent years, national security officers have warned against the use of social media by external forces to incite unrest, reflecting close attention to these platforms. 10th Bureau officers may lurk in Chinese chat groups under pseudonyms to collect grassroots public opinion.

– Joint Operations with Local Partners: In some countries, especially those in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa with friendly relations with Beijing, the MSS can rely on local intelligence or police assistance to arrest or deport dissidents. The 10th Bureau coordinates such cases. In 2006, the extradition of Uyghur activist Yusup Chekher from Uzbekistan is suspected to have been a collaboration between CCP agents and local security departments. The repatriation of Chinese asylum seekers from Thailand at Beijing's request is also suspected to involve the MSS.

It can be shown that the 10th Bureau employs multiple human, electronic, and psychological means, using various methods. If a dissident's relatives in China are coerced, the 10th Bureau can coordinate with the Ministry of Public Security to apply pressure. If a group of Canadian students plans a protest, the 10th Bureau can deploy cyber units to hack WeChat groups while internal informants report the plan. This multi-pronged strategy makes it difficult for targets to evade, effectively extending CCP surveillance to the doorsteps of overseas Chinese.

• Collaboration with Other National Security Bureaus, CCP Military Units, and State Agencies Within the Ministry of State Security: The 10th Bureau does not operate in isolation but is one of the matrices composed of multiple MSS bureaus, often collaborating in cases:

– Close cooperation with the 9th Bureau (Internal Security and Counter-intelligence). The 9th Bureau monitors foreign entities and "reactionary" organizations within China (such as foreign NGOs and underground political groups inside China). If an overseas dissident group is targeted by the 10th Bureau, its domestic supporters or relatives may be monitored by the 9th Bureau. The two bureaus share intelligence to form a complete target profile across borders. For example, if the 10th Bureau discovers an overseas student activist, the 9th Bureau immediately monitors their relatives and friends in China.

– Coordination with the 7th and 8th Bureaus (Counter-espionage Intelligence and Investigation). The 7th Bureau collects foreign spy intelligence and attempts to flip foreign agents, while the 8th Bureau is responsible for domestic spy investigations. If a foreign intelligence agency recruits an overseas Chinese person, the 10th Bureau monitors the contact and feeds it back to the 7th Bureau to attempt to turn them into a double agent. Conversely, if the 7th Bureau learns that a China-related spy network contains ethnic Chinese members, the 10th Bureau assists in overseas tracking. Example: The CIA recruits a Chinese student in Europe; the 10th Bureau monitors their contacts in the overseas Chinese community, and the 7th Bureau handles operations within China. The Xi Jinping era emphasizes breaking down departmental barriers and unifying the counter-espionage front.

– Close coordination with the 2nd Bureau (Diplomatic Intelligence "Open Line") and the 1st Bureau ("Secret Line"). These two bureaus provide cover for MSS overseas officers. 10th Bureau officers may nominally belong to the 1st Bureau (non-official cover) or the 2nd Bureau (diplomatic cover) but execute 10th Bureau missions. The responsibilities for intelligence collection and Chinese security monitoring within many embassies are blurred and often borne by the same MSS station. The 10th Bureau utilizes the global "legal" resident agent network managed by the 2nd Bureau.

– The 11th Bureau (Intelligence Research and Analysis), represented by the China Institute of International Relations (CICIR), may provide the 10th Bureau with research reports on overseas Chinese, such as political trends in the Australian or US overseas Chinese communities, helping to determine target priorities. CICIR scholars often contact foreign delegations and may also discover potential recruitment targets to report to the 10th Bureau.

– The 12th Bureau (Social Investigation/United Front Liaison) is responsible for the MSS's role within the CCP's United Front system and may coordinate with the 10th Bureau on the activities of overseas Chinese associations, media, and opinion leaders. For example, when the United Front Work Department organizes a Global Chinese Conference, the 10th Bureau can take the opportunity to an

Agents or informants are inserted. The 12th Bureau introduces overseas Chinese figures considered "friendly" to the 10th Bureau, facilitating intelligence gathering or monitoring assistance. Conversely, discoveries by the 10th Bureau regarding hostile or neutral individuals in the community can be fed back to the United Front Work Department (UFWD) to guide their influence strategies.

– The 18th Bureau (Counter-terrorism or U.S. Operations): The functions of the 18th Bureau are uncertain. Chinese sources state it is responsible for counter-terrorism, handling threats such as overseas "Uyghur extremists." Western reports (citing Mattis & Brazil) suggest the 18th Bureau has recently become the "U.S. Operations Bureau," specifically targeting U.S. covert actions. If true, the 10th Bureau would likely cooperate closely with it, as the Chinese diaspora community in the U.S. and U.S. societal targets overlap. For example, the U.S. Operations Bureau might infiltrate U.S. political circles, with the 10th Bureau providing intelligence on the Chinese diaspora. This information is speculative and unconfirmed. "Counter-terrorism operations" also rely on the 10th Bureau's network to locate targets, with the 18th Bureau providing expert analysis on "terrorist organizations."

