張穎婕：困局無解，體制無救——北大副教授直言：中國體制無解，改革迫在眉睫

在美國留學工作十年後，我又回到了熟悉的北京。12年前，我在清華本科畢業後踏上留美讀博之路。如今，我回到隔壁北大任教已經四年多了。十幾年，彈指一揮間。十幾年，竟還都是習天下的共產黨新時代。最深刻的感受，概括下來，無非八個字：困局無解、體制無救。於是提筆，把這些年以來心中積攢的肺腑真言和的學理思考整理成文，與大家分享。

中國國家統計局公佈的中國2024年GDP增長是5%。看到這個數字，很多人都笑了。宏觀層面，當局公佈的經濟指標，是肯定要保的，不知道統計局的康義局長當時壓力會有多大。但關鍵的問題是背後經濟發展的結構是否健康，百姓們看到這個數字後的微觀反應（包括信心與預期等等），這些才是大問題。中微觀層面，各行各業大有百業凋敝、信心暗淡的趨勢，無論是老百姓還是市場主體都對未來前景憂心忡忡。做生意做不成、錢放在村鎮銀行還取不出來，紛紛想往外逃。我身邊的同事，拿到海外永居綠卡的不在少數，很多人都是工作在國內、孩子和資產在國外。就比如，北大一位退休校領導是我們院的教授，退休後常年呆在國外和孩子在一起，偶爾回來跟我們吐槽一下。院長則更不用說，找到機會就往國外跑。

從小在國內長大，後來又到海外讀書工作，因為家庭原因回國…我當然希望自己的國家能富裕起來。只是，歲月曆盡，近些年看到的情況不是越來越好，反而是越來越糟。美國有個學者叫餘茂春，最著名的一句話就是要把中共當局和中國人民分開，還是很有道理。中共當局最擅長的就是畫大餅，為了自身的合法性。更可笑的是，不但畫餅，還不斷“翻烙餅”，朝令夕改的情況數不勝數，正式檔案說廢就廢，毫無信用可言，老百姓自然沒有信心。

例如，前些年一直畫的大餅，是中國式現代化。說的目標裡，有一條最實在的，就是2035年達到中等發達國家水平。據國內同事測算，想達到這個目標，至少每年要保證5%的GDP增長。但保5何其之難！2024年的5，又有多少水分！年終歲末靠預期型集中出口把數字拉上去，泱泱大國竟然要靠進出口來拉動1/3的經濟增長，這是極不正常的事情。更不論這5%背後的經濟結構，實在稱不上“高質量”。中共自己制定的政策目標，時常被人看作笑話。

但其實，但凡學過一點經濟學的都知道，以中國人民的勤勞和智慧，體制機制選對了，達到人均至少兩三萬美元的GDP，不是什麼難事。八十年代一改革開放，否定階級鬥爭，全方位解放社會生產力。歷經三十多年高速發展，到了十八大之後，增速一路從10%到今天的維持5%都困難，原因有很多重。學者們都在討論的房地產經濟模式、經濟自然規律、國際形勢等等，都是真的道理。但根本上，還是經濟基礎與上層建築之間產生了矛盾。上層建築不改革，改革開放釋放的發展紅利也就快到頭了。前任領導人看這個問題看得很清楚，溫家寶的原話是，沒有政治體制改革的成功，經濟體制改革不可能進行到底。

政治體制再不改革，將親手掐死很多原本有益的發展機會！很多人都知道的例子，李克強當年任上，“放任”了微信、共享單車的初期生長，才有了今時今日的平臺經濟、共享經濟的代表性企業。當然，克強總理和這個時代的政治環境格格不入。當今中國的很多事情，是體制機制的黑色幽默，就是，它會親手扼殺掉一些對自身發展有利有益的事情。小到最微觀的每個人，被很多反人性的制度約束著。大到宏觀政策，根本不為主要矛盾服務，而是擰巴著。整個體制如此，經濟社會發展必然遇到瓶頸。

