中國的“王牌”與人民的枷鎖——外匯、低工資與人口困局
國家外匯管理局副局長、新聞發言人李斌日前表示，2024年，我國國際收支繼續保持基本平衡。其中，經常賬戶順差4220億美元......
中國政府手裡的外匯儲備，以及維持經常專案順差的能力，就是中國的核心競爭力，就是共產黨手裡的王牌。
中國需要長期維持經常專案順差，中國勞動者的福利就不能太高，中國製造業從業人員10000萬人，農民工佔80%，那麼多貨物貿易順差哪裡來的？就是從他們身上來的。你把最低工資提高一倍試試？出口價格漲20%試試？還能賣出去嗎？
中國的國力，與中國屁民的消費力越來越沒有關係，甚至是負相關。屁民有錢了，就會有更多選擇，就不好管理了。錢都給屁民發福利，政府就會變窮。
【韓非子. 六反】中說，則雖足民，何可以為治也？老百姓有錢了，國家怎麼治理呢？《商君書》則講的更系統：民辱則貴爵，弱則尊官，貧則重賞。……民有私榮，則賤列卑官；富則輕賞。
中國人不窮不弱不蠢不屈辱，沒天理，他們要是富了，要是他們有一天揚眉吐氣了，那制度就垮了。
中國歷史上有為的政治家，都是法家，秦始皇、漢武帝，毛澤東......那個宋仁宗，講權力制衡、君臣共治、讓百姓休養生息的，並未在歷史上留下濃墨重彩，宋朝是屈辱的朝代。
毛主席在人生中最後一首詞中寫道，“祖龍魂死業猶在......百代都行秦政治”，他稱自己為“馬克思+秦始皇”，自稱 “和尚打傘，無法無天”。
漢武帝在位53年，連年征戰，把中國人搞死一半，“竭民財力，奢泰亡度，天下虛耗，百姓流離，物故者半”，卻能青史留名。
未來50年，中國人口還會死（減少）一半。2070年代，中國只有7億多人，這個很容易計算。
2070年代，1990年之前出生的中國人基本死乾淨了，1990年到2024年，大概生出來5億人，2024到2070年，按照現在的生育率暴跌趨勢，中國還能生出來多少人？不是明擺著嗎？
問題是，2070年代這七億多人中，竟然由一半兒是老人，1990-2010年，中國生出來3.8億人，就是2070年代的老人。
中國養那麼多老人幹什麼？不是累贅？90後00後，未來會怎樣，政府現在就替他們規劃好了。
圖片中，是當代中國人給搞死一半兒古代中國人的漢武帝樹起的豐碑。
China’s "Trump Card" and the People's Shackles—Foreign Reserves, Low Wages, and the Population Dilemma
Translated by ChatGPT
Li Bin, Deputy Director and spokesperson of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, recently stated that in 2024, China's international balance of payments will continue to maintain basic equilibrium. The current account surplus amounts to $422 billion…
China’s foreign exchange reserves and its ability to maintain a current account surplus are the core of the country's competitiveness—they are the trump card in the hands of the Communist Party.
For China to maintain a long-term current account surplus, the welfare of Chinese workers cannot be too high. China’s manufacturing workforce numbers around 100 million, with migrant workers making up 80% of that. Where does this massive trade surplus come from? It comes from them. What would happen if you doubled the minimum wage? If export prices increased by 20%? Would Chinese goods still be competitive in the global market?
China's national strength is increasingly disconnected from the purchasing power of its ordinary citizens—in fact, the two are almost inversely related. If the common people have more money, they will have more choices, making them harder to control. If the government spends money on social welfare for the people, then the government itself will become poorer.
As stated in Han Feizi's "Six Counterarguments": "Even if the people are well-off, how can they be governed?" If the common people have money, how can the state govern them? The Book of Lord Shang elaborates on this idea: "If the people are humiliated, nobility is honored; if they are weak, officials are respected; if they are poor, rewards are valued… If the people achieve private wealth and glory, officials are despised; if they are rich, they disregard rewards."
For Chinese people to be neither poor, nor weak, nor ignorant, nor humiliated—it would be against the natural order. If one day they become wealthy and hold their heads high, the system will collapse.
Throughout history, China’s most successful politicians have all followed Legalist principles—Qin Shi Huang, Emperor Wu of Han, Mao Zedong… Take Emperor Renzong of Song, who advocated for power balance, governance through cooperation between ruler and ministers, and allowing the people to rest and recuperate—did he leave a lasting mark on history? No. The Song Dynasty is remembered as an era of national humiliation.
In his final poem before his death, Mao Zedong wrote: "The spirit of the First Emperor lingers on… For a hundred generations, the Qin system endures."
He called himself "Marx + Qin Shi Huang," and described his rule as "a monk holding an umbrella—lawless and unrestrained."
Emperor Wu of Han ruled for 53 years, waged continuous wars, and drove the Chinese population to near collapse. Historical records state that he "exhausted the people's wealth and resources, lived in extreme extravagance, left the land desolate, forced people into exile, and caused half the population to perish." Yet, he is still glorified in history.
Over the next 50 years, China’s population will shrink by half. By the 2070s, China will have only around 700 million people—a simple calculation.
By the 2070s, almost all Chinese people born before 1990 will have died. From 1990 to 2024, around 500 million people were born. How many more will be born between 2024 and 2070, given the current plummeting birth rate? The answer is obvious.
The problem is that, by the 2070s, half of these 700 million people will be elderly. Between 1990 and 2010, China gave birth to 380 million people—they will all be elderly in the 2070s.
What is the point of supporting so many elderly people? Aren’t they just a burden? The post-90s and 00s generations—what does their future hold? The government has already planned it out for them.
The image below shows a monument erected by modern Chinese people to Emperor Wu of Han—the ruler who caused half of ancient China's population to perish.