Cooperation with the CCP Military and Other State Organs:

– Military Intelligence: The CCP military has independent intelligence units (formerly the Second Department of the General Staff, now the Joint Staff Department and Strategic Support Force responsible for cyber/signals intelligence). Traditionally, military intelligence focused on military defense technology, while the MSS handled political, economic, and counter-espionage matters. There is overlap in technical espionage and overseas operations. After 1983, the military initially led foreign intelligence, and the MSS gradually grew. Currently, the MSS is globally active, and the two still coordinate. For instance, military cyber units (like the notorious Unit 61398) share tools and coordinate targets with MSS cyber units. The 10th Bureau is primarily responsible for overseas Chinese in sensitive positions (e.g., within foreign militaries or defense industries), with initial human intelligence collected by the MSS, followed by military involvement in military intelligence. They have jointly launched attacks using the "ShadowPad" malware, indicating information sharing or blurred boundaries.

– Ministry of Public Security (MPS): Domestic public security is handled by the MPS, while overseas operations are led by the MSS. However, they cooperate closely, especially in transnational law enforcement and fugitive repatriation. The renowned "Operation Fox Hunt" is led by the MPS, and MSS officials sometimes accompany these operations abroad. The MPS focuses on economic fugitives, while the MSS targets political exiles. They cooperate seamlessly when targets possess characteristics of both. For example, a former Chinese official wanted in the U.S. was threatened by Chinese authorities; MPS personnel applied pressure using tourist visas, while the MSS provided intelligence on family and assets. U.S. indictments allege such operations aim to suppress dissent, implying MSS coordination. The controversial overseas "Chinese police liaison stations" are led by local public security bureaus, but it is widely suspected that the MSS uses them as cover for monitoring the diaspora. Both agencies report to the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, and Xi Jinping's strengthening of national security in 2022-2023 has led to closer MSS-MPS cooperation.

– United Front Work Department (UFWD): The CCP Central United Front Work Department is not a security agency but is crucial in overseas influence networks. The 12th Bureau serves as a bridge between the MSS and the UFWD. The UFWD is the "public face," co-opting diaspora communities and foreign elites through cultural and business activities, while the MSS is the "secret arm," ensuring control and compliance. For example, in the Canadian election interference case, UFWD-affiliated individuals funded candidates, and the MSS provided covert monitoring to ensure operational secrecy. The UFWD's 10th Bureau (Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau) is responsible for contacting overseas Chinese leaders and likely exchanges information with the MSS's 10th Bureau – one publicly coordinates "friendly" diaspora leaders, while the other secretly monitors "hostile" individuals. Such coordination occurs through embassy or consulate working groups. Embassy political counselors are typically responsible for UFWD work, and cultural counselors engage with student leaders. MSS officials often hold nominal positions within these departments, blurring the lines between UFWD and MSS roles.

– Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA): MSS officers often operate under diplomatic cover and require coordination with the MFA. CCP ambassadors and consuls general are usually aware of MSS personnel's presence (and may even participate in UFWD activities). The 10th Bureau relies on consulates to access local Chinese communities; consular officials arrange meetings with student leaders or community events, which MSS officers use as cover. Reports have emerged of CCP consuls in Houston directly instructing Chinese associations to organize anti-U.S. demonstrations, allegedly with MSS support. The MFA publicly denies espionage activities but implicitly condones them: the MSS Diplomatic Bureau coordinates with embassies to assist in expelling suspected spies or handling intelligence leaks. The MFA also handles public relations after incidents, such as labeling expelled MSS officials as "diplomats" and denying their involvement. While the 10th Bureau executes missions, the MFA manages the aftermath and official responses.

– State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and Other Ministries: The MSS sometimes utilizes resources from Chinese corporations or civilian organizations. Large SOEs provide cover and logistical support in Belt and Road Initiative countries. Overseas representatives of energy companies may be MSS officers or willing to host MSS personnel. The 10th Bureau, focusing on political targets, may cooperate with journalists from state-owned media (who also act as informants) or education ministry officials responsible for international students. For example, overseas CCP state-owned media outlets have been exposed for hiring journalists who report on dissident protests to the MSS. The MSS's 17th Bureau (Enterprise Bureau) manages shell companies and business operations, often responsible for funding and legal structures for overseas covert activities. Cultural centers promoting CCP narratives may be joint UFWD-MSS projects, with the Enterprise Bureau handling funding and the 10th Bureau deploying personnel.

Overall, the 10th Bureau is a critical node in the CCP's security apparatus, frequently collaborating with its MSS counterparts across counter-espionage and influence operations. It is closely intertwined with military intelligence, MPS fugitive repatriation, UFWD manipulation, and diplomatic cover, embodying the CCP's "whole-of-government" approach to national security. The 10th Bureau's focus on overseas Chinese targets leverages the capabilities of various entities to amplify its influence and effectiveness.

