Leva：放弃幻想，社会主义制度无法改革

科尔奈是研究苏联东欧经济的权威，也是许成钢，胡祖六，李稻葵等人的老师，哈佛大学教授。 Kornai was a renowned authority on the Soviet and Eastern European economies, and served as a mentor to scholars like Xu Chenggang, Hu Zuliu, and Li Daokui. He was a professor at Harvard University.

他认为社会主义制度不具备改革的可能性，他在书的开头就写道： He believed that the socialist system was inherently unreformable. At the beginning of his book, he wrote:

The system is incapable of stepping away from its own shadow. 这个制度无法逃出自己的阴影。

最后的结局就是走向自我毁灭（the eventual dissolution of the system）。 Its ultimate fate is self-destruction—the eventual dissolution of the system.

社会主义国家之所以从热情高涨的改革逐渐陷入停滞并无可挽回地走向崩溃，原因自然是多重且复杂的。 The reason why socialist countries moved from enthusiastic reform to stagnation and ultimately to irreversible collapse is naturally complex and multifaceted.

社会主义国家陷入崩溃与社会主义改革的总体思路密切相关：在绝对限定改革的政治前提的情况下，苏东改革无论如何都无法取得结构性的成效。 The collapse of socialist countries is closely related to the overarching strategy of socialist reform: under strict political limitations, the reforms in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe could never achieve structural success.

不管苏东改革采取多么不同的进路，其崩溃的结局都是一样的。 No matter how different the reform paths were, they all ended in the same collapse.

从比较的视角看苏东改革，可以分为三种类型： From a comparative perspective, reforms in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe can be categorized into three types:

一是南斯拉夫的强人启动与内部阻止中断型； First, the Yugoslav model, where strongmen initiated reforms but they were later blocked and interrupted internally.

二是捷克斯洛伐克、波兰等国的内部驱动改革与苏联的外部强制终止型； Second, countries like Czechoslovakia and Poland, where reforms were internally driven but forcibly terminated by Soviet intervention.

三是苏联的内部矛盾驱动与国家反改革力量集结性反对的阻止型。 Third, the Soviet model, where internal contradictions drove reform, but organized anti-reform forces within the state blocked progress.

虽然南斯拉夫的改革可以说是社会主义改革中较为彻底的类型，但总的说来仍然是功能调整型改革。 Although Yugoslavia's reform could be considered one of the most thorough among socialist reforms, it was still fundamentally a functional adjustment.

当这样的改革遭遇国家结构的基本难题，诸如共产党的领导地位和国家权力的分权制衡等棘手问题时，便处于束手无策的状态。 When such reforms encountered core structural issues—such as the leading role of the Communist Party and the lack of checks and balances—they became helpless.

一旦在党权和国家权力领域引入竞争性机制，国家就呈现崩溃的迹象。 Once competitive mechanisms were introduced into party or state power structures, the nation began to show signs of collapse.

东欧其他社会主义国家也都有改革的内源动力。但与南斯拉夫一样，改革的政治前提是完全一致的，改革初期都是限定在经济─管理领域，都是为了显示社会主义制度的优越性， Other Eastern European socialist countries also had internal motivations for reform. But just like Yugoslavia, the political premise of reform was the same: initially limited to economic and administrative areas, aimed at demonstrating the superiority of the socialist system.

到后来才不得不触及政治体制问题。 Eventually, they were forced to confront political system issues.

但是，执政党总是绝对拒绝与其他社会─政治力量分享国家权力。 However, the ruling party always absolutely refused to share power with other socio-political forces.

在不得不触及这类问题的时候，国内的反对改革集团就和苏联勾连在一起，成为葬送改革的强大力量。 When such issues had to be addressed, domestic anti-reform factions would align with the Soviet Union, forming powerful forces that ultimately buried the reforms.

苏联自身改革的最初阶段也曾有声有色，但由于改革的前提是执政党维持专制体制，完全拒绝分享权力，因此经济体制改革的产权基础没有建立起来，经济绩效的提高也就不具有可持续性。 The Soviet Union's own reforms were initially vigorous, but since the precondition was the Party’s continued authoritarian rule and a complete refusal to share power, the reforms failed to establish a foundation of property rights, and the improvement in economic performance was unsustainable.

于是，苏联和东欧国家一样，第一轮改革都在一段时期内提高了经济绩效，但很快就出现经济停滞； Thus, like Eastern European countries, the Soviet Union’s first round of reforms temporarily boosted performance, but soon led to economic stagnation.

此后再经过一轮改革，以形式上新颖但实质上依旧的一些改革举措来应对经济下滑。 Another round of reforms would follow, appearing new in form but remaining the same in substance, attempting to counter economic decline.

