Leva：放棄幻想，社會主義制度無法改革

科爾奈是研究蘇聯東歐經濟的權威，也是許成鋼，胡祖六，李稻葵等人的老師，哈佛大學教授。 Kornai was a renowned authority on the Soviet and Eastern European economies, and served as a mentor to scholars like Xu Chenggang, Hu Zuliu, and Li Daokui. He was a professor at Harvard University.

他認為社會主義制度不具備改革的可能性，他在書的開頭就寫道： He believed that the socialist system was inherently unreformable. At the beginning of his book, he wrote:

The system is incapable of stepping away from its own shadow. 這個制度無法逃出自己的陰影。

最後的結局就是走向自我毀滅（the eventual dissolution of the system）。 Its ultimate fate is self-destruction—the eventual dissolution of the system.

社會主義國家之所以從熱情高漲的改革逐漸陷入停滯並無可挽回地走向崩潰，原因自然是多重且複雜的。 The reason why socialist countries moved from enthusiastic reform to stagnation and ultimately to irreversible collapse is naturally complex and multifaceted.

社會主義國家陷入崩潰與社會主義改革的總體思路密切相關：在絕對限定改革的政治前提的情況下，蘇東改革無論如何都無法取得結構性的成效。 The collapse of socialist countries is closely related to the overarching strategy of socialist reform: under strict political limitations, the reforms in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe could never achieve structural success.

不管蘇東改革採取多麼不同的進路，其崩潰的結局都是一樣的。 No matter how different the reform paths were, they all ended in the same collapse.

從比較的視角看蘇東改革，可以分為三種型別： From a comparative perspective, reforms in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe can be categorized into three types:

一是南斯拉夫的強人啟動與內部阻止中斷型； First, the Yugoslav model, where strongmen initiated reforms but they were later blocked and interrupted internally.

二是捷克斯洛伐克、波蘭等國的內部驅動改革與蘇聯的外部強制終止型； Second, countries like Czechoslovakia and Poland, where reforms were internally driven but forcibly terminated by Soviet intervention.

三是蘇聯的內部矛盾驅動與國家反改革力量集結性反對的阻止型。 Third, the Soviet model, where internal contradictions drove reform, but organized anti-reform forces within the state blocked progress.

雖然南斯拉夫的改革可以說是社會主義改革中較為徹底的型別，但總的說來仍然是功能調整型改革。 Although Yugoslavia's reform could be considered one of the most thorough among socialist reforms, it was still fundamentally a functional adjustment.

當這樣的改革遭遇國家結構的基本難題，諸如共產黨的領導地位和國家權力的分權制衡等棘手問題時，便處於束手無策的狀態。 When such reforms encountered core structural issues—such as the leading role of the Communist Party and the lack of checks and balances—they became helpless.

一旦在黨權和國家權力領域引入競爭性機制，國家就呈現崩潰的跡象。 Once competitive mechanisms were introduced into party or state power structures, the nation began to show signs of collapse.

東歐其他社會主義國家也都有改革的內源動力。但與南斯拉夫一樣，改革的政治前提是完全一致的，改革初期都是限定在經濟─管理領域，都是為了顯示社會主義制度的優越性， Other Eastern European socialist countries also had internal motivations for reform. But just like Yugoslavia, the political premise of reform was the same: initially limited to economic and administrative areas, aimed at demonstrating the superiority of the socialist system.

到後來才不得不觸及政治體制問題。 Eventually, they were forced to confront political system issues.

但是，執政黨總是絕對拒絕與其他社會─政治力量分享國家權力。 However, the ruling party always absolutely refused to share power with other socio-political forces.

在不得不觸及這類問題的時候，國內的反對改革集團就和蘇聯勾連在一起，成為葬送改革的強大力量。 When such issues had to be addressed, domestic anti-reform factions would align with the Soviet Union, forming powerful forces that ultimately buried the reforms.

蘇聯自身改革的最初階段也曾有聲有色，但由於改革的前提是執政黨維持專制體制，完全拒絕分享權力，因此經濟體制改革的產權基礎沒有建立起來，經濟績效的提高也就不具有可持續性。 The Soviet Union's own reforms were initially vigorous, but since the precondition was the Party’s continued authoritarian rule and a complete refusal to share power, the reforms failed to establish a foundation of property rights, and the improvement in economic performance was unsustainable.

於是，蘇聯和東歐國家一樣，第一輪改革都在一段時期內提高了經濟績效，但很快就出現經濟停滯； Thus, like Eastern European countries, the Soviet Union’s first round of reforms temporarily boosted performance, but soon led to economic stagnation.

此後再經過一輪改革，以形式上新穎但實質上依舊的一些改革舉措來應對經濟下滑。 Another round of reforms would follow, appearing new in form but remaining the same in substance, attempting to counter economic decline.