• International Activities and Influence Operations The Ministry of State Security's 10th Bureau is a key force in the CCP's international covert operations, particularly in influencing foreign societies through the Chinese diaspora. Its involvement spans continents, engaging in various influence and espionage activities:

– United States: The U.S., with its largest and most active communities of Chinese democracy and ethnic minority dissidents, is a primary battleground for the 10th Bureau. The aforementioned FBI revelations of surveillance operations and attempts to disrupt congressional campaigns serve as examples. Beyond this, the MSS influences and infiltrates academic and technological sectors, recruiting informants from top universities and tech companies. U.S. authorities have warned that some Chinese student associations are directed by CCP officials to monitor critics and exert peer pressure. In 2020, a Chinese student at a U.S. university secretly recorded a classmate's pro-democracy remarks and sent the recording back to China, leading to harassment of the classmate's family (disclosed in congressional testimony). While such activities are not explicitly labeled MSS operations, they align with the 10th Bureau's patterns of diaspora monitoring and transnational repression. Election interference has also become a focus: while Russia grabs headlines, China, through the MSS and UFWD, operates more discreetly. In 2022, the U.S. Department of Justice accused China of interfering in New York City elections, targeting the case of Xiong Yan. In 2023, the FBI arrested two men in New York operating an illegal "Chinese police station" to monitor and intimidate dissidents; one was linked to the "Peaceful National Unification Promotion Association," associated with the MSS. Such incidents demonstrate the 10th Bureau's diaspora control mandate extending to influence operations within the U.S., aimed at shaping a favorable environment for Beijing or suppressing anti-CCP voices.

– Canada: With a significant Chinese immigrant population, including Uyghur-Canadian activists like Khery Tursun and Hong Kong diaspora groups, Canada has become a hotspot for Chinese espionage and interference. Allegations of CCP election interference in 2022-2023 (funneling funds to pro-Beijing candidates, cultivating politicians) have surfaced. While largely attributed to the UFWD and CCP consulates, the MSS provides intelligence and covert support. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) has reported suspected MSS agents tracking and intimidating ethnic Chinese journalists critical of Beijing. A Uyghur activist in Toronto reported threats and communication hacks, indicative of state-sponsored espionage. The 10th Bureau likely directs such operations, identifying key dissidents and coordinating with consulates to neutralize threats. In March 2023, under public pressure, Canada launched an inquiry, indirectly acknowledging the MSS's disruptive presence. These influence operations aim to curb anti-CCP activities within the Canadian Chinese community and support pro-Beijing politicians. The 10th Bureau's effectiveness is mixed; while it has induced self-censorship in some communities, the exposure has triggered political backlash and impacted Sino-Canadian relations.

– Australia and New Zealand: Both countries have faced scrutiny over CCP influence operations in recent years. Australia's large Chinese diaspora and close strategic alliance with the U.S. have made it a target of an "unprecedented wave of espionage" by the CCP. In 2019, Australian political operative Bo Yang was investigated for alleged links to CCP national security, and defector Wang Liqiang claimed MSS interference in Australian academia and media. The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) thwarted a CCP espionage plot in 2020 aimed at infiltrating the federal parliament, suspected to be linked to the MSS. The 10th Bureau, in collaboration with the UFWD, attempts to co-opt leaders and donors within the Chinese diaspora to expand Beijing's influence. A New Zealand MP of Chinese descent was revealed to have links to the "People's Liberation Army Academy," not directly implicating the MSS but reflecting the broader influence ecosystem. Both nations have strengthened laws against foreign interference. MSS activities aim to suppress critical voices (e.g., pressuring Chinese-language media) and soften mainstream political attitudes.

– Europe: While European Chinese communities are smaller, they host key dissidents (exiled writers, the World Uyghur Congress in Germany, etc.). Germany's domestic intelligence agency has repeatedly warned of CCP espionage activities, including using LinkedIn to recruit informants (thousands of German citizens have been approached). MSS activities in Europe intersect economic espionage with anti-CCP diaspora operations. Uyghur exiles in Germany have reported receiving threatening phone calls from CCP agents. Tibetan communities in France suspect infiltration by the CCP embassy. In 2022, the UK's MI5 warned of the MSS has warned of...

Christine Lee is accused of being an agent of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), influencing British politics. While the United Front Work Department (UFWD) is suspected of leading these efforts, the Ministry of State Security (MSS) may have provided intelligence support. "Secret police stations" have been discovered in several European countries, including Spain and the Netherlands, believed to be operated by Chinese security agencies for monitoring overseas Chinese. A 2022 European Parliament report highlighted the MSS's deep involvement in overseas influence operations, specifically naming the Tenth Bureau's infiltration of diaspora communities, indicating increased European awareness of the Tenth Bureau's role as a political warfare tool.