政治體制再不改革，當前和之後一段時間的困局就將無解！2021年夏天，河南那場大暴雨，官方說法是一共造成小几百人的死亡失蹤。事實上，當我們站在鄭州京廣路的隧道，看到路面上漂浮具具屍體時，就知道實際的死亡人數絕對被誇小了十倍不止！這一兩年，社會戾氣愈來愈重，砍人傷人暴力事件頻發。中共當局的一個最大笑話，就是言行完全相反。比如，黨章裡寫的“實事求是、求真務實”，與很多當局的言行完全相悖，老百姓直言，“我們已經看過太多生動的例子，我們現在不好騙了！”

政治體制再不改革，無論如何唱響光明論都是無救的體制！有時候被人問，你們北大的學者能否說幾句公道話，讓上面的人聽到。但事實上，知識分子什麼都做不了。除了一些小修小補的技術性細節，不敢說真話，只能配合著唱響所謂的光明論。高校、科研院所、企業的體制機制也上行下效，浮躁功利、根本沒有長期主義。雖然說上上下下創新的土壤已經基本沒有，但諾大的國家，還是時不時冒出黑諸如神話悟空、Deepseek等零星的高質量創新。只是這種星星之火，在這種體制下，大機率無法燎原。

說這麼多，也沒有什麼解決方案。“問題在經濟，根子在政治”。如果非提方案，大抵是和絕大多數中國老百姓、市場主體、甚至體制內大部分人所期待的一樣，那就是政治體制改革，政治體制改革，政治體制改革！重要的話說三遍！

2025年4月 寫於燕園

作者張穎婕是北大光華管理學院營銷系副教授

The System Is Hopeless Without Political Reform: Voices from Inside China’s Academia

After Ten Years in the U.S., I Returned to Beijing, Only to See a System Beyond Repair Written in April 2025 at Yanyuan (Peking University) By Zhang Yingjie, Associate Professor of Marketing, Guanghua School of Management, Peking University

After studying and working in the United States for ten years, I have returned to the familiar city of Beijing. Twelve years ago, after completing my undergraduate studies at Tsinghua University, I embarked on the journey of pursuing a Ph.D. in the U.S. Now, I’ve been teaching at neighboring Peking University for over four years. A dozen years—gone in the blink of an eye. And yet, all these years have unfolded under the same “New Era” of Xi Jinping’s Communist China.

The most profound feeling I’ve had can be summed up in eight Chinese characters: the deadlock is unsolvable, the system is beyond salvation. So I’ve picked up my pen, hoping to share the heartfelt truths and theoretical reflections I’ve accumulated over these years.

The National Bureau of Statistics of China reported a 5% GDP growth for 2024. When people saw this figure, many simply laughed. At the macro level, economic indicators released by the authorities are bound to be “protected” (i.e., manipulated). One can only imagine the pressure on Kang Yi, the head of the Bureau of Statistics. But the real issue lies in whether the underlying economic structure is healthy and how the public reacts to such figures—their confidence and expectations. Those are the critical questions.

At the micro level, across sectors and industries, there is a widespread sense of stagnation and fading confidence. From ordinary people to market entities, there is deep anxiety about the future. Businesses can’t survive. Some people can’t even withdraw their deposits from local banks. Many are desperate to escape. Among my colleagues, quite a few already hold permanent residency in foreign countries. Many work in China while their children and assets are abroad.

For example, a retired school administrator at Peking University, now a professor in our department, spends most of their time overseas with family. They only occasionally return and share their frustrations with us. As for our dean, it goes without saying—he seizes every opportunity to go abroad.

Having grown up in China and later studied and worked overseas, and now returning for family reasons—I, of course, wish for my country to become prosperous. But after all these years, what I see is not improvement, but deterioration.