所謂的“改革”就在這種迴圈往復中徘徊。一旦觸及政治體制問題，不是立即退守，起碼也是無功而返。 So-called “reforms” fell into this repetitive cycle. Once they touched on political structures, they either immediately retreated or achieved nothing.

造成社會主義國家改革走向崩潰的原因確實非常複雜。 The reasons for the collapse of socialist reforms are indeed very complex.

除上述改革的功能性定位偏離了社會主義國家的結構性問題之外，不少論者曾從宏觀的制度設計和微觀的經濟執行等各個方面，進行過細緻的討論。 Besides the functional nature of reform being misaligned with the structural issues of socialist states, many scholars have examined macro-level institutional design and micro-level economic operations in detail.

但是，人們很少從社會主義國家的總體結構上（common properties）分析蘇東改革歸於失敗並導致國家崩潰的深層次原因。 However, few have analyzed the deeper reasons for the failure of reform and state collapse from the perspective of the common structural properties of socialist countries.

其實，國家結構對於自我調整的內在限定，才是首要原因。 In fact, the internal limitations imposed by state structure on self-adjustment are the primary reason.

從總體結構上講，國家的剛性體制，註定社會主義改革空間的明顯有限性。 Structurally speaking, the rigid state apparatus predetermined the extremely limited space for socialist reform.

從意識形態起源來看，社會主義國家是建立在怨恨倫理基礎上的政治結構構（Political power structure and of communist ideology） From an ideological standpoint, socialist states are political structures built on an ethic of resentment.

這一結構註定難以從仇恨狀態走向合作狀態。 This structure is inherently resistant to transitioning from a state of hostility to one of cooperation.

就如中國憲法中寫明國家的“人民民主專政”政體，“一黨專政、以黨領政”，並明確拒絕分享權力。 As stated in China’s Constitution, the state operates under the “People’s Democratic Dictatorship,” with one-party rule and Party-led governance, explicitly refusing to share power.

而社會主義改革恰恰需要從革命的、怨恨的結構走向後非暴力的、合作的、權力分享結構。 Yet socialist reform inherently requires a transition from a revolutionary and resentful structure to a post-violent, cooperative, power-sharing system.

在這個意義上，“改革”等於點中了社會主義的死穴。 In this sense, “reform” touches socialism’s fatal weak spot.

科爾奈認為： Kornai believed:

reform socialism （改革社會主義）相對於classical socialism（古典社會主義），雖然減少了壓迫，但是隨著改革的深入，會讓社會內部矛盾變得更加尖銳，最後毀滅這個制度。 Compared to classical socialism, reform socialism may reduce oppression, but as reforms deepen, internal social contradictions intensify, eventually leading to the destruction of the system.

聯想到當今中國，面臨的現實困境與前蘇聯一樣，無法回到鄧小平時代，更不能徹底回到毛澤東時代，也不能走向西方的憲政和分權制衡，進退維谷。 Looking at present-day China, the situation mirrors the Soviet Union’s: it cannot return to the Deng Xiaoping era, nor can it fully return to Mao's era, nor can it move toward Western-style constitutionalism and checks and balances. It is caught in a deadlock.

“民族復興”、“中國式現代化”……這些詞彙，都是為了掩蓋改革的無法推進，不得不發明的概念，從而混淆改革的最終目的，凸顯制度困境。 Terms like “national rejuvenation” and “Chinese-style modernization” are invented to obscure the inability to advance reform, muddling the real goals of reform and exposing the institutional deadlock.

沒有分配製度改革，一切改革都是徒勞，而分配製度改革也就是重新分配利益的前提，是重新分配權力即政治體制改革，但中國政治體制改革的視窗早已關閉。 Without reforming the system of distribution, all reforms are in vain. But distributional reform entails reallocation of interests, which in turn requires redistribution of political power—that is, political system reform. Yet the window for political reform in China has long since closed.

這裡引用法國大思想家托克維爾對社會主義的評價，他認為，社會主義就是“新農奴制”。 Here we cite French thinker Alexis de Tocqueville’s evaluation of socialism—he considered it a “new form of serfdom.”

托克維爾在一次演講中說到社會主義： In one of his speeches, Tocqueville remarked on socialism:

......to the point where, were I to attempt to sum up what socialism is, I would say that it was simply a new system of serfdom. ……如果我必須總結社會主義是什麼，我會說它不過是一種新的農奴制度。

請問，農奴制怎麼改革？人類歷史上有把農奴制改造成功的先例嗎？農奴制是不是隻能崩潰而不能改造的？ So, how can serfdom be reformed? Has human history ever witnessed a successful transformation of serfdom? Is it not true that serfdom can only collapse, rather than be reformed?