– Asia and Developing Countries:

– Hong Kong and Macau: The MSS operated more cautiously in Hong Kong and Macau, especially during the British colonial era before 1997. The Tenth Bureau viewed Hong Kong's democracy movement and media as "hostile foreign forces." During the 2019 Hong Kong protests, reports emerged of mainland agents, suspected to be from the MSS and Ministry of Public Security (MPS), infiltrating the protests to conduct surveillance and command operations. After the National Security Law was enacted in 2020, Beijing established the central National Security Office, reportedly with overt MSS officials involved in surveillance and suppression, potentially replacing the Tenth Bureau's covert functions. Macau's political landscape is more stable, with the MSS focusing on casino financial flows and potential subversion.

– Taiwan: While official policy is primarily driven by the Taiwan Affairs system and CCP military intelligence, the MSS is also involved, often operating through Hong Kong channels or diaspora networks. The Tenth Bureau may be responsible for counter-subversion efforts related to Taiwan overseas, such as monitoring pro-independence activities and influencing Taiwanese diaspora communities. Some sources suggest the Fifteenth Bureau is responsible for Taiwan affairs, indicating a multi-pronged MSS approach. The Tenth Bureau monitors Taiwanese activities in countries like the United States and Japan, focusing on their connections with mainland diaspora communities and united front efforts.

– Other Asian and African Countries: In Southeast Asian nations like Thailand, Malaysia, and Cambodia, with large ethnic Chinese populations and serving as transit points for Chinese dissidents, the MSS enjoys greater operational freedom. Cases include the alleged abduction of Chinese dissidents in Thailand and surveillance of Uyghurs in Turkey. Although Africa and Latin America are not traditional havens for dissidents, the growing presence of Chinese investment and expatriates has expanded the MSS's global reach. In countries like South Africa and Argentina, CCP police liaison officers have been established within Chinese communities, ostensibly to assist with public security but actually engaging in political surveillance. With the advancement of the Belt and Road Initiative, the MSS utilizes civilian cover to establish listening posts and agent networks. The Tenth Bureau's responsibilities include protecting overseas Chinese workers and projects from espionage and ideological "contamination." During the 2015 political turmoil in Myanmar, the CCP provided "security advice for Chinese nationals," reportedly executed by the Tenth Bureau.

– Information and Narrative Shaping: The Tenth Bureau is also involved in the covert funding and editorial influence of diaspora media. By controlling Chinese-language newspapers and radio stations, they gather information (such as complaints from community members and telephone interactions) and disseminate propaganda, suppressing dissenting voices. Some Chinese-language media outlets in the United States and Australia have been acquired by pro-Beijing capital, exhibiting a clear pro-Beijing stance. The UFWD leads these media influence operations, while the Tenth Bureau provides background checks on journalists, identifies compliant or suppressible media figures, and even manipulates hostile takeovers through intermediaries. These influence operations blur the lines between "national security" and soft power, achieving the silencing of dissent not through imprisonment, but through control of overseas discourse.

Overall, the Tenth Bureau's international operational strategy is clear: extend the CCP's security apparatus overseas, preemptively eliminate threats, and prevent the formation of international alliances by anti-CCP forces abroad. Through surveillance and pressure on diaspora communities, they aim to prevent overseas support for movements similar to Soviet émigré governments or Middle Eastern uprisings. This aggressive approach has increasingly drawn global attention and backlash. Countries that once tacitly permitted CCP espionage activities against exiles are now condemning "transnational repression." Agencies like the FBI, CSIS, ASIO, and MI5 are actively investigating and prosecuting MSS activities. Consequently, the Tenth Bureau has become more clandestine, relying on private investigators and third-country meetings to evade detection. While international backlash may restrict overt harassment, intelligence gathering is difficult to halt. As long as the CCP views overseas criticism as an existential threat, the Tenth Bureau will continue its global operations, adapting its tactics to pursue its strategic objectives.

• Facilities and Operational Areas Headquarters and Facilities: The Tenth Bureau's headquarters is located in Beijing, co-located with other departments of the Ministry of State Security. The MSS main office building is highly classified, with its official registered address at 14 East Chang'an Avenue, Beijing (State Council compound). However, its actual operational headquarters is suspected to be in Haidian District (northwestern Beijing). Chinese sources indicate that the MSS plaque was initially displayed at the MPS compound, with the de facto headquarters situated in the heavily guarded "Yidong Garden" in Haidian – a district known for its concentration of prestigious intelligence academies and research institutes, near the Summer Palace. MSS bureaus are distributed across at least four compounds in Beijing, each with independent office spaces. The Tenth Bureau, focusing on external operations, may be located near Bureaus 1, 2, 7, 8, and 9 for coordination purposes.

Notable facilities associated with the MSS include the Institute of International Relations (IIR) in Haidian, a training ground for MSS elites (formerly known as Beijing Institute of International Relations, not the University of International Business and Economics), which is subordinate to the MSS. This institute trains new intelligence officers, teaching languages, espionage techniques, and regional studies. Many Tenth Bureau officials are alumni of the IIR, particularly those assigned overseas. The IIR campus may also serve as an analysis center. The China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) is located in Beijing, near the MSS headquarters, and serves as a think tank for the Eleventh Bureau, which the Tenth Bureau utilizes for analysis of international issues.

