弱小者如何戰勝最強大的軍隊——反侵略戰爭的成功要素
之前從歷史層面感性的聊了聊抗俄前景(某些人口中的“獲勝路徑”),但有的朋友想探討這背後的支撐理論,挺好的,強有力的思想吸引強有力的人。不用扯什麼克勞塞維茨或孫子的書袋,我們就從最直觀的角度簡單聊聊:為何弱小者也能打敗這世上最強的軍隊,無論它叫蘇軍還是美軍,以及哪些要素會促成這一點?當然,這個話題有一個大前提:
它得是一場反侵略戰爭。或者嚴謹一點,它至少得是一場有爭議的衝突以至於其中一方認定自己遭受了侵犯。
這個前提很好理解,弱小者一般也不會去侵略別人,侵略的話結果可想而知,無需我們討論。弱小者要戰勝強大的軍隊,一定要藉助反侵略這個槓桿,否則是無效行為。
我們先分別說說對陣雙方:
1,弱小的反抗者通常無法在常規的,正面的衝突中對陣入侵者,所以他們必須轉變衝突的性質以對自己有利,這樣就只有一個選擇:把反抗轉變為低烈度的戰爭但同時又是高烈度的治安戰。
治安戰這個詞並非學術用語,但能很形象的描述這個概念。我再更進一步的打個比方來定位這種烈度,那就是低於一般戰爭,卻遠遠高於普通犯罪。低於很好理解,無非就是打不過就躲,就藏,就跑,儲存實力避其鋒芒。而高於,你可以想象一下蝙蝠俠的哥譚市,沒錯,就是比那種猖獗的犯罪還要可怕的衝突,且針對的目標是軍隊。
無法對抗入侵者軍隊的反抗者,基本都得把衝突拉入到這個層面才有贏的空間。
2,入侵者的軍隊。無論多麼強大的軍隊,請記住,它也只是軍隊,有著自己天然的侷限,它可以打垮敵人的軍隊,但一旦衝突被拖入曠日持久的治安戰中,它就只能破綻百出。
因為治安戰的烈度雖然低於正常戰爭,但卻是一場無限的,超限的衝突,解決它需要很多不同的角色,不同的系統,以及長期綜合的措施。它需要軍隊,更需要警察,醫生,教師……總之,它不再是簡單的戰爭,而成了一項龐大的社會工程,而單靠軍隊,根本不足以承擔這個工作。
歷史上的侵略者通常用兩個辦法來緩解這個問題。
一,進行殖民。把整個社會工程包括本國的忠誠公民,直接搬過來,換血。這個辦法成功率高,但隨著殖民時代的終結,這個辦法不怎麼被使用了,不過俄烏戰爭中,我們可以看到俄羅斯的某些類似作法,比如吸引本國公民去定居,同時把可以被洗腦的烏克蘭兒童送到大後方進行“頭腦殖民”。
二,扶植傀儡。問題是,傀儡政府天然缺乏合法性,同時又被宗主刻意壓制以防威脅自身,所以這類傀儡一旦失去了宗主的駐軍支援,往往容易垮臺,這在歷史上屢見不鮮。
總之,在一場反侵略戰爭中,反抗者就算十分弱小,但只要成功將衝突轉變為治安戰,最終獲勝的機率就不會很低。
而且治安戰所需的資源門檻,往往比你預計的低得多。比如阿富汗對陣蘇聯時,某些反抗領袖由於此前經商,積累了頗豐的身家,當然,這身家拿出來對比國家財政實在算不得什麼,可在當時,即便支撐全阿富汗十幾萬游擊隊的供給,居然一個人的身家就能做到且綽綽有餘。這種極低的門檻,使得反抗的可持續性得到了有效保障。
講到這裡,篇幅有點長了。直接點出此類衝突的成功要素吧:
最主要,最關鍵,絕對不可或缺的要素就是——抵抗意志。
有了這個要素,其它條件才能逐步具備,各種問題才會逐步解決。沒有這個要素,就算本來手中有牌,也會一個個爛在手裡。
侵略者的意志是堅定的,他們為了實現它不惜用最殘酷的手段掃蕩整個國家。
反侵略的一方必須在意志上堅如磐石,且遠遠的壓倒侵略者,使得他們能夠在一場令幾乎所有人都絕望的看不到盡頭的衝突中,依然能緩慢的,堅定的,猶如壓路機一般的前進並碾碎敵人的意志,並鼓舞起全國的反抗精神,使得游擊戰的規模和襲擊頻率不斷發展,逐步奪回整個戰爭的主動權,使得撤軍成為侵略者最後不得不選擇的唯一選項。
除了這個最主要最關鍵的要素,還有其餘一些要素。這裡就只提一個:外援。
維持治安戰運轉需要的資源門檻低,但資源這個東西,當然多多益善。所以,反抗者最好能獲得外援。侵略者在國際上總少不了宿敵,所以爭取敵人的宿敵十分必要。同時外援要有效發揮作用,地理因素也很重要。被入侵的國家最好能與支援自己的國家接壤,這樣不僅方便武器裝備的運輸,也便於戰鬥人員在必要時撤到其它國家休整待戰。
只要具備頑強的抵抗意志,加上其它有利條件,即便強如蘇軍美軍,也很難在一場高烈度的治安戰中最終獲勝。
所以,我們又有什麼理由散佈烏克蘭失敗的情緒,鼓吹各種包頭換面的投降理論呢?