A U.S.-based scholar, Miles Yu (Yu Maochun), once famously said that one must distinguish between the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people—a statement I find deeply reasonable. The CCP excels at making empty promises to justify its own legitimacy. Even more ridiculous is that it not only makes empty promises but also keeps flipping them. Policies change overnight. Official documents can be scrapped at will. There is no credibility, and naturally, the public has no confidence.

Take for example the grand promise of "Chinese-style modernization" that has been promoted in recent years. Among its stated goals, the most tangible one is for China to reach the level of a “moderately developed country” by 2035. According to domestic academic estimates, to achieve that, China needs to maintain at least 5% annual GDP growth. But hitting 5% is now extremely difficult! How much of that 5% in 2024 is even real? At the end of the year, the government ramped up exports to artificially inflate the numbers. That a major power must rely on foreign trade to drive a third of its economic growth is, frankly, abnormal. And never mind the quality of that 5%—its structure can hardly be called “high quality.” Even the CCP’s own policy goals have become a public joke.

But anyone with even a basic understanding of economics knows that with the intelligence and diligence of the Chinese people, if the system were well designed, reaching a per capita GDP of $20,000 to $30,000 would not be difficult.

In the 1980s, reforms negated the class struggle narrative and unleashed society’s productive forces. After over 30 years of rapid development, growth started slowing sharply after the 18th National Congress. From 10% to struggling to maintain 5% today—the reasons are manifold. Scholars often cite the real estate model, economic cycles, and international pressures—all of which are valid.

But at the root of it lies the conflict between the economic base and the political superstructure. Without reforming the superstructure, the dividends of reform and opening-up will soon be exhausted.

The former premier, Wen Jiabao, saw this issue clearly. He once said: “Without the success of political reform, it is impossible to fully implement economic reform.”

If the political system is not reformed, many valuable opportunities for development will be strangled to death by its own hand.

Everyone knows the example: during Li Keqiang’s tenure, his relatively “hands-off” approach allowed WeChat and the bike-sharing industry to flourish in their early stages. That gave rise to China’s platform and sharing economies. But Premier Li was always out of sync with the political climate of the time.

Today, many of China’s issues are examples of “black humor” institutional dysfunctions—the system often ends up killing off things that are beneficial to its own growth.

At the micro level, individuals are bound by anti-human regulations. At the macro level, policy direction often ignores the real principal contradictions in society and twists itself into contradictions. Under such a system, economic and social development will inevitably hit bottlenecks.

If political reform does not happen, the current deadlock will remain unsolvable.

Take the example of the massive floods in Henan during the summer of 2021. The official death toll was reported in the low hundreds. But when we stood at the Jingguang Road tunnel in Zhengzhou and saw the floating bodies, we knew the actual number was at least ten times higher.

In the past year or two, social hostility has intensified. Violent stabbings and assaults happen more frequently.

One of the CCP’s greatest ironies is how often its words and deeds contradict each other.

For instance, the Party Charter claims to promote “seeking truth from facts and pragmatic governance,” yet countless government actions are the opposite. Ordinary citizens often say: “We’ve seen too many vivid examples. We’re not that easy to fool anymore.”

Without political reform, no amount of “bright future” rhetoric can save this system.

People often ask: can scholars at Peking University speak some truth to power? The reality is: intellectuals can do nothing. Apart from some minor technical tinkering, we dare not speak the truth. All we can do is go along with the state-sponsored “bright future” narrative.

The institutional structures of universities, research institutes, and enterprises mimic the political hierarchy. They are short-sighted, utilitarian, and lack any long-term vision.

Even though the soil for innovation is essentially gone, a nation of this size still occasionally gives rise to exceptional achievements like Black Myth: Wukong or DeepSeek. But in this system, such sparks of brilliance will almost certainly not be allowed to spread into a wider flame.

I’ve said so much, and yet there is no real solution.

“The problems lie in the economy, but the root is in politics.”

If I were to offer any solution, it would likely be the same as what most Chinese people, businesses, and even many within the system silently hope for:

Political reform, political reform, political reform.

Say it three times—because it’s that important.