Report on the Wealth and Corrupt Activities of CCP Leaders
March 21 (Secret Translation Group) -- On March 20, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) released the "Report on the Wealth and Corrupt Activities of the Leaders of the Chinese Communist Party." The full text is as follows:
Executive Summary
This report is submitted by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) pursuant to Section 6501 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Pub.L. No. 117-263). This unclassified report addresses the wealth and corrupt activities of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
This report was drafted by the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and the National Intelligence Officer for China within the ODNI.a
Wealth and Corrupt Activities of the Chinese Communist Party Leadership
Corruption is a pervasive feature of China and a challenge for the country, stemming from the highly centralized nature of political power in the hands of the CCP, a CCP-centric concept of rule of law, a lack of independent constraints on public officials, and limited transparency. In 2012, President Xi Jinping launched a sweeping anti-corruption campaign to address China's long-standing problem of corruption. In the subsequent years, the campaign investigated and convicted nearly 5 million officials at all levels of government. Corruption in China typically involves money in various forms of bribery or embezzlement, and public sources indicate that some officials and their families have accumulated significant wealth due to their positions and connections. However, Xi's anti-corruption campaign more profoundly reflects a party-led securitization, or targeting of lax political discipline and ideological impurity, particularly at the highest levels of government, aimed at preserving the CCP's domestic control and legitimacy.
(Translator's Note: Securitization refers to the process by which state actors transform routine political issues into "security" issues, enabling the actors to take extraordinary measures in the name of "maintaining security.")
China's domestic lack of transparency, pervasive government censorship, and absence of regulations regarding the public disclosure of leaders' finances pose challenges to public study of corruption or leaders' personal wealth. Powerful Central and local disciplinary commissions are the leading bodies for anti-corruption efforts in China, operating at all levels of government. Some data released by these organizations helps illustrate the scope of China's anti-corruption investigations and provides an indicator of the overall level of corruption.
Corruption and Anti-Corruption
Academic research indicates that corruption has been endemic in China since its founding, including during periods of rapid economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s, when corruption was also particularly severe. Many scholars and observers state that since 2000, corruption has become so pervasive that it has jeopardized the legitimacy of the regime.
Consistent with this analysis, after coming to power in 2012, Xi Jinping launched a sweeping anti-corruption campaign, vowing a "zero tolerance" approach to both "flies" (low-level cadres) and "tigers" (high-ranking officials). His campaign also targeted officials at the bureau chief and county magistrate levels. From 2012 to 2022, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) and the National Supervisory Commission investigated nearly 5 million people in government and the CCP, convicting 4.7 million officials. In Xi's words, he wanted to make government officials "unable to be corrupt, unwilling to be corrupt."
Xi used the anti-corruption campaign to purge rampant corruption that undermined the party's legitimacy and control, and in specific cases, targeted his political rivals. Xi linked the eradication of corruption to party discipline and ideological commitment, deeming it crucial for China's stability and its ability to achieve long-term ambitious goals. In China, corruption is characterized as a political crime, a manifestation of disloyalty and ideological impurity, highlighting its importance to the party and serving as a warning against any internal disciplinary violations. Government propaganda emphasizes the commitment and self-sacrifice of the CCP, characterizing corrupt officials as political enemies of the state. Purged officials, particularly those at higher and more visible levels of government, were often first publicly accused of serious violations of party discipline. In 2021, the CCDI described the anti-corruption effort as "a serious political struggle," accusing corrupt officials of "undermining the Party Central Committee's centralized and unified leadership and the Party's unity and solidarity." In 2024, the campaign targeted more than 50 senior government officials.
While Xi did not primarily use the campaign against his political rivals, the impetus to eliminate competing power centers was significant in decisionmaking during the initial stages of the campaign. In the early years of Xi's tenure, senior officials with ties to his predecessors were targets of investigation and arrest. However, academic analyses of a decade of anti-corruption investigations have not found a focus on officials with specific factional ties or backgrounds, suggesting the anti-corruption campaign broadly sought to eradicate corruption present at all levels of government. More importantly, political connections to senior officials did not protect officials from prosecution, including those with close personal ties to Xi himself; the anti-corruption campaign also purged senior officials deemed loyal to Xi and promoted under his patronage.
It is almost certain that the extent of corruption in China varies by region and level of government. One academic study of a particular city found that between 8% and 65% of officials (depending on their rank) received unofficial income from bribes or embezzlement; another study and a public opinion survey both estimated that about 50% of Chinese officials were involved in corruption, particularly at the local level. These analyses of corruption concluded that bribes could increase an official's legitimate income by four to six times, and that higher-ranking officials received more income from embezzlement and bribery than lower-ranking officials, commensurate with their rank and power. These studies collectively indicate the pervasiveness and breadth of corruption within the party and state.