畢竟,烏克蘭的實力和境況,還遠遠沒有到放棄常規戰場轉入治安戰的那一步。
Previously, we discussed the prospects of resisting Russian aggression from a historical and emotional perspective (what some refer to as the "path to victory"). Some friends, however, want to explore the theoretical foundations behind this, which is a great idea—strong ideas attract strong people. There's no need to cite Clausewitz or Sun Tzu; instead, let’s approach this topic in the most straightforward way:
Why can weaker forces defeat the world’s most powerful armies, whether they are called the Soviet Army or the U.S. Army? And what factors contribute to this outcome?
Of course, this discussion is based on a fundamental premise:
It must be a war of resistance against invasion. Or, to be more precise, at least a conflict where one side perceives itself as being invaded.
This premise is easy to understand. Weaker forces generally do not invade others—if they did, the result would be obvious, and there would be no need for discussion. For a weaker force to defeat a stronger army, it must leverage the concept of anti-invasion; otherwise, the effort would be futile.
Now, let’s examine the two opposing sides separately:
1. The Weaker Resistance Forces
Weaker resistance forces typically cannot engage the invading army in conventional, direct confrontations. Thus, they must shift the nature of the conflict in their favor. This leaves them with only one option: transforming resistance into a low-intensity war while forcing the enemy into a high-intensity counterinsurgency operation.
The term "counterinsurgency war" is not an academic term, but it vividly describes this concept. To clarify its intensity, think of it as being lower than a conventional war but far more severe than ordinary crime.
The “lower intensity” aspect is easy to understand—resistance forces cannot win head-on, so they must hide, evade, and retreat to preserve their strength while avoiding direct confrontation.
The “higher intensity” aspect means the conflict is far worse than rampant crime. Imagine Gotham City from Batman—yes, it’s even worse than that, but targeted at the invading army.
Resistance forces that cannot defeat the invading military must escalate the conflict to this level to have any chance of victory.
2. The Invading Army
No matter how powerful an army is, remember: it is still just an army, with inherent limitations. It can defeat opposing military forces, but once a conflict drags into a prolonged counterinsurgency war, the army’s weaknesses become evident.
Counterinsurgency warfare, while lower in intensity than conventional warfare, is an unending, unrestricted conflict. Resolving it requires numerous roles, systems, and long-term, comprehensive measures. It requires not only the military but also police, doctors, teachers… In short, it is no longer simply a war but an enormous social engineering project. And an army alone is insufficient to handle such a task.
Historically, invaders have typically relied on two methods to mitigate this problem:
1. Colonization
This involves relocating loyal citizens from the invading nation, effectively replacing the population. This method has a high success rate but has largely fallen out of use with the end of the colonial era. However, in the Russia-Ukraine war, we see some similar strategies, such as encouraging Russian citizens to settle in occupied territories and sending Ukrainian children to the Russian heartland for "ideological reprogramming."
2. Puppet Governments
The issue with puppet regimes is that they inherently lack legitimacy. Moreover, they are deliberately kept weak by their masters to prevent them from becoming a threat. As a result, once the occupying military withdraws, these puppet governments often collapse—something history has repeatedly demonstrated.
The Path to Victory in an Anti-Invasion War
In an anti-invasion war, even if the resistance forces are weak, as long as they successfully transform the conflict into a counterinsurgency war, their chances of ultimate victory are not low.
Moreover, the resource threshold for sustaining a counterinsurgency war is often much lower than expected. For example, during Afghanistan’s resistance against the Soviet Union, certain resistance leaders had amassed personal wealth from business ventures. While their wealth was negligible compared to a national budget, it was more than sufficient to sustain Afghanistan’s guerrilla forces—numbering in the tens of thousands—without financial strain. This low barrier to entry made sustained resistance feasible.
The Key Factor: Will to Resist
The most crucial, indispensable factor in such conflicts is the will to resist.
With this factor in place, other conditions can gradually be met, and various problems can be overcome. Without it, even a force with strong assets will see them wasted.
Invaders are resolute in their goals and will not hesitate to employ the most brutal methods to suppress an entire nation.
The resistance must be even more resolute—unyielding, unwavering—so that, even in a seemingly hopeless and never-ending conflict, they can steadily advance like a relentless steamroller, grinding down the invaders’ morale. This unwavering spirit must inspire nationwide resistance, allowing guerrilla warfare to expand in scale and frequency until the resistance ultimately seizes the initiative and forces the invader into one inevitable choice: withdrawal.
Additional Factors: Foreign Aid
While the resource demands for a counterinsurgency war are low, more resources are always beneficial. Thus, securing foreign aid is vital.
Invaders often have geopolitical rivals, so enlisting the support of their adversaries is crucial. Geography also plays a key role—if the invaded country shares a border with its supporters, the transportation of weapons and supplies becomes far easier, and fighters can retreat to allied territory for rest and reorganization when needed.
Conclusion
As long as the resistance maintains an unyielding will and secures other advantageous conditions, even formidable armies like the Soviet or U.S. military will struggle to achieve victory in a high-intensity counterinsurgency war.
So, why should we spread pessimism about Ukraine’s prospects or advocate for disguised surrender?
After all, Ukraine’s capabilities and current situation are still far from the point where they would need to abandon conventional warfare in favor of counterinsurgency.