Additionally, the MSS operates the Cadre Management College (Administrative College, commonly known as Jiangnan Social College, located in Suzhou), which serves as a training base for mid-career officials. Tenth Bureau personnel may undergo rotational training here, especially before being assigned to overseas posts.

There is no publicly disclosed dedicated office building for the Tenth Bureau. However, given the high degree of compartmentalization within the MSS, it is presumed that secure office buildings exist in Beijing for the Tenth Bureau to formulate operational plans, analyze overseas reports, and coordinate departmental activities. The image at the beginning of the report is often identified as an MSS facility (possibly one of the headquarters buildings).

Overseas Presence: The MSS does not publicly disclose overseas offices, and its intelligence operations are conducted secretly. However, in practice:

– Embassies and Consulates: MSS officials are often stationed within diplomatic missions, with the Second Bureau responsible for diplomatic cover personnel. In the embassies of major powers such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom, there are typically several MSS officials serving under various titles, such as cultural counselors, science counselors, and education consuls. Tenth Bureau officials often hold positions interacting with Chinese communities, such as education consuls overseeing students, who effectively act as MSS agents. The MSS Diplomatic Bureau coordinates these assignments to ensure they meet the bureau's requirements.

– State-Owned Enterprises and Cultural Centers: Chinese enterprises have numerous projects in Africa, Latin America, and Belt and Road Initiative countries. MSS officials sometimes accompany or embed within these projects, not for long-term stationing, but for rotational execution of specific tasks. Tenth Bureau officials undertake short-term business trips (under cover as auditors, trade representatives, etc.) to meet informants or conduct on-site surveillance. While Confucius Institutes and "Chinese Cultural Centers" are ostensibly under the Ministry of Education and the propaganda system, they have been suspected of harboring intelligence personnel. Heads of Confucius Institutes in Sweden and the United States have been identified as MSS personnel, effectively serving as the Tenth Bureau's covert presence in those locations, monitoring Chinese scholars and students.

Regional Focus: The Tenth Bureau's operations primarily target regions with significant Chinese diaspora populations or influence:

– North America (United States, Canada): A primary focus area due to the large Chinese communities and active dissident presence.

– Western Europe (United Kingdom, Germany, France, Netherlands, etc.): Medium priority, focusing on exile communities and the tech diaspora.

– Asia-Pacific Region: Australia, New Zealand (Western allies and diaspora locations), Southeast Asia (large ethnic Chinese populations in Singapore, Malaysia; although many are local citizens, MSS activities intertwine with local politics and business).

– East Asia: While Chinese populations in Japan and South Korea are smaller, Japan has diaspora dissidents and technological exchanges. In 2019, a Chinese professor in Hokkaido was arrested on suspicion of passing intelligence to the MSS. In 2019, violent clashes occurred in South Korea between Chinese students and supporters of Hong Kong protests, allegedly influenced by the consulate or MSS.

– Africa and the Middle East: Lower priority, but rising with the growth of Chinese expatriates and investments. The MSS often dispatches "security officers" to protect Chinese nationals involved in African mining and railway projects and to prevent contact with Western intelligence agencies. Israel, due to its close relationship with China, is suspected of harboring MSS spies. Some Chinese businesspeople are suspected of providing cover for intelligence agencies. The Tenth Bureau may monitor Chinese Christians and Falun Gong practitioners in Israel, despite their limited numbers.

– Latin America: Traditionally less of a focus, but Chinese communities and Taiwanese influence in countries like Peru and Panama have attracted MSS attention. If dissidents are found to be hiding, the MSS will extend its reach; otherwise, efforts focus on technical and commercial intelligence.

Domestic and Overseas Operational Facilities: China has specialized facilities within the country to support overseas operations. These include safe houses in Beijing for returning agents to report secretly, and technical centers for analyzing overseas intercepted data (e.g., Shanghai signal stations process overseas internet surveillance). The China Information Technology Evaluation Center (CITEC), belonging to the Thirteenth Bureau, suggests infrastructure for cyber operations. The Tenth Bureau utilizes these facilities to process data from diaspora surveillance, such as sending video footage of overseas gatherings to video labs for facial recognition, leveraging the technical capabilities of other departments.

Covert Organizations: The MSS has historically established overseas cover organizations. The Xinhua News Agency in Hong Kong, during British rule, served as an actual MSS intelligence station. Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSA) at universities in the United States are often guided or funded by consulates, effectively extending surveillance and influence. The Tenth Bureau may maintain rosters of such organizations and occasionally dispatch personnel or agents to assume leadership roles.

