中国的“王牌”与人民的枷锁——外汇、低工资与人口困局

国家外汇管理局副局长、新闻发言人李斌日前表示，2024年，我国国际收支继续保持基本平衡。其中，经常账户顺差4220亿美元......

中国政府手里的外汇储备，以及维持经常项目顺差的能力，就是中国的核心竞争力，就是共产党手里的王牌。

中国需要长期维持经常项目顺差，中国劳动者的福利就不能太高，中国制造业从业人员10000万人，农民工占80%，那么多货物贸易顺差哪里来的？就是从他们身上来的。你把最低工资提高一倍试试？出口价格涨20%试试？还能卖出去吗？

中国的国力，与中国屁民的消费力越来越没有关系，甚至是负相关。屁民有钱了，就会有更多选择，就不好管理了。钱都给屁民发福利，政府就会变穷。

【韩非子. 六反】中说，则虽足民，何可以为治也？老百姓有钱了，国家怎么治理呢？《商君书》则讲的更系统：民辱则贵爵，弱则尊官，贫则重赏。……民有私荣，则贱列卑官；富则轻赏。

中国人不穷不弱不蠢不屈辱，没天理，他们要是富了，要是他们有一天扬眉吐气了，那制度就垮了。

中国历史上有为的政治家，都是法家，秦始皇、汉武帝，毛泽东......那个宋仁宗，讲权力制衡、君臣共治、让百姓休养生息的，并未在历史上留下浓墨重彩，宋朝是屈辱的朝代。

毛主席在人生中最后一首词中写道，“祖龙魂死业犹在......百代都行秦政治”，他称自己为“马克思+秦始皇”，自称 “和尚打伞，无法无天”。

汉武帝在位53年，连年征战，把中国人搞死一半，“竭民财力，奢泰亡度，天下虛耗，百姓流离，物故者半”，却能青史留名。

未来50年，中国人口还会死（减少）一半。2070年代，中国只有7亿多人，这个很容易计算。

2070年代，1990年之前出生的中国人基本死干净了，1990年到2024年，大概生出来5亿人，2024到2070年，按照现在的生育率暴跌趋势，中国还能生出来多少人？不是明摆着吗？

问题是，2070年代这七亿多人中，竟然由一半儿是老人，1990-2010年，中国生出来3.8亿人，就是2070年代的老人。

中国养那么多老人干什么？不是累赘？90后00后，未来会怎样，政府现在就替他们规划好了。

图片中，是当代中国人给搞死一半儿古代中国人的汉武帝树起的丰碑。

China’s "Trump Card" and the People's Shackles—Foreign Reserves, Low Wages, and the Population Dilemma

Translated by ChatGPT

Li Bin, Deputy Director and spokesperson of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, recently stated that in 2024, China's international balance of payments will continue to maintain basic equilibrium. The current account surplus amounts to $422 billion…

China’s foreign exchange reserves and its ability to maintain a current account surplus are the core of the country's competitiveness—they are the trump card in the hands of the Communist Party.

For China to maintain a long-term current account surplus, the welfare of Chinese workers cannot be too high. China’s manufacturing workforce numbers around 100 million, with migrant workers making up 80% of that. Where does this massive trade surplus come from? It comes from them. What would happen if you doubled the minimum wage? If export prices increased by 20%? Would Chinese goods still be competitive in the global market?

China's national strength is increasingly disconnected from the purchasing power of its ordinary citizens—in fact, the two are almost inversely related. If the common people have more money, they will have more choices, making them harder to control. If the government spends money on social welfare for the people, then the government itself will become poorer.

As stated in Han Feizi's "Six Counterarguments": "Even if the people are well-off, how can they be governed?" If the common people have money, how can the state govern them? The Book of Lord Shang elaborates on this idea: "If the people are humiliated, nobility is honored; if they are weak, officials are respected; if they are poor, rewards are valued… If the people achieve private wealth and glory, officials are despised; if they are rich, they disregard rewards."

For Chinese people to be neither poor, nor weak, nor ignorant, nor humiliated—it would be against the natural order. If one day they become wealthy and hold their heads high, the system will collapse.

Throughout history, China’s most successful politicians have all followed Legalist principles—Qin Shi Huang, Emperor Wu of Han, Mao Zedong… Take Emperor Renzong of Song, who advocated for power balance, governance through cooperation between ruler and ministers, and allowing the people to rest and recuperate—did he leave a lasting mark on history? No. The Song Dynasty is remembered as an era of national humiliation.

In his final poem before his death, Mao Zedong wrote: "The spirit of the First Emperor lingers on… For a hundred generations, the Qin system endures."

He called himself "Marx + Qin Shi Huang," and described his rule as "a monk holding an umbrella—lawless and unrestrained."

Emperor Wu of Han ruled for 53 years, waged continuous wars, and drove the Chinese population to near collapse. Historical records state that he "exhausted the people's wealth and resources, lived in extreme extravagance, left the land desolate, forced people into exile, and caused half the population to perish." Yet, he is still glorified in history.

Over the next 50 years, China’s population will shrink by half. By the 2070s, China will have only around 700 million people—a simple calculation.

By the 2070s, almost all Chinese people born before 1990 will have died. From 1990 to 2024, around 500 million people were born. How many more will be born between 2024 and 2070, given the current plummeting birth rate? The answer is obvious.

The problem is that, by the 2070s, half of these 700 million people will be elderly. Between 1990 and 2010, China gave birth to 380 million people—they will all be elderly in the 2070s.

What is the point of supporting so many elderly people? Aren’t they just a burden? The post-90s and 00s generations—what does their future hold? The government has already planned it out for them.

The image below shows a monument erected by modern Chinese people to Emperor Wu of Han—the ruler who caused half of ancient China's population to perish.