Corruption in China is primarily driven by concentrated power, a lack of independent oversight or accountability—especially at the provincial level—and perverse incentives that generate political advancement and economic enrichment. These characteristics of the Chinese bureaucracy contribute to corruption in many ways or impede institutional reform efforts. For example:
• The CCDI, the primary body responsible for investigating misconduct, is a political organization that reports directly to its Party Committee and lacks independent external oversight, enabling it to handle anti-corruption cases arbitrarily. The CCP is unwilling to accept external oversight, prioritizing self-correction, possibly out of concern that independent institutions would undermine centralized control, thereby limiting the prospects for accountability and comprehensive reform.
• The central government sets economic growth targets for local governments, which must be met for promotion, but decentralization of decisionmaking authority to provincial and other local levels of government allows for considerable flexibility in policy implementation. This structure effectively incentivizes provincial and local leaders to engage in illicit actions for personal and professional gain.
• Membership in elite organizations such as the National People's Congress (NPC) is a symbol of power and authority and provides access to sensitive government documents. The potential benefits of NPC membership incentivize individuals to pay high fees (often through bribes) to join the NPC and to accept bribes during and even after their tenure as NPC members to facilitate business transactions.
High-Level Corruption
Despite indications that corruption remains pervasive, it is difficult from the outside to identify specific corrupt activities by high-level CCP leaders. One academic study of criminal corruption cases in China found that the level of corruption at the highest echelons of the bureaucracy was very high, with over 80% of charges involving bribery among those accused of crimes.
The ubiquitous government censorship and lack of regulations regarding the public disclosure of leaders' finances result in a lack of transparency regarding personal wealth in China. Nevertheless, a news study published in 2012 found that the families of senior leaders, including then-Premier Wen Jiabao and incoming CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping, had accumulated substantial wealth.
• Wen Jiabao's family members, such as his mother, wife, son, and siblings, controlled at least $2.7 billion in assets in 2012. Similarly, Xi Jinping's siblings, nephews, and nieces possessed over $1 billion in assets in business investments and real estate.
• The study did not find investments specifically linked to the leaders themselves, nor did it find any direct influence of the leaders on the growth of their families' investments. However, their senior positions would have given them access to privileged information, and the actions of private and state-owned enterprises would have benefited family holdings due to their connections with political power figures. Following the publication of this study, China increased its control over information, restricting access for many foreign news agencies, thereby continuing to pose challenges to public research on corruption or personal wealth issues of high-level leaders.
• Following Xi Jinping's rise to power, he may have urged family members to divest. However, evidence from industry research suggests that as of 2024, Xi's family still retained millions in business interests and financial investments. While the available data does not directly link these investments to Xi, these holdings could potentially be managed indirectly on his behalf.
Publicly available information indicates that corruption cases within the CCP Central Committee involve senior officials who oversee a range of portfolios and projects.
• In 2020, Chinese businessman Zhang Wei was arrested on charges of organizing, leading, and participating in organized crime; illegal detention; and illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. In 2021, he was also convicted of illegally absorbing public deposits.
• Chen Gang, formerly a member of the Party Group of the All-China Federation of Science and Technology Associations
In 2019, he was accused of accepting bribes totaling more than 18 million yuan, at least some of which may have been related to his role overseeing Beijing’s 2008 Olympic construction projects.
• In April 2024, Yao Qian, former director of the Science and Technology Supervision Bureau and Information Center of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), was investigated for “serious violations of discipline and law,” possibly due to his role in China’s central bank digital currency initiative. The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) investigated at least 16 people within the CSRC, six of whom were investigated in 2024.
The anti-corruption campaign targets rampant leadership corruption and has not shied away from purging senior officials within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), including a culture of promotion-for-pay that continues more than a decade after the anti-corruption campaign began. In 2024, Xi Jinping emphasized in a speech to military commanders that “the gun must always be held in the hands of those who are loyal and reliable to the Party,” further highlighting his commitment to and expectation of officials’ loyalty to the Party and the military. His focus on corruption within the PLA may also reflect his concerns that corruption will impede the military’s ability to achieve the capabilities and readiness he has directed for 2027 in preparation for a potential war over Taiwan.
• In 2023, China removed General Li Shangfu as defense minister and investigated him and his predecessor after arresting the commander of the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) and at least nine other current or former PLARF personnel.
• In 2024, Beijing investigated General Miao Hua, director of the PLA’s Political Work Department and responsible for the loyalty of the Chinese military.
• Both Li Shangfu and Miao Hua were accused of violating Party discipline and were considered Xi loyalists, indicating the CCP’s serious concerns about loyalty and efficiency—especially within the PLA—and the scope of the CCP regime’s anti-corruption drive.
Report official website: https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/reports-publications-2025/4056-report-prc-ccp-leadership