所谓的“改革”就在这种循环往复中徘徊。一旦触及政治体制问题，不是立即退守，起码也是无功而返。 So-called “reforms” fell into this repetitive cycle. Once they touched on political structures, they either immediately retreated or achieved nothing.

造成社会主义国家改革走向崩溃的原因确实非常复杂。 The reasons for the collapse of socialist reforms are indeed very complex.

除上述改革的功能性定位偏离了社会主义国家的结构性问题之外，不少论者曾从宏观的制度设计和微观的经济运行等各个方面，进行过细致的讨论。 Besides the functional nature of reform being misaligned with the structural issues of socialist states, many scholars have examined macro-level institutional design and micro-level economic operations in detail.

但是，人们很少从社会主义国家的总体结构上（common properties）分析苏东改革归于失败并导致国家崩溃的深层次原因。 However, few have analyzed the deeper reasons for the failure of reform and state collapse from the perspective of the common structural properties of socialist countries.

其实，国家结构对于自我调整的内在限定，才是首要原因。 In fact, the internal limitations imposed by state structure on self-adjustment are the primary reason.

从总体结构上讲，国家的刚性体制，注定社会主义改革空间的明显有限性。 Structurally speaking, the rigid state apparatus predetermined the extremely limited space for socialist reform.

从意识形态起源来看，社会主义国家是建立在怨恨伦理基础上的政治结构构（Political power structure and of communist ideology） From an ideological standpoint, socialist states are political structures built on an ethic of resentment.

这一结构注定难以从仇恨状态走向合作状态。 This structure is inherently resistant to transitioning from a state of hostility to one of cooperation.

就如中国宪法中写明国家的“人民民主专政”政体，“一党专政、以党领政”，并明确拒绝分享权力。 As stated in China’s Constitution, the state operates under the “People’s Democratic Dictatorship,” with one-party rule and Party-led governance, explicitly refusing to share power.

而社会主义改革恰恰需要从革命的、怨恨的结构走向后非暴力的、合作的、权力分享结构。 Yet socialist reform inherently requires a transition from a revolutionary and resentful structure to a post-violent, cooperative, power-sharing system.

在这个意义上，“改革”等于点中了社会主义的死穴。 In this sense, “reform” touches socialism’s fatal weak spot.

科尔奈认为： Kornai believed:

reform socialism （改革社会主义）相对于classical socialism（古典社会主义），虽然减少了压迫，但是随着改革的深入，会让社会内部矛盾变得更加尖锐，最后毁灭这个制度。 Compared to classical socialism, reform socialism may reduce oppression, but as reforms deepen, internal social contradictions intensify, eventually leading to the destruction of the system.

联想到当今中国，面临的现实困境与前苏联一样，无法回到邓小平时代，更不能彻底回到毛泽东时代，也不能走向西方的宪政和分权制衡，进退维谷。 Looking at present-day China, the situation mirrors the Soviet Union’s: it cannot return to the Deng Xiaoping era, nor can it fully return to Mao's era, nor can it move toward Western-style constitutionalism and checks and balances. It is caught in a deadlock.

“民族复兴”、“中国式现代化”……这些词汇，都是为了掩盖改革的无法推进，不得不发明的概念，从而混淆改革的最终目的，凸显制度困境。 Terms like “national rejuvenation” and “Chinese-style modernization” are invented to obscure the inability to advance reform, muddling the real goals of reform and exposing the institutional deadlock.

没有分配制度改革，一切改革都是徒劳，而分配制度改革也就是重新分配利益的前提，是重新分配权力即政治体制改革，但中国政治体制改革的窗口早已关闭。 Without reforming the system of distribution, all reforms are in vain. But distributional reform entails reallocation of interests, which in turn requires redistribution of political power—that is, political system reform. Yet the window for political reform in China has long since closed.

这里引用法国大思想家托克维尔对社会主义的评价，他认为，社会主义就是“新农奴制”。 Here we cite French thinker Alexis de Tocqueville’s evaluation of socialism—he considered it a “new form of serfdom.”

托克维尔在一次演讲中说到社会主义： In one of his speeches, Tocqueville remarked on socialism:

......to the point where, were I to attempt to sum up what socialism is, I would say that it was simply a new system of serfdom. ……如果我必须总结社会主义是什么，我会说它不过是一种新的农奴制度。

请问，农奴制怎么改革？人类历史上有把农奴制改造成功的先例吗？农奴制是不是只能崩溃而不能改造的？ So, how can serfdom be reformed? Has human history ever witnessed a successful transformation of serfdom? Is it not true that serfdom can only collapse, rather than be reformed?