Use of Technological Platforms: China's global digital platforms (WeChat, Douyin, etc.) also fall within the scope of the Tenth Bureau's "facilities." While WeChat is a product of Tencent with servers located in China, its data is subject to national laws. Overseas Chinese extensively use WeChat for communication, allowing the MSS to legally access data for individual or conversational surveillance. Multiple overseas student WeChat groups have been infiltrated, with critics within these groups facing retaliation. The location data from Chinese-manufactured mobile phones and applications is theoretically available for MSS surveillance, although there is no public evidence of this.

but the security community is widely concerned.

In summary, while the Tenth Bureau's facilities are not overt military bases, it can be inferred that it maintains secure office spaces in Beijing and relies on diplomatic missions, businesses, and community networks overseas. Its "offices" are spread across global Chinese diaspora communities, from Sydney cafes to Boston student dorms. The combination of physical bases and virtual networks allows the Tenth Bureau to operate globally without formal overseas stations. When discovered, they often appear as ad-hoc groups (colluding officials and local personnel), facilitating plausible deniability for Beijing. Recent crackdowns on covert CCP police stations and the expulsion of undeclared MSS officials indicate that some unofficial outposts have been exposed, and the cat-and-mouse game will continue, with the Tenth Bureau constantly adjusting its asset deployment.

• Strategic Objectives and Guiding Ideology of the Tenth Bureau The Tenth Bureau's strategic objectives align closely with the CCP's security strategy, guided by several core concepts and directives:

– "Overall National Security Concept": Proposed by Xi Jinping in 2014, this concept emphasizes that national security encompasses political, territorial, military, economic, cultural, social, and cyber domains, with internal and external security being interconnected. It stresses the need to guard against hostile forces engaging in "infiltration, subversion, and sabotage." The MSS is the primary instrument for implementing this strategy, with the Tenth Bureau focusing on external security to prevent foreign threats from destabilizing the domestic situation, prioritizing regime security (i.e., the security of the CCP's rule) as the ultimate goal. The Tenth Bureau's strategic mission is to preempt external threats to the CCP regime, disrupt overseas opposition alliances, prevent foreign intelligence agencies from recruiting Chinese citizens, and counter narratives challenging the CCP's legitimacy. Xi Jinping specifically emphasizes so-called sovereignty and "unification" (Taiwan, Hong Kong) as core interests, which translates to the Tenth Bureau's mandate to suppress overseas independence or democratic movements they deem threatening.

– Legal Framework and Directives: In recent years, the CCP has enacted numerous security laws, granting the MSS broader powers. The 2014 "Counter-Espionage Law" and the 2017 "National Intelligence Law" explicitly mandate the MSS and related agencies to conduct intelligence work both domestically and internationally to safeguard "national (regime) security." These laws require Chinese citizens and organizations to cooperate with national intelligence efforts. Consequently, the Tenth Bureau can legally mobilize overseas Chinese (both citizens and those of Chinese descent) to provide intelligence or assistance. The laws authorize the "punishment of acts that endanger national security," which the Tenth Bureau interprets as globally tracking dissidents. The establishment of the Central National Security Commission (chaired by Xi Jinping) in 2015 unified command of security forces and issues high-level directives to the MSS and the Tenth Bureau. If an overseas organization is deemed a threat, the Tenth Bureau allocates resources for intensive monitoring.

– Mission and Spirit: The MSS's overall mission is to "prevent enemy infiltration, espionage, and subversive activities through effective measures to ensure national security." The Tenth Bureau's responsibilities are precisely aimed at "anti-revolutionary" overseas activities, continuing the brutal definition of political dissent from the Mao era. The Xi Jinping era has replaced these with modern terms like "political security" and "regime security," but the essence remains unchanged. Tenth Bureau officials are indoctrinated to be "shields and sharp knives for the motherland," targeting so-called "traitors" and foreign forces labeled as ideological aggressors. A 1983 speech by Chen Pixian explicitly linked national security work with "anti-hegemony and the realization of national unification," providing a theoretical justification for the Tenth Bureau's suppression of forces deemed "hegemonistic" (Western) or separatist.

– Key Targets and Strategic Adjustments: The Tenth Bureau's strategic focus shifts with the CCP's evolving threat perceptions. In the 1980s, its primary focus was Taiwan and Western espionage, with early work including tracking Kuomintang intelligence and preventing Western infiltration. Following the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, overseas democratic dissidents and religious movements (later Falun Gong) became key targets. The 2000s and 2010s saw an rise in threats from ethnic separatism and "color revolutions" – instability in Xinjiang after 9/11, unrest in Tibet in 2008, and the Arab Spring. Xi Jinping has repeatedly warned of Western attempts to instigate "color revolutions" using Chinese people, leading the Tenth Bureau to emphasize early detection of overseas anti-CCP organizations and prevent their linkage with domestic discontent. Strategic directives instruct the denigration of exiled dissidents and the creation of internal divisions to prevent unity.

– Balance of Defense and Offense: Traditional Chinese intelligence agencies leaned towards defensive counter-espionage, protecting secrets, and avoiding risks. The Xi Jinping era has seen a more proactive approach, with the Tenth Bureau's strategy incorporating offensive influence operations. If rumors are true, the Eighteenth Bureau, specifically targeting the United States, exemplifies this proactive stance. The strategic philosophy is to "not only passively respond to threats but also actively shape a favorable environment." The Tenth Bureau not only monitors diaspora dissent but also attempts to co-opt, coerce, or propagandize, using bribery, blackmail, and propaganda. It also engages in managing political discourse in host countries (e.g., supporting pro-China politicians in Australia and Canada). This constitutes political warfare, falling under the scope of "Three Warfares" (public opinion, psychological, and legal warfare), with the MSS deeply involved in overseas political battles. The Tenth Bureau leverages its diaspora networks to mobilize Chinese community groups to protest the Dalai Lama's visits or amplify pro-CCP voices to suppress dissent.

– Known Directives and Campaigns: Some internal slogans have been made public, such as "anti-infiltration struggle," which aligns with the Tenth Bureau's responsibilities, emphasizing opposition to foreign infiltration (espionage and ideology). "Safeguarding overseas interests" reflects the CCP's need to protect its global interests, with the MSS coordinating with the CCP's military expeditionary forces. The Tenth Bureau's duties include protecting overseas Chinese citizens from harm and preventing defections. The CCP's 2022 Global Security Initiative, calling for respect for each country's security concerns, serves to legitimize crackdowns on overseas separatists and so-called "terrorists." The MSS views dissident groups as threats to political security, and overseas tracking is considered a legitimate security requirement.

– Relationship with Foreign Policy: The Tenth Bureau's actions support the CCP's foreign policy, projecting an image of strength and deterring external interference. By monitoring and intimidating overseas dissidents, it prevents them from influencing domestic public opinion and signals to the international community that opposing the CCP is "insecure." This complements Beijing's carrot-and-stick diplomacy: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs uses economic leverage to prevent the Dalai Lama's visits (the "carrot"), while the Tenth Bureau acts as the "stick." Xi Jinping has declared "safeguarding national political security" as the highest priority. The Tenth Bureau provides covert support for foreign policy.

The Tenth Bureau's guiding ideology can be summarized as: protecting the party-state regime at all costs, integrating offense and defense, and ensuring that overseas opposition forces cannot threaten the CCP's stability and rule. As the CCP's global ambitions expand, its strategic objectives continue to escalate, but its core mission remains consistent with the MSS's founding principles and Xi Jinping's priorities – maintaining CCP rule and suppressing all dissent, both domestically and internationally.

• Role in the CCP's National Security and Foreign Policy System Although the Tenth Bureau of the Ministry of State Security (MSS) is a relatively covert component of the CCP's intelligence apparatus, it plays a crucial role in the execution of the CCP's overall national security strategy and foreign policy:

– Core of Regime Security: The CCP leadership explicitly links national security with regime security (the security of CCP rule). The MSS, as the primary agency for regime security, is assisted domestically by the Ministry of Public Security. The Tenth Bureau is responsible for a critical aspect of overseas regime security, internally referred to as an important component of the "invisible front," encompassing espionage and anti-subversion struggles. Xi Jinping's National Security Seminars frequently emphasize "preventing color revolutions," implicitly defining the Tenth Bureau's responsibilities.

– Influencing Foreign Policy: While intelligence agencies do not directly engage in diplomacy, the intelligence gathered by the Tenth Bureau can directly influence foreign policy decisions. If the Tenth Bureau reports that a diaspora group in a certain country is planning anti-CCP protests, Beijing may adjust its diplomatic strategy towards that country, exert pressure to restrict dissent, or offer economic incentives for cooperation. For example, tensions in Sino-German relations due to human rights issues might involve the MSS monitoring Uyghur activities in Germany, which could influence extradition negotiations and economic cooperation as leverage. Similarly, if Tenth Bureau intelligence indicates active lobbying for Taiwan in a Latin American country, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs might increase engagement with that country to counter Taiwan's influence. The Tenth Bureau provides intelligence support for foreign policy, aiding in the isolation of Taiwan, maintaining the CCP's international image, and countering Western alliances.

– Participation in Policy-Making Institutions: The MSS and the Tenth Bureau participate in high-level decision-making bodies. In 2022, Minister of State Security Chen Wenqing was appointed to the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee, enhancing the MSS's power. Various bureaus within the MSS (including the Tenth Bureau) report to the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission and the Central National Security Commission. When the Politburo Standing Committee discusses how to deal with exiled tycoons (like Guo Wengui), the MSS provides legal and covert action plans. The Guo Wengui affair involved inter-departmental coordination, with the MSS (including during Ma Jian's tenure) having had connections to him. After his betrayal, the MSS utilized proxy litigation and pressure on associated individuals, serving foreign policy objectives and undermining dissident influence.

– National Security Architecture: In 2018, the CCP integrated some agencies to form the National Supervisory Commission, while the MSS maintained its independence. Provincial MSS branches strengthened vertical management, reducing local interference. Reforms in 2016-2017 enhanced central control over provincial resources, enabling the Tenth Bureau to more effectively utilize resources from provinces like Guangdong and Hong Kong for overseas missions. The Tenth Bureau benefits from the enhanced central authority, facilitating cross-provincial coordination (e.g., informants from diaspora communities of different origins) and the implementation of orders.

– Deterrence and Signal Transmission: The Tenth Bureau's operations are imbued with deterrence and intimidation, sending a terrifying message to those within China that "fugitives have nowhere to flee," thereby deterring leakers and potential defectors. It sends a stark warning to foreign intelligence agencies, asserting that Chinese citizens must never be recruited, or the MSS will relentlessly monitor and retaliate. This action has exacerbated diplomatic friction.

– Relations with Foreign Security Agencies: The Tenth Bureau is the MSS department most frequently in contact with foreign security agencies (FBI, CSIS, MI5, ASIO, etc.). This confrontation makes it a primary target for foreign surveillance, and foreign agencies also mobilize diaspora communities to resist CCP espionage. The FBI collaborates with leaders in the Chinese diaspora community to raise awareness about counter-espionage.

Knowledge forms a special dynamic. The actions of the Tenth Bureau have prompted foreign countries to strengthen policies such as screening Chinese researchers and registering foreign agents. Diplomatic negotiations often involve the actions of CCP agents, and countries like the United States have repeatedly publicly demanded that the CCP stop harassment within their borders.

– Supporting Other Security Agencies: The Tenth Bureau indirectly supports the CCP military and the Ministry of Public Security. Intelligence from overseas Chinese communities aids military strategic planning, such as understanding fundraising for defense by the Taiwanese diaspora and the connections of Uyghur dissidents, assisting the military in "counter-terrorism." If the Ministry of Public Security learns that a dissident might return to China, the Tenth Bureau immediately assists in luring them back, and the Ministry of Public Security is responsible for the arrest. The case of Hong Kong bookseller Lam Wing-kee being lured back to the mainland is a typical example, with the MSS secretly luring him and the Ministry of Public Security publicly arresting him.

– Severing Internal and External Links: One of the Tenth Bureau's most crucial tasks is to sever the links between domestic dissidents and overseas support. The CCP most fears its internal opposition gaining external resources or support (e.g., the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Arab Spring). By monitoring and disrupting dissident organizations in overseas Chinese communities, the Tenth Bureau ensures that no "government-in-exile" or international pressure coalition is formed. On the eve of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, CCP agents monitored and slandered activists calling for a boycott, reflecting this strategy. Keeping dissident groups fragmented and powerless is an important factor in the CCP's successful diplomatic response to criticism. The Tenth Bureau's covert operations supplement public diplomacy, eliminating troublesome individuals and weakening the influence of dissent.

It can be seen that the Tenth Bureau is an indispensable cog in the CCP's national security machinery, forcibly extending the CCP's authoritarian control beyond its borders. It maintains domestic high-pressure stability by managing external threats; it supports diplomatic expansion by shaping the so-called national image. Although much of it is secret, its impact is significant, interfering with overseas Chinese community dynamics and suppressing anti-CCP voices. As the CCP's global ambitions grow, the Tenth Bureau's role in safeguarding these ambitions and in conflicts with the sovereignty of other nations becomes increasingly important. The CCP's "invisible front" has gone global, and the Tenth Bureau is key to understanding the CCP's comprehensive security strategy in the 21st century.

Conclusion The Tenth Bureau of the "Ministry of State Security" has, as a core unit of the CCP's overseas security strategy system, demonstrated a highly covert and systematic capacity for terror operations in recent years concerning global Chinese communities, political dissent, and the protection of national interests. Its philosophy, centered on proactive defense and offensive counter-subversion, treats overseas Chinese communities as a frontline battlefield for surveillance and coercion. Through multi-layered cooperation networks and various cover-up methods, it is extensively building its "invisible front" globally to expand the CCP's influence. The Tenth Bureau not only maintains regime stability through traditional counter-espionage methods but also actively manipulates and shapes an international discourse environment favorable to Beijing, influencing overseas political ecosystems. Its coordination with state organs such as the CCP military, the Ministry of Public Security, and the United Front Work Department enables it to launch all-around responses and transnational repression against any dissenting voices.

However, as policies to counter the CCP's transnational repression and intelligence infiltration are upgraded in Europe, the United States, and other countries, the Tenth Bureau's covert operations and methods of concealment are gradually being exposed, leading it into a more complex and severe international security confrontation. In the future, its global intelligence activities are bound to become more covert and technologically advanced, but its strategic support role for the CCP's national security and foreign policy will remain indispensable. This study provides a basic framework for understanding the CCP's overseas regime stability maintenance strategies and the evolution of the global intelligence landscape, while also calling for greater academic attention to the destructive and threatening impact of its covert security forces on the international political structure.